The Corporate & Commercial Law Society Blog, HNLU

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  • Beyond Arbitrage: The High-Speed Scandal That Shook Dalal Street

    Beyond Arbitrage: The High-Speed Scandal That Shook Dalal Street

    PRIYANSHI JAIN, FOUTH-YEAR STUDENT AT INSTITUTE OF LAW, NIRMA UNIVERSITY

    INTRODUCTION

    India’s ₹4,844 crore Jane Street case was not just about fraudulent trading; it attacked the very credibility of India’s securities market. It is about whether the world’s largest derivatives market is built on a settlement system that can easily be manipulated.

    On July 2025, the Securities Exchange Board of India (‘SEBI’) passed an interim order against the Jane Street group, an American proprietary trading firm, for its alleged manipulation of the Bank Nifty index derivatives during expiry-day trading. The order seized nearly ₹4,844 crore and barred the firm from accessing Indian markets while proceedings continue. It was SEBI’s largest enforcement action of its kind and immediately drew attention across financial and legal circles.

    The case matters because it highlights the structural flaws in India’s market framework. Unlike the United States (‘US’) and European Union (‘EU’), which use closing auctions, or Singapore, which employs randomized settlement windows, India continues to rely on a 30-minute Volume-Weighted Average Price (‘VWAP’) to settle expiries. VWAP, an indicator derived from price and volume that represents the average price of a security, is increasingly outdated. Entity-level surveillance misses group strategies and doctrinal standards under the Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices Regulations, 2003 (‘PFUTP’), which remain unclear. SEBI’s order looks powerful in the headlines, but in reality, its durability before tribunals is far less certain.

    EXPIRY-DAY MECHANICS AND VULNERABILITIES

    To understand why SEBI’s order matters, it is necessary to see how expiry in India works. When Bank Nifty future options expire every Thursday, their final settlement value is not taken from the last traded price. Instead, it is computed using the VWAP of the index in the last half-an-hour before trading closes. The problem lies in VWAP as it can be influenced. Large, well-timed trades placed near the close can push the average up or down, even if only slightly. This practice is known as “marking the close”, and it can tilt the expiry settlement in a direction favourable to those who hold large options positions. In theory, these trades appear genuine; however, in reality, they are buy or sell orders, and their purpose is to manipulate the benchmark rather than reflect true supply and demand.

    The stakes are high as Bank Nifty is India’s most heavily-traded derivatives contract. As per SEBI’s own analysis, nearly 9/10 of retail derivatives traders lost money, with Bank Nifty options driving much of this activity. Even a slight change in VWAP can result in major retail losses. Unlike the US or EU, where expiry markets are dominated by institutions with hedging strategies, India’s market is retail-driven. This implies that structural fragilities like VWAP distortions inflict disproportionate harm on individuals who are least equipped to hedge risk. What looks like a technical flaw in design is a transfer of wealth from small investors to sophisticated firms.

    VWAP was chosen to avoid the distortions of last-trade settlement, but in practice, it creates a different vulnerability: it concentrates risk in a short window that sophisticated traders can target. The Jane Street episode illustrates that the vulnerability is not in one firm’s strategy but in the structure of the expiry system itself.

    LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND DOCTRINAL STANDARDS

    PFUTP Regulations, 2003

    SEBI’s case against Jane Street rests mainly on the Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices (PFUTP) Regulations, 2003. Regulation 3 prohibits the use of fraudulent or deceptive devices, and Regulation 4(1) bans trading practices that create a false or misleading appearance of trading or manipulate prices.

    Indian tribunals have consistently required a high threshold for providing manipulation. In Ketan Parekh v. SEBI (2006), (‘Ketan Parekh’), the Securities Appellate Tribunal (‘SAT’) held that a case must show the creation of an artificial price backed by intent, not merely aggressive or opportunistic trading. In Nirma Bang Securities v. SEBI (2004), the SAT emphasised that trades must produce a false appearance; if the orders are real and executed transparently on an exchange, they may not qualify as fraud. In DSQ Software Ltd. v. SEBI (2002), (‘DSQ Software’), expiry-day manipulation was penalised, but the case turned on circular trades and matched orders, not exploitation of settlement mechanics.

    Under Ketan Parekh, influencing VWAP may not amount to an “artificial” price at all, since VWAP is the legally prescribed benchmark. Under the Nirmal Bang case, Jane Street’s trades were genuine, transparent, and on-exchange, which made it difficult to argue that they created a “misleading appearance”. And unlike DSQ Software, where sham trades propped up expiry values, here the trades were economically real, albeit timed strategically. SEBI must therefore stretch precedent to fit behaviour that exploits design flaws rather than violates market integrity in the conventional sense.

    SEBI ACT, 1992

    The SEBI Act, 1992, grants the regulator broad powers to act in the interest of investors. Section 11 establishes SEBI’s mandate, while Sections 11B and 11D allow it to issue interim directions, including barring firms from markets. Section 12A prohibits manipulative conduct, and Section 24 provides for criminal sanctions.

    Interim orders under these provisions are often passed ex-parte, which enables SEBI to act quickly. Yet their durability is fragile. On appeal before the SAT or the Supreme Court, regulators must present evidence that meets the strict doctrinal tests of “artificial price” or “misleading appearance”. As past jurisprudence shows, SEBI’s broad preventive powers are constrained by how tribunals interpret manipulation, and orders that appear stringent at first glance often face dilution when they are tested against precedent.

    FPI REGULATIONS, 2019

    SEBI also cited breaches of the Foreign Portfolio Investor Regulations, 2019 (‘FPIRegulations’). Regulation 20(4) restricts intraday netting of trades across affiliates. The logic is to prevent one entity from using multiple arms to take offsetting positions. However, India’s surveillance remains entity-based, not consolidated. If affiliates or sub-accounts operate in coordination, their trades may escape detection unless positions are aggregated at the group level.

    This creates a structural blind spot. SEBI can penalise one entity, but coordinated strategies across multiple offshore vehicles may remain invisible. The Jane Street episode underscores how global trading firms can exploit the limits of surveillance architecture rather than simply breaching the letter of the law.

    SEBI’S INTERIM ORDER: STRENGTHS AND LIMITS

    SEBI’s interim order against Jane Street was notable for its speed and scale. Within days of the expiry, SEBI had impounded nearly ₹4,844 crore and imposed a trading ban. The sheer size of the disgorgement sent a deterrent signal not only to foreign portfolio investors but also to domestic proprietary desks that expiry-day strategies would be scrutinized closely. By framing the order around retail investor protection, SEBI strengthened its optics: Bank Nifty is retail-heavy, and positioning the case as a defence of small investors bolstered regulatory legitimacy. SEBI’s action is depicted as forceful yet legally fragile, because proving manipulation under PFUTP technically requires showing an artificial or misleading price, and Jane Street’s on-exchange, economically significant trades may be viewed as lawful VWAP exploitation unless regulators prove the trades lacked any legitimate economic purpose, a stance appellate bodies like the SAT have taken in narrowing “manipulation” in past cases. The order also highlights a surveillance gap: by focusing on entity-level positions, current systems may miss coordinated strategies run across affiliates or sub-accounts, implying that without group-level oversight enforcement can become piecemeal, penalizing one entity while broader structure remains unaddressed. The upshot is a recurring cycle where headline penalties signal resolve, but fragile legal footing leads to dilution or reversal on appeal unless settlement frameworks and surveillance architectures are overhauled to withstand scrutiny and capture cross-entity orchestration at scale.

    COMPARATIVE INSIGHTS AND REFORM DIRECTIONS

    India should pivot from a 30-minute VWAP expiry to transparent closing auctions or hybrid windows to curb benchmark tilts and concentrate integrity where liquidity is deepest. Sequencing pilots on F&O names and phasing towards auctions aligns with global practice and SEBI’s active consultations, while guarding liquidity optics. At the same time, regulators should mandate group-level disclosures and beneficial ownership look-through, operationalized via standardized, trigger-based reporting and a lead-regulator model. Cross-border Memorandum of Understandings with explicit timelines and data schemes should backstop enforcement against SPVs and secrecy regimes. Finally, the pair auction closes with AI-assisted surveillance under human oversight, restrained on labelled expiry datasets to manage false positives.

    CONCLUSION

    The Jane Street episode underlines that India’s episode underlines that India’s expiry framework itself is vulnerable. VWAP-based settlement concentrates risk in a narrow window, while entity-level surveillance misses coordinated strategies across affiliates. These are not flaws of one case but of the market’s design.

    Doctrinally, SEBI also faces hurdles. Under the PFUTP Regulations, tribunals have demanded proof of “artificial prices” or “misleading appearances”. Jane Street’s trades, though large and well-timed, were real and visible. This ambiguity may weaken SEBI’s case before appellate forums, showing how difficult it is to stretch the old standard to new trading strategies.

    The policy lesson is straightforward: in the absence of change, SEBI will continue to act reactively, making headlines by penalizing people after the fact while running the risk of legal reversals. Reliance on VWAP and fragmented oversight leaves India exposed in ways other major markets have already addressed through auctions, randomization, and consolidated monitoring.

    For the world’s largest derivatives market, with millions of retail traders, the demand is simple that India’s framework should be at least as robust as that of the US or EU. Anything less risks repeating the same cycle.

  • SEBI’s Closing Auction Session: Legal and Market Fault lines

    SEBI’s Closing Auction Session: Legal and Market Fault lines

    ANISHA AND DEV KUMAWAT, THIRD AND FOURTH- YEAR STUDENTS AT TNNLU, TIRUCHIRAPPALLI

    INTRODUCTION

    The Securities and Exchange Board of India (‘SEBI’) has released a consultation paper on 22 August, 2025, suggesting the commencement of Closing Auction Session (‘CAS’) in the equity share market or stock market. The new framework is not just a reform to the market structure for ameliorating the closing- price integrity rather it has far-reaching implications for Indian securities law and corporate governance. The proposed amendment related to CAS is far more than the statistical closing price for the trading day, as it has paramount implications for the legal and contractual matters, none the less from takeover regulations, delisting thresholds to mutual fund net asset valuations and the determination of settlement obligations. Through this, SEBI is not just affecting the economic framework of the market but also proposing a new regulatory and commercial frameworks by recalibrating on determination of prices.

    To address this issue, this article examines the legal and market issues that are raised by CAS ranging from takeover thresholds, delisting processes mutual fund valuations to its impact on insider trading enforcement and minority shareholder protection. Thus, a comparative analysis has been drawn focusing on its regulatory safeguards and highlighting the opportunities and risks of the proposed framework. Ultimately, it suggests a layered regulatory approach to harmonize SEBI’s twin objectives of accurate price discovery and investor protection through greater transparency, real-time surveillance and protective mechanisms.

