The Corporate & Commercial Law Society Blog, HNLU

Tag: CIRP

  • The CCI’s Nod for Resolution Plans: The 2025 Amendment Strikes the Right Note

    The CCI’s Nod for Resolution Plans: The 2025 Amendment Strikes the Right Note

    BY VAISHNAV M, THIRD- YEAR STUDENT AT NUALS, KERALA

    INTRODUCTION

    The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘IBC’) ensconces a mechanism known as the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (‘CIRP’) that attempts to revive the Corporate Debtor (‘CD’) through restructuring and strategic resolution of debts. With the CD managed by a Resolution Professional (‘RP’), the Resolution Applicants (‘RA’) can propose restructuring plans to resolve debts and sustain the CD as a going concern.

    Where the plan involves acquisition, merger or amalgamation (collectively, ‘Combination’), it is important that the restructuring does not distort the competition in the market. This is where merger control and the Competition Commission of India (‘CCI’) step in. The Supreme Court in Independent Sugar Corporation Ltd. v. Girish Sriram & Ors (‘ISC’)dealt with the procedure to seek the CCI’s approval for combination during the insolvency process.

    The piece is not a general comment on the decision; instead, it aims to examine a particular point in the judgement that has not received the critical attention it deserves. That is, the particular stage at which the CCI-nod for the combination is to be obtained. This question is especially pertinent in the context of the recently introduced IBC (Amendment) Bill, 2025 (‘2025 Amendment’), which proposes to relax the timeline for the CCI’s approval for resolution plans.

    THE ISC CASE AND THE STATUS QUO

    In the ISC case, one of the RAs challenged the CIRP, citing many procedural laxities. One of the grounds was failure to seek approval of the CCI before placing the resolution plan before the Committee of Creditors (‘CoC’) for voting. According to Section 31(4) of the IBC, an RA has one year from the approval of the Adjudicating Authority (‘AA’) to obtain necessary clearances under other laws. But the proviso clarifies that the approval of the CCI for the combination is to be obtained before the approval of the CoC.

    Hitherto, the position was that this proviso is directory and not mandatory in nature, as laid down by the decision of the National Company Law Tribunal (‘NCLAT’) in Arcellor Mittal v Abhijit Guhakartha & Ors. The Supreme Court (‘SC’), in the ISC case, reversed the position by holding that the proviso is to be read literally, and treating it otherwise would render it obsolete. However, the proviso does not specify who seeks approval and at what stage before the CoC nod. In the scheme of CIRP, the stages preceding the CoC approval are:

    • Stage 1: Invitation for expression of interest from prospective RAs
    • Stage 2: Request for resolution plans from prospective RAs
    • Stage 3: Examination and confirmation of the plans by the RP
    • Stage 4: Voting by the CoC on the plans

    The SC in ISC clarified that the RA need not wait till submission of the plan to the RP before sending a notice to the CCI for approval. In effect, the approval of the CCI can be sought at any time, even in Stage 1 during the invitation for expression of interest at any point before Stage 4. The next section shall discuss the workability of the same.

    DETERMINING THE TRIGGER POINT FOR CCI NOTICE

    When to send the notice?

    According to Section 6 of the Competition Act, 2002, (‘the Competition Act’) an enterprise must send a notice of combination to the CCI when it executes any agreement or document for acquisition, or when the Board of Directors (‘Board’) of the enterprises involved approves the proposal for a merger or amalgamation.

    As held in ISC, an RA can send a notice to the CCI much before it submits its resolution plan to the RP. But is the requirement of an agreement or a decision for acquisition or the Board’s approval for merger met at Stages 1 and 2?

    An ‘agreement’ to acquire is a broad and liberal construct, and includes an arrangement of understanding or even an action in concert. Such an arrangement or understanding can be reflected in a formal or written form, and it need not have been formulated with the intent legal enforceability. In the case of the CIRP, the RP is tasked with managing the CD, including entering into contracts on behalf of the CD, courtesy Section 23 read with Section 20 of IBC. Resultantly, an agreement or understanding for the purpose of acquisition has to be between the RA proposing the combination on one side and the RP on the other side.

    But such an understanding or arrangement is absent at Stage 1. An agreement requires a meeting of minds of at least two parties, which is lacking when the RA is yet to share their proposal with the RP. Similarly, Stage 2 only marks a point where the RAs have prepared the plan. That does not signify an agreement as it is yet to be examined and understood by the RP.  

    At Stage 3, the RP examines the resolution plans proposed by the RAs and confirms whether they comply with the minimum essentials mandated by the law. This confirmation implies an agreement or an understanding, making Stage 3 and onwards the appropriate trigger for notice.

    Now, in the case of a merger or amalgamation, the notice is triggered only after the proposal is approved by the Board of both parties.[i]  In the case of a CD, the interim RP (‘IRP’) or the RP steps into the shoes of the management. Resultantly, the approval would have to be sought from the RP himself. Therefore, a notice for merger or amalgamation cannot be sent to the CCI before the plan is submitted to the RP and confirmed by them, which is Stage 3. So, the same conclusion follows – it is at Stage 3 that the notice is triggered.

    Who should send the notice?

    In the case of acquisition, the acquirer sends the notice.[ii] Generally, the successful RA submitting the plan acquires the target CD company, as was seen in the case of ISC. Therefore, it is the RA who is required to send the notice to the CCI. For merger or amalgamation, notice must be sent jointly by the RA and the RP.[iii]

    Suppose there are RAs intending to propose an acquisition in Stages 1 and 2, then all those RAs must send the notice to the CCI with the requisite fees,[iv] even before the plan is seen and examined by the RP. So, even RAs whose plan might not be voted in later would have to bear the cost at an early stage. Quite similarly, in the case of merger or amalgamation, the RP and the respective RA have to send the notice and pay the fees, jointly or severally.[v]Whether the RA or the RP handling the stressed CD would want to take the liability to pay the fees amid relative uncertainty is doubtful.

    WELCOMING THE 2025 AMENDMENT

    The 2025 Amendment has been appreciated for many desirable introductions, from the new ‘creditor-initiated insolvency resolution process’ to ‘group insolvency’. Clause 19(d) amends the proviso to Section 31(4), allowing the RA to obtain the CCI approval before submission to AA. So, the approval process can be deferred till the CoC votes on the plan and the Successful Resolution Applicant is identified. The minor change resolves the above-discussed problem of redundancy, while leaving room for seeking approval at an earlier stage.

    There are certain concerns regarding the amendment as well, but these can be addressed duly. One of the concerns is regarding compliance with the CIRP timeline of 330 days under Section 12 of the Code. However, 330 days is a general rule. The Court has already held, previously as well as in ISC, that the breach of the time-limit can be condoned in exceptional circumstances where any blame for such a delay cannot be attributed to any of the parties.

    In case the plan approved by the CoC is rejected by the CCI, it must be modified to address those objections. However, the successful RA cannot make any change at its own behest. So, once changes are made, the CoC must approve it again. Essentially, such a rejection need not be fatal to the CIRP, though it may elongate the process. In any case, Clause 19(b) of the 2025 Amendments allows the AA to return back the plan to the CoC for correcting any defects. What it reflects is that alterations made post first CoC approval is not doctrinally unacceptable. When CCI recommends changes, the CoC is well-equipped to accommodate it then and there. 

    Therefore, the proposed amendment to the procedure for CCI approval of the resolution plan is a pragmatic improvement as it spares the RA and the RP from the additional paperwork and costs that are characteristic of the existing position.

    CONCLUDING REMARKS

    The current position as settled in the ISC case does not gel well with reality. Even though it seems to make available a broad period for sending the notice, starting from Stage 1, it is generally not possible to send a notice until Stage 3 when the trigger for the notice under the Competition Act is activated. In rare cases with only one RA and mutual certainty as to the terms of the combination, this proposition in ISC might be of some use. Such cases are rare in the typically uncertain flow of business in the CIRP.

