The Corporate & Commercial Law Society Blog, HNLU

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  • Antitrust Implications of Dual Role Played by Food Intermidiaries vis-a-vis the Recent Tussle Between NRAI and Zomato-Swiggy

    Antitrust Implications of Dual Role Played by Food Intermidiaries vis-a-vis the Recent Tussle Between NRAI and Zomato-Swiggy

    BY PRIYAM INDURKHYA AND RITURAJ SINGH PARMAR, THIRD-YEAR STUDENTS AT NLIU, Bhopal

    Introduction

    CCI, the antitrust watchdog of India, has ordered a probe against food service aggregators like Zomato and Swiggy (FSAs) on a complaint filed by National Restaurant Association of India (NRAI) for the violation of section 3 of the Competition Act. Out of the several anticompetitive malpractices alleged by NRAI, the CCI, vide order dated April 4, 2022, has observed that a prima facie case exists against Zomato and Swiggy on the following three conducts— (i) dual role played by FSAs by listing their own cloud kitchen brands exclusively on their platform, akin to private labels, thereby creating an inherent conflict of interest in their role as an intermediary on one hand and as a participant on the other hand, (ii) entering into exclusive contracts with restaurant partners, (RPs) thereby compelling them to be exclusively listed with FSAs, (iii) imposing price parity terms on the RPs, thereby restricting them to offer lower prices or providing better terms to customers on the platforms other than that of the FSAs. 

    In light of the recent developments, this article attempts to analyse the anticompetitive concerns arising out of the dual role played by Zomato and Swiggy. The authors, in addition to examining the violation of section 3, also delves into the violation of section 4 of the Act.

    Analysis of probable violation of s. 3(4) read with s. 3(1) of the Act

    The Act, under s. 3(1), prohibits enterprises from entering into an agreement which causes or is likely to cause appreciable adverse effect on competition within India. Furthermore, s. 3(4) of the Act defines vertical agreements as those agreements which are entered into between enterprises which operate in different markets, and at different levels of the production chain. In the present case, the agreement between the FSAs and the RPs is in the nature of vertical agreements since both of them are in different markets and at different levels. The FSAs are in in the market of application-based food delivery platforms in India, while the RPs cater to the market of providing food services. 

    Vertical agreements are not per se anticompetitive and they require a rule of reason analysis to determine their legality. The rule of reason analysis under s. 19(3) of the Act entails weighing various procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of the agreements. The authors herein contend that the vertical agreements entered into by Zomato and Swiggy with a select few RPs fail to pass the rule of reason test, and are therefore, in violation of section 3(4) read with s. 3(1) of the Act.

    The anticompetitive effects arising out of the dual role played by the food intermediaries significantly outweigh the procompetitive effects, if any. The anticompetitive effects listed under s. 19(3)(a)—(c) include creation of entry barriers to new entrants in the market, foreclosure of competition, and driving existing competitors out of the market. It is contended that the listing of cloud kitchens on their own platform certainly causes these anticompetitive effects.

    Having their own vested interests in the downstream market, the food intermediaries are more inclined towards those RPs which are either their private labels or those which pay huge commissions to them. This inclination can be manifested in a host of ways which include, but are not limited to, skewed search results, customer reviews, favourable listings, among others. The data masking and lack of transparency in sharing the modus operandi of the intermediaries further exacerbates the situation. Given such a background, it becomes extremely difficult for the new entrants to cross the entry barrier and break into the market. Moreover, such a conflict of interest is also detrimental to the interests of the existing players in the market. The vested interest of the intermediaries in favour of a select few RPs puts other players in a disadvantageous position, and has a potential to drive them out of the market. Thus, Zomato and Swiggy acting as a participant as well as an intermediary, gives rise to anticompetitive effects listed under s. 19(3)(a)—(c). Moreover, such a dual role neither promotes any technological innovation, nor does it lead to accrual of benefit to consumers.

    In fact, the Competition Commission of India (CCI) had earlier released a Market Study on E-Commerce. The study focused on competition aspects pertaining to e-commerce marketplaces and platforms. Out of the five major concerns identified by CCI, the first one was the Platform Neutrality (or lack thereof). The other concerns included, deep discounting, i.e., discounts of preferred sellers being selectively funded by the platform, price parity clauses in the agreements,  exclusive agreements, and the skewed search rankings along with misuse of data The study delineated two major issues concerning the neutrality of e-commerce platforms. The first is the intermediary’s access to competitively sensitive transaction data on its platform. This data is utilised by the intermediaries to enter into and strengthen their position in the downstream market through private labels. The second is the intermediary’s control over search parameters and results which gives preferential listing and favoured placement to its own brands and preferred sellers on the website. Interestingly, the concerns identified by the CCI in the Market Study are similar to those which are identified by the Commission in its prima facie order against Zomato and Swiggy.    

    Analysis of probable violation of s. 4 of the Act

    It is to be noted that the prima facie order passed by the CCI only suspects the probable violation of section 3 of the Act due to the dual role played by the intermediaries. However, the authors herein contend that the said conduct of Zomato and Swiggy also attracts section 4 of the Act.

    For analysing the violation of section 4 of the act i.e., Abuse of dominance, it is indispensable to firstly, delineate the relevant market, secondly, show that the enterprise is dominant in the relevant market and thirdly, it has abused its dominant position. 

    Relevant market

    Unlike section 3, section 4 in strict sense requires delineation of relevant market to assess the competitive constraints that the enterprise faces. The relevant market in the present case is the ‘market of application-based food delivery platforms in India’. The market has two major players viz., Zomato and Swiggy. The said delineation of relevant market is justified because, firstly, there is substitutability in the delineated market, which is an essential criterion for the relevant product market under section 2(t) of the Act. The service of app-based food delivery is user friendly and unique as it allows customers to order food hassle free from any location. It also provides an array of choices to the consumers in terms of budget, cuisine, restaurant partner ratings, mode of payment and safety classifications. These attributes make app-based food delivery services non substitutable with other services of like nature viz., dine-in, take out, direct orders and vertically integrated food chain services. Secondly, the market of app-based food delivery also satisfies touchstone of section 19(7), like the consumer preferences, and price of goods or services. Furthermore, CCI has also approved this delineation of relevant market in the case of In Re Prachi Agarwal & Ors. v Swiggy..  In this case, it was alleged by the informant that Swiggy was abusing its dominant position in the market by charging unreasonable and unfair prices. CCI, in that case, had delineated the relevant market as “App based food delivery with restaurant search platform across territory of India”. Given that Swiggy is involved in the present case as well, the delineation of the relevant market should be on similar lines in this case as well. The relevant market delineated in the present analysis, i.e., “Market of application-based food delivery platforms in India” is similar to that of the market delineated by the CCI in the Prachi Agrawal case. Therefore, the said delineation of the relevant market is justified. 

    Dominance 

    After establishing relevant market, the next stage is to assess dominance of Swiggy and Zomato in the relevant market. There is a twofold approach in assessing dominance of any enterprises under the Act viz., the definition of dominance under section 4 and the factors enunciated under section 19(4) of the Act. The definition provides that dominant position means position of an enterprise which enables it to operate independently of competitive forces prevailing in the market. In the much-celebrated DLF case, CCI has held that the presence of one-sided agreements generally results in loss of customers, however, if such agreement doesn’t result in loss of customers, then this amplifies the ability of enterprise to operate independently of the competitive forces. Zomato and Swiggy also entered into one-sided terms and conditions with the RPs, like committing them exclusively to be listed on their respective platforms, charging exorbitant commission ranging upto 25%-30%, imposing price parity terms, and compelling the RPs to fund the discount provided by platforms. Despite these unviable conditions, Zomato and Swiggy have duopoly in the market of food delivery business with a cumulative market share of 95%.This shows the dependence of consumers (RPs) on these platforms which in turns reflect their ability to operate independently of competitive forces prevailing in the market.  

    The conduct of Zomato and Swiggy also satisfies factors mentioned under section 19(4). The first factor is market share of an enterprise. Market share of around 50 per cent could be considered large enough for an undertaking to be presumed as dominant. The market share of Zomato and Swiggy is 52% and 43% respectively. The second factor to be considered is the creation of entry barrier in the market. It is pertinent to note that there has not been an entry of any significant player in the food delivery market from the last three years. The application-based food delivery market requires huge fleet in order to deliver food on time. Both Zomato and Swiggy have a fleet consisting of 1.5 lakh and 1.3 lakh drivers respectively. Mobilising such a huge fleet of drivers on a pan India level is not a cakewalk for a new entrant. The third factor is the countervailing buying power. The presence of duopoly between Zomato and Swiggy in the relevant market left RPs with a Hobson’s choice because despite of anticompetitive practices of Zomato and Swiggy, RPs have no other option but to keep availing services of these FSAs. This reflects the sheer absence of countervailing buyer power in the relevant market. Moreover, the acquisition of Uber Eats, Blinkit, and other app-based food delivery platforms by Zomato further reflects upon its dominance in the relevant market. Thus, the cumulative factors of market share, entry barrier, countervailing  buying power, and the acquisition of existing market players establish the dominance of Zomato and Swiggy in the market of application-based food delivery platforms in India. 

