The Corporate & Commercial Law Society Blog, HNLU

Category: Insolvency Law

  • IBC And The Homebuyers’ Debacle: One Step Forward and Two Steps Back

    IBC And The Homebuyers’ Debacle: One Step Forward and Two Steps Back

    BY srihari gopal and vedant malpani, fourth-year students at GNLU, gandhinagar

    In the latter half of the last decade, the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (‘RERA’) and the Insolvency Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘IBC’) have arguably been the two most revolutionary legislations in India. While IBC replaced a broken system of corporate resolution and restructuring under disparate laws with a comprehensive self-contained code, RERA introduced accountability to the opaque real estate sector, which over the years had gained infamy for its severe delays, irregularities and unfair practices. The legislations also provide for the constitution of two regulatory bodies, i.e. the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (‘IBBI’) and the Real Estate Regulation Authority respectively to protect the interest of the stakeholders. Over the years, RERA and IBC have come to be recognized as complementary legislations. However, their interplay has resulted in significant overlapping issues which cannot be ignored.

    So far, the biggest issue concerning the two legislations has been the result of a recent amendment to the IBC in March 2020 (‘the Amendment’), which has left the homebuyers nearly remediless. This Amendment takes the homebuyers, who were only recently recognized as creditors under the IBC, a step backwards. The amendment’s constitutional validity has been challenged, and on 15th June 2020, the Supreme Court (‘SC’) has ordered the government to respond to the petitioner’s claims.

    Before delving into the issues with this Amendment and the judgement, it would be relevant to briefly touch upon the status of homebuyers under these legislations over the years.

    Position of homebuyers under the IBC before 2018

    Under Section 2(d) of the RERA, a homebuyer is an allottee who acquires a property through sale, transfer or otherwise but does not include a tenant. Before the enactment of RERA, a homebuyer had no remedy against a real estate developer to receive a monetary compensation in case of default and had to resort to the Consumer Protection Act (‘CPA’). Even after enactment of RERA, there were no provisions for a time-bound resolution, which left homebuyers in dire need of an effective, speedy remedy.

    Prior to the 2018 Amendment to the IBC, homebuyers could not file for insolvency of real estate developers as there was no clarity as to the nature of debt owed to a homebuyer. Since the IBC classified debts as either operational or financial in nature, homebuyers, whose transactions were in the nature of a ‘sale and purchase’, did not fall under either categories.

    The issue of classification of homebuyers under IBC resurged  in decisions like Nikhil Mehta v. AMR Infrastructure, where the NCLT Delhi considered that homebuyers could be brought under the definition of financial creditor due to the nature of their transactions having the ‘commercial effects of a borrowing’. Further, in Chitra Sharma v. Union of India, the Supreme Court   attempted to protect the interest of homebuyers by appointing an Advocate on Record to represent their interest in the Committee of Creditors. Nonetheless, courts could only grant limited protection without a change in legislation.

    Further, it became all the more important to resolve this issue, considering that once an insolvency petition is initiated, a moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC is imposed on all legal proceedings, including those under the RERA (essentially leaving homebuyers out of the process). It was in this light that the IBC Amendments of 2018 and 2020 were introduced.

    Issues with the 2020 Amendment: You can have an apple, but you cannot eat it

    Through the 2018 Amendment to the IBC, homebuyers were recognized as financial creditors, with the amount owed to them coming within the definition of a financial debt having the commercial effects of a borrowing. This came as a huge respite to homebuyers, who often made substantial investments into real estate projects, both in terms of loans and EMIs. The Amendment also survived a constitutional challenge in the decision of Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors.

