The Corporate & Commercial Law Society Blog, HNLU

Tag: Companies Act

  • Settlement Agreements and Section 12A Withdrawals: A Comparison with Section 230 of the Companies Act, 2013

    Settlement Agreements and Section 12A Withdrawals: A Comparison with Section 230 of the Companies Act, 2013

    BY ARSHIA ANN JOY AND ADITI SINGH, FOURTH-YEAR STUDENTS AT NUALS, KOCHI.

    Introduction

    A liquidation order is passed as per the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 (“IBC“)  when the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (“CIRP“) falls through, and the company cannot be revived within the stipulated timeline. However, courts, over time, have interpreted that issuing a liquidation order is not to be treated as a death sentence to the company and its operations. This is because the ultimate aim of the IBC is to facilitate the revival of the company if it is a feasible option. This further implies that the order permitting an entity’s liquidation can be reversed if the petition initiating CIRP proceedings is itself withdrawn. Section 12A was introduced in the IBC in 2018 to allow settlements between the Corporate Debtor (“CD“) and the creditors by allowing withdrawal of proceedings, with 1035 such withdrawals recorded till December 2023.

    This article explores the legality of allowing the withdrawal of proceedings after issuing the liquidation order, when a settlement agreement is reached. The authors also look at how the lack of procedural clarity surrounding the acceptance of the settlement agreement leads to difficulties in reviving the CIRP if the settlement agreement fails. Further, solutions are suggested through a comparison with section 230 of the Companies Act, 2013 (“CA”), which facilitates arrangements aiming at debt restructuring and thereby resolving the financial crisis of the company. The authors argue that allowing the Adjudicating Authority (“AA”) to thoroughly analyse the settlement agreements while admitting section 12A applications, similar to the procedure envisaged in section 230 of CA, would be a step in the right direction in addressing the ambiguities surrounding the withdrawal of CIRP and revival of proceedings, if need be.

    Reversibility of a Liquidation Order and Withdrawal of Proceedings Post Issuance of Liquidation Order

    The parties are said to have arrived at a settlement agreement if the CD agrees to pay the creditor an agreed sum to resolve the conflict. Once a settlement agreement is reached after a liquidation order is passed, the parties can approach the AA under section 12A and withdraw the proceedings initiating CIRP. The primary intention behind introducing section 12A is to recognise post-admission settlement cases in line with statutory provisions. 

    The NCLAT, in Navaneetha Krishnan v. Central Bank of India, settled the law on reversibility of a liquidation order. It was held that even during the liquidation period, if any person satisfies the Committee of Creditors (“CoC”) , and CoC accepts the said offer with a 90% voting share, such a person may apply for a withdrawal of the proceedings before the AA.

    In 2019, the NCLAT, in a similar case, emphasised the importance of allowing the promoters/shareholders to arrive at a settlement as per section 12A. In such cases, the application seeking initiation of CIRP can be withdrawn. The Supreme Court in Vallal RCK v. Siva Industries held that the wisdom of the CoC in approving a settlement plan must not be interfered with by the AA unless such a decision was wholly ‘capricious, arbitrary, irrational and de hors the provisions of the statute or the Rules.’ In this case, the CoC had failed to approve the proposed resolution plan with the requisite 66% majority. Subsequently, the Resolution Professional filed an application under section 33(1)(a) of IBC seeking liquidation of the entity pending which the promoter of the CD approached the AA with a settlement plan. The AA had, in turn, refused to approve it without giving due regard to the 90% majority decision of the CoC to go ahead with the settlement plan. 

    More recently, in 2022, the NCLT analysed the rationale put forth in Navaneetha Krishnan and Vallal RCK to conclude that even after the order of liquidation is passed, the application for withdrawal of proceedings may be allowed. In this case, the liquidator had received a settlement proposal from the promoter of the CD duly approved by the CoC with the requisite majority. 

    The NCLT Chennai Bench rightly noted:

    “Thus, it could be seen that even during the liquidation process, the parties have arrived at a settlement, then the application filed under Section 7, 9 and 10 can be withdrawn. Consequently, the CIRP and the liquidation initiated against the CD also stand withdrawn.”

    Thus, the order of liquidation already passed does not hinder the AA from passing an appropriate order of withdrawal as per section 12A if all the requisite conditions are satisfied.

    The Dilemma: Applying Section 12A Post Issuance of Liquidation Order

    Although the law seems to be settled regarding the impact of section 12A on a liquidation order, the lack of procedural clarity has led to contradictory results in the past few years. 

