The Corporate & Commercial Law Society Blog, HNLU

Tag: CoC

  • The CCI’s Nod for Resolution Plans: The 2025 Amendment Strikes the Right Note

    The CCI’s Nod for Resolution Plans: The 2025 Amendment Strikes the Right Note

    BY VAISHNAV M, THIRD- YEAR STUDENT AT NUALS, KERALA

    INTRODUCTION

    The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘IBC’) ensconces a mechanism known as the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (‘CIRP’) that attempts to revive the Corporate Debtor (‘CD’) through restructuring and strategic resolution of debts. With the CD managed by a Resolution Professional (‘RP’), the Resolution Applicants (‘RA’) can propose restructuring plans to resolve debts and sustain the CD as a going concern.

    Where the plan involves acquisition, merger or amalgamation (collectively, ‘Combination’), it is important that the restructuring does not distort the competition in the market. This is where merger control and the Competition Commission of India (‘CCI’) step in. The Supreme Court in Independent Sugar Corporation Ltd. v. Girish Sriram & Ors (‘ISC’)dealt with the procedure to seek the CCI’s approval for combination during the insolvency process.

    The piece is not a general comment on the decision; instead, it aims to examine a particular point in the judgement that has not received the critical attention it deserves. That is, the particular stage at which the CCI-nod for the combination is to be obtained. This question is especially pertinent in the context of the recently introduced IBC (Amendment) Bill, 2025 (‘2025 Amendment’), which proposes to relax the timeline for the CCI’s approval for resolution plans.

    THE ISC CASE AND THE STATUS QUO

    In the ISC case, one of the RAs challenged the CIRP, citing many procedural laxities. One of the grounds was failure to seek approval of the CCI before placing the resolution plan before the Committee of Creditors (‘CoC’) for voting. According to Section 31(4) of the IBC, an RA has one year from the approval of the Adjudicating Authority (‘AA’) to obtain necessary clearances under other laws. But the proviso clarifies that the approval of the CCI for the combination is to be obtained before the approval of the CoC.

    Hitherto, the position was that this proviso is directory and not mandatory in nature, as laid down by the decision of the National Company Law Tribunal (‘NCLAT’) in Arcellor Mittal v Abhijit Guhakartha & Ors. The Supreme Court (‘SC’), in the ISC case, reversed the position by holding that the proviso is to be read literally, and treating it otherwise would render it obsolete. However, the proviso does not specify who seeks approval and at what stage before the CoC nod. In the scheme of CIRP, the stages preceding the CoC approval are:

    • Stage 1: Invitation for expression of interest from prospective RAs
    • Stage 2: Request for resolution plans from prospective RAs
    • Stage 3: Examination and confirmation of the plans by the RP
    • Stage 4: Voting by the CoC on the plans

    The SC in ISC clarified that the RA need not wait till submission of the plan to the RP before sending a notice to the CCI for approval. In effect, the approval of the CCI can be sought at any time, even in Stage 1 during the invitation for expression of interest at any point before Stage 4. The next section shall discuss the workability of the same.

    DETERMINING THE TRIGGER POINT FOR CCI NOTICE

    When to send the notice?

    According to Section 6 of the Competition Act, 2002, (‘the Competition Act’) an enterprise must send a notice of combination to the CCI when it executes any agreement or document for acquisition, or when the Board of Directors (‘Board’) of the enterprises involved approves the proposal for a merger or amalgamation.

    As held in ISC, an RA can send a notice to the CCI much before it submits its resolution plan to the RP. But is the requirement of an agreement or a decision for acquisition or the Board’s approval for merger met at Stages 1 and 2?

    An ‘agreement’ to acquire is a broad and liberal construct, and includes an arrangement of understanding or even an action in concert. Such an arrangement or understanding can be reflected in a formal or written form, and it need not have been formulated with the intent legal enforceability. In the case of the CIRP, the RP is tasked with managing the CD, including entering into contracts on behalf of the CD, courtesy Section 23 read with Section 20 of IBC. Resultantly, an agreement or understanding for the purpose of acquisition has to be between the RA proposing the combination on one side and the RP on the other side.