    FROM VWAP TO CAS: A STRUCTURAL SHIFT IN PRICE DISCOVERY

    The proposed amendment sharply contrasts with the present method of calculating the price of the stocks for each company i.e. the closing price. Currently, the closing price is calculated from the Volume-Weighted Average Price (‘VWAP’), i.e. the weighted average price of trades that has been executed continuously during the last half an hour. But under the new framework, a dedicated twenty- minute CAS (3:15–3:35 p.m. IST) would be taken into account and the orders would be finalized as per the acceptance, matching and execution of stocks via buying and selling, through a call- auction mechanism. For the first instance, it has been initiated for derivatives eligible (Future & Option Stocks) the highly liquid securities crucial for index and derivatives settlement with possibility of later expansion to wider cash market. This framework is reasoned by SEBI in phased approach on two grounds: firstly, F&O stocks form the backbone of institutional portfolios and are most relevant for index benchmarking; secondly, manipulation risks could be mitigated because of their high liquidity rates.

    The practical effect can be elucidated by a short numeric contrast. Under the current VWAP approach, if a stock trades mostly between ₹100- ₹102 during the day and one among the last few trades transaction is of ₹108, the VWAP may lift modestly to about ₹103.5, thus slightly affecting the Net Asset Value (‘NAV’) and index weights. Now, under the newly introduced framework (CAS), if the 3:00- 3:15 VWAP is ₹101 with ±3% band, then the auction could clear  up to around ₹104. Should a cluster of institutional orders push the clearing price to that level, ₹104 would stand as the official close, determining NAVs, takeover thresholds, and derivative settlements. This change is not minimal as a shift of ₹3-₹4 per share across millions of shares put a lot of effect on wealth transfers between acquirers, minority shareholders and passive investors. This shows how VWAP dilutes the impact of any single trade across an extended period, while on the other hand, CAS magnifies the influence by compressing decisive price formation into a narrow, highly visible window, thus creating  a natural choke point for significant players.

    CLOSING PRICE AS A LEGAL AND MARKET BENCHMARK

    The shift is not just a mere technicality as the closing price acts as the standardized benchmark in securities regulation. For instance, under Regulation 3 of the SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 2011, open offer which has the mandate of 25% shareholding threshold is calculated with reference to the closing price.  Through this, it protects the minority shareholders in control transactions. Additionally,  Regulation 8 of the SEBI (Delisting of Equity Shares) Regulations, 2021 set the floor for exit consideration in delisting exercises through closing price. Moreover, even mutual fund valuations under Regulation 47 of the SEBI (Mutual Funds) Regulations, 1996  determine the NAV  available to investors through the same. In this sense, the closing price performs a quasi- legal function, extending beyond market mechanics to structure substantive entitlements and liabilities. Any change in the methodology of its discovery, therefore, extends beyond technical microstructure reform like price fluctuations and engages fundamental questions of investor protection and regulatory design. Heavy order flows during the auction period can unduly influence the closing price. This makes it difficult for the small shareholders to counter the influence of large institutional trades.

    One of the most analytical difficulty lies in balancing SEBI’s dual objectives: one being enhancing price accuracy and other being preventing regulatory arbitrage or market distortions. The consultation paper has acknowledged that the closing prices are often subject to marking the close, a practice where traders execute small-volume traders just before the market closes to nudge prices in the desired direction. It has been globally recognized by courts and regulators as a form of market manipulation. The fact has been reinstated in India by the Securities Appellate Tribunal through Regulation 3 of the SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices) Regulations, 2003 which prohibits manipulative and deceptive devices. While the newly introduced framework of CAS by concentrating liquidity into a single call auction, may diminish the efficacy of last- minute trades, it also creates a new issue related to concentration of large orders to influence the equilibrium price by large players.

    In the context of takeovers, the person holding 25% of company’s shares has to make an open offer to other stakeholders and that price is linked to past closing prices. So, under the new framework, the closing price could be fluctuated either up or down, depending on how big investors place their orders in that short auction window. This advantages the buyer, who is willing to take the risk of bidding aggressively in the CAS. In delisting too, price is influenced by CAS. When such a scenario persists, then prices become more volatile or controlled by the hands of a few large orders, thus leading to unfair exit value of minority shareholders. In the case of SEBI v. Cabot International Capital Corp. (2004), it was held that the main aim of securities law is to protect the investors. It means any change in reduction of fairness for investors in exit processes goes against the principal of investor protection.

    CONCENTRATED ORDERS, MANIPULATION, AND INSIDER RISKS

    Moreover, insider trading regulation is also affected by CAS. Under the SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015, material events are reflected in stock prices with the closing price serving as a reference for detecting suspicious trading activities. When the auction price can be influenced by a dominating group of participants, then the casual link between non-public information and price movement becomes harder to establish. This results in weakening of evidentiary foundation of enforcement i.e. without adequate surveillance. If left unchecked, it could undermine the deterrent value of insider trading provisions. For minority investors, the risk is especially acute, as concentrated orders during the auction could distort prices to their disadvantage, undermining the very protections securities law aims to guarantee.

    Comparative jurisprudence like European Union’s Euronext market shows that closing auctions are typically safeguarded by protective mechanism like volatility extensions, real-time extensive prices, and order imbalance disclosures. Even though, the same has been acknowledged by the SEBI’s consultation process but it does not properly consider the operability in India’s context. It is characterized by substantial retail participation, high algorithmic trading activity, and resource- constrained market surveillance. If these safeguards are not incorporated, CAS may unintentionally tilt the market towards institutional investors, thus weakening the legal and fiduciary protections afforded to minority shareholders under the Takeover Code and Delisting Regulations.

    A layered approach is required to address these risks posed by CAS like requiring disclosure of large orders at the time of auction could enhance transparency and would supply regulators with empirical data to monitory systematic risks. Additionally, practices like layering, spoofing and order clustering could be incorporated in the system to protect both market integrity and equitable access as real- time surveillance system. Through the lens of economics, these measures could help reduce price imbalance, thus ensuring minority shareholders rights.

    CONCLUSION

    The proposed CAS marks a structural reorientation in India’s price- discovery framework, with implications that extended far beyond a technical refinement. By concentrating the price formation into a narrow window, potential choke points could be found where the dominant investors get disproportionate influence, raising questions over fairness and investor protection, especially for minority shareholders. SEBI must therefore approach CAS with strong rigorous safeguards, empirical oversight and a commitment to equitable governance, to ensure a balance between the statutory and fiduciary protections that underpins the Indian securities law.

  • Reconsidering the Scope of Section 14 of IBC: Analysing the Inherent Extra-Territorial Scope of Moratorium 

    Reconsidering the Scope of Section 14 of IBC: Analysing the Inherent Extra-Territorial Scope of Moratorium 

    BY ADITYA DWIVEDI AND PULKIT YADAV, FOURTH-YEAR STUDENTS AT NUSRL, RACHI

    INTRODUCTION

    The moratorium provisions under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘The Code’), are important mechanisms to maintain the debtor’s assets and maximise value for all stakeholders. Yet, the territorial applicability of these provisions, especially in proceedings involving cross-border assets, is a matter of judicial interpretation and academic discussion. 

    This article analyses the extra-territorial applicability of moratorium under the Code with a special focus on comparing and contrasting the interpretation of moratoriums applicable to Corporate Insolvency Resolutions Process (‘CIRP’) and Insolvency Resolution Process (‘IRP’) under Sections 14 and 96 of the Code, respectively. 

    By analysing the recent judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Rajesh Sardarmal Jain v. Sri Sandeep Goyal, (‘Rajesh Sadarmal’) this article contends that whereas Section 96 moratorium might be restricted to Indian jurisdiction, Section 14 moratorium necessarily has extra-territorial application due to the interim resolution professional’s statutory obligation to manage foreign assets under Section 18(f)(i) of the Code.

    TERRITORIAL SCOPE OF MORATORIUM: DIVERGENT INTERPRETATIONS

    The Code provides for two types of insolvency proceedings: CIRP for corporate persons under Part II and IRP for individuals and partnership firms under Part III, with moratoriums under Sections 14 and 96, respectively, to facilitate these processes

    However, courts have interpreted the moratoria under Sections 14 and 96 differently. In P. Mohanraj v. Shah Bros. Ispat, the Supreme Court held that Section 14 has a broader scope but limited its analysis to domestic proceedings. In contrast, the Calcutta High Court in Rajesh Sadarmal highlighted the extra-territorial reach of Section 96. Hence, examining these interpretations is key to understanding the territorial scope of both provisions.

    INSOLVENCY RESOLUTION PROCESS VIS-A-VIS SCOPE OF SECTION 96: ANALYSING THE NARROW INTERPRETATION OF MORATORIUM UNDER PART III

    IIn Rajesh Sardarmal, the Calcutta High Court held that the Section 96 moratorium for personal guarantors does not extend to foreign jurisdictions, as the Code’s scope under Section 1 is limited to India and does not specify the enforcement of the Section 96 moratorium in foreign courts. Thus, the court held that actions in foreign jurisdictions cannot be suspended by Section 96. This interpretation implies that all provisions under the Code lack extra-territorial application.

    However, this view contradicts the Code’s inherent extra-territorial mechanism, as outlined in Sections 234 and 235 of the Code which respectively empower the central government to enter into reciprocal arrangements with other countries to enforce the provisions of the Code and allow the Adjudicating Authority (‘AA’) to issue a letter of request to the competent authority of a reciprocating country, requesting it to take necessary action regarding any ongoing homebound proceedings against the Corporate Debtor (‘CD’) under the Code. Further, this interpretation also negates the inherent extra-territorial scope of the moratorium under Section 14. 

    CORPORATE INSOLVENCY RESOLUTION PROCESS VIS-À-VIS SCOPE OF SECTION 14: A CASE WARRANTING BROADER INTERPREATAION OF MORATORIUM UNDER PART II

    The Supreme Court, in M/S HPCL Bio-Fuels Ltd v. M/S Shahaji Bhanudas Bhad, held that the Code, as an economic legislation, is intended for the revival of the CD rather than being used as a recovery mechanism. Further, in Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, the Apex Court held that moratorium under section 14 envisions the protection of the assets of the CD, to facilitate its smooth revival. 

    Therefore, applying Rajesh Sadarmal’s narrow interpretation to Section 14 would weaken the moratorium’s purpose and hinder the CIRP. In a globalised economy, corporate debtors often hold foreign assets, which must be brought under the control of the interim resolution professional and the resolution professional under Sections 18 and 25 of the Code, respectively. This will maximise the value of the CD and enhance the chances of higher recovery for creditors. Further, it would also prevent successful resolution applicants from acquiring foreign assets of the CD without making any payment, and enable the committee of creditors to exercise their commercial wisdom judiciously in selecting the most suitable resolution plan after assessing the true financial position of the CD. 

    EXTRA-TERRITORIAL SCOPE: LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

    In Dr. Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil v. The Chief Minister & Anr, the Supreme Court held that courts must act upon the intent of the legislature, and such intent can be gathered from the language used in the statute. Moreover, inRenaissance Hotel Holdings Inc. v.  B. Vijaya Sai & Others, the Apex Court ruled that the quintessential principle of interpretation is that every provision of a statute shall be interpreted considering the scheme of the given statute. Meaning thereby that the textual interpretation must align with the contextual one. 

    The Supreme Court went further ahead in the State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala, and held that a statute may have extra-territorial application if a sufficient territorial nexus exists. Hence, Section 1 of the Code does not bar such application. Interpreting Section 14 thus requires examining legislative intent and nexus, with Sections 18(f)(i), 234, and 235 providing key guidance.