    The proposed change in the 2025 Amendment reflects the reality. The RAs and the RP can even wait till the CoC approval to send the notice. This improves ease of doing business and provides more leeway for the stakeholders to ensure compliance.

    [i] Competition Commission of India (Combinations) Regulations, 2024, Reg. 5(7).

    [ii] Id., Reg. 9(1).

    [iii] Id., Reg. 9(3).

    [iv] Id., Regs. 10, 11.

    [v] Id., Regs. 10(2), 9(3).

  • Microfinance In India: The Bad Loan Crisis And The Regulatory Conundrum

    Microfinance In India: The Bad Loan Crisis And The Regulatory Conundrum

    BY Kshitij Kashyap and Yash Vineesh Bhatia FOURTH- Year
    STUDENT AT DSNLU, Visakhapatnam

    INTRODUCTION

    Microfinance offers financial services to low-income people generally overlooked by conventional banking systems, facilitating small businesses and propelling the growth of the economy. India is a country where nearly every second household relies on microcredit, therefore, it is often the only bridge between aspiration and destitution. While the sector empowers millions, it is increasingly burdened by bad loans, also known as Non-Performing Assets (‘NPA’).

    In India, microfinance is regulated by the Reserve Bank of India (‘RBI’). Although the Indian microfinance sector has shown promising growth, it has had its share of challenges. During COVID-19, Micro Finance Institutions (‘MFIs’) experienced an unprecedented rise in NPAs, followed by a sharp recovery. The recovery appears promising, but a closer look reveals deeper structural vulnerabilities in the sector, owing to its fragmented regulatory framework.

     This piece analyses the statutory framework of India’s microfinance sector, reviewing past and present legislations, and exploring potential reforms for the future, allaying the existing challenges. While doing so, it does not touch upon The Recovery of Debt and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (‘Act’) since Non-Banking Financial Companies (‘NBFCs’) do not fall within the ambit of a “bank”, “banking company” or a “financial institution” as defined by the Act in Sections 2(d), 2(e) and 2(h) respectively.

    LOST IN LEGISLATION: WHY THE MICROFINANCE BILL FAILED

    In 2012, the Government of India introduced The Micro Finance Institutions (Development & Regulation) Bill (‘Bill’), intending to organise microfinance under one umbrella. However, in 2014, the Bill was rejected by the Standing Committee on Finance (‘Yashwant Sinha Committee’), chaired by Mr. Yashwant Sinha. Glaring loopholes were identified, with a lack of groundwork and a progressive outlook.

    In its report, the Yashwant Sinha Committee advocated for an independent regulator instead of the RBI. It highlighted that the Bill missed out on client protection issues like multiple lending, over-indebtedness and coercive recollection. Additionally, it did not define important terms such as “poor households”, “Financial Inclusion” or “Microfinance”. Such ambiguity could potentially have created hurdles in judicial interpretation of the Bill since several fundamental questions were left unanswered. 

    A SHIELD WITH HOLES: SARFAESIs INCOMPLETE PROTECTION FOR MFIs

    The Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest (‘SARFAESI’) Act, 2002, is a core legal statute when it comes to credit recovery in India. It allows banks and other financial institutions to seize and auction property to recover debt. Its primary objective involves allowing banks to recover their NPAs without needing to approach the courts, making the process time and cost-efficient.

    While SARFAESI empowered banks and financial institutions, originally, NBFCs and MFIs were excluded from its purview. This was changed in the 2016 amendment, which extended its provisions to include NBFCs with an asset size of ₹500 crore and above. This threshold was further reduced via a notification of the government of India dated 24 February, 2020, which incorporated smaller NBFCs with an asset size of ₹100 crore and above within the ambit of this Act. However, its impact is extremely limited when it comes to MFIs as they do not meet the financial requirements

    .

    THE IBC GAP: WHERE SMALL NBFCs FALL THROUGH THE CRACKS

    The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘IBC’), is another statute aimed at rehabilitating and restructuring stressed assets in India. Like the SARFESI Act, this too originally excluded NBFCs from its purview. The IBC recovers debt through Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (‘CIRP’), wherein the debtor’s assets are restructured to recover the debt. In 2019, the applicability of  IBC was extended to NBFCs with an asset size of ₹500 crore and above.

    The IBC, however, has certain pitfalls, which have kept it away from the finish line when it comes to debt recovery. Some of these pitfalls were enumerated in the thirty-second report of the Standing Committee on Finance 2020-2021 (‘Jayant Sinha Committee’), chaired by Mr. Jayant Sinha. The Jayant Sinha Committee observed that low recovery rates and delays in the resolution process point towards a deviation from the objectives of this Code. Further, under the existing paradigm, Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (‘MSMEs’), which somewhat rely on microfinance, are considered as operational creditors, whose claims are addressed after secured creditors.

    BRIDGING THE GAP: REGULATORY PROBLEMS AND THE WAY FORWARD

    Fundamentally, three problems are to be dealt with. The first one is a regulatory overlap between the SARFAESI Act and the IBC. While the SARFAESI Act caters to NBFCs with an asset size of ₹100 crore and above, the IBC caters to those with an asset size of ₹500 crore and above. Secondly, there is a major regulatory gap despite there being two statutes addressing debt recovery by NBFCs. The two statutes taken collectively, fix the minimum threshold for debt recovery at ₹100 crore. Despite this, they continue to miss out on the NBFCs falling below the threshold of ₹100 crore. Lastly, the problem of the recovery of unsecured loans, which constitute a majority of the loans in the microfinance sector and are the popular option among low to middle income groups, also needs redressal since unsecured loans have largely been overlooked by debt recovery mechanisms.

    For the recovery of secured loans

    Singapore’s Simplified Insolvency Programme (‘SIP’), may provide a cogent solution to these regulatory problems. First introduced in 2021 as a temporary measure, it was designed to assist Micro and Small Companies (‘MSCs’) facing financial difficulties during COVID-19. This operates via two channels; Simplified Debt Restructuring Programme (‘SDRP’) and Simplified Winding Up Programme (‘SWUP’). SDRP deals with viable businesses, facilitating debt restructuring and recovery process, while on the other hand, SWUP deals with non-viable businesses, such as businesses nearing bankruptcy, by providing a structured process for winding up. The SIP shortened the time required for winding up and debt restructuring. Winding-up a company typically takes three to four years, which was significantly reduced by the SWUP to an average of nine months. Similarly, the SDRP expedited debt restructuring, with one case completed in under six months, pointing towards an exceptionally swift resolution.

    In 2024, this was extended to non-MSCs, making it permanent. The application process was made simpler compared to its 2021 version. Additionally, if a company initiates SDRP and the debt restructuring plan is not approved, the process may automatically transition into alternative liquidation mechanisms, facilitating the efficient dissolution of non-viable entities. This marked a departure from the erstwhile SDRP framework, wherein a company was required to exit the process after 30 days or upon the lapse of an extension period. This, essentially, is an amalgamation of the approaches adopted by the SARFAESI Act and the IBC.

    Replicating this model in India, with minor tweaks, through a reimagined version of the 2012 Bill, now comprehensive and inclusive, may finally provide the backbone this sector needs. Like the SIP, this Bill should divide the debt recovery process into two channels; one for restructuring, like the IBC, and the other for asset liquidation, like SARFAESI. A more debtor-centric approach should be taken, wherein, based on the viability of the debt, it will either be sent for restructuring or asset liquidation. If the restructuring plan is not approved, after giving the debtor a fair hearing, it shall be allowed to transition into direct asset liquidation and vice versa. The classification based on asset size of the NBFCs should be done away with, since in Singapore, the SIP was implemented for both MSCs and non-MSCs. These changes could make the debt recovery process in India much simpler and could fix the regulatory overlap and gap between SARFAESI and the IBC.