    Due to the extraordinary number of appeals brought forth by real estate developers challenging the 2018 Amendment, another amendment was introduced in 2019 through an ordinance, which was later inserted in the IBC by an amendment in March 2020. It introduced a minimum threshold for initiation of insolvency proceedings against a builder, requiring that an application for corporate insolvency resolution process should not be filed by less than 100 or 10 per cent of all homebuyers in a project, whichever was lesser. It was also stated that the threshold limit had to be complied with within 30 days of the promulgation of the ordinance. This was largely unfair to the homebuyers, as before this Amendment even a single homebuyer, with a claim of Rs.1 lakh or more could move to NCLT against the defaulting developer. The Amendment placed homebuyers in a disadvantaged position as compared to other financial creditors who were not subject to such a requirement. The constitutionality of this Amendment was challenged before the Supreme Court in the case of Manish Kumar v. Union of India & Anr. At present, the matter is sub-judice.

    In this case, homebuyers have challenged the Amendment claiming that it has rendered them remediless under the IBC. They further contended that the Amendment is unfair, arbitrary and in violation to Article 14 and 21 of the Indian Constitution due to unequal treatment of similarly placed creditors. Interestingly, the idea of a similar threshold was already rejected by the Supreme Court in the Pioneer case, which makes it all the more confusing as to why the amendment was introduced in the first place. The SC, in this case, stated that the objective of keeping the threshold limit at Rs. 1 lakh was to specifically enable small financial creditors (homebuyers) to trigger the Code just like other similarly placed financial creditors such as banks and financial institutions to whom crores of money may be due.

    The threshold requirement has been subjected to critique in several other instances. Mr. T.K. Rangarajan, a Rajya Sabha MP and a member of the Standing Committee of Finance, had written a letter to the chairman of the Committee citing his concerns with the minimum threshold requirement. In his report, he alleged that (a) the legislature has been influenced by a strong lobby of builders in introducing the Amendment, (b) it is unfair to homebuyers, having individual claims of more than the minimum threshold of Rs. 1 lakh (now Rs. 1 crore), as unlike other operational and financial creditors, they cannot file an proceed against defaulting builders without fulfilling the minimum threshold requirement, (c) it is unreasonable to expect the homebuyers to unite for the purposes of an application when they are unaware of each other in most cases, and (d) there is no such requirement placed on other similarly placed financial Creditors, such as creditors who are a part of a joint lenders scheme.

    The Insolvency Law Committee released a report in February, 2020 in an attempt to justify the threshold. The primary reasons stated were that (i) the threshold was imposed so that an application is filed only in the collective interest of the homebuyers (ii) even if an application under the IBC fails for want of the threshold, alternative remedies under RERA are still available, (iii) undue pressure will be exerted on the corporate debtor for even ‘minor disputes’ without the threshold and (iv) RERA disputes are heavily contentious, and this will be a set-back on the time-bound RERA process.

    None of these reasons justifies the requirement. Undermining claims of single homebuyers as ‘minor issues’ irrespective of the claim they are owed is unfair and arbitrary, considering that homebuyers often invest their life savings or incur significant debt in real estate purchases. In fact, the requirement of the minimum threshold will only make the disputes more contentious, considering that homebuyers, with their limited resources, now have to not only gather information about other homebuyers by themselves but also consolidate their individual claims to file the insolvency application, all within a span of 30 days. Further, as discussed above, though the remedies in RERA and the IBC are concurrent, IBC provides the more time-bound and efficacious solution. Therefore, the mere existence of another remedy is no excuse to limit homebuyers’ rights under the IBC.

    Conclusion

    The ailing real estate sector has been drastically hit due to the pandemic. Many experts from the industry have shown concern about the severe reduction in demand in the housing sector. It is also forecasted that homebuyers are among the ones who are going to be the most affected, as real estate constructions have come to a standstill due to the nationwide lockdown imposed by the Government. With the subsequent costs being expected to exponentially increase, it can be reasonably expected that the number of cases relating to insolvencies in the real estate sector will also rise considerably once the IBC comes back into force. This makes it all the more important to provide expansive protections to homebuyers.