    SECTION 18(f)(i): CONTROL OVER FOREIGN ASSETS

    After the commencement of insolvency and imposition of moratorium, the AA appoints an interim resolution professional under Section 16. As per Section 18(f)(i), the interim resolution professional must take control of all assets owned by the corporate debtor, including those located abroad. This establishes a clear territorial nexus, supporting extra-territorial application.

    In M/s Indo World Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. Mukesh Gupta, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (‘NCLAT’) held that under Section 18(f), read with Section 20, the interim resolution professional must secure and preserve the corporate debtor’s assets. This interpretation aligns with the moratorium’s objective under Section 14. Such an intra-textual reading reflects the legislative intent to extend the moratorium to foreign assets for effective CIRP and value maximisation. While Section 1 poses no bar, supported by the doctrine of territorial nexus, actual enforcement abroad still depends on securing international cooperation through agreements under the Code.

    INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT UNDER SECTION 234 AND 235: HIGHLIGHTING THE INHERENT EXTRA-TERRITORIAL SCOPE OF THE CODE

    Under Part V, the Code provides a legislative route under Sections 234 and 235 to facilitate the extraterritorial application of its provisions. This legislative structure recognises the necessity of international coordination and highlights the extraterritorial nature of the Code. 

    However, their efficacy is yet to be tested because, to date, no notification[i] has been issued by the central government in this regard. Therefore, unless the central government gives effect to these provisions through mutual agreement with other countries, no provision of the Code can be extended to foreign proceedings or assets situated in foreign lands. 

    However, in State Bank of India v. Videocon Industries Ltd., the National Company Law Tribunal (‘NCLT’) held that the  CD’s foreign assets will form part of the CIRP and be subject to Sections 18 and 14 of the Code. Yet, the NCLT has not provided any judicial framework for the consolidation of the CD’s foreign assets in the CIRP. 

    Therefore, even if the CD’s foreign assets are considered part of the CIRP, in the absence of a judicial or legislative framework (such as mutual agreements), those assets cannot be included in the CIRP.

    NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE CROSS-BORDER FRAMEWORK

    In DBS Bank Limited Singapore v. Ruchi Soya Industries Limited & Another, the Apex Court held that the primary aim of the Code is to balance the rights of various stakeholders by enabling the resolution of insolvency, encouraging investment, and optimising asset value. 

    Therefore, it is necessary to address the concerns of distressed Indian companies with a foreign presence and foreign companies having the centre of main interest (‘COMI’) in India. This will ensure that stakeholders or creditors are not left in the lurch due to skewed recovery resulting from the non-inclusion of the CD’s foreign assets in the CIRP. 

     However, to effectively address these concerns, there is a need to devise a cross-border framework that encompasses not only the CIRP but also the IRP. At present, India lacks such a framework, which constitutes a significant regulatory gap in its insolvency regime. In cases where personal guarantors possess assets located outside the country, this gap severely impairs the ability of creditors to recover dues effectively. The present framework is limited in scope and fails to provide mechanisms for the recognition and enforcement of foreign proceedings involving personal guarantors, thereby undermining the efficiency of cross-border recoveries.

    While the Report of the Insolvency Law Committee on Cross-Border Insolvency, 2018 (‘The Report’) laid down a robust foundation for dealing with CDS, it did not address personal insolvency, as Part III of the Code had not yet been notified at that time. The report emphasised the importance of providing foreign creditors access to Indian insolvency proceedings and of enabling Indian insolvency officials to seek recognition abroad. However, with the subsequent notification of provisions relating to personal guarantors, there is now an urgent need to expand the cross-border framework to encompass personal guarantor insolvency as well. The report also supports this view as it provides for the subsequent extension of cross-border provision on IRP, post notification of Part III. 

    Moreover, in Lalit Kumar Jain v. Union of India,  the Supreme Court held that due to the co-extensive nature of the liability of the surety with that of the principal debtor under Section 128 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, creditors can recover the remaining part of their debt from CIRP by initiating IRP against the personal guarantor to the CD.

    Therefore, failing to extend the cross-border insolvency regime to IRP would limit creditors’ access to the guarantor’s foreign assets, thereby impeding the full and effective realization of their claims.

    To address this regulatory shortfall, a pragmatic way forward would be to operationalise Section 234 through mutual agreements with key trading partners of India, by expanding the scope of the cross-border framework, as suggested in the report   to include IRP, and amending the Code accordingly. 

    Further, the Courts should also refrain from narrowly interpreting the scope of moratoriums and other provisions of the Code, and should take into account the doctrine of territorial nexus while analysing the scope of any provision of the Code. 

    A broader interpretation, especially in cases involving foreign assets or proceedings, would facilitate a more effective and holistic resolution process by recognising the global footprint of many CDs. This approach aligns with the objective of maximising the value of assets under Sections 20 and the preamble of the Code and ensures that proceedings under the Code are not rendered toothless in cross-border contexts. 

    Additionally, invoking the doctrine of territorial nexus can help establish a sufficient legal connection between India and foreign assets or persons, thereby allowing Indian insolvency courts to issue directions that can have extraterritorial reach, wherever justified. This interpretive approach will ultimately enhance creditor confidence and will reinforce India’s credibility as a jurisdiction with a robust insolvency regime.

    Moreover, in the absence of any judicial and legislative framework, the doctrine of Comity of Courts can be invoked by the creditors seeking the enforcement of insolvency proceedings on foreign lands. This common law doctrine postulates an ethical obligation on the courts of one competent jurisdiction to respect and to give effect to the judgments and orders of the courts of other jurisdictions.

    Creditors can also seek recognition of Indian insolvency proceedings abroad through the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, as seen in Re Compuage Infocom Ltd., where the Singapore High Court recognised the Indian CIRP but denied asset repatriation. This highlights the urgent need for a comprehensive cross-border insolvency framework aligned with the spirit of the Code and the report that is primarily based on the Model Law.

    CONCLUSION

    While the Calcutta High Court’s ruling in Rajesh Sardarmal limits the territorial reach of Section 96 moratorium, Section 14 moratorium has to be interpreted more expansively, considering its inextricable link with Section 18(f)(i). Further, while interpreting the Code, the courts must give due regard to the legislative intent and the judicial principle of territorial nexus.  The success of the Code’s insolvency resolution mechanism, especially in cross-border asset cases, relies on acknowledging and enabling the extra-territorial operation of moratorium provisions. Legislative amendments, international cooperation frameworks, and judicial interpretation of the Code’s provisions based on legislative intent are essential to realise this goal.

    [i] Uphealth Holdings, INC. v. Dr. Syed Shabat Azim & Ors. Co., 2024 SCC OnLine Cal 6311 ¶ 20

  • RBI’s Electronic Trading Platforms: a Bittersweet Take on Trading

    RBI’s Electronic Trading Platforms: a Bittersweet Take on Trading

    BY ABHISHEK KAJAL, FOURTH YEAR STUDENT AT IIM, ROHTAK
    Introduction

    The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) introduced the 2024 framework on Electronic Trading Platforms (“ETPs”) in April 2024 (“2024 Draft Framework”), superseding the earlier 2018 Direction (“2018 Framework”) with some key changes.

    As defined by the RBI, an ETP means any electronic system, other than a recognised stock exchange, on which transactions in eligible instruments are contracted.It is a platform that allows trading in eligible instruments as notified by the Reserve Bank of India. The main instruments include Government Securities (“G-Sec”), Money instruments, and Foreign Exchange instruments.

    No individual or organisation, whether local or foreign, is permitted to run an ETP without first securing authorisation or registration from the RBI. A resident person under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (“FEMA”) is allowed to do online forex transactions only on authorised ETPs by the RBI. The purpose of this blog is to analyze the Indian ETP framework by tracing its evolution, examining key regulatory changes in the 2024 draft, highlighting challenges faced by domestic platforms, and suggesting practical solutions to strengthen the framework.

    Evolution of ETPs in India

    After the global financial crisis, trading on electronic platforms was being encouraged in several jurisdictions, driven primarily by regulatory initiatives to reform Over-the-Counter (“OTC”) derivative markets through a technology-driven approach. 

    Therefore, to have more market access, increased competition, and reduced dependency on traditional trading methods, the RBI, in 2017, issued a Statement on Developmental and Regulatory Policies as a part of its fourth bi-monthly Monetary Policy Statement 2017-18, where it highlighted its intention, for the first time, to regulate the money markets instruments under their purview through ETPs.  They recommended a framework to be put in place for ETPs that will deter market abuse and unfair trading practices, leading to better price discovery and improved market liquidity. Following this, the ETP Direction was first introduced in 2018.

    More Flexibility in Trading

    Under the 2018 framework, only banks were excluded from the framework’s applicability given that they allowed trading of eligible market instruments only with their customers on a bilateral basis and did not trade with market makers, including authorised dealers under FEMA.

    However, under the 2024 framework, the RBI has expanded the relaxation of this framework. Now, scheduled commercial banks (“SCB(s)”) and standalone primary dealers are also excluded from the framework for trading in eligible instruments. They can operate ETP platforms and trade in eligible instruments even without the authorization of the RBI, given that the SCB or primary dealer is the sole provider of price/quote and is a party to all the transactions of the platform.

    Certain reporting requirements have been provided for the SCBs or primary dealers, where they have to report any data or information whenever asked by RBI, and further, to avoid any misuse, the RBI can require such ETPs to comply with the ETP Direction. This change by the RBI reflects a balance between promoting ease of doing business and ensuring market protection in the ETP market.

    Setting up and Authorisation of ETPs

    To establish itself, an ETP must meet specific eligibility criteria for authorization from the RBI. The criteria are dynamic, beginning with the basic requirement that the ETP must be a company incorporated in India. Then, the ETP must comply with all applicable laws and regulations, including those of FEMA.

    The ETP or its Key Managerial Personnel (“KMP”) must have at least three years of experience in managing trading infrastructure within financial markets. This requirement serves as a preventive measure against potential market collapses. The ETP must have a minimum net worth of ₹5 crores at the outset and must maintain this net worth at all times. The ETP must have a robust technology infrastructure that is secure and reliable for systems, data, and network operations. All the trade-related information must be disseminated on a real-time or near real-time basis. Once an ETP meets the eligibility criteria, it must submit an application to the RBI in the prescribed format to obtain authorization.

    Offshore ETPs: Opening Doors for Cross-Border Trading

    The background of offshore ETPs is closely linked to the rising incidents of unauthorized forex transactions in India. In response, the RBI has periodically issued warnings against unauthorized platforms engaged in misleading forex trading practices and has maintained an Alert List of 75 such entities.

    The reason for such unauthorized practices lies in the previous 2018 framework, where a significant barrier for offshore ETPs was the requirement to incorporate in India within one year of receiving RBI authorization. This regulation proved challenging for foreign operators, leading to their non-compliance. Under the 2024 draft framework, foreign operators are now allowed to operate from their respective jurisdictions, however, they need authorisation from the RBI.

    The authorization process involves adhering to a comprehensive set of criteria aimed at ensuring regulatory compliance and market integrity. To qualify, the offshore ETP operator must follow some conditions, which include incorporating it in a country that is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”). This will enhance the transparency and integrity of Indian Markets. It ensures adherence to global standards in combating money laundering and terrorist financing. This can enhance the overall credibility of India’s financial markets, making them more attractive to global investors.