    For the recovery of unsecured loans

    For the recovery of unsecured loans, the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, the pioneer of microfinancing, can serve as an inspiration. It offers collateral free loans with an impressive recovery rate of over 95%. Its success is attributed to its flexible practices, such as allowing the borrowers to negotiate the terms of repayment, and group lending, wherein two members of a five-person group are given a loan initially. If repaid on time, the initial loans are followed four to six weeks later by loan to other two members. After another four to six weeks, the loan is given to the last person, subject to repayment by the previous borrowers. This pattern is known as 2:2:1 staggering. This significantly reduced the costs of screening and monitoring the loans and the costs of enforcing debt repayments. Group lending practically uses peer pressure as a method to monitor and enforce the repayment of loans. Tapping basic human behaviour has proven effective in loan recovery by the Grameen Bank. The statute should similarly mandate unsecured microcredit lenders to adopt such practices, improving recovery rates while cutting operational costs.

    CONCLUSION

    Microfinance has driven financial inclusion in India but faces regulatory hurdles and weak recovery systems. Existing systems offer limited protection for unsecured lending. A unified legal framework, inspired by the models like Grameen Bank and Singapore’s SIP can fill these gaps and ensure sustainable growth for the sector.

  • A New Chapter in India’s Insolvency Law: What the 2025 Amendments Mean for Stakeholders

    A New Chapter in India’s Insolvency Law: What the 2025 Amendments Mean for Stakeholders

    BY Suprava Sahu, Fourth-Year student at gnlu, Gandhinagar
    INTRODUCTION

    The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘IBC’) marked a shift in India’s approach to the corporate resolution process. By changing a fragmented framework into a unified, creditor-centric process, IBC aimed to expedite the resolution of non-performing assets and enhance the ease of doing business. While studies have highlighted that IBC succeeded in improving recovery rates and reducing the timelines, structural issues began to surface as the code matured. Delays in the resolution, underutilization of viable assets, and limited investor participation called for reform.

    Recognizing this need, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (‘IBBI’) introduced the IBBI ((Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Fourth Amendment Regulations 2025 which aim to address the inefficiencies and enhance the effectiveness of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (‘CIRP’). Key features of this amendment include enabling part-wise resolution of corporate debtors, harmonizing payment timelines for dissenting creditors, and mandating the presentation of all resolution plans to the Committee of Creditors (‘CoC’).

    The piece unpacks whether the regulatory changes align with the IBC and its intended goals or are just a mere paper over the institutional cracks.

    DIAGNOSING THE IBC’S STRUCTURE

    IBC rests on three foundational pillars: maximizing the value of assets, ensuring a time-bound insolvency process, and balancing the interests of all stakeholders. These principles are affirmed as the foundational principle behind the IBC by cases like Essar Steel India Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta.

    Yet these principles exist in tension. For example, despite the 190–270-day timeline for the CIRP, the IBBI’s quarterly report shows that  more than 60% of the CIRPs have exceeded the timelines, which leads to diminished asset value, deters strategic investors, and disrupts the objective of value maximization.

    The framework also gives substantial control to financial creditors via the CoC, with operational creditors having a very limited say. This structure offers swift decision making it has attracted criticism for privileging institutional lenders at the cost of small creditors. The introduction of staged payments for dissenting creditors and asset-specific resolution under the new regulations can be seen as a regulatory response to this imbalance.

    The IBC initially favoured a rigid process to instill discipline in resolution, but a one-size-fits-all model may stifle innovation. Scholars have argued that insolvency systems need to adapt to varied market structures and varied market structures especially in emerging economies. A key question remains: can a rigid, rule-bound structure effectively adapt to the complexities of a diverse insolvency system? The amendments must be understood not as isolated tweaks but as strategic interventions to reconcile the tensions inbuilt in the IBC’s design.

    DISSECTING THE KEY AMENDMENTS

    The amendment introduces four main changes each targeting to address long-standing inefficiencies and gaps in the stakeholder engagement.

    • Part-wise Resolution of Corporate Debtors

    The amended regulations now allow the Resolution Professionals (‘RPs’)to invite resolution plans for specific business segments of the corporate debtor in addition to the entire company. This creates a dual-track mechanism that offers unprecedented flexibility to the CoC and RPs. It is grounded on the fact that many insolvency cases involve heterogeneous assets, some of which are viable, some of which are distressed. Under the earlier regime, focusing on a holistic resolution often led to delayed proceedings and discouraged potential resolution applicants who were only interested in certain businesses. A similar model has been employed in jurisdictions like UK, where the pre-pack administrative sales and partial business transfers allow administrators to sell parts of their enterprise to recover the maximum value. Studies have advocated for asset-wise flexibility as a strategy to reduce liquidation rates and protect value.

    However, this reform risks of cherry picking, where bidders might try to choose profitable units while leaving liabilities and nonperforming divisions. This can potentially undermine the equitable treatment of creditors and complicate the valuation standard and fair assessment. This concern was evident in cases like Jet Airways where bidders sought profitable slots while avoiding liabilities. Jurisdictions like the UK mitigate this through independent scrutiny in pre-pack sales, a safeguard which India could adapt.

    • Harmonized Payment Timelines for Dissenting Creditors

    In cases like Jaypee Kensington and Essar Steel, the Supreme Court upheld that dissenting creditors must receive at least the liquidation value but left ambiguity on payment. Previously, the treatment of dissenting creditors lacked clarity, especially around the payment timelines. The amendment resolves this ambiguity by laying down a clear rule. . By ensuring that dissenters are not disadvantaged for opposing the majority, it reinforces a sense of procedural justice and also encourages more critical scrutiny of resolution plans within the CoC. It seeks to balance the majority rule with individual creditor rights, thereby enhancing the quality of proceedings.

    But, this provision could also complicate cash flow planning for resolution applicants and disincentivize performance-based payouts. Early, mandatory payouts to dissenters could affect plan viability and reduce the flexibility needed for restructuring. There is also a risk that dissenters may use their position to strategically extract early payments, leading to non-cooperation or tactical dissent – an issue which the amendment has left unaddressed.

    The balancing act between fairness and functionality can be seen as a reform which not just enhances inclusivity but also introduces a new operational pressures.  

    • Enhanced role for interim finance providers

    Another noteworthy intervention is that the CoC may now direct RPs to invite interim finance providers to attend CoC meetings as observers. These entities will not have voting rights but their presence is expected to improve the informational symmetry within the decision-making process. Finance providers have more risk when they are lending to distressed entities. Allowing them to observe deliberation offers more visibility into how their funds are being used and enhances lender confidence. From a stakeholder theory perspective, this inclusion marks a shift away from creditor dominance towards a more pluralist approach. This was also argued by Harvard Professor Robert Clark, who stated that insolvency regimes must recognize the varied capital interests involved in business rescue.

    While the introduction of interim finance providers promotes transparency and may increase lender confidence, the observer status needs to be carefully managed. Without clear boundaries, non-voting participants could still exert indirect influence on CoC deliberations or access sensitive information. To mitigate such risks, the IBBI could consider issuing guidelines to standardize observer conduct. This highlights a broader concern – expanding stakeholder involvement without proper guardrails, which may create issues in the already complex process.

    • Mandatory Presentation of All Resolution Plans to the CoC

    Earlier, RPs would filter out non-compliant plans and only present eligible ones to the CoC. The new amendment mandates all resolution plans to be submitted to the CoC along with the details of non-compliance. This reform shifts from RP discretion to CoC empowerment. It repositions the RP as a facilitator and reduces the risk of biased exclusion of potential plans.