    But such an understanding or arrangement is absent at Stage 1. An agreement requires a meeting of minds of at least two parties, which is lacking when the RA is yet to share their proposal with the RP. Similarly, Stage 2 only marks a point where the RAs have prepared the plan. That does not signify an agreement as it is yet to be examined and understood by the RP.  

    At Stage 3, the RP examines the resolution plans proposed by the RAs and confirms whether they comply with the minimum essentials mandated by the law. This confirmation implies an agreement or an understanding, making Stage 3 and onwards the appropriate trigger for notice.

    Now, in the case of a merger or amalgamation, the notice is triggered only after the proposal is approved by the Board of both parties.[i]  In the case of a CD, the interim RP (‘IRP’) or the RP steps into the shoes of the management. Resultantly, the approval would have to be sought from the RP himself. Therefore, a notice for merger or amalgamation cannot be sent to the CCI before the plan is submitted to the RP and confirmed by them, which is Stage 3. So, the same conclusion follows – it is at Stage 3 that the notice is triggered.

    Who should send the notice?

    In the case of acquisition, the acquirer sends the notice.[ii] Generally, the successful RA submitting the plan acquires the target CD company, as was seen in the case of ISC. Therefore, it is the RA who is required to send the notice to the CCI. For merger or amalgamation, notice must be sent jointly by the RA and the RP.[iii]

    Suppose there are RAs intending to propose an acquisition in Stages 1 and 2, then all those RAs must send the notice to the CCI with the requisite fees,[iv] even before the plan is seen and examined by the RP. So, even RAs whose plan might not be voted in later would have to bear the cost at an early stage. Quite similarly, in the case of merger or amalgamation, the RP and the respective RA have to send the notice and pay the fees, jointly or severally.[v]Whether the RA or the RP handling the stressed CD would want to take the liability to pay the fees amid relative uncertainty is doubtful.

    WELCOMING THE 2025 AMENDMENT

    The 2025 Amendment has been appreciated for many desirable introductions, from the new ‘creditor-initiated insolvency resolution process’ to ‘group insolvency’. Clause 19(d) amends the proviso to Section 31(4), allowing the RA to obtain the CCI approval before submission to AA. So, the approval process can be deferred till the CoC votes on the plan and the Successful Resolution Applicant is identified. The minor change resolves the above-discussed problem of redundancy, while leaving room for seeking approval at an earlier stage.

    There are certain concerns regarding the amendment as well, but these can be addressed duly. One of the concerns is regarding compliance with the CIRP timeline of 330 days under Section 12 of the Code. However, 330 days is a general rule. The Court has already held, previously as well as in ISC, that the breach of the time-limit can be condoned in exceptional circumstances where any blame for such a delay cannot be attributed to any of the parties.

    In case the plan approved by the CoC is rejected by the CCI, it must be modified to address those objections. However, the successful RA cannot make any change at its own behest. So, once changes are made, the CoC must approve it again. Essentially, such a rejection need not be fatal to the CIRP, though it may elongate the process. In any case, Clause 19(b) of the 2025 Amendments allows the AA to return back the plan to the CoC for correcting any defects. What it reflects is that alterations made post first CoC approval is not doctrinally unacceptable. When CCI recommends changes, the CoC is well-equipped to accommodate it then and there. 

    Therefore, the proposed amendment to the procedure for CCI approval of the resolution plan is a pragmatic improvement as it spares the RA and the RP from the additional paperwork and costs that are characteristic of the existing position.

    CONCLUDING REMARKS

    The current position as settled in the ISC case does not gel well with reality. Even though it seems to make available a broad period for sending the notice, starting from Stage 1, it is generally not possible to send a notice until Stage 3 when the trigger for the notice under the Competition Act is activated. In rare cases with only one RA and mutual certainty as to the terms of the combination, this proposition in ISC might be of some use. Such cases are rare in the typically uncertain flow of business in the CIRP.

    The proposed change in the 2025 Amendment reflects the reality. The RAs and the RP can even wait till the CoC approval to send the notice. This improves ease of doing business and provides more leeway for the stakeholders to ensure compliance.

    [i] Competition Commission of India (Combinations) Regulations, 2024, Reg. 5(7).

    [ii] Id., Reg. 9(1).

    [iii] Id., Reg. 9(3).

    [iv] Id., Regs. 10, 11.

    [v] Id., Regs. 10(2), 9(3).