    Then, the operator must be regulated by the financial market regulator of its home country. This regulator must be a member of either the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) or the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), both of which are key international bodies that promote robust financial market practices and infrastructure. Once an offshore ETP operator meets these criteria, they must then follow the standard ETP application process for registration with the RBI.

    While analyzing this decision of the RBI, it is a promising initiative. The reason is that it does serve the purpose for which it was intended to be implemented, i.e., preventing unauthorized forex trading. The fundamental issue of unauthorized forex trading was about mandatory incorporation or registration in India, which has been done away with.

    Further, the framework specifies that transactions on these offshore ETPs can only involve eligible instruments that include the Indian rupee or rupee interest rates, and these transactions must strictly be between Indian residents and non-residents.

    Transactions between residents are not permitted under this framework, which indicates that the offshore ETP serves a cross-border trading function rather than facilitating domestic transactions. This is the right step in increasing Foreign Portfolio Investment in India and ensuring risk mitigation that may arise by allowing offshore ETPs to allow transactions among Indian residents.

    The Domestic Game

    However, when it comes to domestic ETPs, the 2024 draft framework is not very effective, the reason being that they do not incentivize domestic operators to apply for authorization. To date, over a span of six years, the RBI has authorized a total of only five ETP operators, one of which is the Clearing Corporation of India and four other private players.

    The reason for such slow adoption is that the operators are ineligible to apply for authorization due to stringent eligibility criteria (Regulatory Restriction). For example, the general authorization criteria for an ETP require that the applying entity or its Key Managerial Personnel must have at least three years of experience in operating trading infrastructure in financial markets. The issue here is that the requirement focuses solely on prior experience in operating trading infrastructure. This effectively limits eligibility to entities already active in this space, leaving little to no opportunity for new entrants to participate and innovate in the ETP market.

    This missed opportunity to foster domestic competition and innovation could limit the full potential of ETPs in India. Therefore, the RBI should take a liberalized approach towards domestic ETPs and ensure that the domestic ETP climate is conducive. To address this, the RBI should broaden the eligibility criteria to allow entities from other financial sectors, not just those with experience in trading infrastructure, to apply for ETP authorization. To ensure market safety, this relaxation can be balanced by imposing stricter disclosure requirements on such entities.

    A phased approach could also be taken by RBI where it could require new players with insufficient experience to first test their platform in the regulatory sandbox operated by RBI and then after rigorous testing, the same could be granted authorization. This will allow more domestic players to participate and will lead to enhanced forex trading in India which will potentially increase FDI investment in India.

    Way Forward

    Another potential change to increase the adoption rate of domestic ETPs might include examining and changing the eligibility requirements. Tax exemptions or lower net worth (less than 5 cr.) entry with certain restrictions could be considered to attract more participants, improving the entire market environment and addressing the low adoption rate found under the existing framework.

    The inclusion of offshore ETPs to register and operate in India has been the most favorable move towards facilitating foreign investment in India. The sturdy registration process ensures that only serious firms join the Indian market, which sets the pace for a market overhaul. The exclusion of scheduled commercial banks and standalone primary dealers is also a significant step forward in simplifying banking operations and increasing FPI.

    Finally, the 2024 Draft ETP Framework may be favorable to foreign ETPs, but the game is not worth the candle for domestic ones. With continued advancements and strategic enhancements, as suggested, India’s ETP framework has the potential to drive significant economic growth and elevate its position in the global financial landscape.

  • Section 12A of Commercial Courts Act : Resolving Territorial Ambiguity in Pre-litigation Mediation

    Section 12A of Commercial Courts Act : Resolving Territorial Ambiguity in Pre-litigation Mediation

    BY ARNAV ROY, THIRD YEAR STUDENT AT Nlu, DELHI
    INTRODUCTION

    The Commercial Courts Act, 2015 was enacted to expedite the resolution of commercial disputes and establish India as an investor-friendly jurisdiction. Among its significant provisions is section 12A, which mandates compulsory pre-institution mediation for commercial disputes unless urgent interim relief is sought. However, section 12A presents an ambiguity regarding territorial jurisdiction, specifically whether mediation must occur within the territorial limits where the subsequent suit is filed. This paper aims firstly to explore the statutory interpretation of section 12A, secondly to discuss judicial clarifications on territorial jurisdiction with specific reference to Ganga Taro Vazirani v. Deepak Rahej, and finally to critically analyse whether substantial compliance suffices to resolve territorial ambiguities.

    UNDERSTANDING SECTION 12A OF THE COMMERCIAL COURTS ACT

    Section 12A requires plaintiffs to exhaust pre-institution mediation, except in urgent interim relief cases. The legislative intent is to promote amicable settlement, reducing judicial burden and enhancing procedural efficiency.

    However, the absence of explicit territorial jurisdiction provisions under section 12A creates ambiguity. Unlike the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, which clearly defines territorial jurisdiction[i], section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act remains silent on this aspect, raising procedural uncertainties.

    MANDATORY NATURE OF PRE-LITIGATION MEDIATION

    Indian courts have reaffirmed the mandatory nature of pre-institution mediation. In Patil Automation (P) Ltd v. Rakheja Engineers, the Supreme Court categorically established the procedural mandatory character of section 12A. Likewise, in Ganga Taro Vazirani v. Deepak Raheja, the Bombay High Court emphasized the necessity for efficient dispute resolution and judicial backlog reduction, underlining the importance of pre-litigation mediation.

    CLARIFYING TERRITORIAL AMBIGUITY: GANGA TARO VAZIRANI JUDGMENT

    The Bombay High Court’s decision in Ganga Taro Vazirani v Deepak Raheja provides crucial guidance on the territorial scope of section 12A’s pre-litigation mediation requirement. In that case, a commercial suit was filed without any urgent relief, raising the question of whether mediation had to occur within the same jurisdiction as the suit. A single judge of the High Court treated section 12A as a procedural provision subject to the doctrine of substantial compliance, rather than an inflexible jurisdictional mandate.

    The court noted that when parties had already made genuine attempts to resolve their dispute, it would be “futile to compel the parties to engage in pre-institution mediation again, merely to satisfy territorial compliance. Such an interpretation would defeat the very purpose for which the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 was brought into force.”  This purposive reading underscored that the objective of section 12A – expeditious settlement of disputes – should not be thwarted by rigid insistence on where the mediation is conducted.

    Substantial compliance over technicality: The High Court emphasized that conducting pre-suit mediation in good faith, even if outside the territorial limits of the court where the suit is later filed, could constitute substantial compliance with section 12A’s mandate. In other words, a bona fide mediation attempt (for example, in a different city or through a private mediator) satisfies the law’s intent, so long as the effort to settle was genuine. This approach prioritizes substantive justice over procedural form – minor deviations in the location or forum of mediation should not invalidate the proceedings, provided the core requirement (attempting amicable resolution) is met.

    Avoidance of redundancy and waiver: By privileging substantial compliance, the High Court avoided redundant procedural cycles. It would serve no purpose to force parties to re-mediate in the court’s locale if they had already mediated elsewhere with no success. Indeed, the judgment warned that insisting on a second mediation solely for territorial alignment would simply cause delay – an outcome contrary to the Act’s intent of swift dispute resolution2. In Ganga Taro, the plaintiff’s initiation of mediation (albeit not in the suit forum) combined with the defendant’s stance meant the court was satisfied that the spirit of section 12A had been honored. This pragmatic stance ensured that procedural rules serve as a means to justice rather than a trap.

    COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES TO MANDATORY PRE-LITIGATION ADR AND TERRITORIAL SCOPE

    Jurisdictions worldwide have adopted varied stances on mandatory pre-filing alternative dispute resolution (ADR), with differing implications for territorial jurisdiction. A brief survey of select jurisdictions illustrates how the balance between procedural mandate and territorial constraints is struck elsewhere:

    United Kingdom: In England and Wales, there is no equivalent statutory mandate requiring mediation before a civil commercial suit. Instead, the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) and court practice encourage ADR through pre-action protocols and cost sanctions. The leading case of Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS Trust established that courts cannot compel unwilling parties to mediate. Still, unreasonable refusal to even attempt mediation can result in adverse cost consequences. This policy has effectively made ADR a de facto expected step in the litigation process. Notably, because mediation in the UK remains voluntary rather than jurisdictionally required, there is no rigid territorial prescription for where it must occur. Parties are free to choose mediation forums anywhere, or even mediate online, as long as it is reasonable and accessible. Recent developments signal a cautious shift toward targeted mandatory mediation , but these initiatives define the process in a way integrated with the court’s system. In all cases, the emphasis is on the fact of engaging in settlement efforts rather than the physical location. Thus, English practice sidesteps territorial disputes by focusing on compliance in substance – if the parties have reasonably engaged with mediation or other ADR, the courts are satisfied, regardless of where or how the mediation took place. This flexible approach aligns with a broader common-law trend of encouraging mediation through incentives and case management, rather than imposing hard territorial rules.

    United States: In the U.S., the approach to pre-litigation mediation varies widely depending on the jurisdiction and subject matter. There’s no blanket federal rule requiring commercial litigants to mediate before filing a lawsuit. However, many states have their own rules mandating ADR in specific contexts. For example, Florida requires pre-suit mediation for certain disputes involving homeowners’ associations. Under Chapter 720 of the Florida Statutes, an aggrieved party must serve a “Statutory Offer to Participate in Pre-suit Mediation” and go through the process as per court rules. Skipping this step can lead to dismissal or a stay of the case.

    Because these requirements are grounded in state law, the mediation is typically localized—it must happen within the state, often with court-approved mediators. A party can’t simply mediate elsewhere or ignore the process; compliance with state-specific procedures is mandatory, much like India’s section 12A requirement for commercial suits. That said, U.S. courts sometimes show flexibility. If the parties have genuinely attempted an ADR process outlined in their contract, courts may still allow the case to proceed, even if the exact statutory steps weren’t followed.

    At the federal level, while there’s no pre-filing mediation rule, many district courts require mediation or settlement conferences after the suit is filed, usually through local rules tied to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16. Overall, the U.S. model is decentralized: mandatory pre-litigation mediation exists in certain pockets, usually tied to state jurisdiction or specific areas of law, and when it does apply, parties must follow the local process to move forward in that state’s courts.

    Singapore: Singapore encourages mediation but does not mandate it before filing commercial suits. Instead, court rules like the Rules of Court 2021 require parties to consider ADR and report efforts to the court. Unreasonable refusal to mediate may lead to cost penalties.

    Being a single-jurisdiction city-state, mediation typically takes place locally, often through the Singapore Mediation Centre or court-linked programs. For cross-border disputes, the Singapore International Commercial Court allows cases to pause for mediation under the Litigation Mediation Litigation protocol, though this is voluntary.

    Mandatory pre-litigation mediation exists in community disputes. Under the 2015 Community Dispute Resolution Act, neighbors must mediate before filing claims, or risk dismissal and penalties. While not compulsory for commercial matters, Singapore’s legal framework supports mediation, reinforced by its adoption of the 2019 Singapore Convention on Mediation.