    The amendment enhances transparency and aligns with the principles of creditor autonomy, which states that the legitimacy of the insolvency process depends not only on outcomes but on stakeholder confidence in the process. It also carries a risk of “decision fatigue” if the CoC is flooded with irrelevant non-viable proposals. The RP’s expert assessment should still carry some weight and structured formats for presenting non-compliant plans may be needed to make this reform operationally sound.

    Taken together, the amendments do not merely fix operational gaps they reflect a broader evolution of India’s insolvency framework from rigidity to responsiveness.

    STAKEHOLDER IMPLICATIONS & CONCERNS

    The regulation significantly rebalances roles within the CIRP, with distinct implications for each stakeholder. For Financial Creditors, part-wise resolutions, allowing staged payments and overseeing finance participants through the CoC has deepened their influence. This aligns with the creditor-in-control model, which states that power demands fiduciary accountability. Dominant creditors could steer outcomes for selective benefit, risking intra-creditor conflicts previously flagged by IBBI.

    Dissenting creditors now gain recognition through statute in phased payouts, ensuring they receive pro rata payments before consenting creditors at each stage. However, operational creditors remain outside the decision-making process, raising concerns about continued marginalization. This concern was also highlighted by IBBI that insolvency regimes that overlook smaller creditors risk creating long-term trust deficits in the process. RPs must now present all resolution plans, including the non-compliant ones to the CoC. This not just curtails arbitrary filtering but also increases the administrative burden.. Beyond the RP’s procedural role, the reforms also alter the landscape for resolution applicants.  The amendment benefits RPs by offering flexibility to bid for specific parts of a debtor. This may attract specialized investors and increase participation. However, unless the procedural efficiencies are addressed alongside the increased discretion, both RPs and applicants may find themselves in navigating through a system which is transparent but increasingly complex.

    CONCLUSION AND WAY FORWARD

    The Fourth Amendment to the CIRP reflects a bold move that seeks to move from a procedural rigidity towards an adaptive resolution strategy. The reforms aim to align the IBC more closely with the global best practices which are mainly focused on value maximization and creditor democracy. Yet as numerous scholars have emphasized insolvency reform is as much about institutional capability and procedural discipline as it is about legal design. The real test would lie in implementation, how the CoCs exercise their enhanced discretion and how RPs manage rising procedural complexity. Equally important is ensuring that small creditors, operational stakeholders and dissenters are not left behind.

    Going forward, further reforms are needed which include standard guidelines for plan evaluation, better institutional support and capacity upgrades for the NCLTs. Without these, the system risks duplicating the old inefficiencies. Overall, the 2025 reform represents a necessary evolution, but whether it becomes a turning point or a missed opportunity will depend on how effectively the ecosystem responds.

  • Reconsidering the Scope of Section 14 of IBC: Analysing the Inherent Extra-Territorial Scope of Moratorium 

    Reconsidering the Scope of Section 14 of IBC: Analysing the Inherent Extra-Territorial Scope of Moratorium 

    BY ADITYA DWIVEDI AND PULKIT YADAV, FOURTH-YEAR STUDENTS AT NUSRL, RACHI

    INTRODUCTION

    The moratorium provisions under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘The Code’), are important mechanisms to maintain the debtor’s assets and maximise value for all stakeholders. Yet, the territorial applicability of these provisions, especially in proceedings involving cross-border assets, is a matter of judicial interpretation and academic discussion. 

    This article analyses the extra-territorial applicability of moratorium under the Code with a special focus on comparing and contrasting the interpretation of moratoriums applicable to Corporate Insolvency Resolutions Process (‘CIRP’) and Insolvency Resolution Process (‘IRP’) under Sections 14 and 96 of the Code, respectively. 

    By analysing the recent judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Rajesh Sardarmal Jain v. Sri Sandeep Goyal, (‘Rajesh Sadarmal’) this article contends that whereas Section 96 moratorium might be restricted to Indian jurisdiction, Section 14 moratorium necessarily has extra-territorial application due to the interim resolution professional’s statutory obligation to manage foreign assets under Section 18(f)(i) of the Code.

    TERRITORIAL SCOPE OF MORATORIUM: DIVERGENT INTERPRETATIONS

    The Code provides for two types of insolvency proceedings: CIRP for corporate persons under Part II and IRP for individuals and partnership firms under Part III, with moratoriums under Sections 14 and 96, respectively, to facilitate these processes

    However, courts have interpreted the moratoria under Sections 14 and 96 differently. In P. Mohanraj v. Shah Bros. Ispat, the Supreme Court held that Section 14 has a broader scope but limited its analysis to domestic proceedings. In contrast, the Calcutta High Court in Rajesh Sadarmal highlighted the extra-territorial reach of Section 96. Hence, examining these interpretations is key to understanding the territorial scope of both provisions.

    INSOLVENCY RESOLUTION PROCESS VIS-A-VIS SCOPE OF SECTION 96: ANALYSING THE NARROW INTERPRETATION OF MORATORIUM UNDER PART III

    IIn Rajesh Sardarmal, the Calcutta High Court held that the Section 96 moratorium for personal guarantors does not extend to foreign jurisdictions, as the Code’s scope under Section 1 is limited to India and does not specify the enforcement of the Section 96 moratorium in foreign courts. Thus, the court held that actions in foreign jurisdictions cannot be suspended by Section 96. This interpretation implies that all provisions under the Code lack extra-territorial application.

    However, this view contradicts the Code’s inherent extra-territorial mechanism, as outlined in Sections 234 and 235 of the Code which respectively empower the central government to enter into reciprocal arrangements with other countries to enforce the provisions of the Code and allow the Adjudicating Authority (‘AA’) to issue a letter of request to the competent authority of a reciprocating country, requesting it to take necessary action regarding any ongoing homebound proceedings against the Corporate Debtor (‘CD’) under the Code. Further, this interpretation also negates the inherent extra-territorial scope of the moratorium under Section 14. 

    CORPORATE INSOLVENCY RESOLUTION PROCESS VIS-À-VIS SCOPE OF SECTION 14: A CASE WARRANTING BROADER INTERPREATAION OF MORATORIUM UNDER PART II

    The Supreme Court, in M/S HPCL Bio-Fuels Ltd v. M/S Shahaji Bhanudas Bhad, held that the Code, as an economic legislation, is intended for the revival of the CD rather than being used as a recovery mechanism. Further, in Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, the Apex Court held that moratorium under section 14 envisions the protection of the assets of the CD, to facilitate its smooth revival. 

    Therefore, applying Rajesh Sadarmal’s narrow interpretation to Section 14 would weaken the moratorium’s purpose and hinder the CIRP. In a globalised economy, corporate debtors often hold foreign assets, which must be brought under the control of the interim resolution professional and the resolution professional under Sections 18 and 25 of the Code, respectively. This will maximise the value of the CD and enhance the chances of higher recovery for creditors. Further, it would also prevent successful resolution applicants from acquiring foreign assets of the CD without making any payment, and enable the committee of creditors to exercise their commercial wisdom judiciously in selecting the most suitable resolution plan after assessing the true financial position of the CD. 

    EXTRA-TERRITORIAL SCOPE: LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

    In Dr. Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil v. The Chief Minister & Anr, the Supreme Court held that courts must act upon the intent of the legislature, and such intent can be gathered from the language used in the statute. Moreover, inRenaissance Hotel Holdings Inc. v.  B. Vijaya Sai & Others, the Apex Court ruled that the quintessential principle of interpretation is that every provision of a statute shall be interpreted considering the scheme of the given statute. Meaning thereby that the textual interpretation must align with the contextual one. 