  • A New Chapter in India’s Insolvency Law: What the 2025 Amendments Mean for Stakeholders

    A New Chapter in India’s Insolvency Law: What the 2025 Amendments Mean for Stakeholders

    BY Suprava Sahu, Fourth-Year student at gnlu, Gandhinagar
    INTRODUCTION

    The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘IBC’) marked a shift in India’s approach to the corporate resolution process. By changing a fragmented framework into a unified, creditor-centric process, IBC aimed to expedite the resolution of non-performing assets and enhance the ease of doing business. While studies have highlighted that IBC succeeded in improving recovery rates and reducing the timelines, structural issues began to surface as the code matured. Delays in the resolution, underutilization of viable assets, and limited investor participation called for reform.

    Recognizing this need, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (‘IBBI’) introduced the IBBI ((Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Fourth Amendment Regulations 2025 which aim to address the inefficiencies and enhance the effectiveness of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (‘CIRP’). Key features of this amendment include enabling part-wise resolution of corporate debtors, harmonizing payment timelines for dissenting creditors, and mandating the presentation of all resolution plans to the Committee of Creditors (‘CoC’).

    The piece unpacks whether the regulatory changes align with the IBC and its intended goals or are just a mere paper over the institutional cracks.

    DIAGNOSING THE IBC’S STRUCTURE

    IBC rests on three foundational pillars: maximizing the value of assets, ensuring a time-bound insolvency process, and balancing the interests of all stakeholders. These principles are affirmed as the foundational principle behind the IBC by cases like Essar Steel India Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta.

    Yet these principles exist in tension. For example, despite the 190–270-day timeline for the CIRP, the IBBI’s quarterly report shows that  more than 60% of the CIRPs have exceeded the timelines, which leads to diminished asset value, deters strategic investors, and disrupts the objective of value maximization.

    The framework also gives substantial control to financial creditors via the CoC, with operational creditors having a very limited say. This structure offers swift decision making it has attracted criticism for privileging institutional lenders at the cost of small creditors. The introduction of staged payments for dissenting creditors and asset-specific resolution under the new regulations can be seen as a regulatory response to this imbalance.

    The IBC initially favoured a rigid process to instill discipline in resolution, but a one-size-fits-all model may stifle innovation. Scholars have argued that insolvency systems need to adapt to varied market structures and varied market structures especially in emerging economies. A key question remains: can a rigid, rule-bound structure effectively adapt to the complexities of a diverse insolvency system? The amendments must be understood not as isolated tweaks but as strategic interventions to reconcile the tensions inbuilt in the IBC’s design.

    DISSECTING THE KEY AMENDMENTS

    The amendment introduces four main changes each targeting to address long-standing inefficiencies and gaps in the stakeholder engagement.

    • Part-wise Resolution of Corporate Debtors

    The amended regulations now allow the Resolution Professionals (‘RPs’)to invite resolution plans for specific business segments of the corporate debtor in addition to the entire company. This creates a dual-track mechanism that offers unprecedented flexibility to the CoC and RPs. It is grounded on the fact that many insolvency cases involve heterogeneous assets, some of which are viable, some of which are distressed. Under the earlier regime, focusing on a holistic resolution often led to delayed proceedings and discouraged potential resolution applicants who were only interested in certain businesses. A similar model has been employed in jurisdictions like UK, where the pre-pack administrative sales and partial business transfers allow administrators to sell parts of their enterprise to recover the maximum value. Studies have advocated for asset-wise flexibility as a strategy to reduce liquidation rates and protect value.

    However, this reform risks of cherry picking, where bidders might try to choose profitable units while leaving liabilities and nonperforming divisions. This can potentially undermine the equitable treatment of creditors and complicate the valuation standard and fair assessment. This concern was evident in cases like Jet Airways where bidders sought profitable slots while avoiding liabilities. Jurisdictions like the UK mitigate this through independent scrutiny in pre-pack sales, a safeguard which India could adapt.

    • Harmonized Payment Timelines for Dissenting Creditors

    In cases like Jaypee Kensington and Essar Steel, the Supreme Court upheld that dissenting creditors must receive at least the liquidation value but left ambiguity on payment. Previously, the treatment of dissenting creditors lacked clarity, especially around the payment timelines. The amendment resolves this ambiguity by laying down a clear rule. . By ensuring that dissenters are not disadvantaged for opposing the majority, it reinforces a sense of procedural justice and also encourages more critical scrutiny of resolution plans within the CoC. It seeks to balance the majority rule with individual creditor rights, thereby enhancing the quality of proceedings.