    In Jayashree Mohan v. Pathukasahasram Raghunathan, the NCLT laid down the limited scope available for reviving an entity undergoing liquidation. It was stated that once the liquidation process is initiated, the entity cannot come out of the process except through the two avenues, namely, by way of a scheme under section 230 of CA or by sale as a going concern. In this case, section 12A is not seen as a potential avenue which could result in the revival of the entity once liquidation is initiated.

    Similarly, the NCLT Chennai bench in Narayan Maheshwari disallowed the withdrawal application made under section 12A while the liquidation process was going on. It was emphasised that section 12A was inserted in Part II of the IBC, which deals exclusively with CIRP and not liquidation. Since no specific amendment is made in the liquidation process regulations, an application for withdrawal under section 12A cannot be allowed post-issuance of a liquidation order. It was further held that in Navaneetha Krishnan, the application under section 12A was never filed during liquidation and that the ex-promoter of the CD had filed an application under section 230 of CA for approving a scheme of compromise. In this case, the NCLT has voiced its concerns regarding allowing withdrawal of proceedings once the order of liquidation has been passed as it might potentially lead to every suspended Director/Promoters waiting till the liquidation order to enter into a settlement agreement at a ‘throw away price.’

    The above rationale of the tribunals could hamper the prospects of reviving a company through settlement, just because the order of liquidation has been initiated against it, thus defeating the purpose for which section 12A was included in the IBC. The application of section 12A to Part III of the IBC has to be specifically inculcated in the regulations to put a rest to these contradictory judgements.

    Revival of CIRP in case of Failure of Settlement Agreement

    In  the cases where withdrawal of proceedings was allowed after issuing the order of liquidation, the stakeholders had agreed on a one-time settlement (“OTS”) or a settlement agreement. In Sudip Dutta, the NCLT, while analysing a catena of decisions including Navaneetha Krishnan stated that:

    “In the instant case, no application was filed under Section 12A of IBC since there was no OTS that was acceptable to the Respondent No. 2 bank.”

    As noted above, the application for withdrawal under section 12A is considered after the issuance of the liquidation order only when the CoC approves a settlement agreement with the requisite majority. 

    However, the procedure for accepting or analysing such a settlement agreement is not specified in the statute or the relevant regulations. As seen above, the commercial wisdom of the CoC is given primacy and judicial intervention is permitted only if the decision of the CoC was wholly arbitrary or capricious. Analysing whether the decision itself was arbitrary or capricious would, in turn, require the settlement agreement to be on the record, which might not happen in most cases, especially when the statute/regulations fail to mandate the same, as was noted by the NCLAT in Krishna Garg. 

    In this case, the CD did not adhere to the terms of the settlement agreement after the CIRP proceedings were withdrawn. The NCLAT refused to revive the CIRP proceedings because the settlement agreement terms were not filed or brought on record before it. The NCLAT in SRLK Enterprises categorically stated that IBC is not a recovery proceeding where parties can repeatedly approach the AA owing to the non-repayment of debt. Proceedings can be revived only if the settlement agreement has been brought on record and has been made a part of the order of withdrawal. The AA can revive the CIRP proceedings, if the settlement agreement has a clause which provides for the revival of CIRP proceedings upon failure of setttlement agreement. The AA need not specifically grant the liberty to revive the proceedings in such cases. This would also imply that if there is no such clause allowing revival, the parties may be granted the liberty to do so specifically, by the AA. These recent orders suggest that the settlement agreement need not always become a part of the order allowing the withdrawal of proceedings, thus complicating the revival of proceedings under the IBC later when the parties fail to adhere to the settlement terms.

    Additionally, in Vallal RCK, the Supreme Court noted how the CoC has entered into many ‘deliberations’ before accepting the settlement plan, and stated that the CoC decision is not ordinarily subject to judicial scrutiny. The analysis done by the court gets confined to checking whether the CoC has done enough ‘deliberations’ before approving the settlement agreement. This seems to be in stark contrast to the procedure followed under section 230 of CA, where the AA is empowered to delve deeper into the actual contents of the proposed scheme.

    Comparison with Section 230 of the Companies Act, 2013

    Even after passing the order of liquidation, if a scheme of Compromise demonstrates viability, feasibility, optimisation of the CD’s assets, and equitable consideration of creditors, the liquidator may submit an application under section 230 of the CA to the AA in a bid to revive the company. As per regulation 2B of the Liquidation Process Regulations 2016, a scheme of compromise and arrangement may be completed within 90 days post the order of liquidation. 