    Comparative Insight: Internationally, the handling of territorial jurisdiction in mandatory pre-filing mediation regimes tends to follow the underlying nature of the mandate. In jurisdictions like the UK, where mediation is encouraged but not explicitly compelled, territorial jurisdiction questions scarcely arise since parties have the freedom to mediate wherever it makes sense. By contrast, in jurisdictions with formal mandatory mediation requirements, the law usually designates or implies a forum or procedure tied to the court’s territory. The Ganga Taro principle of substantial compliance finds echoes in these systems as well, as courts internationally are inclined to excuse technical lapses if the claimant can demonstrate a sincere attempt at pre-litigation ADR. Ultimately, the comparative lesson is that mandatory pre-litigation mediation, as a growing global trend, must be implemented with an eye on practicality. This may be through flexible interpretation, as seen in India, cost-shifting incentives in the UK, or clear but reasonable procedural preconditions in the US and Singapore. Each model seeks to balance the promotion of settlement with the parties’ right of access to courts, navigating territorial concerns by either formalizing the required forum or, conversely, remaining silent on the forum to allow flexibility.

    CONCLUSION: BALANCING EFFICIENCY AND PROCEDURAL COMPLIANCE

    The judgment in Ganga Taro Vazirani clarifies section 12A’s territorial ambiguity effectively. While promoting efficiency, the ruling balances procedural compliance with practical objectives.

    While section 12A requires pre-litigation mediation, judicial interpretation, notably in Ganga Taro Vazirani v. Deepak Raheja, affirms that mediation conducted outside territorial jurisdiction constitutes substantial compliance. Nevertheless, substantial compliance does not supersede explicit jurisdictional requirements under procedural laws such as the CPC. Mediation outside territorial limits is sufficient for compliance provided it does not conflict with jurisdictional rules. A purposive interpretation balancing procedural adherence with practical efficiency ensures that the legislative intent of expedient dispute resolution is maintained without undermining jurisdictional integrity.

    Requiring repeated mediation merely for territorial compliance would defeat the very purpose of the Commercial Courts Act, which aims to ensure the swift resolution of commercial disputes. As the Bombay High Court rightly observed, procedural provisions should facilitate justice rather than obstruct it.

    Therefore, if mediation has already taken place outside the jurisdiction where the action is pending, it should be deemed proper compliance with section 12A. Insisting on strict territorial compliance would only cause unnecessary delays and frustrate the objectives of the Act.

    Thus, the law must balance procedural compliance with practical efficiency. A purposive interpretation of section 12A aligns with legislative intent, ensuring that commercial disputes are resolved swiftly without being entangled in unnecessary technicalities.

    [i] Civil Procedure Code 1908, ss 15-20.

  • Evaluating the Impact of the RBI’s Draft Prudential Framework on Project Financing

    Evaluating the Impact of the RBI’s Draft Prudential Framework on Project Financing

    BY ARYAN SHARMA, THIRD-YEAR STUDENT AT MAHARASHTRA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY, MUMBAI

    INTRODUCTION

    Project financing serves as a cornerstone for infrastructure development, by facilitating the construction of essential assets such as roads, power plants, and urban facilities. In May 2024, the Reserve Bank of India released the draft ‘Prudential Framework for Income Recognition, Asset Classification, and Provisioning pertaining to Advances—Projects Under Implementation, Directions 2024’. The draft was aimed at strengthening the regulatory environment that governs project finance. This circular created quite a stir in the financial sector.

    This article aims to examine the implications of these regulatory changes for lenders, borrowers, and the broader infrastructure sector. It explores whether the RBI’s cautious approach strikes the right balance between financial prudence and India’s ambitious infrastructure goals, and it analyzes potential market reactions and policy adjustments that may emerge in response to these new norms.

    UNDERSTANDING PROJECT FINANCE

    A discourse on the implications of the draft prudential norms requires an insight into project financing. Project finance refers to the method of financing infrastructure and other long-gestating capital-intensive projects like power plants, ports, and roads involving huge financial outlays. The typical project involves a high-risk profile, long gestation periods, and uncertain cash flows, all of which characterize the infrastructure sector.

    Unlike a regular loan sanction, which would depend on the character, capital, and capacity of the borrower, the loan structure of project financing predominantly depends on the project’s cash flow for repayment. The project’s assets, rights, and interests form part of the collateral. Additionally, the lender assesses the project sponsors and their experience in handling and commissioning the project. Project funding could be through a consortium of several lending institutions or include loan syndication. It could have any sort of funding proposition. A project has three distinct phases: design, construction, and operation.

    Banks and lending institutions primarily become involved during the construction and operational phases, where money is lent, and out standings appear in the books of accounts. After this, the extant prudential framework of income recognition, asset classification, and provisioning comes into effect.

    The draft prudential framework recently released by the RBI pertains to loans and advances for projects. The regulator has proposed stricter regulations for project financing, which makes it more expensive for lenders to provide loans for infrastructure and industrial projects like roads, ports, and power. The main question is: what has changed and why?

    WHY HAVE THESE CHANGES BEEN PROPOSED?

    During the infrastructure lending boom of 2008 to 2015, banks whitewashed their books of bad loans and defaults, which forced RBI to launch an asset quality review. This led to the unearthing of thousands of crores of hidden bad loans, causing investors to lose money. NPAs in banks shot up to an all-time high of ₹6.11 lakh crores, and the government had to invest more than ₹3 lakh crores in capital to bring banks back into shape.

    Furthermore, facts show that most project loans have been categorized as standard assets, even though there were some projects delayed beyond the planned schedule and were not yielding cash flows. This gave rise to the necessity for more stringent lending standards with extra provisions, which were directed towards avoidance of accounting shocks that might adversely affect the balance sheets of such entities. These actions are cautious from a risk management point of view, based on the regulator’s experience in the last credit cycle. Experience, after all, is a good teacher.

    WHAT ARE THESE NEW REGULATIONS?

    Under the new norms, there will be a broad provisioning of 5% of the funded outstanding on all existing and new exposures at a portfolio level. The new norms also demand a 1% provision even post-completion of the project, well over double the current requirement.

    The central bank has created a provisioning timeline of: “2% by March 31, 2025 (spread over four quarters of 2024-25); 3.50% by March 31, 2026 (spread over four quarters of 2025-26); 5.00% by March 31, 2027 (spread over four quarters of 2026-27)”

    Further, the allowable deferment periods for date of commencement of commercial operations (“DCCO”) are: “Up to 1 year for exogenous risks (including CRE projects); Up to 2 years for infrastructure projects with endogenous risks; Up to 1 year for non-infrastructure projects with endogenous risks; Up to 1 year for litigation cases”.

    Perhaps the RBI’s proposal to impose a 5% provision requirement on project loans has been triggered by the Expected Credit Loss (“ECL”) norms, which require banks to make provisions based on past default experiences.

    The ECL approach provides for the recognition of losses on loans as soon as they are anticipated, even if the borrower has not defaulted. These are prudential standards in accordance with international best practices. Every time the ECL norms are notified, banks will be required to reserve provisions for defaults accordingly.

    HOW WILL THIS IMPACT LENDERS?

    These new norms will significantly increase the provisioning requirements for banks and NBFCs, particularly those involved in large-scale infrastructure lending. Since the 5% provisioning mandate applies uniformly across all infrastructure projects, regardless of their inherent risk profiles, it may create a deterrent effect for lower-risk projects. Lenders could become more cautious in financing even relatively safer infrastructure ventures, as the increased provisioning costs may reduce the overall attractiveness of such exposures. This one-size-fits-all approach could inadvertently constrain credit flow to viable projects.

    The higher provisioning during the construction phase will directly impact the profitability of lenders, as a substantial portion of their capital will be locked in provisions rather than being available for lending.

    For lenders heavily engaged in project financing, such as PFC, REC, and IIFCL, this could mean a reduction in their lending appetite, thereby slowing down infrastructure development in the country.

    IMPACT ON BORROWERS AND PROJECT DEVELOPERS

    Project developers, especially in sectors like power, roads, ports, and renewable energy, will face tighter credit conditions. The cost of borrowing is likely to increase as banks and NBFCs factor in the higher provisioning costs into their lending rates. This could lead to:

    • Higher interest rates on project loans
    • More stringent lending criteria, making it harder for some projects to secure funding
    • Potential project delays, as financing becomes more expensive and risk-averse

    While these measures may enhance financial stability and prevent a repeat of the bad loan crisis of the past decade, they could also create bottlenecks in infrastructure development.

    POSSIBLE MARKET REACTIONS AND POLICY ADJUSTMENTS

    The sharp decline in banking and financial sector stocks following the release of this draft indicates that the market anticipates lower profitability and slower loan growth in the sector. Industry feedback is likely to request risk-weighted provisioning (lower rates for low-risk projects), extended implementation timelines, and carve-outs for strategic sectors like renewables. Developers may also seek clearer DCCO extension guidelines for projects delayed by regulatory hurdles.

    Objections from banks, NBFCs, and infrastructure developers may include requests for tiered provisioning rates based on project risk (e.g., sectors with historically low defaults). There may also be appeals to adjust quarterly provisioning targets to ease short-term liquidity pressures. Additionally, there could be demands for exemptions in renewable energy or other priority sectors to align with national development goals.

    However, the RBI may recalibrate its stance after engaging with industry stakeholders. Potential adjustments could include phased implementation of the 5% norm, reduced rates for priority infrastructure projects, or dynamic provisioning linked to project milestones. Maintaining financial stability remains paramount, but such refinements could ease credit flow to viable projects and mitigate short-term market shocks.

    Given India’s ambitious infrastructure goals under initiatives like Gati Shakti and the National Infrastructure Pipeline, a balance must be struck between financial prudence and the need to maintain momentum in project execution.

    CONCLUSION

    The RBI’s draft prudential framework is definitely a step in the right direction to strengthen financial stability and prevent systemic risks in project financing. However, it also raises concerns about credit availability, borrowing costs, and infrastructure development. It is true that the primary focus remains on the increased provisioning requirements, but the norms also raise broader concerns about their potential impact on credit availability and infrastructure growth, which may have cascading effects. By necessitating higher capital buffers, the norms risk reducing credit availability and increasing borrowing costs, which are unintended consequences that could slow infrastructure development despite their prudential benefits. If implemented as proposed, these norms will fundamentally alter the project financing landscape, making lending more conservative and expensive.    

    Albeit the proposed norms will likely make lending more conservative and expensive, they also offer important benefits, such as improved risk management, better asset quality for lenders, and long-term sustainability of infrastructure financing. The framework could potentially reduce NPAs in the banking system.

    Looking ahead, if implemented as proposed, we may see a short-term slowdown in infrastructure lending followed by more sustainable, risk-adjusted growth. A phased implementation approach could help mitigate transitional challenges, which would allow lenders and developers time to adapt. The framework could be complemented with sector-specific risk weights and credit enhancement mechanisms for priority infrastructure projects.

    The final framework, once confirmed, will be crucial in determining the future trajectory of infrastructure lending in India. Whether the market’s initial reaction is justified or premature remains to be seen, but one thing is clear, i.e., the era of easy project finance is over, and a more cautious, risk-averse approach is here to stay.