    But, this provision could also complicate cash flow planning for resolution applicants and disincentivize performance-based payouts. Early, mandatory payouts to dissenters could affect plan viability and reduce the flexibility needed for restructuring. There is also a risk that dissenters may use their position to strategically extract early payments, leading to non-cooperation or tactical dissent – an issue which the amendment has left unaddressed.

    The balancing act between fairness and functionality can be seen as a reform which not just enhances inclusivity but also introduces a new operational pressures.  

    • Enhanced role for interim finance providers

    Another noteworthy intervention is that the CoC may now direct RPs to invite interim finance providers to attend CoC meetings as observers. These entities will not have voting rights but their presence is expected to improve the informational symmetry within the decision-making process. Finance providers have more risk when they are lending to distressed entities. Allowing them to observe deliberation offers more visibility into how their funds are being used and enhances lender confidence. From a stakeholder theory perspective, this inclusion marks a shift away from creditor dominance towards a more pluralist approach. This was also argued by Harvard Professor Robert Clark, who stated that insolvency regimes must recognize the varied capital interests involved in business rescue.

    While the introduction of interim finance providers promotes transparency and may increase lender confidence, the observer status needs to be carefully managed. Without clear boundaries, non-voting participants could still exert indirect influence on CoC deliberations or access sensitive information. To mitigate such risks, the IBBI could consider issuing guidelines to standardize observer conduct. This highlights a broader concern – expanding stakeholder involvement without proper guardrails, which may create issues in the already complex process.

    • Mandatory Presentation of All Resolution Plans to the CoC

    Earlier, RPs would filter out non-compliant plans and only present eligible ones to the CoC. The new amendment mandates all resolution plans to be submitted to the CoC along with the details of non-compliance. This reform shifts from RP discretion to CoC empowerment. It repositions the RP as a facilitator and reduces the risk of biased exclusion of potential plans.

    The amendment enhances transparency and aligns with the principles of creditor autonomy, which states that the legitimacy of the insolvency process depends not only on outcomes but on stakeholder confidence in the process. It also carries a risk of “decision fatigue” if the CoC is flooded with irrelevant non-viable proposals. The RP’s expert assessment should still carry some weight and structured formats for presenting non-compliant plans may be needed to make this reform operationally sound.

    Taken together, the amendments do not merely fix operational gaps they reflect a broader evolution of India’s insolvency framework from rigidity to responsiveness.

    STAKEHOLDER IMPLICATIONS & CONCERNS

    The regulation significantly rebalances roles within the CIRP, with distinct implications for each stakeholder. For Financial Creditors, part-wise resolutions, allowing staged payments and overseeing finance participants through the CoC has deepened their influence. This aligns with the creditor-in-control model, which states that power demands fiduciary accountability. Dominant creditors could steer outcomes for selective benefit, risking intra-creditor conflicts previously flagged by IBBI.

    Dissenting creditors now gain recognition through statute in phased payouts, ensuring they receive pro rata payments before consenting creditors at each stage. However, operational creditors remain outside the decision-making process, raising concerns about continued marginalization. This concern was also highlighted by IBBI that insolvency regimes that overlook smaller creditors risk creating long-term trust deficits in the process. RPs must now present all resolution plans, including the non-compliant ones to the CoC. This not just curtails arbitrary filtering but also increases the administrative burden.. Beyond the RP’s procedural role, the reforms also alter the landscape for resolution applicants.  The amendment benefits RPs by offering flexibility to bid for specific parts of a debtor. This may attract specialized investors and increase participation. However, unless the procedural efficiencies are addressed alongside the increased discretion, both RPs and applicants may find themselves in navigating through a system which is transparent but increasingly complex.

    CONCLUSION AND WAY FORWARD

    The Fourth Amendment to the CIRP reflects a bold move that seeks to move from a procedural rigidity towards an adaptive resolution strategy. The reforms aim to align the IBC more closely with the global best practices which are mainly focused on value maximization and creditor democracy. Yet as numerous scholars have emphasized insolvency reform is as much about institutional capability and procedural discipline as it is about legal design. The real test would lie in implementation, how the CoCs exercise their enhanced discretion and how RPs manage rising procedural complexity. Equally important is ensuring that small creditors, operational stakeholders and dissenters are not left behind.