    Furthermore, clauses (2) to (10) of section 230 puts forth the powers of the AA in overseeing the admission of the scheme of compromise and arrangement. The AA is to be made aware of the latest financial position of the entity, the creditor’s responsibility statement, the auditor’s report on the fund requirements, the valuation report on the assets of the company, etc. Further, in SREI Equipment Finance Limited, the NCLAT observed that sections 230-232 cast an obligation on the AA to ensure that the scheme is not contrary to public policy and not prejudicial to the company’screditors and members. Greater checks and balances are put in place under section 230 of the CA while admitting a proposed scheme of compromise and arrangement even after a liquidation order is passed.

    Conclusion and Recommendations

    A similar procedural clarity on the AA’s oversight is absent when it comes to the role of the AA in a section 12A application involving a settlement agreement. Section 12A must specifically be made applicable to Part III of the IBC. Further, a time period may be mentioned in section 12A, similar to section 230 of CA, for accepting and analysing the settlement agreement once the AA has issued the order for liquidation. The regulations must also specify that the settlement agreement entered into must mandatorily be brought on record while withdrawing the proceedings so that revival of the CIRP can be made possible without much hassle if the said agreement falls through at a later stage.

  • Mandatory Dematerialisation of Securities: Unveiling the new MCA Amendment

    Mandatory Dematerialisation of Securities: Unveiling the new MCA Amendment

    BY TARUN THAKUR, A SECOND-YEAR STUDENT AT NLUO, CUTTACK

    Introduction

    In an interesting move recently, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) vide notification on 27 October 2023 introduced the Companies (Prospectus and Allotment of Securities) Second Amendment Rules, 2023. Now, this amendment has inserted Rule 9B which stipulates that securities issued by private companies must be in a dematerialised form, and further mandates that both issue and facilitation of its existing securities should necessarily be in dematerialised form. This is a major leap as now securities can now only be in dematerialised form. After this amendment, with effect from 30 September 2024, a private company has to comply with the new rules.

    This amendment does not come as a huge surprise to the private companies as there were already discussions in the market from a long time that soon it will become mandatory that securities must be held in dematerialised form. Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) in its report titled – Report of the Group on Reduction of Demat Charges that was released in early 2004 highlighted the risks involved when dealing with physical shares and SEBI also stated that it is playing an important role in in nurturing the growth of dematerialisation of securities in the country. So, from the report it is very coherent that even SEBI was in favour of dematerialisation at that time and was also working to achieve it. Moreover, the CLC working committee report was released last year in March 2022 which also hinted towards the new amendment that has been done to the Companies (Prospectus and Allotment of Securities) Rules, 2014 (PAS rules), as it noted the advantages of dematerialisation and also proposed that the Companies Act, 2013 (CA) should be amended and issue, transfer and facilitation of securities should be done only in dematerialised form.

    Tracing the origins of dematerialization

    Now before moving forward with the intricacies and challenges that this amendment poses it is crucial to know about dematerialisation and its inception. The term “dematerialisation” simply means converting physical shares and securities into electronic form and it was first introduced in the Depository Act, 1996 (DA 1996), as section 9(1) of the Act states that all securities pertaining to a depository shall be dematerialised.

    This was the inception point when securities facilitation and storage started in dematerialised form.  It is also noteworthy that Section- 29 of the CA broadened the scope of dematerilization as it mandates that the issuance of securities should only be in dematerialized form, thus complimenting the DA.  

     Understanding the rationale behind mandatory dematerilisation

    The main contention revolves around the rationale behind making dematerilisation mandatory for the private companies  Earlier in 2018, MCA amended the PAS Rules (2018 Amendment) which inserted Rule 9A and made it mandatory for the public companies to issue and facilitate existing securities in dematerialised form. The same Rules have been applied to the private companies via the new amendment with minor differences.

    Dematerialization combats back-dated transactions and improves transparency of the system. Backdating is the practice of changing a document’s date to an earlier one but when the documents pertaining to shares will be in an electronic form than backdating cannot be done, hence transparency will get bolstered.  Furthermore, dematerialization assists in real-time monitoring of any non-compliance of rules that has been done by any company due to its electronic nature and strict regulatory oversight.

    Challenges Ahead: Examining the Transition to Dematerialisation

    The current amendment exempts only small and government companies from mandatory dematerilisation in contrast to its previous 2018 Amendment, which in addition to small and government companies, also exempted Nidhi companies and wholly owned subsidiaries from mandatory dematerilisation. The reason cited for this was that these type of companies have limited number of shareholders. This gives rise to a pertinent question – why is there a diversion from the previous 2018 amendment, and what is the rationale behind not exempting Nidhi companies and wholly owned subsidiaries in the current amendment?

    One justification for non-exemption might be to fill in the gaps that existed in the 2018 amendment. An additional and more convincing rationale could be that the government is rapidly approaching dematerialization and any exemption granted to any company will eventually run its course. As a result, soon there will be no company that will be exempted from dematerialization. To maintain a cohesive framework, MCA must address the concerns of the stakeholders.