    The Supreme Court went further ahead in the State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala, and held that a statute may have extra-territorial application if a sufficient territorial nexus exists. Hence, Section 1 of the Code does not bar such application. Interpreting Section 14 thus requires examining legislative intent and nexus, with Sections 18(f)(i), 234, and 235 providing key guidance.

    SECTION 18(f)(i): CONTROL OVER FOREIGN ASSETS

    After the commencement of insolvency and imposition of moratorium, the AA appoints an interim resolution professional under Section 16. As per Section 18(f)(i), the interim resolution professional must take control of all assets owned by the corporate debtor, including those located abroad. This establishes a clear territorial nexus, supporting extra-territorial application.

    In M/s Indo World Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. Mukesh Gupta, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (‘NCLAT’) held that under Section 18(f), read with Section 20, the interim resolution professional must secure and preserve the corporate debtor’s assets. This interpretation aligns with the moratorium’s objective under Section 14. Such an intra-textual reading reflects the legislative intent to extend the moratorium to foreign assets for effective CIRP and value maximisation. While Section 1 poses no bar, supported by the doctrine of territorial nexus, actual enforcement abroad still depends on securing international cooperation through agreements under the Code.

    INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT UNDER SECTION 234 AND 235: HIGHLIGHTING THE INHERENT EXTRA-TERRITORIAL SCOPE OF THE CODE

    Under Part V, the Code provides a legislative route under Sections 234 and 235 to facilitate the extraterritorial application of its provisions. This legislative structure recognises the necessity of international coordination and highlights the extraterritorial nature of the Code. 

    However, their efficacy is yet to be tested because, to date, no notification[i] has been issued by the central government in this regard. Therefore, unless the central government gives effect to these provisions through mutual agreement with other countries, no provision of the Code can be extended to foreign proceedings or assets situated in foreign lands. 

    However, in State Bank of India v. Videocon Industries Ltd., the National Company Law Tribunal (‘NCLT’) held that the  CD’s foreign assets will form part of the CIRP and be subject to Sections 18 and 14 of the Code. Yet, the NCLT has not provided any judicial framework for the consolidation of the CD’s foreign assets in the CIRP. 

    Therefore, even if the CD’s foreign assets are considered part of the CIRP, in the absence of a judicial or legislative framework (such as mutual agreements), those assets cannot be included in the CIRP.

    NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE CROSS-BORDER FRAMEWORK

    In DBS Bank Limited Singapore v. Ruchi Soya Industries Limited & Another, the Apex Court held that the primary aim of the Code is to balance the rights of various stakeholders by enabling the resolution of insolvency, encouraging investment, and optimising asset value. 

    Therefore, it is necessary to address the concerns of distressed Indian companies with a foreign presence and foreign companies having the centre of main interest (‘COMI’) in India. This will ensure that stakeholders or creditors are not left in the lurch due to skewed recovery resulting from the non-inclusion of the CD’s foreign assets in the CIRP. 

     However, to effectively address these concerns, there is a need to devise a cross-border framework that encompasses not only the CIRP but also the IRP. At present, India lacks such a framework, which constitutes a significant regulatory gap in its insolvency regime. In cases where personal guarantors possess assets located outside the country, this gap severely impairs the ability of creditors to recover dues effectively. The present framework is limited in scope and fails to provide mechanisms for the recognition and enforcement of foreign proceedings involving personal guarantors, thereby undermining the efficiency of cross-border recoveries.

    While the Report of the Insolvency Law Committee on Cross-Border Insolvency, 2018 (‘The Report’) laid down a robust foundation for dealing with CDS, it did not address personal insolvency, as Part III of the Code had not yet been notified at that time. The report emphasised the importance of providing foreign creditors access to Indian insolvency proceedings and of enabling Indian insolvency officials to seek recognition abroad. However, with the subsequent notification of provisions relating to personal guarantors, there is now an urgent need to expand the cross-border framework to encompass personal guarantor insolvency as well. The report also supports this view as it provides for the subsequent extension of cross-border provision on IRP, post notification of Part III. 

    Moreover, in Lalit Kumar Jain v. Union of India,  the Supreme Court held that due to the co-extensive nature of the liability of the surety with that of the principal debtor under Section 128 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, creditors can recover the remaining part of their debt from CIRP by initiating IRP against the personal guarantor to the CD.

    Therefore, failing to extend the cross-border insolvency regime to IRP would limit creditors’ access to the guarantor’s foreign assets, thereby impeding the full and effective realization of their claims.

    To address this regulatory shortfall, a pragmatic way forward would be to operationalise Section 234 through mutual agreements with key trading partners of India, by expanding the scope of the cross-border framework, as suggested in the report   to include IRP, and amending the Code accordingly. 

    Further, the Courts should also refrain from narrowly interpreting the scope of moratoriums and other provisions of the Code, and should take into account the doctrine of territorial nexus while analysing the scope of any provision of the Code. 

    A broader interpretation, especially in cases involving foreign assets or proceedings, would facilitate a more effective and holistic resolution process by recognising the global footprint of many CDs. This approach aligns with the objective of maximising the value of assets under Sections 20 and the preamble of the Code and ensures that proceedings under the Code are not rendered toothless in cross-border contexts. 

    Additionally, invoking the doctrine of territorial nexus can help establish a sufficient legal connection between India and foreign assets or persons, thereby allowing Indian insolvency courts to issue directions that can have extraterritorial reach, wherever justified. This interpretive approach will ultimately enhance creditor confidence and will reinforce India’s credibility as a jurisdiction with a robust insolvency regime.

    Moreover, in the absence of any judicial and legislative framework, the doctrine of Comity of Courts can be invoked by the creditors seeking the enforcement of insolvency proceedings on foreign lands. This common law doctrine postulates an ethical obligation on the courts of one competent jurisdiction to respect and to give effect to the judgments and orders of the courts of other jurisdictions.

    Creditors can also seek recognition of Indian insolvency proceedings abroad through the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, as seen in Re Compuage Infocom Ltd., where the Singapore High Court recognised the Indian CIRP but denied asset repatriation. This highlights the urgent need for a comprehensive cross-border insolvency framework aligned with the spirit of the Code and the report that is primarily based on the Model Law.

    CONCLUSION

    While the Calcutta High Court’s ruling in Rajesh Sardarmal limits the territorial reach of Section 96 moratorium, Section 14 moratorium has to be interpreted more expansively, considering its inextricable link with Section 18(f)(i). Further, while interpreting the Code, the courts must give due regard to the legislative intent and the judicial principle of territorial nexus.  The success of the Code’s insolvency resolution mechanism, especially in cross-border asset cases, relies on acknowledging and enabling the extra-territorial operation of moratorium provisions. Legislative amendments, international cooperation frameworks, and judicial interpretation of the Code’s provisions based on legislative intent are essential to realise this goal.

    [i] Uphealth Holdings, INC. v. Dr. Syed Shabat Azim & Ors. Co., 2024 SCC OnLine Cal 6311 ¶ 20

  • Settlement Agreements and Section 12A Withdrawals: A Comparison with Section 230 of the Companies Act, 2013

    Settlement Agreements and Section 12A Withdrawals: A Comparison with Section 230 of the Companies Act, 2013

    BY ARSHIA ANN JOY AND ADITI SINGH, FOURTH-YEAR STUDENTS AT NUALS, KOCHI.

    Introduction

    A liquidation order is passed as per the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 (“IBC“)  when the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (“CIRP“) falls through, and the company cannot be revived within the stipulated timeline. However, courts, over time, have interpreted that issuing a liquidation order is not to be treated as a death sentence to the company and its operations. This is because the ultimate aim of the IBC is to facilitate the revival of the company if it is a feasible option. This further implies that the order permitting an entity’s liquidation can be reversed if the petition initiating CIRP proceedings is itself withdrawn. Section 12A was introduced in the IBC in 2018 to allow settlements between the Corporate Debtor (“CD“) and the creditors by allowing withdrawal of proceedings, with 1035 such withdrawals recorded till December 2023.