  • The European Commission’s Fine On Meta For Tying Allegations And Why India Needs To Do More

    The European Commission’s Fine On Meta For Tying Allegations And Why India Needs To Do More

    BY ANUSHKA GUHA, THIRD-YEAR STUDENT AT NLU, ODISHA

    INTRODUCTION

    The European Commission (‘EC’) fined Meta for tying Facebook Marketplace (‘FM’) to its social media platform, Facebook, in November 2024. FM is Meta’s online classified advertisement service which was introduced in 2016 and can be used to sell and buy products. Tying is a practice in which the availability of a product or a service is made conditional upon the availability of another. The EC found that Facebook had used its dominant position in the market for social networks and in the market for displaying classified ads to tie both services. What this essentially does is, expose all users of Facebook to FM, regardless of whether they want to see those ads or not. Such practices pose a competitive disadvantage for other online classified ads services, as they do not have access to the enormous database of social media users like Facebook does. Meta has also been accused of imposing unfair trade conditions through its terms of service that authorizes it to use ad-related data of competing classified ads service providers, who advertise on Facebook and Instagram, for the benefit of FM.

    GLOBAL SCRUTINY ON META

    This comes at a time when Meta is also under the scrutiny of the United States Federal Trade Commission for its acquisition of WhatsApp and Instagram resulting in the elimination of competition among social media platforms. The EC has previously fined Meta for providing misleading information during the WhatsApp-Facebook merger in 2014. In India, the Competition Commission of India (‘CCI’) has penalised Meta for abuse of its dominant position over WhatsApp’s contentious privacy policy introduced in 2021, which authorized the messaging platform to share user data with its parent company Meta and its subsidiaries. 

    This is not the first time Meta has been accused of tying its services. The launch of Threads in 2023 raised concerns about tying, as it requires one to have an account on Instagram. Meta, formerly known as Facebook, acquired Instagram, a photo-sharing app, in 2012. Although marketed as a competitor of microblogging platform X, the prerequisite of an Instagram account to operate the application makes it vulnerable to antitrust scrutiny, because the functioning of Threads and Instagram is fundamentally different. The Turkish Competition Authority, Rekabet Kurumu (‘RK’), has been investigating Meta’s anti-competitive practices since last year. In December 2023, the RK launched an investigation into the alleged tying of Threads and Instagram. 

    Subsequently, in January 2024, Meta was fined $160,000 per day for failure to adequately address competition concerns arising from its dominance in social networking, consumer communication, and online advertising. Most recently, the RK fined Meta $37.20 million over data-sharing practices between Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram, and Threads.

    TYING : THE INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

    Tying is prohibited under section 4(2)(e)  of the Competition Act, 2002, in the context of abuse of dominance. The CCI’s interpretation of tying has been a bit more restrictive than its European counterpart. This is especially demonstrated by the element of ‘coercion’ which is very narrowly considered by the CCI. We will try to understand this through two cases: Harshita Chawla v. WhatsApp and Facebook (‘Harshita Chawla’) and the Baglekar Akash Kumar v. Google LLC (‘Google Meet case’). 

    In Harshita Chawla, WhatsApp was accused of tying its Unified Payments Interface, WhatsApp Pay (‘WPay’) services with its messaging platform. The CCI dismissed the allegations on two grounds: first, that the element of ‘coercion’ in using the two products was absent; and second, that it did not cause foreclosure of competition in the market for payments services. It is prima facie amply clear that WhatsApp’s messaging platform and WPay operate in different relevant markets, which is a consideration that was taken into account by the CCI as well. However, its rationale for reaching the conclusion stands on shaky ground. The CCI has failed to consider here that WPay is not independent of the messaging platform, and users need to have a WhatsApp account in order to use it. While the implementation of WPay did not foreclose competition in the market of payment services by itself because it is a heterogeneous market, WhatsApp’s conduct is in clear violation of Section 4(2)(e) for two reasons: first, that users need to use the messaging platform in order to use WPay; and second, that WhatsApp leveraged its dominance in the smartphone-based OTT messaging service market to enter into the payments services market.

    A similar reasoning was used in the Google Meet case. In 2020, Google was accused of anti-competitive tying following the integration of its video-conferencing service Google Meet (‘Meet’) with its client mail service, Gmail. This meant that Meet came pre-installed with Gmail and the latter could not be used without the former. CCI dismissed the allegations on Google on two grounds. Firstly, users were free to use Meet without having a Gmail account. They just needed a Google account, not Gmail. Additionally, they were not under an obligation to necessarily use the video-conferencing service while using Gmail. Secondly, it did not restrict users from using other video conferencing apps with their Google account, thus reaching the conclusion that users are not being ‘coerced’ to use Meet and Gmail together. This approach again overlooks the fact that a dominant enterprise (here, Google) leveraged its position in one relevant market (here, client mail service) to enter into another relevant market (here, video-conferencing service). 

    A PROBLEMATIC APPROACH

    The CCI’s narrow interpretation and mandatory requirement of ‘coercion’ in order to constitute tying is arguably not a favorable one. As demonstrated by both the cases above, it clearly neglects the presence of leveraging. Even if we consider that WPay did not cause foreclosure of market competition in Harshita Chawla, it does not weaken the fact that if a user wishes to use WPay, they would necessarily have to pass through WhatsApp, thereby increasing the market power of the messaging platform and giving it a competitive edge over its counterparts in that relevant market. Additionally, the CCI completely ignores the aspect of consumer inertia or status quo bias with its disproportionate focus on coercion. The concept of status quo bias assumes that consumers refrain from making active choices to change the status quo regardless of economic irrationality. In comparison, it has been due importance by the EC on more than one instance, a notable one being the Google Search (Shopping) decision, where it was observed that of the total consumers, only 1% looked at the second page of Google search results. Similarly, a user with a Gmail account is more likely to tilt towards using Meet over other video-conferencing apps, simply out of convenience, or one may say, irrationality. 

    If we apply the Indian approach to the present case of Meta tying FM with Facebook, chances are that Meta will probably escape CCI’s scrutiny, specifically with respect to tying, because it does not ‘coerce’ Facebook users to necessarily use FM. Users can use the social media platform without using the classified ads services and are also free to use other classified ads services while using Facebook. This approach ignores the aspect that FM is a service that cannot be used in isolation without having a pre-existing Facebook account. Consumer inertia is a significant factor in this case, considering the enormous user base of Facebook. Additionally, as compared to any other online classified ads services, Meta obviously has access to a variety of personal data of millions of users across the world (‘Big Data’), which gives it a significant competitive advantage. Something that has been consistently also ignored is the annoyance caused to the users who do not want to use the additional services but are unable to disable them. These are factors that must be taken into account by CCI while adjudicating upon tying allegations in the digital market. 

    CONCLUSION AND THE WAY FORWARD

    In evolving digital markets, Big Data raises competitive concerns, when dominant undertakings use it to the detriment of other competitors, by indulging in tying and leveraging. Being a non-price parameter for competition, possession of Big Data by technological giants (‘Big Tech’) puts non-dominant enterprises at a disadvantage. This is where competition regulators are expected to step in. As Big Tech is under stringent scrutiny around the world, remarkably in jurisdictions other than the European Union, it calls for stronger compliance strategies. For more market-friendly effects of antitrust regimes, it is essential to go beyond the imposition of fines. A monetary penalty, no matter how hefty it is, does not act as an effective deterrent for Big Tech as compared to the money that they make every minute of the day. Antitrust watchdogs should go further than that, and ensure the termination of the services or modification of anti-competitive features of such services, in order to protect and promote competition in the market. Considering liberal jurisdictions like the United States are becoming more active in scrutinising the distortion of competition by Big Tech, it is essential for developing economies like India to catch up as well, and not shy away from imposing stringent measures in the interest of consumer welfare. As we anticipate India’s ex-ante framework, one can hope that CCI will take its lessons and adopt a more dynamic approach in the future. 

  • Algorithmic Enforcement and Anti-Competitive Effects: CCI vs. Swiggy and Zomato

    Algorithmic Enforcement and Anti-Competitive Effects: CCI vs. Swiggy and Zomato

    BY VASHMATH POTLURI, THIRD-YEAR STUDENT AT NALSAR, HYDERABAD

    INTRODUCTION

    The food delivery market in India has been one of the most dynamic and volatile markets, witnessing the quick exit of players like Uber Eats and Food Panda, among others, while being dominated by Zomato and Swiggy with a whopping market share of 58% and 42%, respectively. While there are many factors for such dominance, the recent allegations of Price Parity Clauses (“PPCs”) and exclusive agreements by the National Restaurants Association of India (“NRAI”) against both these platforms shed some light on the reasons for such market share. The findings of the Director General (“DG”), as reported by Reuters, indicate that the Competition Commission of India (“CCI”) is proceeding against these platforms under section 3(4)(c) of the Competition Act, 2002 (“Act”) based on the presumption that Swiggy and Zomato operate in a vertical framework as intermediaries distinct from their restaurant partners. However, this article challenges this presumption and argues that Swiggy and Zomato’s ownership of cloud kitchens transforms their relationship with restaurants into one of direct competition. As a result, this paper pushes for a reclassification of this case under Section 3(3)(a) and (b), enabling a shift from a ‘rule of reason’ approach to a per se standard. 

    The article advances this argument in a two-fold manner. First, it will analyze the anti-competitive effects of PPCs and exclusivity agreements, particularly in conjunction with Swiggy and Zomato’s cloud kitchens. Second, it will examine the role of dynamic algorithms in furthering these practices, proposing the introduction of the Algorithmic Facilitation Standard (“AFS”) in the Act, to ensure regulatory scrutiny and transparency in the market in line with the approach of the EU. 

    HORIZONTAL PRICE FIXING AND MARKET ALLOCATION

    The allegations by the NRAI that Swiggy and Zomato operate their cloud kitchens and enter into arrangements such as PPCs and exclusivity agreements throw light on the dominance of these platforms through anti-competitive practices. These practices demonstrate that these platforms are not merely intermediaries with restaurants as downstream partners, but competitors operating simultaneously in both the food preparation and delivery markets. This dual role works to the detriment of independent restaurants. 

    In the MakeMyTrip (“MMT-GO”) case, the CCI assessed the anti-competitive effects of wide Price Parity Clauses (“PPCs”) and exclusivity partnerships in a vertical framework between MakeMyTrip, Goibibo, and OYO with their hotel partners. The CCI found that these agreements restricted hotels from offering lower prices or better terms on competing platforms, creating entry barriers and limiting consumer choice. As a result, the CCI held that these agreements resulted in an Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition (“AAEC”) — a standard under Section 19(3) of the Act, which examines factors such as foreclosure of competition, barriers to entry, and harm to consumer choice. Relying on these findings, this article argues that the anti-competitive practices of Swiggy and Zomato produce identical effects, such as inflated prices and foreclosure of competition, but in a horizontal framework rather than a vertical one. 