    We believe that the current amendment leaves homebuyers without any effective recourse under the IBC. Corporate debtors are already protected against bogus applications through the new increased thresholds under Section 4 of the IBC. The amendment is therefore nothing but an unnecessary obstacle. However, in case the amendment is found to be constitutional, the RERA should be amended to devise a mechanism for homebuyers to be aware of other homebuyers involved in the project. However, the legislature should primarily consider repealing the amendment completely, considering that the Supreme Court had already struck down the idea of such thresholds before.

  • While IBC Takes a Nap, Could Scheme of Arrangement Rise to the Occasion?

    While IBC Takes a Nap, Could Scheme of Arrangement Rise to the Occasion?

    By Harsh Kumra and Divyanshi SrivastavA, fourth-year students at amity law school, Delhi

    The ongoing pandemic has resulted in a situation that the world has never seen before. While its cause is still unknown to us, its effect is not. Reports suggest that the global economy was undergoing turbulence since 2019, and now, in the wake of COVID-19, the risk of global recession is high.

    To this end, the Indian government has taken a number of policy reforms to limit the economic impact of this pandemic. One of the key reforms has been to put Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘IBC’) in abeyance via the IBC (Amendment) Ordinance, 2020, by suspending Sections 7, 9 and 10 for a period of six months to one year. Given such circumstances, it is only obvious that the companies will need an alternative to restructure their debts and make their way out of the distress.

    Debt restructuring laws have been in existence for more than a century now. In this respect, Section 230 of the Companies Act, 2013 (‘Act’) prescribes for a scheme of arrangement (‘SOA’) or compromise between the company and its creditors or between the company and its members. This provision was part of its preceding Acts of 1913 and 1956 as well; however, the process failed to meet the crucial requirements of a rescue mechanism, as it was a protracted procedure, too expensive and complicated to be effective where speed and urgency were required.1

    Resultantly, to address these problems and to change the regime of insolvency laws, IBC was enacted in the year 2016. Although it superseded the debt recovery mechanism under the Companies Act, it is essential to keep in mind that Section 230 still remains an important tool in the hands of companies, its creditors and other members.

    Interplay-Section 230 and IBC

    The primary focus of IBC – a beneficial legislation, since its birth, has been to revive and continue the corporate debtor,2 and therefore, during the suspension of certain provisions of the Code, its alternative mechanisms ought to achieve the same objective.

    The Hon’ble NCLAT, in a number of cases such as S.C. Sekaran v. Amit Gupta, directed the liquidator appointed under the IBC, to take steps in terms of Section 230 of the Act for the revival of the corporate debtor before proceeding with the liquidation of the company.

    Further, in the case of Y. Shivram Prasad v. S. Dhanpal, the Hon’ble NCLAT held that the SOA should be in consonance with the statement and object of IBC. Further, it was highlighted that the Adjudicating Authority can play a dual role, one as an Adjudicating Authority in the matter of liquidation and the other, as a Tribunal for passing orders under Section 230 of the Act.

    Key Differences

    To understand the utility of Section 230 during the suspension of IBC, it is important to understand the key differences between the two mechanisms.  SOA, being one of the oldest and worldly renowned debt recovery mechanisms, has primarily been used in large and complex transactions. It is an important tool at the behest of a company, while on the other hand, IBC is a creditor driven process. Wherein Section 230 can be used both in cases of solvent and insolvent companies, Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (‘CIRP’) under IBC can be triggered only when there is a debt and subsequently a default of the same.

    Firstly, IBC provides that the Adjudicating Authority shall declare a moratorium after admitting an application under Sections 7, 9 or 10. Where, Section 14 of the IBC highlights moratorium as mandatory, automatic and of wide nature, the structure under Section 230 of the Act, excludes any moratorium provision. Although, under its erstwhile Act of 1956, Section 391(6) provided for a court discretionary moratorium but even so, its ambit was not as wide as that under the IBC. Nevertheless, the NCLT has inherent powers under Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules, 2016 to make such orders as may be necessary for meeting the ends of justice. This means that the NCLT may impose a moratorium to give proper effect to the Section 230 mechanism. In the case of NIU Pulp and Paper Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s. Roxcel Trading GMBH, the Hon’ble NCLAT on the basis of its reasoning that “the Tribunal can make any such order as may be necessary for meeting the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process or the Tribunal,” stated that the NCLT has inherent powers to impose moratorium even before the start of CIRP.