    Abuse of dominance 

    The next and final stage is to prove abuse of dominance as dominance per se is not prohibited under the Competition Act. The market of application-based food delivery platforms in India provides wide array of food choices to customers and they have to choose in accordance with their taste and preferences.  But it is not that easy because human character is tuned in a way that it directs more attention towards the thing it sees and the entire advertisement industry is cashing on this tendency.  Thus, a product’s visibility is directly proportional to consumer’s propensity to purchase it. Both Zomato and Swiggy have equity participation in their platforms through their cloud kitchens and their private labels. It is alleged that they manipulate the search results and divert user traffic to increase visibility of these kitchens. Furthermore, the platforms provide access to data like consumer preferences and patterns to their cloud kitchens and private labels. The cumulative effect of all these is that it puts the other RPs in discriminatory conditions for sale and therefore the act of FSA squarely falls under section 4(2)(a)(i) i.e., imposing discriminatory condition in sale of goods.

    The conduct of FSA also violates section 4(2)I of the Act, i.e., using dominant position in one relevant market to enter into another relevant market. As discussed earlier, Zomato and Swiggy are dominant in the market of app-based food delivery. In addition to their principal role of acting as a medium between customers and RPs, they also list their own cloud kitchen brands exclusively on their platform, akin to private labels. These private labels like the Bowl Company, Homely and Breakfast Express fall under the relevant market in which the other RPs are operating. Thus, FSAs like Zomato and Swiggy use their dominant position in the market of app-based food delivery to enter into another relevant market in which the other restaurant partners are operating in the first place.

    It is clear from the above analysis that the conduct of Zomato and Swiggy perpetrates abuse of dominance in the market of application-based food delivery platforms in India. 

    Conclusion

    It is pertinent to note that Zomato has not denied the allegations of listing its own cloud kitchen brands on its platform. In its defence, it has only contended that, “…it does not have any ownership in any of the restaurants listed on its platform nor own or operate cloud kitchens or private labels or restaurants. Thus, no claims for discrimination and preferential treatment can be made against it.” The CCI did not find merit in Zomato’s contentions as they solely relied upon the ‘ownership’ of the RPs and cloud kitchens to argue that there can be no anticompetitive malpractice.  

    As highlighted by NRAI, in lieu of providing access to the Kitchen Spaces, Zomato charges a commission from the RPs, on the rents as well as on the orders received by them through the Kitchen Spaces. Therefore, even though Zomato does not ‘own’ the Kitchen Spaces, or the RPs which function through those Kitchen Spaces, the revenue structure employed by Zomato for this arrangement has a potential to attract anti-competitive concerns and thus calls for a deeper scrutiny. Moreover, the Commission should not limit its examination only for the violation of section 3 of the Act. Instead, it should also consider the dominance of the FSAs to enquire into the possible violation of section 4 of the Act.  

  • Institutionalizing Social Impact: The Scope Zero Coupon Zero Principal Instruments

    Institutionalizing Social Impact: The Scope Zero Coupon Zero Principal Instruments

    BY RITU RAJ, THIRD-YEAR STUDENT AT GNLU, Gandhinagar

    The Ministry of Finance, through a gazette notification dated 15th July 2022 has recognized Zero Coupon Zero Principal Instruments as securities within the purview of the Securities Contract (Regulation) Act, 1956 (‘SCRA’). Envisioned under the Securities and Exchange Board of India’s (‘SEBI’) Framework for Social Stock Exchange, Zero Coupon Zero Principal Instruments (‘ZCZP’) are bonds issued by Not for Profit Organizations (‘NPOs’) for the purpose of raising funds through the newly established Social Stock Exchange (‘SSE’) segment of authorized Stock Exchanges. They resemble debt bonds but are devoid of any interest or principal repayment obligation upon maturity. The investors can subscribe to ZCZP instruments to fund specified social impact projects and indicate the same on their balance sheets as assets. Upon maturity, they have to be written off from the books, and the investors are not entitled to receive any interest or repayment of principal. The return on investment is in the form of the social impact created by the underlying project.

    NPOs  (except those incorporated under section 8 of the Companies Act, 2013) like Trusts and Societies are not defined as ‘body corporates’ under the Companies Act, 2013. Consequently, before this notification, the instruments issued by them for raising funds did not qualify as securities under the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act 1956. This, coupled with their non-profit making nature and non-availability of audited information pertaining to the actualized social impact of the projects undertaken by them, impeded their access to institutionalized funding and restricted the maximization of their social impact potential. The Ministry of Finance, through this notification, has attempted to circumvent this impediment by facilitating the channelization of funds from the capital market to social impact projects through ZCZP.

    This post analyses the scope of this newly introduced instrument by assessing the implementational framework, understanding the advantages it offers for both issuers and investors, and gauging the challenges it faces in the Indian market. It further attempts to undertake a comparative analysis of similar projects in other counties to understand the structural impediments and proposes measures to circumvent them while operationalizing ZCZP instruments in India.

    Understanding Zero Coupon Zero Principal Instruments 

    The NPOs demonstrating social impact and intent as their primary goal can get registered on the Social Stock Exchange segment of authorized Stock Exchanges and consequently raise funds from the capital market for specified social development projects by issuing ZCZPs. ZCZP comes with a maturity period which will usually be determined on the basis of the tenure of the specified development projects. Upon maturity, they can be written off from the books of the investors. While the investors are not entitled to any repayment from the NPOs, they bear a risk to the extent that the NPOs might not deliver the proposed social impact (Fundraising instruments and Structures for NPOs, Framework for Social Stock Exchange).

    The issue of ZCZP will be regulated by SEBI under the Securities and  Exchange  Board of India  (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) (Third Amendment) Regulations, 2022. The NPOs must demonstrate expertise in the targeted areas through the social performance of past projects by making disclosures as mandated in Annexure III 2(d) of the SEBI’s Technical Group’s Report on Social Stock Exchange. The registered NPOs will be obligated to make periodic public disclosures with regard to the utilization of funds and the social impact of the projects vide realized annual impact report to ensure transparency. For the purpose of periodic disclosures, a new Chapter has also been introduced in SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 through SEBI Securities and Exchange Board of India (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) (Fifth Amendment) Regulations, 2022. These disclosures shall be based on the social audits conducted by institutions/firms of high standings in the domain employing auditors certified by the National Institute of Security Markets (‘NISM’). Moreover, to ensure authenticity and procedural fairness, a proposal has been made to establish a sustainability directorate under the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (‘ICAI’) to act as a Self-Regulatory Organization (‘SRO’) for the Social Auditors.

    While the trading potential of ZCZP instruments is limited, their recognition and the subsequent listing, coupled with the extensive disclosure requirements, offer an efficient framework of checks and balances. It enables an independent and objective assessment of the utilization of funds and the actualized social impact of the associated projects.  Consequently, this makes the functioning of NPOs transparent and mitigates the informational asymmetry between the issuers and the investors.

    The availability of authentic impact assessment will aid both the retail and institutional investors in gauging the operational efficiency of the NPOs and help channel the funds to the ZCZP with higher social impact potentials. This will further incentivize the NPOs to improve their operational efficacy and adopt the best practices facilitating the maximization of the social impact of the projects funded through ZCZP. 

    The ZCZP instruments offer a scope of altering the fundamental nature of funding social development projects by inducting liquidity. While the NPOs have no obligation to repay the principal received by them, the ZCZP can be freely traded on Social Stock Exchanges. The investors can liquidize their investment by selling it to other investors on the exchange who can continue to hold it as their contribution. 

    Gauging The Challenges

    The recognition of ZCZP as securities is a significant step toward the institutionalization of funding opportunities available for social development projects which continues to remain driven by individual philanthropists and state-sponsored grants. However, its successful operationalization faces multiple challenges.

    Similar attempts to channel funds from the capital market for social development projects by enabling the listing of securities issued by NPOs were made in Canada, the United Kingdom, Singapore, Brazil, South Africa, Portugal, and Jamaica. However, they failed to take off in four (i.e., Brazil, Portugal, South Africa, UK) out of seven countries.

    In the United Kingdom, a lack of investor and donor appetite for securities issued by social impact enterprises led to the failure of the Social Stock Exchange, which was founded in 2013 to facilitate social impact investment. The exchange had to restructure itself as a licensing body, and has been reduced to a directory of enterprises that have passed the social impact.

    In South Africa, South Africa Social Investment Exchange (‘SASIX’) facilitated the listing and trading of securities issued for funding Social Impact projects. However, before closing its doors in 2017, SASIX could only raise $ 2.7 Million for 73 social impact projects in 11 years of its operation.

    Similarly, a lack of interest on the part of investors forced Bolsa de Valorous Socioambientais (‘BVSA’), Social Stock Exchange launched by Brazil’s stock exchange Bolsa de Valores (‘BVS’) in 2003, to act as a facilitator between NPOs seeking funding and social impact investors to discontinue operations and make its official website inaccessible in 2018. After raising merely 2 million Euros in the first four years of incorporation, Portugal’s SSE Bolsa de Valores Sociais was also forced to shut its operations in 2015.