    Applying the findings of the MMT-GO on wide PPCs, the PPCs entered into by Swiggy and Zomato are wide because they suppress competition in the market by mandating that restaurants maintain uniform prices across all channels, including their direct platforms and competing delivery services. This eliminates price differentiation and forces restaurants to inflate prices, depriving consumers of competitive pricing or discounts. These clauses also ensure that Swiggy and Zomato’s cloud kitchens are insulated from price competition, as restaurants cannot undercut them even when operating more cost-effectively. On the other hand, exclusivity agreements further suppress competition by restricting restaurants from listing on competing platforms or offering direct delivery services, creating a “lock-in” effect. This limits consumer access to popular restaurants and forecloses rival platforms from competing effectively. 

    These arrangements unfairly establish the dominance of Swiggy and Zomato’s cloud kitchens by allowing them to leverage vast data generated through their platforms. This data provides critical insights into consumer preferences, including popular cuisines, peak ordering times, delivery locations, and pricing trends. Using this information, Swiggy and Zomato can strategically design their cloud kitchen offerings to align with market demand precisely, bypassing the trial-and-error process faced by independent restaurants. They can quickly identify underserved cuisines or delivery zones and establish cloud kitchens to fill these gaps with minimal risk and cost. This data-driven approach grants their cloud kitchens a significant competitive edge over independent restaurants, which lack access to such comprehensive data and must rely on slower, costlier market research methods.

    The combined effects of PPC, exclusivity agreement, and cloud kitchens on a horizontal level, results in the creation of barriers to entry and foreclosure of competition, causing an AAEC under Section 19(3)(a) to (c). Hence, this article argues that the CCI must re-examine this case under Section 3(3)(a) and (b) through a ‘per se’ approach. Taking inspiration from the EU’s Vertical Block Exemption Regulation (“VBER”), which removed wide PPCs from the regulatory exemption, the CCI could impose cease-and-desist orders and monetary penalties, ensuring a competitive marketplace.

    ALGORITHMIC FACILIATATION STANDARD

    Swiggy and Zomato’s algorithms play a crucial role in enforcing PPCs and exclusivity agreements, amplifying their anti-competitive effects. These platforms use algorithms to monitor pricing across various channels, including restaurants’ direct platforms and competing delivery services, ensuring strict compliance with PPCs. By scanning for pricing discrepancies, the algorithms flag instances where restaurants offer lower prices on alternative channels. Non-compliant restaurants face automated penalties, such as reduced visibility in search results or exclusion from promotional campaigns, discouraging price competition. Similarly, these algorithms enforce exclusivity agreements by tracking restaurants’ activities on competing platforms. Exclusive partners receive preferential treatment, such as enhanced visibility, while restaurants breaching exclusivity face reduced exposure, limiting their ability to attract orders.

    Operating as a “black box,” these algorithms lack transparency, leaving restaurants unaware of the reasons for penalties or visibility changes. This creates a unilateral power dynamic that disproportionately favours Swiggy and Zomato, making it difficult for restaurants to challenge or adapt to platform policies.  In this context, the article proposes that the AFS identify the role of such algorithms and bring them under regulatory scrutiny. Under this, the CCI would be required to follow a two-step inquiry-

    MANDATORY ALGORITHMIC DISCLOSURES: 

    The first step in the proposed AFS is to mandate disclosures by Swiggy and Zomato regarding their algorithmic decision-making. These platforms must provide information about the design, operation, and structure of their algorithms, specifically in relation to penalizing or incentivizing restaurants. Such disclosures should be made to the DG under Section 36(4)(b) of the Act during the investigation stage. This requirement mirrors the EU Platform to business regulations 2019/1150, which mandates transparency in ranking criteria, ensuring that platforms do not manipulate search results based on monetary compensation or preferential treatment.

    EFFECTS BASED OUTCOME ANALYSIS:

    The second step shifts the scrutiny from intent to effects, applying an effects-based outcome analysis to assess whether these algorithms control prices, foreclose competition, or limit consumer choice by restricting visibility or promotions. If these practices result in an AAEC, the burden of disproving their anti-competitive impact should shift onto Swiggy and Zomato, allowing the CCI to order a rollback of such algorithms, if necessary. This aligns with the EU Court of Justice’s ruling in the Google Shopping case which found algorithmic self-preferencing anti-competitive, and rejected short-term efficiency arguments as justifications for long-term market harm. Likewise, under Section 19(3)(d) to (f) of the Act, any efficiency claims by Swiggy and Zomato should be dismissed if they come at the expense of competition.

    WAY FORWARD

    This article proposes that the AFS could be incorporated into the Act in two ways. First, under the ‘Hub-and-Spoke’ model, introduced through the Competition Amendment Act, 2023, wherein, a central entity (hub) can facilitate anti-competitive coordination among independent entities (spokes), even if they do not explicitly collude with each other. In this context, Swiggy and Zomato function as hubs, using algorithms to impose price parity and exclusivity conditions on restaurants (spokes), effectively orchestrating market behavior without direct collusion between restaurants. Second, the liability of Swiggy and Zomato could be invoked under Section 2(b), as part of tacit collusion through algorithmic enforcement. Since intent is irrelevant under ‘per se’ approach, the AFS would impute intent constructively, aligning with the Competition Law Review Committee 2019’s recommendation of a “guilty until proven otherwise” standard in cases involving algorithmic anti-competitive practices.

    CONCLUSION

    While the case is still pending before the CCI, this article has established that Swiggy and Zomato’s anti-competitive practices produce effects similar to horizontal price fixing and market allocation under Section 3(3)(a) & (b). A reclassification accordingly would enable for a shift to ‘per se’ from ‘rule of reason’, under which the entire burden to prove the anti-competitive effects rests on the complainant, and in such situations where these practices are furthered by opaque algorithms, it becomes difficult to hold Swiggy and Zomato responsible for their actions. Thus, under the AFS, the mere presence of algorithms and assessment of their prima-facie effects after due disclosure to the CCI, the burden to disprove AAEC would be heavy on Swiggy and Zomato. This reclassification would represent a significant jurisprudential shift, setting a precedent for addressing algorithm-driven anti-competitive practices and establishing a framework for future actions against quick commerce platforms.

  • Examining the Flaws in SEBI’s Proposed AI & ML Regulations

    Examining the Flaws in SEBI’s Proposed AI & ML Regulations

    BY SACHIN DUBEY AND AJITESH SRIVASTAVA, THIRD-YEAR STUDENTS AT NLU, ODISHA AND LLOYD LAW COLLEGE

    INTRODUCTION

    Artificial Intelligence (‘AI’) has become an integral part of our daily lives, influencing everything from smart home technology to cutting-edge medical diagnostics. However, it’s most profound influence is perhaps in transforming the landscape of securities market. AI has advanced the efficiency of investor services and compliance operations. This integration empowers stakeholders to make well-informed decisions, playing a pivotal role in market analysis, stock selection, investment planning, and portfolio management for their chosen securities.

    However, despite the advantages, AI poses risks such as algorithmic bias from biased data, lack of transparency in models, cybersecurity threats, and ethical concerns like job displacement and misuse, highlighting the need for strong regulatory oversight. Therefore, Securities and Exchange Board of India (‘SEBI’) vide consultation paper dated 13thNovember, 2024 proposed amendments holding regulated entities (‘REs’) accountable for the use of AI and machine learning (‘ML’) tools.  

    These amendments enable SEBI to take action in the event of any shortcomings in the use of AI/ML systems. SEBI emphasises that these entities are required to safeguard data privacy, be accountable for actions derived from AI outputs, and fulfil their fiduciary responsibility towards investor data, while ensuring compliance with applicable laws.

    In this article, the author emphasises the necessity of the proposed amendments while simultaneously highlighting their potential drawbacks. 

    NEED OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS

    The need for proposing amendments holding REs accountable for AI/ML usage has arisen due to various risks associated with its usage. 

    AI relies heavily on customer inputs and datasets fed into them for arriving at its output. The problem is that humans have found it very difficult to understand or explain how AI arrives at its output. This is widely referred to as “black box problem”. In designing machine learning algorithms, programmers set the goals the algorithm needs to achieve but do not prescribe the exact steps it should follow to solve the problem. Instead, the algorithm creates its own model by learning dynamically from the given data, analysing inputs, and integrating new information to address the problem. This opacity surrounding explainibility of AI outputs raises concerns about accountability for AI-generated outcomes within the legal field.

    Further, if just one element in a dataset changes, it can cause the AI to learn and process information differently, potentially leading to outcomes that deviate from the intended use case. Data may contain inherent biases that reinforce flawed decision-making or include inaccuracies that lead the algorithm to underestimate the probability of rare yet significant events. This may lead to jeopardising the interests of customers and promoting discriminatory user biases. 

    Additionally, relying on large datasets for AI functionality poses considerable risks to privacy and confidentiality. AI models may sometimes be trained on datasets containing customers’ private information or insider data. In such situations, it becomes crucial to establish accountability for breaches of privacy and confidentiality. 

    SHORTCOMINGS

    SEBI’s proposal to amend regulations and assign responsibility for the use of AI and machine learning by REs is well-intentioned. However, it could create challenges for both regulated entities and industry players, potentially slowing down the adoption of AI and stifling innovation.

    a. Firstly, SEBI’s proposal to assign responsibility for AI usage adopts a uniform, one-size-fits-all regulatory approach, which may ultimately hinder technological innovation. Effective AI regulation requires greater flexibility, favouring a risk-based framework. This approach classifies AI systems based on their risk levels and applies tailored regulatory measures according to the associated risks. A notable example is the European Union’s AI Act which adopts a proportionate, risk-based approach to AI regulation. This framework introduces a graduated system of requirements and obligations based on the level of risk an AI system poses to health, safety, and fundamental rights. The Act classifies risks into four distinct categories- unacceptable risks, high risks, limited risks and minimal risks. As per the classification, certain AI practices which come under the category of unacceptable risks are completely prohibited while others have been allowed to continue with obligations imposed upon them to ensure transparency.  

    b. Secondly, while SEBI’s regulatory oversight of AI usage by REs is crucial for protecting investor interests, it is equally important to establish an internal management body to oversee the adoption and implementation of AI within these entities. SEBI could draw insights from the International Organization of Securities Commission’s (‘IOSCO’) final report on AI and machine learning in market intermediaries and asset management. The report recommends that regulated entities designate senior management to oversee AI/ML development, deployment, monitoring, and controls. It also advocates for a documented governance framework with clear accountability and assigning a qualified senior individual or team to approve initial deployments and major updates, potentially aligning this role with existing technology or data oversight.

    c. Thirdly, SEBI has entirely placed the responsibility for AI and machine learning usage on REs, neglecting to define the accountability of external stakeholders or third-party providers. REs significantly rely on third parties for AI/ML technologies to ensure smooth operations. Hence, it is vital to clearly outline the responsibilities of these third parties within the AI value chain. 

    d. Fourthly, the Asia Securities Industry & Financial Markets Association (‘ASIFMA’) raised a concern that financial institutions should not be held responsible for client decisions based on AI-generated outputs. It contends that it would be unjustified to hold institutions liable when an AI tool provides precise information, but the client subsequently makes an independent decision. This viewpoint goes against SEBI’s proposed amendments which seemingly endorses broader institutional liability.  

    e. Lastly, SEBI’s proposed amendments and existing regulations remain silent on the standards or requirements for the data sets (input data) utilized by AI/ML systems to carry out their functions. While the amendments imply that REs must ensure AI models are trained using data sets that either do not require consent (e.g., publicly available data) or have obtained appropriate consent, particularly under the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (DPDPA), SEBI could have more explicitly define the standards for high-quality data sets suitable for AI/ML functionality particularly crucial when the data protection rules have not seen the light of the day.