    This article explores the legality of allowing the withdrawal of proceedings after issuing the liquidation order, when a settlement agreement is reached. The authors also look at how the lack of procedural clarity surrounding the acceptance of the settlement agreement leads to difficulties in reviving the CIRP if the settlement agreement fails. Further, solutions are suggested through a comparison with section 230 of the Companies Act, 2013 (“CA”), which facilitates arrangements aiming at debt restructuring and thereby resolving the financial crisis of the company. The authors argue that allowing the Adjudicating Authority (“AA”) to thoroughly analyse the settlement agreements while admitting section 12A applications, similar to the procedure envisaged in section 230 of CA, would be a step in the right direction in addressing the ambiguities surrounding the withdrawal of CIRP and revival of proceedings, if need be.

    Reversibility of a Liquidation Order and Withdrawal of Proceedings Post Issuance of Liquidation Order

    The parties are said to have arrived at a settlement agreement if the CD agrees to pay the creditor an agreed sum to resolve the conflict. Once a settlement agreement is reached after a liquidation order is passed, the parties can approach the AA under section 12A and withdraw the proceedings initiating CIRP. The primary intention behind introducing section 12A is to recognise post-admission settlement cases in line with statutory provisions. 

    The NCLAT, in Navaneetha Krishnan v. Central Bank of India, settled the law on reversibility of a liquidation order. It was held that even during the liquidation period, if any person satisfies the Committee of Creditors (“CoC”) , and CoC accepts the said offer with a 90% voting share, such a person may apply for a withdrawal of the proceedings before the AA.

    In 2019, the NCLAT, in a similar case, emphasised the importance of allowing the promoters/shareholders to arrive at a settlement as per section 12A. In such cases, the application seeking initiation of CIRP can be withdrawn. The Supreme Court in Vallal RCK v. Siva Industries held that the wisdom of the CoC in approving a settlement plan must not be interfered with by the AA unless such a decision was wholly ‘capricious, arbitrary, irrational and de hors the provisions of the statute or the Rules.’ In this case, the CoC had failed to approve the proposed resolution plan with the requisite 66% majority. Subsequently, the Resolution Professional filed an application under section 33(1)(a) of IBC seeking liquidation of the entity pending which the promoter of the CD approached the AA with a settlement plan. The AA had, in turn, refused to approve it without giving due regard to the 90% majority decision of the CoC to go ahead with the settlement plan. 

    More recently, in 2022, the NCLT analysed the rationale put forth in Navaneetha Krishnan and Vallal RCK to conclude that even after the order of liquidation is passed, the application for withdrawal of proceedings may be allowed. In this case, the liquidator had received a settlement proposal from the promoter of the CD duly approved by the CoC with the requisite majority. 

    The NCLT Chennai Bench rightly noted:

    “Thus, it could be seen that even during the liquidation process, the parties have arrived at a settlement, then the application filed under Section 7, 9 and 10 can be withdrawn. Consequently, the CIRP and the liquidation initiated against the CD also stand withdrawn.”

    Thus, the order of liquidation already passed does not hinder the AA from passing an appropriate order of withdrawal as per section 12A if all the requisite conditions are satisfied.

    The Dilemma: Applying Section 12A Post Issuance of Liquidation Order

    Although the law seems to be settled regarding the impact of section 12A on a liquidation order, the lack of procedural clarity has led to contradictory results in the past few years. 

    In Jayashree Mohan v. Pathukasahasram Raghunathan, the NCLT laid down the limited scope available for reviving an entity undergoing liquidation. It was stated that once the liquidation process is initiated, the entity cannot come out of the process except through the two avenues, namely, by way of a scheme under section 230 of CA or by sale as a going concern. In this case, section 12A is not seen as a potential avenue which could result in the revival of the entity once liquidation is initiated.

    Similarly, the NCLT Chennai bench in Narayan Maheshwari disallowed the withdrawal application made under section 12A while the liquidation process was going on. It was emphasised that section 12A was inserted in Part II of the IBC, which deals exclusively with CIRP and not liquidation. Since no specific amendment is made in the liquidation process regulations, an application for withdrawal under section 12A cannot be allowed post-issuance of a liquidation order. It was further held that in Navaneetha Krishnan, the application under section 12A was never filed during liquidation and that the ex-promoter of the CD had filed an application under section 230 of CA for approving a scheme of compromise. In this case, the NCLT has voiced its concerns regarding allowing withdrawal of proceedings once the order of liquidation has been passed as it might potentially lead to every suspended Director/Promoters waiting till the liquidation order to enter into a settlement agreement at a ‘throw away price.’

    The above rationale of the tribunals could hamper the prospects of reviving a company through settlement, just because the order of liquidation has been initiated against it, thus defeating the purpose for which section 12A was included in the IBC. The application of section 12A to Part III of the IBC has to be specifically inculcated in the regulations to put a rest to these contradictory judgements.

    Revival of CIRP in case of Failure of Settlement Agreement

    In  the cases where withdrawal of proceedings was allowed after issuing the order of liquidation, the stakeholders had agreed on a one-time settlement (“OTS”) or a settlement agreement. In Sudip Dutta, the NCLT, while analysing a catena of decisions including Navaneetha Krishnan stated that:

    “In the instant case, no application was filed under Section 12A of IBC since there was no OTS that was acceptable to the Respondent No. 2 bank.”

    As noted above, the application for withdrawal under section 12A is considered after the issuance of the liquidation order only when the CoC approves a settlement agreement with the requisite majority. 

    However, the procedure for accepting or analysing such a settlement agreement is not specified in the statute or the relevant regulations. As seen above, the commercial wisdom of the CoC is given primacy and judicial intervention is permitted only if the decision of the CoC was wholly arbitrary or capricious. Analysing whether the decision itself was arbitrary or capricious would, in turn, require the settlement agreement to be on the record, which might not happen in most cases, especially when the statute/regulations fail to mandate the same, as was noted by the NCLAT in Krishna Garg. 

    In this case, the CD did not adhere to the terms of the settlement agreement after the CIRP proceedings were withdrawn. The NCLAT refused to revive the CIRP proceedings because the settlement agreement terms were not filed or brought on record before it. The NCLAT in SRLK Enterprises categorically stated that IBC is not a recovery proceeding where parties can repeatedly approach the AA owing to the non-repayment of debt. Proceedings can be revived only if the settlement agreement has been brought on record and has been made a part of the order of withdrawal. The AA can revive the CIRP proceedings, if the settlement agreement has a clause which provides for the revival of CIRP proceedings upon failure of setttlement agreement. The AA need not specifically grant the liberty to revive the proceedings in such cases. This would also imply that if there is no such clause allowing revival, the parties may be granted the liberty to do so specifically, by the AA. These recent orders suggest that the settlement agreement need not always become a part of the order allowing the withdrawal of proceedings, thus complicating the revival of proceedings under the IBC later when the parties fail to adhere to the settlement terms.

    Additionally, in Vallal RCK, the Supreme Court noted how the CoC has entered into many ‘deliberations’ before accepting the settlement plan, and stated that the CoC decision is not ordinarily subject to judicial scrutiny. The analysis done by the court gets confined to checking whether the CoC has done enough ‘deliberations’ before approving the settlement agreement. This seems to be in stark contrast to the procedure followed under section 230 of CA, where the AA is empowered to delve deeper into the actual contents of the proposed scheme.