    It is evident that the absence of mass transactions and a limited investor base made their business models unsustainable, as the exchanges could not generate the revenue required to cover their operational expenditures.  

    Beyond the structural challenges of raising funds for development projects universally, in India, the proposed model appears skewed towards large NPOs with resources to comply with the required eligibility and periodic disclosure mandates. Effectively leaving out small/rural organizations working at the grassroots level out of its scope.

    The Way Ahead

    To materialize the envisaged goal of bringing ‘the capital market closer to the masses’ and democratizing funding for social development projects. It is imperative for the Government to navigate the challenges that might impede the successful operationalization of ZCZP Instruments in the Indian capital market. The Government needs to learn from the failure of similar models in other countries and adopt mitigating measures curated for the Indian context. There is a need to develop investor and donor appetite in institutionalized social impact investments and curate a sustainable revenue stream for the hosting SSEs.

    Going beyond recognition of ZCZP as securities, there is a need to accept other recommendations of SEBI’s Working Group. The Group proposed incentivizing the investors through 100 percent tax deduction for investments made through ZCZP in NPOs with 80G certification, waiver of Securities Transaction Tax and Capital Gains Tax on investments in ZCZP, and making the Corporate Social Responsibility expenditure made by the corporates through investment in ZCZP deductible from their taxable income.

     The knowledge capital, credibility, and network of established exchanges can be leveraged to develop investor and donor appetite in the country. They can carry out awareness programs targeted at educating and sensitizing potential investors about ZCZP and curate networking opportunities for the NPOs.

    Further, in the spirit of inclusive growth and financial inclusion, there is a need to establish a framework enabling small NPOs working at grassroots levels to raise funds through ZCZP. This can be facilitated by providing pro-bono services through the proposed Self-Regulatory Organization of Social Auditors within ICAI. 

    Conclusion

    The notification designating ZCZPs issued by NPOs as securities to enable the channelization of funds from the capital market to social development projects is a laudable step in the positive direction. It has the potential to circumvent the traditional ideas of collective risk aversion, valuation, and wealth maximization and materialize the goal of bringing the capital market closer to the masses by inducing the concept of social impact investments, financial inclusion, and sustainable economic growth. However, learning from the fate of similar initiatives in other nations, there is a need for the Government to ensure its successful operationalization by providing for efficient implementational framework, attractive incentivizing measures for investors, and structural support enabling the small/rural NPOs to access this avenue of fundraising.

  • The Divisive AICOA Weighed: Possible Takeaways for India?

    The Divisive AICOA Weighed: Possible Takeaways for India?

    BY RANJUL MALIK, third-year student at ail, mohali

    Introduction

    Competition regulators across the world including places like Europe, the USA, Australia, Japan and even India are eyeing major amendments in their respective legislatures to better equip themselves in dealing with new and rising antitrust challenges. While there can be a combination of factors leading to this phenomenon, there can be no denying of the inability of regulators to control big tech as the primary factor for such global shifts. To this effect, the Competition Commission of India (‘CCI’) conventionally is likely to implement some changes along the lines of the Digital Markets Act introduced in the European Union.

    It may also be of value for the CCI to draw inference with some provisions from developments taking place in rather far West, in the USA. The American Innovation and Choice Online Act (‘AICOA/the Bill’) is a proposed antitrust legislature which is touted as the tool to regulate ‘selective big tech players’. Though still to be cleared on floor by the Senate, this article aims to focus on facets of AICOA, which might be adopted by the CCI to solve some problems of the Indian antitrust ecosystem, especially with respect to big tech.

    A Look Into the AICOA- Parallels With India

    The bill on the back of bipartisan support in the senate provides new channels to deal with issues like the privacy of users, providing a definition for big tech players that are considered to be a threat to the competition and importantly, the issue of self-preferencing. A breakdown of these three issues vis-à-vis the Indian picture is as follows:

    • Defining big tech (covered platforms)

    Big tech in antitrust has often been constituted by large companies like Amazon, Apple, Google, etc. By quantifying the definition and referring to them as ‘covered platforms’, the AICOA is surely a mechanism provided against tech giants operating digitally. Most of such enterprises thrive on user data and algorithms based on user-generated data. Due to such instance, the new draft has left both telecommunication and financial services outside the ambit of the legislature, effectively applicable to only core tech enterprises dealing with user data. The AICOA shall apply to companies with either a market capitalization of $1 billion in the last one year or a user base of over 100 million users, to ensure both private and public companies are covered within the ambit.

    Secondly, it restricts itself to companies with online platforms either generating user data, involving information queries basis the user, or involving transactions. The Competition Commission of India on the other hand has often failed to regulate big tech due to its inability to define relevant markets in the digital space, largely due to the fact that it still is sticking with the interchangeability or substitutability tests which do not always depict the correct picture with digital and tech-heavy cases.

    Additionally, there is no definition with CCI with regards to big tech, with the Chairman of CCI once going on record to refer to big tech as “centres for entrenched and unchecked dominance“. Therefore, in case of there being difficulty in defining a relevant market for such players and a need to restrict their activities, the proposed definition within the AICOA with its quantitative nature ensures stricter compliance and regulations to such players.

    At the same time, it is necessary to implement such provisions after negating their negative halves. For example, the AICOA definition will be practically limited to domestic players, with the threshold of 50 million US users or 1 lakh business users from USA, thus ousting from its realms the likes of Tencent, Huawei, etc. for USA. To elaborate further, WeChat, whose parent company happens to be Tencent, has only about 1.3 million users in USA while its global userbase is a whooping 1.3 billion. This step is a big drawback as it is pro-competitive for foreign players while impairing domestic competitiveness via restrictions.

    • Selective preferencing

    The issue of self-preferencing by giants like Google, Apple, Amazon has been in contention of many debates and discussions. Self-preferencing has been defined as “a digital platform giving preferential treatment to its own products and services when they are in competition with the products and services provided by other companies”. While conventionally an enterprise’s foray into a vertically related business is known to have pro-competitive and pro-consumer impact, it is only the rapid expansion by big tech and digital enterprises into multiple domains at once that has compelled policymakers to think over the practice of selective preferencing.

    The example in the Senate was of Amazon Alexa promoting Amazon Basic products over its search results for queries related to products, in cases where they might be of sub-par quality to those of third-party sellers too. In the Indian regime questions of self-preferencing have been raised in cases like Matrimony.com Ltd and Google LLC and Ors, Umar Javeed and Ors v. Google LLC and Ors and in complaints received against likes of Apple. But because the self-preferencing is not per se violative under section 4 of the Competition Act, it has led to no strict actions against such enterprises.

    In contrast, the AICOA proposes to impose a fine of 10% of the total revenue of the past year generated within the USA, in case enterprises were to be found engaged in self-preferencing. This thereby ensures that the referred covered platforms need to be neutral in their regular conduct so as not be discriminating against other third-party service providers present on their platforms. While the bill proposes standard exceptions like that for cybersecurity, the more interesting addition is two-layered criteria as an exception. The criteria check an activity vis-à-vis its importance to the core function of the company and comparing it with any less harmful method which could have been used to achieve a similar outcome. The two points as given are:

    1. If an activity seems to be anti-competitive, then to check whether or not  such an act is being done to maintain or substantially enhance the core functionality of the covered platform.
    2. And that the conduct could not be achieved through materially less discriminatory means, meaning there is no alternative which provides equal or effective results while being less discriminatory.

    Hence the bill provides a strong framework which is mechanised with craft to treat unfair self-preferencing.

    • Data and Privacy

    The bill has introduced many terms which remain undefined and abstract and might be responsible for some high stake litigation in the upcoming times if it were to be enacted. Terms like ‘materially harm competition’, ‘generated data’, or ‘core functionality’ might not be defined, yet anyone can join the dots to point out the direction being aimed at is user data and its privacy. Lummis for example highlights how big tech companies use data generated on their platforms to their unfair advantage. This has explained by FTC and Privacy International in two ways, one by big tech having large data sets about consumers in different markets which help them design products of the future, and acting as gatekeepers to other companies who are in need of such user data and are ultimately made to adhere to unfair conditions to acquire such data.  The Google Fitbit merger at its helm was again a timely importance of such data to Big Tech, with google looking to grab hold of the data aquired by Fitbit over the years

    The bill hands down the regulatory powers in entirety to the Federal Trade Commission (‘FTC’). While the powers given to the FTC are an effective step, the term ‘data’ has been broadly and vaguely used and hence the scope of the powers remains undefined and will require regulation in continuance with section 5 of the FTC Act, but the bottom-line is that the FTC is tasked to restrict commercialisation of sensitive user data to unfair advantage and ensuring building of user interfaces which facilitate sharing of such data with the FTC itself, effectively chartering the path to what might be USA’s first central data regulator.