    Further, while extension of the dematerialized realm to private companies seems like a bold move, the compliance timeline given to the private companies is only 18 months i.e. till 30 September 2024, after which issuance and transfer of securities can only happen in demat form.  In India, there are 24,61,937 private companies that are currently registered. . All of these companies will be filing applications in the NSDL and CSDL for the conversion of securities. Consequently, the main concern is whether both these systems have the requisite digital infrastructure and technology to not only facilitate this conversion of securities, but also facilitate them in a fast and smoother way as massive amount of applications may pose operational challenges to both of them.

    Another  obstacle is that a private subsidiary company cannot qualify as a small company.  In case of subsidiaries of private foreign companies, they will also need to adhere to the new rules that have been notified. This will be cumbersome for both, the government and private foreign companies, as they will need to open a demat account with SEBI which requires them to complete a comprehensive Know Your Customer (KYC) process and also obtain a permanent account number (PAN).  This will be taxing for the government as there will be an influx of foreign entities trying to obtain PAN. Moreover, the private foreign companies will also face a challenge as even after obtaining PAN after a comprehensive process, they will have to incur a recurring cost to maintain their demat account.

    Course of Action for Private companies

    In order to comply with the new regulations, private enterprises will need to take a few steps as a result of this amendment. Initially, in order to facilitate the dematerialisation of securities, a private company must get the International Securities Identification Number (ISIN) for each security. Subsequently, the company must notify its shareholders of this information. A private company’s securities should only be issued and transferred in dematerialised form once its share capital has been dematerialised. Additionally, the dematerialisation of the securities held by the company’s directors and promoters should be required. The amendment does not provide for any penal sanctions for non-compliance but on non-compliance a private company will not be able to facilitate transfer of securities and if a there is any grievance a security holder has then it will be resolved by the Investor Education and Protection Fund Authority (IEPFA).

    Concluding thoughts

    This amendment though has some issues but this is a major transformation from the conventional system where the transfer and issuance of securities was done in physical form. Dematerialization shall help in  bringing more efficiency and transparency into the system. Further, from the regulators point of view, this will help them in tackling and mitigating benami transactions and theft by incorporating this new technology driven digital system. It is still debatable whether there is adequate infrastructure to sustain this paradigm shift. The government has to ensure that intact systems are placed so as to regulate and facilitate changes that this new amendment will bring.

    Electronic form of securities also helps in tracking real time market movements and see if there is any suspicious activity which cannot be done in the case of physical securities. While a company has to bear printing expense in case of physical securities, a much lower cost is involved in managing electronic securities. Also, the stringent KYC norms posed by this amendment give an overriding benefit to the government as it will help them to maintain a comprehensive database which would further help in bringing more transparency in the system and make it more robust.

    In the end, it can be stated that this is a major progressive reform but there are some concerns that needs to be addressed by the MCA.

  • Section 68 of FERA: Liability Of Directors For Offences Committed By Companies

    Section 68 of FERA: Liability Of Directors For Offences Committed By Companies

    BY RISHABH KUMAR, FOURTH-YEAR STUDENT AT NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY, JODHPUR

    The Liability of people acting on behalf of companies, for offences committed by companies, has been a very widely debated topic under the law of corporate governance. The general rule in the cases involving criminal liability stands against vicarious liability. This means that no one can be held criminally liable for offences committed by others. However, this general rule is overridden by specific provisions, provided by statutes, extending liability to others. An example of one of such provisions can be found under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (‘FERA’). Section 68(1) of FERA provides that, in case of contravention of any of the provisions of the act by a company, a person in charge of, and responsible to the company for, the conduct of the business of the company has to be deemed guilty. Recently,in the case of Shailendra Swarup v. The Deputy Director, Enforcement Directorate, a bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealt with the question of liability for offences under FERA, committed by a company, and the procedure for attributing such liability to persons acting on behalf of the company. 

    Facts

    A show cause notice was issued by the Enforcement Directorate against all the directors of a company named Modi Xerox Ltd. (‘MXL‘) for alleged violation of FERA provisions.  The appellant, Mr.Shailendra Swarup was a practising advocate of the Supreme Court and only a part-time non-executive director of MXL. He replied to the show cause notice stating that he was a part-time non- executive director for MXL and that he was not in the employment of the company nor he played any role in conducting the affairs of the company. Irrespective of this, the Enforcement Directorate went on to conduct a hearing, implicating the appellant and imposed a fine of Rs. 1,00,000/- on all the directors including the appellant. On appeal, this order was upheld by the appellate tribunal as well as the High Court resulting in an appeal before the Supreme Court.