    Comparison with Section 230 of the Companies Act, 2013

    Even after passing the order of liquidation, if a scheme of Compromise demonstrates viability, feasibility, optimisation of the CD’s assets, and equitable consideration of creditors, the liquidator may submit an application under section 230 of the CA to the AA in a bid to revive the company. As per regulation 2B of the Liquidation Process Regulations 2016, a scheme of compromise and arrangement may be completed within 90 days post the order of liquidation. 

    Furthermore, clauses (2) to (10) of section 230 puts forth the powers of the AA in overseeing the admission of the scheme of compromise and arrangement. The AA is to be made aware of the latest financial position of the entity, the creditor’s responsibility statement, the auditor’s report on the fund requirements, the valuation report on the assets of the company, etc. Further, in SREI Equipment Finance Limited, the NCLAT observed that sections 230-232 cast an obligation on the AA to ensure that the scheme is not contrary to public policy and not prejudicial to the company’screditors and members. Greater checks and balances are put in place under section 230 of the CA while admitting a proposed scheme of compromise and arrangement even after a liquidation order is passed.

    Conclusion and Recommendations

    A similar procedural clarity on the AA’s oversight is absent when it comes to the role of the AA in a section 12A application involving a settlement agreement. Section 12A must specifically be made applicable to Part III of the IBC. Further, a time period may be mentioned in section 12A, similar to section 230 of CA, for accepting and analysing the settlement agreement once the AA has issued the order for liquidation. The regulations must also specify that the settlement agreement entered into must mandatorily be brought on record while withdrawing the proceedings so that revival of the CIRP can be made possible without much hassle if the said agreement falls through at a later stage.

  • Determination of the Status of A Creditor: Artificial Wisdom of the Committee of Creditors

    Determination of the Status of A Creditor: Artificial Wisdom of the Committee of Creditors

    A 4-minute read by Arihant Jain, a fourth-year student of Nirma University

    The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (‘NCLAT’) on 18.12.20 in the case of Rajnish Jain v. BVN Traders and ors (‘Rajnish Jain’)held that the Committee of Creditors (‘CoC’) constituted under Section 21 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy IBC, 2016 (‘IBC’) cannot determine the status of a creditor as a financial or an operational creditor. It is a matter of applying insolvency law to the facts of each case. The judgment clarified that only the adjudicating authority has power to adjudicate the status of a creditor as a financial or an operational creditor. The author hereinafter highlights the judiciousness of the Rajnish Jain judgment in the light of the principle of equality of similarly situated creditors, commercial wisdom of the CoC & limited rights of the CoC under the IBC.

    Factual Background

    The National Company Law Tribunal, Allahabad (‘NCLT’) admitted an application under Section 9 of the IBC to initiate Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (‘CIRP’) against the corporate debtor, Jain Mfg (India) Pvt. Ltd. BVN Traders,the Respondent in this case had extended a loan of Rs. 80,00,000 to the corporate debtor having a secured title deed of the property of corporate debtor against the consideration of 18% per annum. BVN Traders had filed FORM C as financial creditors and the insolvency resolution professional (‘IRP’) admitted the claim of BVN Traders as a financial creditor.

    Rajnish Jain, the promoter, stakeholder and managing director of the corporate debtor, filed an application for removal of BVN Traders from the status of financial creditor. The NCLT directed the resolution professional (‘RP’) of the corporate debtor to seek approval from the CoC to change the status of BVN traders from financial creditor. Pursuant to this, the CoC passed a resolution that BVN Traders is to be treated as financial creditors.  In light of this resolution, the NCLT rejected the claim of the promoter via order dated 23.01.20.

    Subsequently, in the 7th meeting of CoC, the RP again proposed the agenda to determine status of BVN Traders. The CoC passed a resolution with its majority that BVN Traders is not a financial creditor. The CoC also discussed the agenda regarding withdrawal of CIRP under Section 12A of the IBC and for the same, prior approval of 90% majority of voting shares of CoC is required. However, the withdrawal resolution did not attain the 90% majority and the same was not passed. In the 8th meeting of the CoC, withdrawal of CIRP process was again discussed and the same was passed by CoC without including BVN Traders in the CoC. An appeal was filed by Rajnish Jain against the order dated 23.01.20 of the NCLT.

    Decision of the NCLAT:

    The NCLAT observed that the CoC cannot determine the status of creditor. It is a matter of applying the applying the IBC laws to facts. It further held that CoC cannot use its commercial wisdom to determine the status of creditor. The NCLAT observed that despite the order being passed by the NCLT, the CoC proceeded to change its earlier stance and passed a resolution contrary to NCLT order, thereby undermining its authority. The NCLAT also held that the resolution passed in the 8th meeting was bad in law since it was passed after illegally reconstituting the CoC. 

    Current Position of Law 

    Financial creditor and Operational creditor are defined under Sections 5(7) and 5(20) of the IBC. Pertinently, the Supreme Court’s judgment in the case of Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd v.UOI differentiated both the terms by relying on the recommendation of  BLRC Report, 2015:

    “Financial creditors are those whose relationship with the entity is a pure financial contract, such as a loan or a debt security. Operational creditors are those whose liability from the entity comes from a transaction on operations.”

    Further, in Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd and ors v. UOI, the Apex Court observed that financial creditors owe financial debt to meet the working capital or requirement of corporate debtor. On the other hand, operational creditors provide goods and service to the corporate person. In the instant case, the loan extended to corporate debtor is a pure financial contract to meet the working requirement. Therefore, the NCLAT has rightly denied the arbitrary decision of CoC in determining the status of creditor.

    Analysis

    • Principle of Equality – Similarly situated creditors should be treated alike

    Article 14 of Constitution of India provides that equals should be treated equally and unequal should be treated unequally. Further, in CoC of Essar Steel Limited through Authorised Signatory v. Satish Kumar Gupta and ors., the Apex Court observed that similarly situated creditors should be treated equally. Empowering the CoC to determine the status of a creditor will create inequality amongst the same class of creditors as other creditors of the CoC would determine the status of a creditor of the CoC who is in pari passu with them. In the instant case, the NCLT failed to consider the principle of equality by authorizing the CoC to determine the status of BVN Traders.

    • Commercial wisdom of the CoC – Not an absolute power

    Commercial wisdom of the CoC is not an absolute power. The Apex Court in CoC of Essar Steel Limited through Authorised Signatory v. Satish Kumar Gupta and ors has observed that commercial wisdom must be in consonance with the basic aims and objectives of IBC.  Decision of the CoC is subject to checks and balances of the IBC. In Swiss Ribbons Pvt Ltd. v. UOI, the Supreme Court has observed that the primary objective of the IBC is to balance the interests of all stakeholders. Under the IBC, an aggrieved person has the authority to challenge the constitution of CoC or categorization of creditors before the adjudicating authority. In the instant case, reclassifying the status of creditor by CoC is beyond the scope of commercial wisdom since it is in the hands of adjudicating authority to adjudicate the claims of categorization of creditors. Under Section 61(1) of the IBC, aggrieved party may challenge the order passed by NCLT before the NCLAT. However, in the instant case, the CoC sat in the position of NCLAT and gave a resolution contrary to the order passed the NCLT, which is beyond the aims and objectives of the IBC.

    •  The IBC is a complete code in itself

    Section 28(1) of the IBC which enumerates the conditions where prior approval of the CoC is required does not provide for seeking it for the determination of the status of a creditor during CIRP. Moreover, no provision under the IBC empowers the CoC to determine the status of a creditor. It is also pertinent to mention that the IBC is complete in itself. It has unambiguously laid down the powers of the CoC. 

