BY SAHIL SINGH AND PRIYASHA PRIYADARSHNI, FOURTH- YEAR STUDENTS AT CNLU, PATNA
INTRODUCTION
The Securities and Exchange Board of India’s (‘SEBI’) recent consultation paper on the SEBI (Issue and Listing of Securitised Debt Instruments and Security Receipts) Regulations, 2008 (‘SDI Regulations’), aims to bring its securitisation regulations in line with the Reserve Bank of India’s (‘RBI’) Master Direction on Securitisation of Standard Assets, 2021. At first glance, the exercise appears sensible, essential, and for good reason. The regulatory differences have been a recurring issue in the past, where some securitisation transactions that meet the RBI criteria are unable to be traded on the listed market. Greater harmonisation will lead to lower costs of compliance, wider market participation and a wider securitisation market.
However, the consultation paper poses a deeper question: can regulatory harmonisation do away with protections that tackle risks specific to investors in securitisation? This piece argues that a few of the suggested amendments are based on an implicit premise that the investor protection mandate of SEBI can be standalone, and RBI supervision can fill the gap. Since many of the same market participants are regulated by both RBI and SEBI, but with different objectives, the proposed changes, therefore, could lead to a decrease in investor protection as they exist only for investors in securitised instruments.
The piece substantiates this claim across three key areas where the consultation paper most visibly substitutes regulatory trust for structural safeguards. It first examines the proposed concentration limit and disclosure shift for single asset securitisation, then turns to the board representation and same group transaction proposals, and finally addresses the removal of winding up as a remedy on trustee replacement. It concludes that harmonisation need not come at the cost of investor protection if the two are recalibrated rather than retreated from.
THE FALSE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AND INVESTOR PROTECTION
A common thread in the consultation paper is that it assumes that some of the safeguards under the SDI Regulations are redundant if the originator is already regulated by the RBI. The rationale behind proposals regarding concentration limits, disclosure requirements, governance requirements, same group transactions and trustee replacement rests squarely on this assumption. However, it ignores the very differing aims of the two regulators.
The objective of the supervisory framework of the RBI is mainly focused on the safety and soundness of the regulated entities and systemic stability. However, unlike the RBI, investor protection and market integrity are the focus of SEBI. While often these objectives are similar, they are not synonymous. Concentration, governance, disclosure and conflict of interest risks may still arise for investors, even in a transaction in which the bank or non-banking financial company has no prudential concerns. Fulfilling RBI requirements, therefore, does not imply compliance with SEBI’s safeguard concerns. The underlying problem in the consultation paper is the idea that regulatory supervision of the originator can take the place of structural protections for the investor in a securitised instrument.
ISSUE OF ACCOUNTABILITY GAP AND CONCENTRATION RISK
The most obvious demonstration of the underlying logic of the consultation paper is the suggestion that no one obligor be more than 25 per cent of a pool in a securitisation. The proposal is aimed at enabling listed single asset securitisations, but it combines two issues. Concentration limits deal with the risk profile of the securitised instrument, while the track-record requirements address an originator’s credibility. While a loan might be a good addition to a bank’s diversified portfolio, it can also be a major risk if it is the only asset on which a securitisation instrument is based. Investors don’t receive the originators’ benefit of diversification, and they are only exposed to the underlying asset.
The problem of concentration risk is not one that is related to the status of the originator, but the makeup of the asset pool. This is consistent with the RBI’s Committee on the Development of Housing Finance Securitisation Market’s Report, which identified pool composition and asset concentration, rather than the originator’s regulatory status, as the key determinants of investor risk in Indian securitisation transactions. The proposal does not reduce the concentration limit and does not add significant safeguards, so there is a risk that it will fail to provide meaningful investor protection and will fall short of providing substantive safeguards.
The same concern comes about in the proposed change to the periodic disclosure requirements to the servicer from the originator. The change is logical from an operational perspective as servicers have access to the latest data on collections, defaults and asset performance. The question is not, however, who is making the disclosures, but who is liable if those disclosures are false. While the consultation paper reiterates that the originator is responsible overall to the investor, there is little clarity about liability, investor remedies or accountability. This concern is compounded by the nature of the framework based on the trustees’ and auditors’ certifications, which provide modestly independent verification. The proposal thus tackles a shortcoming of the system, without resolving issues about liability and investor protection.