    Judgment

    It was held by the court that, the adjudicating officer was wrong in imposing a penalty on the appellant and, the same was wrongly upheld by the appellate tribunal as well as the High Court. Moving further on, the court held that, for holding a person liable under the provisions of FERA, the active involvement of such person in company affairs must be looked into rather than just superficially taking into consideration the designation they are accorded. The court, to come to this conclusion, heavily relied on the ratio of judgments involving section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (“NIA”).

    Ratio

    The court said that, section 68(1) of FERA contains a legal fiction, i.e. “shall be deemed to be guilty” which is qualified by certain conditions that have to be fulfilled in order to establish liability under the provision. The conditions as mentioned in the provision require a person to be in charge of, and responsible to the company for, the conduct of the business of the company for them to be liable for any contravention of the section. In N. Rangacharivs. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited, the apex court had observed that, although a person in the commercial world transacting with a company is entitled to presume that the directors of the company are in charge of the affairs of the company, the court has held that such a presumption is rebuttable. The provision cannot be interpreted in a manner so as to implicate each and every person who was a director of the company at the time the offence was committed. Therefore, if a person is to be proceeded against and punished for any contravention, necessary ingredients as required by section 68 have to be fulfilled.

    Since the appellant was just a part-time non-executive director and was neither in charge of nor responsible for the conduct of the business of the company, the ingredients under Section 68 are not fulfilled in order to hold  him liable for the contravention.

    Relevance of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

    In view of the court, section 68 of FERA is pari materia to Section 141 of NIA, 1881. Section 141 of NIA imposes the liability of a company, for the dishonour of cheques, on a person who at the time of such dishonour was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company. Therefore, the ratio of judgments involving liability under section 141 of the NIA, 1881 are of considerable importance while interpreting section 68 of FERA.

    The ratio of the following two judgments have been referred by the court, while deliberating upon the present case:

    S.M.S Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. Neeta Bhalla and another

    Since section 141 of the NIA creates criminal liability, the conditions provided thereunder have to be strictly complied with. What is required is that the persons who are sought to be criminally liable under section 141 should be, at the time the offence was committed, in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company. The condition requires so because a person in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company is supposed to know the purpose behind the issuing of a cheque and the reasons for its dishonour. Furthermore, a complaint under section 141 must contain specific averments disclosing the facts that fulfil the conditions under the provision. If facts making a person liable under the provision are missing from the complaint, the conditions as required by the provision cannot be said to have been satisfied.

    N. Rangchari vs. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited

    Reiterating the principle given in Neeta Bhalla (supra), the court held that, besides mentioning in the complaint that the person implicated is a director of the company, it is important to specifically allege that they were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the time of the commission of the offence. Otherwise, a complaint may be found unsustainable.

    Referring to the above mentioned case laws, the court has laid down a due procedure for proceeding against a director under section 68 of FERA.

    Due procedure for conducting proceedings under the FERA

    The court has laid down that, even though FERA is silent on filing of written complaints, while proceeding under section 51, the person who has to be proceeded against shall be informed of the contravention for which penalty proceedings are to be initiated against them. This flows from section 51 which imposes an obligation on the adjudicating officer to give a reasonable opportunity to a person to be proceeded with for making a representation in the matter. The requirement under section 51 envisages due communication of the allegations of contravention and requires fulfilment of the ingredients of the offence under section 68. If this due procedure is not followed, the reasonable opportunity, as contemplated by section 51, cannot be said to have been given to the person to make representation in the matter. After a reasonable opportunity to make representation is granted in true sense, the adjudicating officer shall hold an inquiry and if on such inquiry he finds the person guilty of the alleged contravention he may impose the requisite penalty in accordance with section 50.

    Conclusion 

    The general notion that persists in the corporate world about non-executive directors is that, they are not involved in the day to day affairs of the company, i.e. they are not in charge of, or responsible for the conduct of the business of the company. Although, by virtue of this, they may not be held liable for various offences or contraventions committed by the company, it doesn’t provide them with blanket immunity. As held in Chaitan M. Maniar vs. State of Maharashtra, they can still be held liable for those contraventions in which their active involvement is shown. The judgment in the present case has furthered this standing. While settling the law as to the liability of directors under FERA, it has also laid down a due procedure for establishing such liability. Moreover, the court, by widening the scope of the phrase “reasonable opportunity for making representation” under section 51, has ensured that the principle of audi alteram partem is duly adhered to under FERA. The judgment shall act as a good precedent, while determining the corporate criminal liability of directors of companies in future.