    Secondly, under the IBC, Financial Creditors play a significant role throughout the CIRP and in approving the resolution plan. The committee of creditors comprises only of financial creditors and it is only after a resolution plan gets 66% votes that it gets approved.  On the other hand, SOA incorporates a more inclusive approach, where, Section 230(6) requires consent of every class of creditors, wherein each class is required to approve the scheme separately by the requisite majority of 75%.

    Thirdly, as to who can propose the schemes, as per Section 230 of the Act, the liquidator, a creditor, or class of creditors, or a member, or class of members can propose a scheme. Further, once the scheme gets the sanction of the court, it becomes binding on the company and all its members, even those who voted against the scheme (Re: ITW SignodgeIndia Ltd.). Under the IBC on the other hand, a resolution applicant can submit a resolution plan, for the insolvency resolution of the corporate debtor.

    In this respect, Section 29A was introduced by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2017 to make certain persons ineligible to submit a resolution plan. Consequently, a promoter of the corporate debtor is barred from being a resolution applicant. However there is no such restriction on persons proposing a scheme of compromise or arrangement, resulting to ample amount of debate on the question of applicability of Section 29A of the IBC on SOA.

    Though NCLAT had given two contradicting decisions in respect of applicability of Section 29A to SOA, (R. Anil Bafna v. Madhu Desikan; Jindal Steel and Power Limited v. Arun Kumar Jagatramka) the debate was settled in January, 2020, through the amendment made to Regulation 2B of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016. A proviso was added to the effect that a person ineligible under Section 29A shall not be a party to a compromise or arrangement under Section 230 of the Act.

    Fourthly, where, under the IBC, once a company is liquidated, Section 53 prescribes a ‘waterfall mechanism’ according to which the proceeds from the sale of liquidation assets of the company are distributed in the prescribed order. It must be noted that the same is not applicable to SOA. It follows a different approach in terms of distribution of proceeds. There is no straitjacket formula under the Act for this distribution, however it is upon the court to check if the distribution is fair and equitable and that creditors have been treated on an equal footing (Re: Spartek Ceramics India Ltd.).

    Lastly, Section 31 of the IBC has circumscribed the judicial review by NCLT only to the approved resolution plans. The scope of judicial interference is restricted to the assessment of factors under Section 30(2), which requires the plan to conform to the prescribed criteria. Further, in Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta, the Supreme Court clarified that the commercial decisions taken by the Committee of Creditors are outside the scope of judicial interference. 

    Contrary to this, the NCLT has wide powers in terms of SOA. The scheme can be made binding on the creditors only after it receives the sanction of the court. In the cases of Miheer H. Mafatlal v. Mafatlal Industries Ltd. & Re: Spartek Ceramics India Ltd., it was held that the court has extensive powers to see if the scheme is just and reasonable.

    The way forward

    The Indian judiciary and the legislature have played an important role in appreciating the IBC. If appropriate steps are not taken at this moment, then all the hard work done over the years can go in vain. SOA has been a well-known restructuring instrument globally, and with IBC under suspension, making proper use of Section 230 would undoubtedly be necessary.

    Although, the process of SOA varies from the process given under IBC, with the incorporation of key changes in the provision, it can certainly create an IBC like outcome. This provision within the Act being a more collective process and predicated upon the “debtor-in-possession” regime, would also provide the creditors, the opportunity to work with the already existing management of the company.

    However, the process also being more complicated in terms of creditor approval would require certain relaxations and/ or alterations in that respect. In such a case, an important alteration within the schemes would be the introduction of an automatic interim moratorium, like that under IBC, to provide a relaxation period to the company. This interim moratorium could be further confirmed by the NCLT once the tribunal is satisfied with the schemes brought in.  Moreover, since SOA is by and large a judicially driven process; efforts must be made, to make it more voluntary in nature, as this will help in solving the issues of prolonged delay that has often been witnessed and will also reduce the burden on judiciary.