    In India, CCI has often recognized the role of data and IT as an evolving factor to analyze anti-competitive behavior, with the WhatsApp suo moto order talking of need to regulate collection and allocation of excessive data and in the context of platforms like Facebook having ability to process significant data. While data has been recognized by the CCI to be a non-price competitive parameter and even proposes a theory of harm for the same, the powers of the CCI have been at loggerheads with jurisdictional powers of the proposed Data Protection Authority (‘DPA’). A provision solidifying data regulating powers of the CCI in competition pretext would accordingly be a step in the right direction for regulation of this important little space at the hinge of data protection and competition law.

    Conclusion

    The AICOA is not perfect and is far from it, but that should not stop us from implementing some of the unconventionally creative solutions it poses. The bill falters and is criticized for its vague and unclear terminology which can be defined better for perusal in India. In fact, there can be a combination of provisions from a combination of foreign legislatures. For example- on the front of data privacy, creating a data regulatory body and allocating it powers similar to those given to th FTC while properly defining the term data similar to the Digital Markets Act and ultimately reaching a more concrete and multidimensional provision shall ensure better compliance. The possibilities are endless, and while the Competition (Amendment) Act of 2022 is awaited, the amendments across the world seem focused to put fair restrictions upon unfair practices which have been carried out by ‘the big tech’ for a considerable time. From this uniform complexity come uniform new solutions, which if implemented selectively, fit well into the scheme of things of various nations, as is the case of AICOA and implementation in the Indian regime on the front of data privacy, selective preferencing, and demarcating big tech.

  • Vidarbha Industries v Axis Bank: A Slumping Case for Financial Creditors

    Vidarbha Industries v Axis Bank: A Slumping Case for Financial Creditors

    By Neelabh Niket and Nitish Dubey, fourth-year students at HNLU, Raipur

    Introduction

    The Hon’ble Supreme Court (the Court) recently in the case of Vidarbha Industries Power Limited Vs Axis Bank Limited has held that the power of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) to admit an application for initiation of CIRP by a financial creditor under section 7(5) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) is only directory and not mandatory in nature. This ruling, in simple words, signifies that even if an application is complete under section 7(5)(a), the Adjudicating Authority (AA) in exceptional cases such as where an impending order lies in favour of the Corporate Debtor (CD), may not accept such an application and keep the CIRP in abeyance to protect the entity from being resolved. The Court was of the opinion that the legislature intended section 7(5) to be discretionary in nature as the word ‘may’ has been used in the provision as opposed to the word ‘shall’ used in section 9(5) which postulates a mandatory requirement in the case of operational creditors. The authors through this article intend to revisit the judgement from critical lenses and would lay down the implications of the judgement. 

    Facts

    The Court, in this case, was considering a Special Leave Petition of the Vidarbha Industries Power Limited (VIPL/defaulting Company) which had defaulted on a loan from Axis Bank Limited,, i.e., the financial creditor. The appellant pleaded that the default was on account of a dispute relating to the price of the electricity which was to be settled by the Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission (MERC) and upon which the appellant was expecting to receive a substantial amount which would enable the appellant to pay off the debt. The appellants have gotten a favourable order from the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (APTEL), however the same has been challenged in the Supreme Court whose order on the issue is awaited. 

    Analysis

    Before we delve into the nuances of the judgement, it is imperative to make it clear that the discretion conferred upon the Adjudicating Authorities to give a breathing space to the CD cannot be asked as a matter of right but can only be granted by the AA when there exist extraordinary circumstances. The authors however will argue that even this step of the Hon’ble Court is unwarranted and will open up Pandora’s box in an otherwise smooth IBC jurisprudence.  The same has been done under four heads which are as follows-

    • Overlooking Past Jurisprudence

    Prior to the instant case, it was well settled through the verdict in E.S. Krishnamurthy vs M/S Bharath Hi Tech Builder judgement that the AA had only two options when an application under section 7(5)(a) came for adjudication: (i) accept it; (ii) reject it. A judgement on similar lines was also expressed impliedly in the landmark case of  Innoventive Industries Ltd vs ICICI Bank wherein the Hon’ble Court held the following, 

    “The moment the adjudicating authority is satisfied that a default has occurred, the application must be admitted unless it is incomplete…” (emphasis supplied)

    However, the present judgement has in effect provided for a third option for the AA— to keep the insolvency proceedings in abeyance. Such an interpretation is not only against the established jurisprudence but also has little backing from the statute itself as neither the IBC nor the rules therein provide the AAs with the power to defer proceedings on account of an external/unrelated event. 

    • Diluting the Cash Flow Insolvency Test

    The Supreme Court’s decision to read discretion into section 7(5)(a) is not simply a simple shift in AA’s routine power but has the potential to disrupt the entire insolvency regime in India. The regime which was built on the solid foundation of a certain and determinable occurrence of a default has been unsettled and may attract bogus excuses by CDs to escape CIRP, causing prolonged litigation. In doing that, the Court has inadvertently dumped the Cash Flow Insolvency Test and allowed facets of the Balance Sheet Test in the Indian insolvency jurisprudence. Before delving into the tests, it becomes imperative to understand their scope and meaning. 

    There exist majorly two tests for determining an entity’s solvent status i) The Cash Flow Insolvency Test and; ii) The Balance Sheet Test. The Cash Flow Insolvency Test concentrates on whether the company can meet current debts from cash and other assets which can be readily realized; if it defaults in such repayment then it is considered insolvent. As long as an entity keeps paying its dues, and does not default no action can be taken against it under this test. Thus, the triggering point in the Cash Insolvency Test is an event of ‘default’. On the other hand, the Balance Sheet Insolvency Test requires the courts to pierce deeper into the company’s balance sheet and gauge its medium to long term liquidity, taking into account the company’s wider circumstances and be satisfied of the company’s insolvency if the company’s assets are less than its liabilities.

    The IBC strictly follows the ‘Cash Insolvency Test’, terming an entity insolvent only when it accounts for defaults. However, the Court via the judgement has digressed from the determination of insolvency from defaults to assessing whether there are other available assets of the company which may be utilized for repayment of debt at a later stage. This approach, as discussed earlier, inclines towards the Balance Sheet Insolvency Test which has not been prescribed or advocated by the IBC. 

    The erstwhile section 433(e) of the Companies Act, 1956 was based on the pretext of Balance Sheet Insolvency as it did not determine insolvency on the basis of defaults but on the entity’s inability to pay dues- a scenario which occurred when the company’s liabilities were greater than its assets.  In simple words, according to this section, an occurrence of default was insufficient in attracting the provisions of insolvency. This was however rejected and replaced by the IBC which ushered significant changes in the Indian Insolvency Regime. Importantly, the Court in Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. vs Union of India  indirectly approved the Cash Flow Insolvency Test and  noted that in a situation of financial stress, the cause of default is not relevant; and protecting the economic interest of the CD  is more relevant. 

    • Proper Usage of Discretion

    The authors are of the opinion that the usage of ‘may’ in section 7(5)(a) shall be construed to confer discretion to AAs in rejecting a CIRP application only when a mala fide intention is detected and such discretion shall not extend to provide weightage to any extraneous matter which is independent of the loan availed. The discretion in this sense is necessary to curb malicious attempts of financial creditors and CDs in deliberately forcing a Company into insolvency. The same is somewhat prevalent in the IBC jurisprudence and can be traced in few cases. For instance, the NCLAT in the case of Hytone Merchants v. Satabadi Investments Consultants rejected a section 7 application which had fulfilled all pre-requisites on the ground that the debtors and the financial creditors colluded and were acting against the interests of the company. 

    Further, the legislature’s usage of ‘shall’ for operational debt can also be justified on the same premise; the operational creditors are third parties who are not concerned with the entity and hence the chances of such collusion between the CD and operational creditors is very slim and unlikely. The Court has failed to delineate properly the different expressions used in the sections and has wrongly expanded the scope of the word ‘may’ on this premise, which in the authors’ view is wholly unnecessary. 

    • Abridging the Powers of the CoC

    If there is a possibility that the CD may get a favorable order or award, then there is always an option of settlement available with the debtor and the Committee of Creditors(CoC) to settle their claims and withdraw the resolution processunder section 12A of IBC. In any case, it is the Committee of Creditors who after assessing the financial condition of the company, shall decide the best course of action for the Company’s revival. The IBC has not conferred any powers to the NCLT to prima facie decide, at the stage of admitting a petition under section 7, whether a Company is solvent or not. It is counterintuitive to say that  an order or award will operate to save the debtor and confer the NCLT the power to stall the very commencement of the CIRP. 

    Thus, authorizing the NCLT and deferring the initiation of the CIRP on account of an uncertain event in the future may adversely affect the interests of all stakeholders, as with time other assets of the debtor may depreciate for the lack of investment and proper management. 

    Conclusion

    The Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code has been built upon the detection of insolvency upon the occurrence of a default or the Cash Flow Test. The Hon’ble Court via this judgement has diluted this Test and has allowed some element of the redundant Balance Sheet Test to again creep into the regime. The authors herein believe that the broad interpretation of the word ‘may’ in section 7(5)(a) by the Supreme Court will create unnecessary confusion and chaos in the Insolvency scenario in India. One must also not forget that in a commercial setup, there is a chain of transactions which are dependent on each other and a major delay in repayment may culminate in a domino effect, disrupting cash flow across sectors. On an optimistic note, it may however be hoped that such discretion does not become the rule and is only exercised in exceptional cases by the AA. 