    Going forward, further reforms are needed which include standard guidelines for plan evaluation, better institutional support and capacity upgrades for the NCLTs. Without these, the system risks duplicating the old inefficiencies. Overall, the 2025 reform represents a necessary evolution, but whether it becomes a turning point or a missed opportunity will depend on how effectively the ecosystem responds.

  • Determination of the Status of A Creditor: Artificial Wisdom of the Committee of Creditors

    Determination of the Status of A Creditor: Artificial Wisdom of the Committee of Creditors

    A 4-minute read by Arihant Jain, a fourth-year student of Nirma University

    The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (‘NCLAT’) on 18.12.20 in the case of Rajnish Jain v. BVN Traders and ors (‘Rajnish Jain’)held that the Committee of Creditors (‘CoC’) constituted under Section 21 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy IBC, 2016 (‘IBC’) cannot determine the status of a creditor as a financial or an operational creditor. It is a matter of applying insolvency law to the facts of each case. The judgment clarified that only the adjudicating authority has power to adjudicate the status of a creditor as a financial or an operational creditor. The author hereinafter highlights the judiciousness of the Rajnish Jain judgment in the light of the principle of equality of similarly situated creditors, commercial wisdom of the CoC & limited rights of the CoC under the IBC.

    Factual Background

    The National Company Law Tribunal, Allahabad (‘NCLT’) admitted an application under Section 9 of the IBC to initiate Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (‘CIRP’) against the corporate debtor, Jain Mfg (India) Pvt. Ltd. BVN Traders,the Respondent in this case had extended a loan of Rs. 80,00,000 to the corporate debtor having a secured title deed of the property of corporate debtor against the consideration of 18% per annum. BVN Traders had filed FORM C as financial creditors and the insolvency resolution professional (‘IRP’) admitted the claim of BVN Traders as a financial creditor.

    Rajnish Jain, the promoter, stakeholder and managing director of the corporate debtor, filed an application for removal of BVN Traders from the status of financial creditor. The NCLT directed the resolution professional (‘RP’) of the corporate debtor to seek approval from the CoC to change the status of BVN traders from financial creditor. Pursuant to this, the CoC passed a resolution that BVN Traders is to be treated as financial creditors.  In light of this resolution, the NCLT rejected the claim of the promoter via order dated 23.01.20.

    Subsequently, in the 7th meeting of CoC, the RP again proposed the agenda to determine status of BVN Traders. The CoC passed a resolution with its majority that BVN Traders is not a financial creditor. The CoC also discussed the agenda regarding withdrawal of CIRP under Section 12A of the IBC and for the same, prior approval of 90% majority of voting shares of CoC is required. However, the withdrawal resolution did not attain the 90% majority and the same was not passed. In the 8th meeting of the CoC, withdrawal of CIRP process was again discussed and the same was passed by CoC without including BVN Traders in the CoC. An appeal was filed by Rajnish Jain against the order dated 23.01.20 of the NCLT.

    Decision of the NCLAT:

    The NCLAT observed that the CoC cannot determine the status of creditor. It is a matter of applying the applying the IBC laws to facts. It further held that CoC cannot use its commercial wisdom to determine the status of creditor. The NCLAT observed that despite the order being passed by the NCLT, the CoC proceeded to change its earlier stance and passed a resolution contrary to NCLT order, thereby undermining its authority. The NCLAT also held that the resolution passed in the 8th meeting was bad in law since it was passed after illegally reconstituting the CoC. 

    Current Position of Law 

    Financial creditor and Operational creditor are defined under Sections 5(7) and 5(20) of the IBC. Pertinently, the Supreme Court’s judgment in the case of Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd v.UOI differentiated both the terms by relying on the recommendation of  BLRC Report, 2015:

    “Financial creditors are those whose relationship with the entity is a pure financial contract, such as a loan or a debt security. Operational creditors are those whose liability from the entity comes from a transaction on operations.”