    Additionally, this is also the right time to introduce some basic tweaks in Section 29A of the IBC, such as adopting a middle ground, wherein, the promoter could be permitted to bid for the corporate debtor but with sufficient safeguards that also protect the interests of the creditors.

    These changes can play a significant role in the debt restructuring mechanism and in the revival of Section 230 of the Act, making it a viable alternative to IBC.

  • UK Parallel to India: Inspiration for Improvement in Insolvency Laws

    UK Parallel to India: Inspiration for Improvement in Insolvency Laws

    BY Pallavi Mishra, A FOURTH-YEAR STUDENT AT HNLU, RAIPUR

    Amidst the Covid-19 pandemic, companies have been facing an increased threat of undergoing an insolvency resolution process due to the default in repayment of loans as well as failure to abide by other statutory demands for many consecutive months now. In light of this, governments throughout the world have introduced changes in their insolvency laws to relieve companies from the stress of liquidation. The author in this article lays down the key measures taken by the United Kingdom (‘UK’) government, parallel to the status in India. It suggests the need to introduce long-term changes in the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code which extends beyond the Covid-19 situation.

    UK Regime:

    To overcome the hue and cry surrounding t the UK Government has recently enacted the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill as a recovery attempt for the survival of the companies which in turn, directly impacts the employment market. This approach towards a debtor-friendly regime consists of both temporary and permanent measures.

    1. Autonomous moratorium period

    The bill proposes an autonomous moratorium period, which gets triggered not only upon the initiation of the insolvency process but also before such formal commencement. This will provide space for giving effect to the restructuring proposals which a corporate debtor may find feasible for getting new credit influx into the company. The intent behind this is to give a ‘break’ to the company from the continuous piling of monthly loans leading to an increment in the claims of the creditors. As of now, 20 days of initial moratorium has been suggested which may be extended further for another 20 days by the management of the company. The directors shall remain in control of the company during this period. However, similar to an administrator, a qualified insolvency practitioner shall be appointed as the ‘monitor’ to overlook the entire process.  While this provision gives relaxation to the loans incurred prior to the moratorium, the loans incurred during the moratorium shall remain payable after 20 days, or such extension as granted.

    1. Cross-clam down provision

    Further, the bill seeks to introduce cross-class clam down provision. This provision has its origin from Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code. In the simplest sense, it allows for the implementation of a restructuring plan despite the fact that some creditors may have expressed dissent against the provision. The provision has been meticulously enacted – the proposal for restructuring has to be submitted before the court. The court shall then direct the convening of a meeting of creditors who will vote on the plan. The threshold for approval of the plan has been kept at 75% and binding on both secured and unsecured creditors. The court will assess the alternatives, and the reasons for dissent, and may “clam-down” the dissenting votes if it is seen that the creditors may not be worse-off than if such restructuring plan was not approved. The restructuring plan must provide a “better alternative” than the option of liquidation or insolvency for every class of creditors.

    1. Demands for winding up petitions

    If any petition for winding up of a company was filed between the months of April and June (“relevant period”), pursuant to the non-fulfillment of statutory demands, such petitions shall not be given effect. It will be deemed that the corporate debtor underwent financial stress due to the Covid-19 pandemic, resulting in failure of its obligations under the statute. However, this has not been imposed as a blanket ban; meaning that if a creditor is able to rely on the balance sheets, accounts as well as the prior records to show that the company would have still undergone the insolvency process irrespective of the Covid-19 pandemic, then such winding-up petitions shall be entertained by the court as prescribed. This has been introduced as a temporary measure.