    Further, an aggrieved party dissatisfied with the status of a creditor can submit an application to the NCLT through RP with the approval of 90% voting share of the CoC for the withdrawal of CIRP. However, in the 7th meeting of CoC in the instant case, only 66% of the CoC approved the withdrawal of CIRP. Further, a financial creditor, being a part of the CoC, cannot be excluded from taking part in the voting process of withdrawal of CIRP process. It would be violation of legal right of creditor of CoC mentioned under Section 12A of IBC.  However, in the 8th meeting of the CoC in the instant case, BVN Traders was not allowed to vote for the withdrawal of CIRP. Hence, the legal right of BVN Traders to vote under Section 12A is being defeated. 

    Judgment of Adjudicating Authority: It is a matter of applying law to the facts of each case    

     It is pertinent to mention that it is the statutory duty of court to deliver any judgment based upon the law. For clarifications, the court has the authority to take the opinion of experts. However, the judgment cannot be based solely on the expert opinion. The judgment has to be delivered by applying the law to the facts. In the instant case, the NCLT had delivered its judgment based solely on the decision of the CoC, however, the status of a creditor needs to be determined by the NCLT by applying the IBC to the facts of each case. The NCLAT has rightly clarified that the status of creditor could be determined only by applying the IBC to the facts of each case. 

    Conclusion

    The NCLAT has rightly adjudicated the matter by removing the flaws of NCLT’s decision which   would have led toimbalance by going against the purpose of commercial wisdom of the CoC. CIRP being the collective resolution process seeks parity amongst similarly situated creditors. Preference cannot be given to any similarly situated creditors. The adjudicating authority, by not providing legal reasoning for empowering the CoC to determine the status of creditor failed to consider that legal reasoning is the core of any judgment. The NCLAT has rightly adjudicated that empowering the CoC with such rights would have completely disabled the intent and purpose of the CIRP under the IBC.

  • Why Lenders are Withdrawing Applications under the IBC and Opting for One-Time Settlement?

    Why Lenders are Withdrawing Applications under the IBC and Opting for One-Time Settlement?

    By Nitya Jain, a fifth-year student at NLU, Jodhpur

    Introduction

    There has been a rising trend of the corporate debtor and the creditor settling their claims out of court after initiating a formal insolvency proceeding in the National Company Law Tribunal (“NCLT”). This has been made possible due to Section 12A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”) which provides for withdrawal of insolvency applications. An aggrieved party first files an insolvency application against the corporate debtor in the NCLT but thereafter realises that a private settlement is more feasible and withdraws the application. In fact, data from Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (“IBBI”) shows that out of the 142 cases closed in the second-half of 2018, 63 had been withdrawn under Section 12A. This is 45 percent of the total insolvency cases closed. Thus, it is relevant to understand the laws governing withdrawal of insolvency applications.

    The withdrawal of the application can be done at various stages of the insolvency proceedings. It can be withdrawn before it’s admission by the tribunal, after its admission, before the setting up of Committee of Creditors (“CoC”) or after the CoC has been set up. It can be withdrawn even after the invitation for expression of interest has been issued and the resolution plan has been made. The laws applicable at each stage differs and the approvals required change. These can be divided into four stages.

    Stage 1: Before the admission of the application

    Before the coming of Section 12A, applicants relied on Rule 8 of the Insolvency & Bankruptcy (Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2016 to withdraw their insolvency applications. This rule provides for “withdrawal of application on a request made by the applicant before its admission.” The term ‘before its admission’ is of relevance here. In Mother Pride Dairy India v. Portrait Advertising & Marketing , the NCLT acknowledged that a private settlement had been reached between the applicant and the corporate debtor. But it held that the application cannot be withdrawn once it has been admitted by the tribunal. The rationale for the same was that other creditors are entitled to raise their claim after the admission of the application and the proceeding has become in rem. Similarly, in Lokhandwala Kataria Construction v. Nisus Finance and Investment Managers LLP, it was held that irrespective of the settlement between the applicant and the corporate debtor, the matter cannot be closed till the claim of all the creditors is satisfied by the corporate debtor.

    Stage 2: After the admission of the application but before the constitution of CoC

    Section 12A of the IBC was introduced via an amendment to provide a mechanism for withdrawal of application after it has been admitted. In order to protect the interest of all creditors, a safeguard was added in the provision whereby such withdrawal is possible only with the approval of ninety percent voting share of the CoC. Here a doubt arises as to what will happen in a case where the application has been admitted but the CoC has not yet been set up. Can such an application be withdrawn? If yes, how?

    This riddle was solved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Swiss Ribbons v. Union of India in January 2019, where it stated that “We make it clear that at any stage where the committee of creditors is not yet constituted, a party can approach the NCLT directly, which Tribunal may, in exercise of its inherent powers under Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules, 2016, allow or disallow an application for withdrawal or settlement…….”

    Consequently, in July 2019, an amendment was made in the IBBI (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016  (“Regulations”) to accommodate a pre-CoC situation. Accordingly, Regulation 30A (1) (a) of the Regulations provides that before the CoC has been constituted withdrawal may be made by the applicant through the interim resolution professional.

    Stage 3: After the constitution of CoC

    Section 12A will simply apply and the application can be withdrawn provided that such withdrawal is approved by ninety per cent of the CoC. This has to be read with Regulation 30A (1) (b) of the Regulations which states that withdrawal after the constitution of the CoC has to be made by the applicant through the interim resolution professional or the resolution professional, as the case may be.

    Stage 4: After the issue of invitation for expression of interest

    Once the CoC has been set up, the next stage in the insolvency proceeding is invitation for expression of interest. It is an invite to the general public whereby those interested in submitting resolution plans for the corporate debtor can do so. Initially, Regulation 30A of the Regulations did not allow withdrawal of application after issuance of invitation for expression of interest. However, the judiciary still allowed the withdrawal in various cases overlooking the regulation and acting in pragmatic economic terms.

    The Supreme Court in the case of Brilliant Alloys v. Mr. S. Rajagopal  held that the insolvency application for can be withdrawn even after issuance of invitation for expression of interest. The rationale for doing so was that the out of court settlement was more beneficial for all the stakeholders involved. It was considered prudent to ignore the Regulations in this matter to ensure maximum economic benefit to the parties.

    Eventually, the Regulations were amended and the withdrawal of insolvency application was allowed after the issuance of invitation for expression of interest provided there are reasons justifying such withdrawal.

    The judiciary went one step further in the matter of SBM Paper Mills and allowed withdrawal even after the resolution plan was accepted by the CoC. The NCLT acknowledged the value that the one-time settlement was offering the parties which was much better than the resolution plan. However, the tribunal also cautioned against such withdrawals and stated that withdrawal at such a later stage of insolvency proceedings must be discouraged.  Such withdrawals waste the time of the court as well as of the insolvency resolution machinery. Accordingly, the NCLT awarded high costs as a deterrent.

    Conclusion

    Settlement has been sought time and again by creditors in lieu of insolvency proceedings under IBC. Although IBC provides a time limit for resolution of insolvency, it is rarely followed and cases get stretched for more than 500 days which is almost double of the time limit provided in the IBC. In light of this, many lenders opt for withdrawing their application and choose to settle outside court with the debtor. For instance, in January 2020, the Union Bank of India withdrew a couple of insolvency petitions and opted for settlements with the defaulting companies for a much better realisation. The reason for the same was that the bank had not seen any successful resolution for cases referred by it to the NCLT. In a statement the MD and CEO of the United Bank stated that looking at the kind of value that lenders are getting through NCLT and the time taken for resolution, the preferred route is settlement with the corporate debtor. 

    It can be concluded that the judiciary is allowing withdrawal of applications filed under IBC where such withdrawal is economically advantageous to the parties. This practice is in line with the central theme of the IBC i.e. maximization of economic benefit for the lenders. However, it also raises an important question about the effectiveness of IBC in providing maximum fiscal relief.