    Further, in Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd and ors v. UOI, the Apex Court observed that financial creditors owe financial debt to meet the working capital or requirement of corporate debtor. On the other hand, operational creditors provide goods and service to the corporate person. In the instant case, the loan extended to corporate debtor is a pure financial contract to meet the working requirement. Therefore, the NCLAT has rightly denied the arbitrary decision of CoC in determining the status of creditor.

    Analysis

    • Principle of Equality – Similarly situated creditors should be treated alike

    Article 14 of Constitution of India provides that equals should be treated equally and unequal should be treated unequally. Further, in CoC of Essar Steel Limited through Authorised Signatory v. Satish Kumar Gupta and ors., the Apex Court observed that similarly situated creditors should be treated equally. Empowering the CoC to determine the status of a creditor will create inequality amongst the same class of creditors as other creditors of the CoC would determine the status of a creditor of the CoC who is in pari passu with them. In the instant case, the NCLT failed to consider the principle of equality by authorizing the CoC to determine the status of BVN Traders.

    • Commercial wisdom of the CoC – Not an absolute power

    Commercial wisdom of the CoC is not an absolute power. The Apex Court in CoC of Essar Steel Limited through Authorised Signatory v. Satish Kumar Gupta and ors has observed that commercial wisdom must be in consonance with the basic aims and objectives of IBC.  Decision of the CoC is subject to checks and balances of the IBC. In Swiss Ribbons Pvt Ltd. v. UOI, the Supreme Court has observed that the primary objective of the IBC is to balance the interests of all stakeholders. Under the IBC, an aggrieved person has the authority to challenge the constitution of CoC or categorization of creditors before the adjudicating authority. In the instant case, reclassifying the status of creditor by CoC is beyond the scope of commercial wisdom since it is in the hands of adjudicating authority to adjudicate the claims of categorization of creditors. Under Section 61(1) of the IBC, aggrieved party may challenge the order passed by NCLT before the NCLAT. However, in the instant case, the CoC sat in the position of NCLAT and gave a resolution contrary to the order passed the NCLT, which is beyond the aims and objectives of the IBC.

    •  The IBC is a complete code in itself

    Section 28(1) of the IBC which enumerates the conditions where prior approval of the CoC is required does not provide for seeking it for the determination of the status of a creditor during CIRP. Moreover, no provision under the IBC empowers the CoC to determine the status of a creditor. It is also pertinent to mention that the IBC is complete in itself. It has unambiguously laid down the powers of the CoC. 

    Further, an aggrieved party dissatisfied with the status of a creditor can submit an application to the NCLT through RP with the approval of 90% voting share of the CoC for the withdrawal of CIRP. However, in the 7th meeting of CoC in the instant case, only 66% of the CoC approved the withdrawal of CIRP. Further, a financial creditor, being a part of the CoC, cannot be excluded from taking part in the voting process of withdrawal of CIRP process. It would be violation of legal right of creditor of CoC mentioned under Section 12A of IBC.  However, in the 8th meeting of the CoC in the instant case, BVN Traders was not allowed to vote for the withdrawal of CIRP. Hence, the legal right of BVN Traders to vote under Section 12A is being defeated. 

    Judgment of Adjudicating Authority: It is a matter of applying law to the facts of each case    

     It is pertinent to mention that it is the statutory duty of court to deliver any judgment based upon the law. For clarifications, the court has the authority to take the opinion of experts. However, the judgment cannot be based solely on the expert opinion. The judgment has to be delivered by applying the law to the facts. In the instant case, the NCLT had delivered its judgment based solely on the decision of the CoC, however, the status of a creditor needs to be determined by the NCLT by applying the IBC to the facts of each case. The NCLAT has rightly clarified that the status of creditor could be determined only by applying the IBC to the facts of each case. 

    Conclusion

    The NCLAT has rightly adjudicated the matter by removing the flaws of NCLT’s decision which   would have led toimbalance by going against the purpose of commercial wisdom of the CoC. CIRP being the collective resolution process seeks parity amongst similarly situated creditors. Preference cannot be given to any similarly situated creditors. The adjudicating authority, by not providing legal reasoning for empowering the CoC to determine the status of creditor failed to consider that legal reasoning is the core of any judgment. The NCLAT has rightly adjudicated that empowering the CoC with such rights would have completely disabled the intent and purpose of the CIRP under the IBC.