    1. Relaxation on the personal liability of directors

    The threats of personal liability on a director arising from indulgence in any wrongful trading have also been relaxed.  This is a temporary measure curbing the rights of the liquidators to take any action against the directors who continued to trade during the relevant period despite the director’s knowledge of the company’s position with respect to its future prospects. The intent is to reduce the personal liability of the directors if later the company is to face liquidation due to any liability resulting within the relevant period. However, the directors will continue to have a deemed responsibility to act in the best interests of the company. Provisions with respect to fraudulent trading and preferential transactions shall also continue to have an effect.

    Indian Regime

    While the above provisions have been introduced in the UK, parallel to these, India too has enacted an array of amendments including the promulgation of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2020. The main changes include suspension on filing of insolvency proceedings for a year as well as raise in the threshold of default to Rs. 1 Crore. While this announcement has come as a rescue call for the corporate borrowers, the creditors, lenders and guarantors will definitely have to find other solutions to overcome the delay in loan repayment. The author believes that the insolvency regime in India requires long term changes not just limited to the effects of the present circumstances.

    This quest for an alternative is also essential to reduce the backlog of cases and burden upon the Adjudicating Authority once the abeyance of the IBC is over.

    1. Pre-Packaged Insolvency Resolution Process

    To this effect, the author believes that an alternate as well as a complementary  mechanism to the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (‘CIRP‘) is a Pre-Packaged Insolvency Resolution Process (‘PPIRP‘) which allows for a similar outcome while leading to the achievement in a much cost-effective, simplified and a shortened manner.

    A unique benefit of the PPIRP is that it allows for a pre-planned arrangement of assets with an objective of relieving stress upon the company much before the default has actually accrued. In fact, in some jurisdictions, the company is allowed to manage its operations throughout this process and even after the default has occurred.

    The implementation of the IBC, though has shown positive results, has not particularly led to a smooth process for approval of the resolution plans. As of January 31, 2020, 3455 cases were admitted under the CIRP. Of these, only 265 could get a resolution plan approved, while 826 of them went into liquidation.  In 2019, the World Bank had put India at 52nd position in resolving insolvency in the Ease of Doing Business rankings and overall 63rd position in the Ease of Doing Business report of 2020. As far as recovery is concerned, India stands at 5%, compared to an average of 20% in the developed economies.

    Within the corporate arena, liquidation poses a major threat to any company but unfortunately is the automatic result arising out of a failure of the CIRP. To combat this issue, the PPIRP provides an additional level of protection to the corporate debtors. It is proposed that the PPIRP be introduced in a manner wherein the creditors are mandated to initiate it first. Only upon its failure should they proceed for filing of the CIRP before the Adjudicating Authority. This will allow for a caveat to introduce important changes to the plan in case it fails to get adequate votes or approval by the Adjudicating Authority at the PPIRP stage. It will also stand as a safeguard against liquidation especially in the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) wherein there is an acute paucity of investors and liquidation in fact poses a major concern. Another incentive for the creditors to indulge in a PPIRP rather than the traditional CIRP is to avoid the usual media coverage, defamation and elongated harm which is caused to the reputation of the company in a CIRP.

    A PPIRP is a viable option even through the eyes of company law as it gives a negotiating table for the formulation of lucrative proposals to the creditors and the corporate debtor. Most importantly, this out-of-court mechanism may be considered to be a “peaceful method of settling the dispute.”

    1. Other alternatives to suspension of the IBC

    The Government has inserted Section 10A prohibiting the commencement of CIRP for the defaults made by the company post March 25, 2020 for up to a year. This provision lacks enough criteria to determine which companies have actually defaulted in their payments due to Covid-19. The provision may be misused by willful defaulters in the absence of guidelines to differentiate companies who defaulted during that period but not as a result of the pandemic.

    Conclusion

    By now, it is definitely understood that the effects of the pandemic will have a huge impact on the economy and employment sector. Keeping this in view, the Government should take steps forward to enact permanent measures which will serve as a balanced approach between the creditors and the corporate debtors in the long run. PPIRP, clear categorisation of companies facing financial distress, need to introduce alternatives to suspension of the CIRP are some of the inspiration points from the UK Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill.