  • Asymmetric Jurisdiction Clause: A note on determining transnational jurisdictional dispute 

    Asymmetric Jurisdiction Clause: A note on determining transnational jurisdictional dispute 

    By Manan Mondal, An SLS, HYDERABAD law graduate

    In general a jurisdiction clause dictates the forum where parties want their disputes arising under the terms of the agreement to be determined before a Competent Court with necessary jurisdiction. However, with present day drafters of finance agreements containing a limited jurisdiction clause, termed asymmetric jurisdiction clause, have created an unnecessary stir in determining the competent jurisdiction. The present analysis sheds some light towards deciphering the jurisdictional turmoil.

    What is Asymmetric jurisdiction?

    Herein parties decide the jurisdiction of the Court or Courts to adjudicate the dispute, allowing one party, usually the lender, to sue the other party, generally the borrower, in any Court of law but preventing the borrower from proceeding in any Court except the one with exclusive jurisdiction.

    For instance, through the terms of the contractual arrangement, in an Asymmetric Jurisdiction Clause between X and Y, Y has limited authority over particular designated jurisdiction named A, while X has jurisdiction to sue in any Court under such a clause. Hence, the terms of an Asymmetric Jurisdiction can also be understood as an exclusive choice of Court or devolving a choice of jurisdiction upon a particular Court, as opposed to the essential factors followed in our domestic Civil Procedure Code, 1908.

    Now, this liberty of choosing any Court to refer the dispute by the party with broader jurisdiction casts a few fundamental questions, i.e., whether such a Court will be stricto sensu ‘any Court’ or a Court of ‘Competent Jurisdiction’? And whether there exist any judicial opinion to determine the competence of a ‘Court’ in a transnational dispute?

    Generally, a non-symmetric jurisdiction draws its sustenance from two primary legislation of the European Union- the Brussels Regulation (Recast) and the 2005 Hague Convention. However, following the Brexit, the Brussels regulation is no longer a valid authority post-December 2020 in the United Kingdom. Parties are constrained to find shelter under the 2005 Hague (Choice of Court Agreement), making it difficult for them to navigate through turbulent jurisdictional waters.

    The Dissonance between Exclusive jurisdiction and Asymmetric jurisdiction

    The Hague Convention relates to an ‘exclusive’ choice of Court arrangement under article 3(a). This exclusivity must be mutual, and a clause stipulating the parties to either sue in a limited jurisdiction or in any other Court will not be an exclusive choice of court, since it designates more than one Court as the venue for dispute resolution. However, different types of arrangements are still valid in determining the suitable jurisdiction, and the 2005 Hague Convention does not protest such domestic legislations towards determining of Court’s adjudicatory authority. Therefore, ‘Exclusive Jurisdiction’ is when the Court of one contracting party is designated to decide the dispute to the exclusion of other jurisdictions, provided the transaction is international. An asymmetrical clause makes this choice of Court a contractual agreement, with the chosen forum applying its laws and procedures, even if the proceedings are running concurrently in another jurisdiction. And the party resisting the choice of agreement needs to establish exceptional circumstances to save itself from this jurisdictional bargain.

    In the English case of Commerzbank AG v Liquimar Tankers Management Inc, (‘Commerzbank AG‘) the issue before the Hon’ble High Court was whether the asymmetric jurisdiction clause is akin to the exclusive jurisdiction clause within the Brussels Regulation (Recast). As per article 31(2) of the Brussels 1 Recast, the jurisdiction agreement confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Courts of an EU member state; but this notion is true when any EU member state has been granted a limited jurisdiction, as in the instant case. Furthermore, Etihad Airways PJSC v Flother [2020] confirmed that the agreements conferring jurisdiction on the Courts of member states through an asymmetric clause would be akin to an exclusive jurisdiction clause. Thus, dictums flowing through article 31(2) of the Brussels 1 Recast will render concurrent judicial processes in other destinations redundant, an absurdity under the 2005 Hague Convention.

    Hence, according to Justice Cranston in Commerzbank AG, the asymmetric jurisdiction is akin to the exclusive jurisdiction clause, and the parties can sue only in the agreed or designated Court, deriving the ratio from Mauritius Commercial Bank Ltd v. Hestia Holdings Ltd ], where it is rightly held the party with the broader jurisdiction can sue in any Court with ‘competent jurisdiction’ the term ‘any Court’ symbolizes a Court with the necessary authority to hear the same.

    Conferring Jurisdiction in Asymmetric Clauses

    An asymmetric choice of court agreements, where only limited freedom to determine the courts having jurisdiction is allowed, should be respected. The jurisdiction of any alternative court depends on whether that Court has personal or subject matter jurisdiction.

    In the seminal decision of Apple Sales International v eBizcuss: Cass. 1ere Civ, (‘Apple Case‘), a dispute between companies incorporated in France and   Ireland, respectively, arose. They entered into an agreement containing an asymmetric clause and agreed that disputes would be decided by the Courts of the Republic of Ireland. However, the clause also allowed the Irish company to resolve disputes before the Court of counterparty’s registered office or in ‘any country’ where it suffered loss caused by the counterparty. The Irish entity then argued that the French Commercial Court did not have the necessary jurisdiction vide the asymmetric clause, and Courts in Ireland had the sole jurisdiction. Under these circumstances, following the afore-established rule of jurisdiction and competency, Ireland must have had broader jurisdiction. In contrast, the French entity had limited jurisdiction over Courts in the Republic of Ireland.

    However, the French Supreme Court took a different stance on the issue of asymmetric jurisdiction in X v Banque Privée Edmond de Rothschild. It observed that the asymmetric clause would be upheld provided there is no unilateral jurisdiction clause, failing the core purpose of the clause. In the Apple Case, it was not open to the entities with the benefit clause to choose jurisdiction in any country; the flexibility of selecting jurisdiction is limited to the registered office or where any loss was caused, and the other party has suffered. The French Supreme Court made it clear that asymmetric clauses are to be avoided that allow a single party to apply to any jurisdiction of its choosing unless other possible forums with competent jurisdiction can be objectively determined and applied.

    These French dictums might appear contrary to the notable English decisions in the Commerzbank AG and the Hestia Holdings case. Still, we can establish a faint connection that the flexibility of wider jurisdiction in the hands of one party is not an infinite ray of jurisdiction. It bends before the need of necessary subject matter to such unimpeded jurisdiction.

    Conclusion

    Let’s take an illustration wherein X is conferred the wider jurisdiction to unilaterally approach any Court through the asymmetric clause and Y to the limited jurisdiction A. Whether in such circumstances, it is fair for the transnational parties in an agreement to choose any Court, destination B, which is outside the knowledge of Y? And would the decision by the Courts of such country B have any bearing on the parties? It is a visible hurdle in these limited jurisdiction clauses.

    In the case of Dr Jesse Mashate vs Yoweri Museveni Kaguta , theEnglish Court has tried to answer this riddle. In this case, an overseas party was subjected to the jurisdiction of the English Courts, and necessary summons was served. However, the overseas party failed to submit the necessary defence or any document intended to protect; consequently, the Court issued a default judgment under the English Civil Procedure Rules.

    The Court of Appeal construed that before involving a party to the jurisdiction of the English Courts, i.e., destination B, the party A, with flexible jurisdiction, must explain why such Court has an authority over the dispute and the party be subjected to such jurisdiction. Otherwise, an overseas party must not be vexed with proceedings lacking substance, who bear no other allegiance to the English Courts’ jurisdiction must not be vexatiously subjected to service upon them of process issued out of English courts. Therefore, an applicant to serve out of the jurisdiction must explain the reason behind conferring jurisdiction and how the overseas party is subjected to the exorbitant jurisdiction of that unilaterally chosen Court.

    Hence, the term ‘any Court’ and ‘competent jurisdiction’ are intertwined in financial agreements containing asymmetric clauses. The asymmetric clause is not an agreement to confer jurisdiction where none would otherwise exist; rather it limits the power of one party to approach a certain court, and expands for the another to ‘any Court’. It preserves the right to sue in any court which would reserve itself as competent by establishing a link with the subject matter; otherwise, an infinite ray of broad jurisdiction will be unnecessarily exorbitant on the parties to the agreement.

  • PCA Framework as an Effort to Contain the Contagion Effect

    PCA Framework as an Effort to Contain the Contagion Effect

    by Abhishkha Moyal, 5th year law student at RGNUL, Patiala.

    Introduction

    A non-banking financial company (“NBFC”) means, (i) a financial institution which is a company; (ii) a non-banking institution which is a company, with principal business of receiving deposits under any scheme or arrangement or in any other manner, or of lending in any manner;; (iii) such other non-banking institution or class of such institutions, as the Reserve Bank of India may, with the previous approval of the central government and by notification in the official gazette, specify.