    CONCLUSION

    While it is commendable that SEBI, recognizing the growing use of AI/ML tools in the financial sector, proposed amendments to hold REs accountable for their usage, it should have given due consideration to the factors mentioned above. Because it is vital to ensure that any policy introduced is crafted carefully in a way that does not, in any way, discourage innovation and growth in the emerging fields of AI and ML technology. 

  • Extra Cover: The Case for Regulating Sports Agents in Cricket

    Extra Cover: The Case for Regulating Sports Agents in Cricket

    BY SIMONE AVINASH VAIDYA, SECOND-YEAR STUDENT AT MNLU, MUMBAI

    Introduction

    The past two decades have witnessed an unprecedented boom in the commercialisation and commodification of Indian sport. An athlete’s horizon is no longer limited to the playing field, with production sets, brand shoots and promotional appearances routinely featuring as aspects of their professional obligations. It is common for A-list athletes to engage the services of Sports Agents or Agencies to manage their commercial ventures, and it is becoming increasingly prominent for upcoming sportspersons to sign with agents for this purpose. This practice has especially permeated the cricket pitch. This agreement comprises endorsements, team affiliations, compliance with regulatory guidelines and other brand ventures, with the agent essentially becoming the athlete’s manager.

    Indian sports are largely unregulated by the State in the absence of a comprehensive sports law and agency contracts in cricket are especially ad-hoc in their functioning. While other jurisdictions or authorities generally have codified laws or regulations pertaining to sports agents, India and the Board of Control for Cricket in India (‘BCCI’) do not prescribe comprehensive or even adequate guidelines for the same. Documentation and registration are the first steps in such regulation, and the BCCI has yet to implement even an accreditation system.

    This article seeks to establish the case for the regulation of agency contracts in cricket. While the rationale is applicable to all sports in India, the researcher focuses on the cricket field, shedding light on the virtual free hand given to player agents and managers. This article is structured along the same lines as Aditya Sondhi’s 2010 paper arguing the need for cricket legislation.

    Prognosis

    In the context of the dearth of laws and regulations for such agency relations, the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (‘ICA’) serves as the governing statute. The enforceability of sports agency contracts flows from Chapters I, II and X of the ICA. The foundation of any sports agency contract is the agency-principal relationship, which is governed by Chapter X of the ICA, starting with Section 182. The multi-billion dollar valuation of the industry amplifies the high stakes as cricket agency contracts operate in a league of their own.  The ICA is a general law failing to meet the unique needs of these situations. It is insufficient to address every aspect of cricket agency contracts, and there are multiple reasons for the same.

    Firstly, the fervour around cricket in India is unparalleled, heightening financial and emotional stakes. Given this massive commercial landscape, sports agents wield significant power in managing business deals. With such high stakes, the potential for conflicts of interest becomes a serious concern. Agents often negotiate across multiple interests, including franchises, sponsors, and the athlete’s commercial rights, which may not always align with the player’s best interests. Cricketer Kamran Khan’s story garnered media attention, with reports of his agent demanding 25% of his IPL contract money. This was not the only instance of such exploitative practices coming to light- Zaheer Khan’s legal dispute with Percept D’Markr, a talent management agency, was decided by the Supreme Court in 2006. It was held that the agency’s Right of First Refusal clause was void on the grounds of restraint of trade, under Section 27 of the ICA.

    Similarly, there is a substantial risk of loss and hardship caused due to category locking. This refers to the practice of restricting an athlete’s ability to endorse products from competitors of their existing sponsors. While this practice is common in sports contracts, it can often lead to an unfair restriction on the athlete’s freedom to choose endorsements. This risk is prevalent in the light of an agent’s often unbridled authority to negotiate and enter into brand deals on behalf of the athlete.

    Secondly, the athlete’s personality rights stand the risk of being misused. Personality rights refer to the right of a person to control the commercial use of their identity, including their name, image, likeness, and other personal attributes In India, while there is no dedicated legislation governing personality rights, athletes increasingly face challenges in protecting these rights from unauthorized commercial exploitation. Sports agencies have substantial power in this regard since they facilitate such agreements and transactions.

    Thirdly, the Mudgal Committee, constituted by the Supreme Court after the 2013 IPL Fixing Scandal, acknowledged the nefarious role played by some agents in its 2014 Report. Although the Report didn’t comprise an in-depth investigation of the same, it addressed the unethical conduct of these agents, and how they often serve as the bridge between the athlete and the bookie. This concern was also reiterated in the Lodha Committee Report, wherein the unscrupulous backgrounds of player agents were brought into question. The agent shares a fiduciary relationship with the athlete and is in a position of power while influencing them. This poses the risk of athletes being pressured by agents to engage in illicit and illegal activities, with younger or less experienced sportspersons being especially vulnerable to such influences.

    Furthermore, the culture of nepotism, non-accountability and excessive discretion in the cricket industry makes athletes reluctant to approach the courts for the redressal of their rights. The observation of favouritism at multiple levels of the cricket set-up also exacerbates the disinclination of athletes to speak up against potentially powerful sports agencies. In light of these varied considerations and interwoven complexities, it is evident that unregulated sports agencies are likely to become the malaise of the commercial world of cricket. The ICA is insufficient to meet the needs of such a uniquely dynamic landscape, and there is a pressing need to introduce- legislation for sports law at large, and rules for agency contracts in particular.

    Global Best Practices- France and the US

    France and the United States have enacted statutory regulations for sports agents, recognizing the need to effectively respond to the various challenges and exploitative practices in the industry.

    France has enacted the Code du Sport for this purpose. Sports agents in France must be licensed by the relevant sports federation, such as the Fédération Française de Football (‘FFF’) for football agents. To obtain a license, agents must meet educational and professional criteria, pass an exam, and adhere to ethical standards set by the federations. One of the key features of French sports law is its focus on transparency and athlete protection. Agents are required to have a written contract with the athlete, which must clearly outline their duties and the financial terms. The Code du Sport also imposes limits on the commissions agents can charge, typically capping them at a percentage of the athlete’s earnings. This prevents exploitation and ensures that athletes are not overcharged for agent services. Additionally, French law includes strict provisions on conflicts of interest and agent conduct. Agents cannot represent conflicting parties in the same deal, such as both a player and a club. Violations of these regulations can result in penalties, including fines, suspension, or revocation of an agent’s license.

    In the US, the Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act of 2004 (‘SPARTA’) and the Uniform Athlete Agents Act of 2015 (‘UAAA’) are in force to protect the duties of student-athletes signing with sports agents, in addition to the various state-specific laws. SPARTA delineates the duties of the agent, revolving around truthfulness and transparency. This creates an additional layer of obligations for sports agents, with unfair or deceptive acts being treated as violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act, subject to civil penalties. The UAAA in turn, is a model state law that provides for standardization, registration and certification of agents representing student-athletes. It also mandates express written contracts which include specific clauses, as stipulated under S. 10. Violation of the UAAA results in civil, as well as criminal penalties. However, it is to be noted that the SPARTA and UAAA are solely applicable to student-athletes, thereby excluding other professionals from its purview. There is no doubt that the SPARTA and UAAA suffer from several deficiencies, including their limited applicability. However, it cannot be said that this weakens the case for the regulation of cricket agents in India, which is negligible at present- the flaws in the application of a certain law cannot overshadow the need for regulation in another jurisdiction. 

    The Way Forward and the BCCI’s Prerogative

    Since the need for separate regulation of cricket agents has been clearly established, it is important to devise an effective and sound implementation system. Such a structure must account for accreditation, conflict of interest complications, transparency and ethical conduct. Currently, the BCCI is recognised as a private body registered under the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act. In BCCI v. Cricket Association of Bihar, the Supreme Court asserted that while the BCCI might be a private body, it discharges public functions with the tacit recognition of the State. The Court also observed that it possesses “complete sway over the game of cricket”, making it incumbent upon the BCCI to operate in the interests of justice and fair play. Therefore, the onus of introducing such regulations is on the Board itself due to its monopoly status in the field and Court-imposed responsibility of transparency and probity. These rules must be in the best interests of cricketers and must include several core regulatory measures. 

    Firstly, agents should be accredited as per the Lodha Report. It would not be unsuitable to prescribe certain qualifications for such agents and require them to pass licensing examinations. Though the BCCI announced an agent accreditation scheme in 2014 to regulate agents in cricket, there is little evidence of its implementation. According to news reports, the BCCI has failed to enforce the scheme effectively, and there is no information available about its actual enforcement, leaving cricketers vulnerable to unregulated agents. A major concern in the sports agent industry is the risk of conflicts of interest. Rules must explicitly prohibit agents from representing multiple parties with conflicting interests in the same transaction. A mandatory code of ethics should govern all accredited sports agents.

    Secondly, incorporating the American and French mandates of express written contracts is also a viable solution to ensure standardisation. The role played by agents in Indian cricket is vastly different from that of American or French agents since negotiations with clubs or franchises generally do not feature as a part of the agent’s functions in Indian cricket. Such global practices are effective when they are adapted to Indian standards. Agency contracts should clearly outline the duties, services, duration and financial terms, including commission rates. This provision would protect both athletes and agents by providing a legal framework for disputes. 

    Thirdly, all financial dealings between agents and athletes should be documented and subject to regular audits by an independent authority such as a Committee constituted by the BCCI for this purpose. A European Commission Report on Sports Agents identified the pressing need to ensure transparency in all financial flows between athletes and their agents. The link between financial crimes such as money laundering, and sports leagues has also been well-established, therefore exacerbating the threat of mismanagement and unscrupulous conduct. External auditing is a suitable mechanism to deter such activities, and this has been pinpointed in a 2021 study that incorporated a law and economics approach. 

    By making such agreements compulsory, athletes, especially young or inexperienced ones, will have a clear understanding of their relationships with agents and avoid exploitation or ambiguous commitments. To ensure compliance, the law must incorporate strict penalties for violations by sports agents, including fines, suspension, and license revocation. The BCCI must also constitute a forum for the investigation and redressal of such complaints and disputes. Encouraging Alternate Dispute Resolution mechanisms is a more athlete-friendly measure, considering the fiduciary relationship between the principal and agent, as well as the surrounding pressures of the cricket world. 

    Conclusion

    The current reliance on the ICA is insufficient to address the complex and high-stakes nature of agency contracts in cricket. As sports agents wield significant power in managing an athlete’s endorsements, sponsorships, and other commercial ventures, the absence of regulatory safeguards leaves players vulnerable to exploitation, unfair contractual terms, and conflicts of interest. 

    Through proactive regulation, it is possible to safeguard the interests of its cricketers, promote ethical conduct among agents, and elevate the professionalism of sports management. This, in turn, will foster a fairer, more accountable system that protects the rights and careers of athletes, ultimately ensuring that the business of cricket aligns with the values of integrity and fairness.