  • Dissecting ‘Dispute’ and ‘Reference to Arbitration’ under Section 7 of IBC

    Dissecting ‘Dispute’ and ‘Reference to Arbitration’ under Section 7 of IBC

    By Shubham Kumar, a Fourth-Year Student at HNLU, Raipur

    In Innoventive Industries Ltd. v/s ICICI Bank the Hon’ble Supreme Court has provided the scheme of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”) with respect to a section 7 application. An application u/s 7 can be filed on the occurrence of a default and ascertainment of the same through records of the information utility or other evidence produced by the corporate debtor. Contrasting the scheme of section 7 with section 9, it was also held that a dispute regarding debt is of no relevance until it is “due”. Therefore, if the Adjudicating Authority is satisfied with the existence of the financial debt and the default, it will admit the application u/s 7(5)(a).

    Thus, a pre-existing dispute between the corporate debtor and financial creditor had no relevance for deciding a Section 7 application until the recent order of the National Company Law Tribunal (“NCLT“) Mumbai in Kotak India Venture Fund-I v/s Indus Biotech Private Limited.

    ‘Dispute’ in terms of section 7 and section 9

    According to section 5(6) of IBC ‘dispute’ includes a suit or arbitration proceedings relating to:

    • the existence of the amount of debt;
    • the quality of goods and services; and
    • the breach of representation or warranty.

    A corporate debtor may bring to the notice of the operational creditor, any pre-existing dispute between the parties. The application u/s 9 can be accepted only in the absence of a pre-existing dispute between the parties prior to the date of demand notice. The dispute can be related to an arbitration award in relation to a pre-existing dispute challenged by the parties or a dispute in relation to the amount claimed pending before an arbitral tribunal etc.

    The Supreme Court in Mobilox Innovations v/s Kirusa Software held that the Adjudicating Authority has to be satisfied only to the extent that there exists a bona fide dispute between the parties. The court is not concerned with the outcome of the dispute.

    However, while adjudicating upon an application u/s 7 the NCLT is not required to look into any pre-existing dispute between the parties. Overturning a decision of the Hon’ble NCLT, Chennai Bench where a section 7 application was dismissed on the grounds of a pre-existing dispute between parties and pendency of civil suit between them, the Hon’ble National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (“NCLAT“) in Vinayaka Exports and another v/s. M/s. Colorhome Developers Pvt. Ltd observed that only if an application is filed by an operational creditor, can the corporate debtor raise the defence of a pre-existing dispute.

    Kotak Case: A Pandora’s box to section 7?

    In the Kotak case, Kotak Private Equity Group (“Financial Creditor“) filed a section 7 application against Indus Biotech Private Limited (“Corporate Debtor”) for the failure to redeem Optionally Convertible Redeemable Preference Shares (“OCRPS“) amounting to Rs. 367,07,50,000 crores. The Corporate Debtor contested the claim of the Financial Creditor questioning its right to redeem such OCRPS when it had participated in the process of conversion of OCRPS into equity shares, including disputes raised regarding the valuation of Financial Creditor’s OCRPS and fixing of the QIPO date. The Corporate Debtor prayed before the Hon’ble NCLT to refer the parties to arbitration pursuant to Article 20.4 of the share subscription and shareholders agreement which contained an arbitration clause for resolving disputes between the parties.

    The Hon’ble NCLT held that since there exists an arbitration clause and the dispute is capable of being arbitrated, the section 7 application cannot be admitted. The said decision of the NCLT raises three-fold concerns: firstly, with regard to the NCLTs’ power to refer a dispute to arbitration in a section 7 application, secondly, the overriding effect of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”) over IBC and lastly, the scope for raising a dispute in an application under Section 7.