    Every NBFC in India deals with substantial number of customers as well as with other NBFCs. NBFCs also partners with digital lenders who have restrictions on lending funds on their own accounts by reason of regulatory issues. Hence, the NBFCs form an important part of the financial system of India and enormously impact the economy as a whole. Any default made or any financial discrepancy caused by a single NBFC can create a substantial risk for the financial system of our country, thereby causing a ‘contagion effect’, that is, escalation of economic crisis in one market or region leading to economic downturn in other national or international markets or regions due to interconnectivity between them. . However, the regulatory framework for NBFCs is lenient in comparison to that for the banks due to which the financial system of India in recent times has suffered various jolts like the collapse of Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services group in 2018, and bankruptcy of Dewan Housing Finance Corporation in 2019 and Reliance Capital in 2021.

    The Reserve Bank of India (“RBI”) introduced the Prompt Corrective Action (“PCA”) framework for NBFCs on December 14, 2021 in order to intervene at the appropriate time to initiate and implement remedial measures in a timely manner, so as to restore financial health of NBFCs which are at risk. The framework will be effective from October 1, 2022, on the basis of financial position of NBFCs on or after March 31, 2022.

    Working of the PCA Framework

    The applicability of PCA framework shall extend to all deposit taking NBFCs (except government companies), and all non-deposit taking NBFCs in middle, upper and top layers
    (except- NBFCs not accepting or intending to accept public funds; government companies; primary dealers; and housing finance companies). The key areas for monitoring in PCA framework will be capital and asset quality, and indicators to be tracked would be Capital to Risk Weighted Assets Ratio (“CRAR”), tier I capital ratio and net non-performing assets (“NNPA”) ratio. The NBFCs will face restrictions when such indicators fall below the stipulated levels.

    The PCA framework provides for three risk thresholds for NBFCs, violation of any of which by any NBFC may lead to invocation of PCA framework by the RBI against such NBFC. The norms which RBI may impose on such NBFC will get stricter as and when such NBFC moves from the first to the third threshold. First risk threshold will be invoked for the NBFCs when the CRAR of such NBFC falls 300 basis points (“bps”) below the regulatory minimum of 15% or when tier I capital ratio falls 200 bps below the regulatory minimum of 10% or in cases where NNPA ratio exceeds 6%. In such cases, it will be mandatory for the NBFC to restrict dividend distribution/remittance of profits. Further, it will be mandatory for promoters/shareholders of such NBFCs to infuse equity and reduce leverage. 

    Similarly, the second risk threshold will be invoked when CRAR falls up to 600 bps below regulatory minimum of 12% or when tier I capital ratio falls up to 400 bps below the regulatory minimum of 8% or in cases where NNPA ratio exceeds 9%. In such cases, it will be mandatory for the NBFCs to restrict their branch expansion, in addition to the restrictions imposed after breach of first risk thresholds. 

    Further, the third risk threshold will be invoked when CRAR falls more than 600 bps below regulatory minimum of 9% or when tier I capital ratio falls more than 400 bps below the regulatory minimum of 6% or in cases where NNPA ratio exceeds 12%. In such cases, it will be mandatory for the NBFCs to impose restrictions on their variable operating costs and capital expenditure, except capital expenditure on technological upgradation within limits approved by their board of directors. In addition to the above restrictions, the PCA framework gives discretionary powers to the RBI to take certain other actions against the defaulting NBFCs relating to governance, capital, credit risk, profitability etc. 

    NBFCs can exit from the PCA framework and the restrictions imposed against them and the PCA framework can be withdrawn under two conditions. Firstly, there should have been no violations of risk thresholds in any of the parameters for four continuous quarterly financial statements, one of which should be annual audited financial statement (subject to assessment by RBI); and secondly, on the basis of supervisory comfort of the RBI, including an assessment on sustainability of profitability of NBFCs.

    Impact

    The PCA framework was introduced for the banking companies in 2002. Eleven public sector unit banks and some private banks were put under the framework; restrictions were imposed on such banks to improve their financial health as a result of which their financial health improved over the years. At present only the Central Bank of India is governed by the PCA framework, however, it has also enhanced its financial position and no longer requires working under the framework. 

    As mentioned earlier, the PCA framework will come into effect from October 1, 2022, based on the financial position of NBFCs on or after March 31, 2022. This will give NBFCs sufficient time to strengthen their financial position, which may have been affected by the Covid-19 pandemic, and avoid any other issues. 

    Imposition of the PCA framework will enable the RBI to (i) regulate NBFCs struggling with financial issues; and (ii) help such NBFCs to resolve such issues in a timely and effective manner. Moreover, empowering the RBI to intervene with the working of struggling NBFCs in order to strengthen their financial position will prevent such NBFCs from advancing risky loans and will encourage them to be more cautious in undertaking lending and other activities. However, this may have a negative impact on the growth of the NBFCs, as imposition of the PCA framework on the NBFCs will tighten their credit norms and their operational focus may shift towards collection activities.

    Conclusion 

    The PCA framework for banks has already been in place since 2002 and has helped the RBI and many other banks to improve their financial health. As NBFCs have become closely integrated with the banking and financial system of India, hence, regulating them is the need of the hour in order to maintain a stable financial system. 

    Moreover, as the Covid-19 pandemic has adversely affected many businesses around the world, it would be rational for NBFCs to lend their funds discreetly in order to avoid financial difficulties at later stages. When remedial measures are implemented in a timely manner for NBFCs at financial risk, it will help in containing the contagion effect on the economy.

  • The Spain-Colombia BIT and What it Holds for the Future of Dispute Resolution

    The Spain-Colombia BIT and What it Holds for the Future of Dispute Resolution

    by Abhay Raj and Ajay Raj, third-year and fourth-year students at Jindal Global Law School and Symbiosis Law School PUNE, respectively.

    On 16 September 2021, the Kingdom of Spain’s Prime Minister, Pedro Sánchez and Republic of Colombia’s President, Iván Duque Márquez singed the ‘promotion and reciprocal protection of investments’ (the ‘BIT’). This has been done with a view to provide legitimate rights to both the parties, to achieve the objective of public interest, and to ultimately secure reciprocal protection for their investments. With that, the BIT aims to ensure more independent, impartial, transparent, and coherent arbitration procedures for dispute resolution. While the BIT is not in the public domain yet, however, once in force, it will replace the 2005 Colombia Spain BIT. Owing to a review process that lasted for more than three years (began in December 2017), there are certainly high expectations with the new Colombia-Spain BIT, including inter alia, substantive protections and procedural rights.

    Over the past few years, Spain and Colombia, two of the largest economies in the world, have undertaken notable reforms in the regime of international investment agreements and its framework. Including but not limited to Colombia’s revamping its Model BIT and Spain focusing on European Union’s investment protection policy. While Spain’s reform has largely been motivated by its experience in investor-State arbitration, Colombia’s reform directly emanates from its inactivity in investor-State arbitration before the year 2006. Common to both is the reform to modernise their investments with a focus on managing their exposure to investor claims. The reforms undertaken by both countries has led to the signing of the BIT.

    Spain’s Outlook

    The Colombia-Spain BIT fits into the narrative of being symbolic and following a systematic reform. The decision to modernise and renegotiate the 2005 BIT appears to follow the coeval discussions in the investment arbitration regime, including the conventional investor-state dispute settlement (‘ISDS’) system, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (‘OECD’), and post-Treaty of Lisbon and European Union framework which authorised the European Commission for negotiating international investment agreements (‘IIAs’) with non-European Union states (regulation 1219/2012). Thus, the Spain government had to obtain authorization from the European Commission, before carrying out the negotiations with Columbia, ensuring a focus on EU objectives and policies.  

    The new BIT, 2021, assists in aligning Spain’s interest in investment commitments governing bilateral relations, with the European Union objectives and principles and European Union’s investment protection policy. These objectives and principles are broader policy considerations, for instance, promotion of democracy, human rights, sustainable development, fundamental freedoms, rule of law, standard of treatment, FET clause, and other features (briefly discussed in the latter part of the article). Despite Spain’s inactivity and non-participation in the realm of international investment, it has been one of the most competitive and attractive markets in the European Union. This is demonstrated by the fact of Spain’s being the third-largest in the investment market in the EU and thirteenth recipient of foreign investments in the world. The 2021 BIT is significant because of the fact that Spain signed a BIT after more than 10 years, and its far-reaching mandate maybe its advent into the area of international investment.

    Colombia’s Outlook

    The Republic of Colombia, following 2006, has been mindful of signing and negotiating BIT’s with different States. Colombia till the year 2006, only signed two BIT’s with Peru (1994), and Spain (2005). Following that, it signed more than fourteen BITs. With that, the Republic of Colombia felt the need to renegotiate the existing BIT of 2005 with Spain to follow the trend after 2006 and the Colombia BIT Model, 2017.

    The investment agreement between Colombia and Spain is symbolic from Colombia’s standpoint. Firstly, it is the first agreement that was renegotiated after Colombia’s Model BIT, 2017. The Model BIT, 2017 itself came after Colombia’s experience with the investor disputes (including, Glencore International AG and CI Prodeco SA v Republic of Colombia, ICSID Case No ARB/16/6; Ame ́rica Mo ́vil SAB de CV v Republic of Colombia, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/16/5;  Eco Oro Minerals Corp v Republic of Colombia, ICSID Case No ARB/16/41; Gas Natural SDG and Gas; and in total 13 such cases) concerning old BIT’s (Model BIT-2003, 2006, 2009, 2011).