For instance, in Jyoti Khemka v. Catalyst Trusteeship Limited and Ors., 2023, the debenture trustee i.e. Catalyst Trusteeship was held liable by the consumer forum for failing to safeguard investors despite the originator Dewan Housing Finance Corporation Limited (‘DHFL’) being RBI-regulated, confirming that prudential oversight of the originator doesn’t resolve who is accountable to the investor when disclosures prove unreliable.
GOVERNANCE INDEPENDENCE AND THE LIMITS OF REGULATORY TRUST
This misplaced reliance on regulatory trust extends to the proposals concerning representation of the board and on the same group securitisation transactions. SEBI suggests that RBI-regulated originators be allowed to have only one representative on the special purpose distinct entity (‘SPDE’) board with no veto powers. This does seem to enhance independence, but influence in corporate governance is not solely based on formal voting rights. An originator’s representative can have a strong influence even if they do not have a veto, since they have informational advantages, authority for agenda-setting, and institutional relationships. In Vishal Ahuja v. SEBI, 2024, the Supreme Court declined to disturb the position established by the Securities Appellate Tribunal, which upheld liability on independent directors for lapses tied to their board committee roles. This suggests that a board seat carries influence independent of veto power and is unlikely to be treated as governance-neutral.
The proposal also introduces an undesirable bifurcation by subjecting RBI-regulated entities to heavier governance controls than non-regulated originators. This distinction is misguided, as the desirability of a governance control should be driven by incentive structure and not by mere regulation.
The idea of allowing securitisation transactions by originators regulated by the RBI on a like-for-like basis is based on a similar assumption. Many restrictions are in place to maintain the concept of arm’s-length dealing by restricting common control transactions. The consultation paper seems to believe that the issues of related-party transactions are adequately managed by the RBI. But it is for this reason that there are structural safeguards when there is a possibility of conflicts of interest, even though all parties are regulated. An originator may also be incentivised to sell assets to the group on terms more favourable to the group, and to transfer these risks to the investors.
These incentives do not go away when there is prudential supervision. Mechanisms like independent trustees, arm’s length pricing and governance separation, however, have been used in the past to tackle agency issues directly and complement the role of regulation. The consultation paper proposes to relax these protections, which could allow the regulator to replace the structural protection with a trust-based approach, but it fails to provide a strong enough rationale for transferring the protection from structure to trust.
INVESTOR PROTECTION AND THE PROBLEM OF TRUSTEE REPLACEMENT
The proposed changes in relation to the replacement of trustees are part of the move to allow for a continuity of transactions. SEBI has come out with a proposal to replace the need for winding up in case of suspension or cancellation of the trustee’s registration with the appointment of another trustee to prevent disruption to the securitisation structures and possible conflict with the RBI’s guidelines on effective buy-backs. The need to replace trustees is often most easily achieved by the appointment of substitute trustees, but the complete removal of winding up is a concern.
RECALIBRATION RATHER THAN RETREAT
The consultation paper is in response to the actual problem due to the difference in the framework of securitisation regimes between the RBI and SEBI. However, there is no need to compromise investor protection when harmonising. A more balanced approach would involve rebalancing existing safeguards in place, rather than replacing them completely; relaxing the concentration limits without removing them, moving the disclosure burden to the same group transaction without removing the liability, reordering the remedies, and prioritising the remedy of replacement of trustees over winding up as a remaining remedy. That approach is founded on the principle that prudential regulation and investor protection are complementary goals and that it is important to maintain both, rather than giving one goal priority over the other.
CONCLUSION
The SEBI consultation paper is in response to a real issue. The lack of convergence in the regulatory frameworks of the RBI and SEBI has resulted in inefficiencies that hinder the development of the Indian listed securitisation market, and integration of the two regulatory frameworks would help in reducing compliance costs, better market participation and ease of access to capital. But there are certain amendments that seem to have the impression that saving is to be achieved through RBI supervision rather than through the framework of SEBI.
This is where the consultation paper loses track because the two types of regulation, prudential and securities, have two different purposes. The primary focus of RBI is to help stabilise the institutions, while SEBI’s primary focus is to protect the investors and the integrity of the market. Harmonisation is desirable but should not be at the expense of protections to address concentration risk, accountability gaps, governance conflicts and investor remedies. Without proper protections, the proposed changes could end up making regulatory alignment a regulatory dilution.