    • NCLTs’ power to refer to arbitration in a Section 7 application

    In Swiss Ribbon v/s Union of India the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the Adjudicating Authority under IBC can exercise inherent powers given under Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules, 2016 which states that the NCLT has inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary for meeting ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of the court. The inherent powers under Rule 11 are similar to the inherent power of the Company Law Board (“CLB”) under Regulation 44 which in turn is similar to the powers of the civil court u/s 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1909. In Union of India v. Paras Laminates (P.) Ltd. the Supreme Court has categorically held that tribunals function as court and being a judicial body, it has all those incidental and ancillary powers which are necessary to make fully effective the express grant of statutory power.

    Further, the Hon’ble NCLAT in Thota Gurunath Reddy & Ors. v/s. Continental Hospitals Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. has held that: “…it is clear that under Section 420 of the Companies Act, 2013, the National Company Law Tribunal passes an order as a ‘Tribunal’, whereas under the provisions of Section 7 or Section 9 or Section 10 or sub-section (5) of Section 60, the same very Tribunal passes an order as an ‘Adjudicating Authority’ and the same Tribunal in the capacity of ‘judicial authority’ passes order under Section 8 or Section 45 of the Arbitration Act, 1996. As the Tribunal is empowered to pass orders in different capacities under different provisions of the Act…”

    Therefore, while adjudicating upon an application u/s 7 of IBC, the NCLT ought to discharge its duty as a judicial authority, hence a reference to arbitration is not bad in law. While adjudicating an application u/s 7 or 9, the Adjudicating Authority is competent to decide upon a section 8 application under the Arbitration Act.

    • Over-riding effect of Arbitration Act over IBC

    Section 238 of IBC provides overriding effect to IBC compared to any other law for the time being in force. Section 5 of the Arbitration Act also provides for a non-obstante clause. The rules of statutory interpretation state that in case of an inconsistency arising between two special legislations, the latter enacted legislation will have an overriding effect on the previously enacted legislation. However, this is not the rule of thumb. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India and Ors. v/s D.J.Bahadur & Ors. laid down that a statute can be treated as special legislation vis-à-vis one legislation but there may be situations where the special statute will be treated as a general statute vis-à-vis another special statute. The categorisation of special or general depends on the specific problem, the topic for decision and other criteria.

    Providing a blanket overriding effect of IBC over all previous legislative enactments means going against the principles of statutory interpretation. The anatomy of the IBC is such that it does not deal with the determination of disputes and nor does it concern itself with fact-finding. The alpha and omega of IBC is to consolidate and amend the laws relating to reorganization and insolvency resolution of corporate persons, partnership firms and individuals in a time-bound manner for maximization of value of assets of such persons, to promote entrepreneurship, availability of credit and balance the interests of all the stakeholders.  In contrast, the Arbitration Act is a complete code for resolution of disputes. The object of the code is to provide speedy resolution of disputes between the parties. Determination of rights and obligations is thus, not within the purview of IBC. Therefore, in an issue related to determination of rights and obligations, the IBC vis-à-vis Arbitration Act, would be considered as a general statute and should have no overriding effect. 

    • Scope for raising a ‘dispute’ in Section 7

    The Innoventive Industries Ltd. case itself leaves scope for raising a dispute under Section 7 of IBC. It states that where the debt is not payable in law or in fact, a section 7 application cannot be admitted. The Hon’ble NCLT in Carnoustie Management (P.) Ltd. v/s CBS International Projects (P.) Ltd. has rightly pointed out that where the loan is itself disputed, the NCLT in a summary proceeding cannot adjudicate upon the existence of the loan, and such questions shall be decided by the competent forum. In other words, the statute mandates the NCLT to ascertain and record satisfaction as to the occurrence of default, and not go into the question of rights of the financial creditor or the corporate debtor.

    Conclusion

    Section 7 of IBC allows NCLT to admit an application on proof of debt and default but it is silent on the aspect where the debt which is being shown as default, is itself disputed. The IBC does not intend to provide a recovery forum to the creditors and should be used only when there exists a debt and default which can be ascertained by the adjudicating authority through summary adjudication. The process should not be used in a manner to threaten corporate debtors and a question of creditors right to claim the amount as debt, when disputed, should be adjudicated upon by a civil court or through arbitration.