    Secondly, the Colombia-Spain BIT has followed the Colombian Constitutional Court’s judgement (available here), which conditioned on issuance of a joint interpretative note of the provisions entailed in the BIT. According to the Colombian Constitution, the Court’s must assert whether the international treaties signed (and before ratification) are constitutionally valid or not. As such, if the Constitutional Court rules that the treaty’s clauses are unconstitutional, it is unfit to enter such treaty into force.

    Features

    The changes introduced by the renegotiated Colombia-Spain BIT precisely include: (i) Replacing the conventional Investor-State Dispute Settlement with the Multilateral Investment Courts once the treaty comes into force and replaces the 2005 BIT; (ii) Explicitly stating the non-consideration of holding companies as investors, i.e., explicitly excluding companies that merely hold financial interest; (iii) Excluding the fulfilment of the commitments assumed by the Contracting Parties in commercial and economic integration projects and implying that most-favoured-nation treatment cannot be reached into other treaties; and (iv) Miscellaneous changes (reviewing of the Standard of Treatment, the Fair and Equitable Treatment standard, Denial of Benefits clause, and inclusion of Transparency Rules of the United Nations Commission for International Trade Law (‘UNCITRAL’)).

    • Multilateral Investment Courts

    As a BIT that is signed at an hour when the world is calling reforms in the Investor-State dispute settlement, (for instance, India; Bolivia; Ecuador; Venezuela; Pakistan have refrained from ICSID Convention), the Interpretative Declaration has catalysed Multilateral Investment Court (‘MIC’) and replaced the conventional ISDS system. The proposal of MIC which began with the UNCITRAL Working Group III suggestion (by the European Union and to which Spain is a member state) has come into play with the recent BIT. Such a Court would adjudicate upon claims brought under IIAs, which the member States have decided in assigning the authority. Both of the bodies shall be staffed by decided adjudicators and would be paid on a permanent basis by the member states, with a secretariat to support them.

    Such a negotiation is correlated with the EU’s efforts in calling for a global level reform in the ISDS system. As also evident in the 2019 Final Dutch Model BIT, the EU is taking steps against replacing the conventional system with a permanent investment court arbitration tribunal; for instance, the EU council provided the European Commission for establishing a MIC under the auspices of UNCITRAL.

    The renegotiation has been placed ensuring independent, coherent, impartial, predictable, and transparent arbitration procedures. However, the BIT could have worked on bringing reforms to the conventional ISDS system. For instance, the new BIT could have provided explicit provisions regarding the advisory centre, third-party participation, claims on public money, and third-party funding (as suggested in the UNCITRAL Working Group III session). The BIT could have drawn a fine balance between the conventional ISDS and State’s exposure, by incorporating several exclusions/reservations with respect to the applicability of the system.

    Notwithstanding that, as also discussed in the blog piece by Andreea Nica, the MIC can effectively cater to the concerns regarding duration and cost of the proceedings, appointment of arbitrators, arbitral decisions’ predictability and consistency, and regarding diversity, independence and transparency. Adoption of MIC, thus, acts as a catalyst in providing a better arbitration regime for both the countries (since it mitigates the above mentioned flaws in ISDS system). With that, being a permanent first instance tribunal, MIC would provide for effective enforcement of the decisions in the BIT. Because of the far-reaching implications of the BIT protection standards, MIC would help in an effective process that works transparently and with highly qualified arbitrators. Spain and Colombia being active protectors of the key legal principles of the international investment law, will definitely be able to uphold the principles through the reforms in the BIT, in particular, the ISDS system.

    • Non-Consideration of Holding Companies as Investors

    The BIT concluded for the first time, the non-consideration of holding companies as investors in Articles 1, 2, and 3. This is reflected by the Interpretive Declaration’s view that “the concept of investor explicitly excludes companies that merely hold financial interests”, which is in contrast with the previous IIAs which did not have such a provision for holding companies. Such a view was observed in the Colombia’s Model BIT, 2017, that the investment shall include a closed list of assets, in place of an exemplary list.

    • MFN Treatment

    The most favoured nation treatment has been subject to controversies in investor-state arbitration. However, both Colombia-Spain BIT, 2005 (Article 3) and Colombia Spain 2021 contain the clause of most-favoured-nation (MFN). The Interpretative Declaration clears the exclusion of MFN clause to the extent of the treatments that are derived from the fulfilment of the commitments assumed by the Contracting Parties in commercial projects. This in turn creates a level-playing field for all the foreign investors by prohibiting the host states in discriminating between investors from different countries, and as such, the investors won’t be able to indulge in treaty-shopping. The same was observed in many of the Brazilians BIT’s, for instance, with Chile, Colombia, and Mexico, wherein it stated ‘excluded from the scope of the MFN clause the benefits deriving from regional economic integration’.[i]  

    Comparing it with Colombia’s Model BIT, 2017 in which, the MFN provision was specifically designed to avoid the usage of standards of protection to ‘import’ procedural and substantial provisions from other IIAs.[ii] The model BIT provided for the MFN standard to be invoked only in cases where measures such as administrative acts, or judicial decisions violate the provision of equal treatment of the foreign investors that are a competitor.

    • Miscellaneous changes

    At present, the Interpretative Declaration shall assist us in, little if any understanding, of its stand on the clauses such as the FET clause, Denial of Benefit clause, UNCITRAL rules, and standard of treatment clause.  f the above-mentioned clauses.

    1. The Fair and Equitable Treatment

    The present BIT has thoroughly revised the Fair and Equitable Treatment (‘FET’) standard to minimise the interpretative margins of the Courts. FET clause will thus, act as a catalyser in encouraging investments in the host state by the investors; by not only protecting the investors rights, but also the autonomy of the states. The changes in the BIT vis-à-vis FET standard has followed the recommendations made by the United Nations Conference of Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the EU investment protection agreement’s approach.

    2. UNCITRAL Rules

    For the first time in history, Spain has agreed to include the Transparency Rules of the United Nations Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL rules) in an attempt to advance its emphasis on independence and impartiality of the members of the Tribunal and the transparency of the procedure. 

    3. Standard of Treatment

    The contents in the BIT, 2021, regarding the standard of treatment has been reviewed in an attempt to circumscribe the tribunal’s margin of interpretation and promote correct interpretation in investor-state disputes. The other mandate is to mitigate the exposure in consideration of the ambiguous wording. It is ideal attempt to clarify the wide spectrum in treaty standards, and simultaneously, it also acts as a catalysers for promoting investment (because of the explicit mention of the provision). With that, it also helps in regulating the autonomy of the States (because of the revision of treatment standard).

    Conclusion

    Although the full text of the BIT is not in the public domain yet, only the Interpretative Declaration, the New BIT definitely includes certain symbolic changes. The new BIT, 2021 is a fresh expression of the speedily shifting landscape in the investment arbitration, and reflects the significant changes since the 2000s. The renegotiated Colombia-Spain BIT addresses a number of conceptual and semantic difficulties that have emanated from the 2005 BIT or that have emerged after the difficulties in the conventional ISDS system. Therefore, the renegotiated Colombia-Spain BIT is anticipated to cater to the interpretative uncertainties that are left to the realms of Courts and mitigate both Spain’s and Colombia’s exposure to non-meritorious claims. When the investor-state dispute settlement system is going through a paradigm shift, the Spain-Colombia BIT, 2021, definitely makes hay while the sun shines, in an attempt to protect investor rights, sovereign prerogatives and public interest.

    [i] Henrique Choer Moraes, Pedro Mendonça Cavalcante, The Brazil-India Investment Co-operation and Facilitation Treaty: Giving Concrete Meaning to the ‘Right to Regulate’ in Investment Treaty Making, ICSID Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal, 2021; siab013, https://doi.org/10.1093/icsidreview/siab013.

    [ii] Kabir AN Duggal, Daniel F García Clavijo, Samuel Trujillo, María C Rincón, Colombia’s 2017 Model IIA: Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, ICSID Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal, 34(1), 224–240 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1093/icsidreview/siz004.

  • Zee vs Invesco: Shareholder Activism or Struggle for Power?

    Zee vs Invesco: Shareholder Activism or Struggle for Power?

    By Monika Vyas and Ayushi Narayan. Monika is an associate at Khaitan & Co. Ayushi is an associate LexInfini.

    Shareholders Activism inter alia includes a situation wherein the shareholders of a company use their equity stake in the company to try and make governance decisions by influencing or controlling the actions of the directors of the corporation. Such structural changes or an attempt to improve the corporate governance are made by the shareholder activists to improve their returns on the investments made in the company. Recently, there has been a trend of rising shareholder activism in the Indian equity market. This article will discuss the recent trend of shareholder activism in India in the wake of the recent case of Zee Entertainment Enterprise Limited and Invesco Developing Markets Fund. The Bombay High court order is analysed in relation to the recent treatment of shareholder activism in India.

    Rise in shareholder activism

    Few examples of shareholders activism in the recent years are that of Cyrus Mistry being removed as the director of Tata Sons by an EGM held on February 2017. In March 2020, during market crash, Vendanta Ltd. was a company which wasunsuccessful in delisting itself from the stock exchange as it received resistance from its shareholders. Further its institution shareholder Life Insurance Company, tendered its share at a high price which forced the promoters to withdraw the offer. Puneet Bhatia, head of TPG Capital Asia was removed from the board of Shriram Transport Finance Corporation Ltd (“STFC”), as the minority shareholders voted against a resolution to re-appoint him as a member of the board due to his lack of sufficient attendance in board meetings. Interestingly, just after a week of Bhatia’s removal from the board of STFC, he was renamed to the board vide a press release from STFC.

    Facts of the case 

    One of latest examples of shareholders activism in India has been that of Invesco Developing Markets Fund (“Invesco”) against Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited (‘Zee”). As a way of background, it may be relevant to note that Invesco which along with OFI Global China Fund LLC, hold a 17.88% stake in Zee, was interested in Zee to strike a deal with Reliance Industries Ltd. However, the discussions between Zee’s CEO and Reliance Industries didn’t turn out to be fruitful. On the other hand, Zee has now finalised merger with Sony Group Corporation’s India Unit, after conducting three months of due diligence. The dispute arose when Invesco requisitioned the board members of Zee to call for an extraordinary general meeting (“EGM”), for the purpose of making structural changes in the company by revamping the board and removing the managing director and Chief Executing Officer and suggesting six new independent board members.

    Zee rejected the proposal made by Invesco with respect to the change in board of members of the company and cited legal infirmities in Invesco’s request. As Zee denied Invesco’s request to revamp the board, Invesco sent a requisition notice to Zee for removal of the managing director and CEO Punit Goenka and to further appoint six new independent board members identified by Invesco. As per the provisions of the Companies Act, a shareholder holding more than 10% stake in a company can seek an EGM. In the event the board declines, the shareholders as per Section 100 of the Companies Act, can convene the EGM itself. Upon Zee’s denial to act upon the said notice, Invesco considered ZEE’s behaviour to be oppressive and filed an appeal before National Company Law Tribunal (“NCLT”) to direct ZEE to act upon Invesco’s notice for EGM. While the said matter was pending before the tribunal, Zee filed an appeal before the Bombay High Court for an injunction against Invesco’s notice for EGM. In the said appeal, Zee stated the notice to be illegal and that it could not implement the same. Further, Zee’s refusal to implement the said notice was within the purview of law and justified.

    analysis of the issues

    Issue of Requisition of EGM

    The issues in this case are quite complex and leads to different outcomes based on the interpretation. The first issue is, whether Zee is obligated to call EGM upon a valid requisition. The court issued the injunction whereby the requisition for the EGM was not granted based on the rationale that objections of Zee were justified and resolutions were illegal. It observed that if the Board itself cannot act call for EGM on such resolutions, then there’s no way that the shareholders would be kept at higher pedestal.

    Opinion- Section 100(2)(a) of the Companies Act, 2013 empowers the Board to call for EGM on requisition of minority shareholders. It reads as thus: the Board shall, at the requisition made by, in the case of a company having a share capital, such number of members who hold, on the date of the receipt of the requisition, not less than one-tenth of such of the paid-up share capital of the company as on that date carries the right of voting, call an extraordinary general meeting of the company within the period specified in sub-section (4). We should interpret the word ‘shall’ in Section 100 of the Companies Act, 2013 to find the legislative intent behind this section. The choice of word ‘shall’ indicates that is must to call the EGM. However, the literal interpretation can sometimes overlook the intent of the legislation. By giving the alternative route in Section 100(4) itself of conduction of the EGM lest the Board shall fail to act, the word ‘shall’ should not be used as ‘must’. It reads as thus: If the Board does not, within twenty-one days from the date of receipt of a valid requisition in regard to any matter, proceed to call a meeting for the consideration of that matter on a day not later than forty-five days from the date of receipt of such requisition, the meeting may be called and held by the requisitionists themselves within a period of three months from the date of the requisition. 

    Thus, we can say that the Board is well within its right to use discretion otherwise it can always be held hostage to the whims of the shareholders who intend to misuse the provisions. Having said this, it is also unclear why this in-built remedy of shareholders proceeding to hold the meeting was not granted to Invesco by the Court. 

    Issue of Legality of Propositions in the Resolutions

    This brings us to the next issue of whether the proposed resolutions were legal for requisition of EGM. For this, interpretation of the word ‘valid’ in section 100(4) of the Act was made the issue. The shareholders are allowed to hold the EGM themselves in case the Board fails to act within the stipulated time provided the requisition is valid. The court concluded that there was no question of interpretation of word ‘valid’ but only of the illegality of the resolutions proposed. It was established that the represented matters by the shareholders were illegal and hence could not be implemented. It held this based on the following reasoning:

    • Non-compliance of Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (“MIB”) guidelines, SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) (“SAST”) Regulations, 2011 and Competition Act, 2002

    The guidelines of MIB require that before effecting any change in CEO/Board of Directors, its prior approval must be taken. Approval of Competition Commission of India (“CCI”) is also required in the eventuality that Invesco is in control if it succeeds in appointing majority of directors. It also attracts the provisions of SEBI SAST Regulations, 2011 which provides for such regulatory approvals. In this case because the approval was not taken from either of them, the resolution was termed illegal by the court on grounds of non-compliance with the guidelines and the statute.

    Opinion-It is unclear whether the word ‘change’ applies to only fresh appointments or its scope covers resignations/removals too as in this case. The guidelines cannot be meant to stop someone from quitting. 

    Secondly, one must also question if the mere non-compliance with the guidelines and statutes would amount to illegality. As it is, the passage of resolution is contingent upon the approval of MIB and CCI. One cannot term it illegal when it is in its nascent stage and yet to fulfil the conditions for its acceptability. If, at all, it is inconsistent, the same would be declined by the regulatory body and need not be decided by the court. Thus, terming the resolution illegal when it is still premature cannot be held in good faith. Also, it would be Invesco who would be responsible for the consequences of not having the approval of competition commission. Hence, on this ground one cannot term the resolution illegal. 

    • Violation of SEBI LODR Regulations and Section 203 of Companies Act, 2013

    Invesco proposed six independent directors to be appointed named by it in the resolution. This is violative of Regulation 17 of SEBI LODR which states that the company should have optimum numbers of executive and non-executive directors processed by the nomination and remuneration committee. Further, the court was of the view that the proposition to remove the managing director and CEO infringed upon section 203 of the Act which envisages that every company must have CEO, managing director or manager.

    Opinion-While SEBI LODR talks about appointment through nomination and remuneration committee, it also envisages situation where appointments are initiated by the board of directors. Thus, the court through its order has created the situation of polarisation between the Companies Act, 2013 and SEBI LODR Regulations. Further, the violation under Section 203 of the Act is curative in nature meaning whereby it can be cured within six months of the removal of CEO.

    Concluding remarks

    There is no doubt that the order of the court is detrimental to the shareholder activism in India. From the above analysis, we can see that Invesco is not entirely in the wrong. However, Invesco has stepped on its feet by not being transparent about the issues why it wants to remove the CEO. The intention of Invesco is not clear as to whether the proposed resolutions are on account of bad governance issues of Zee or to exercise control by appointing independent directors, the names which it has not justified for appointment. Earlier, this year, it had also approached Goenka, CEO with the proposalto merge Zee with media entities of Reliance Industries Ltd. which failed. It is not clear why it did not approach the Board directly. However, the court could have been lenient in its interpretation of the provisions since the order wards off the shareholder activism which could have been for the benefit of the company. However, as Invesco has contested the Single Bench decision and the case has now been taken up by the Division Bench of Bombay High Court, one can be hopeful that the decision ushers in towards welcoming this concept. It would be especially interesting to see how the case unfolds in light of the recent merger with Sony which has facilitated the continuation of post of CEO being held by Punit Goenka.

  • Claim Period and Enforcement Period in Bank Guarantees

    Claim Period and Enforcement Period in Bank Guarantees

    Manasvini Vyas, an NLU-O graduate currently practicing in Mumbai

    On 28 July 2021, the Delhi High Court in the case of Larsen & Toubro Limited vs. Punjab National Bank passed a landmark ruling clarifying the scope of exception 3 of section 28 of the Indian Contract Act 1872 (ICA). The order passed by a Single Judge Bench has set aside the circulars issued by the Indian Banking Association (IBA) that recommended an unalterable claim period of 12 months for bank guarantees. 

    Before delving further into the judgment, it is imperative to analyse the background against which the judgment holds significance.

    Background 

    Bank Guarantees (BG) are independent contracts that confer upon the beneficiary the right to claim performance from the bank in case of default by the principal borrower. On default, the beneficiary can invoke the guarantee by making a claim within the lifetime of the BG i.e. the “validity period”. This period is mutually determined by the creditor and the principal debtor and it expires on a decided date. Often, a BG provides for an additional grace period over and above the validity period for making a claim before the bank, which is known as the “claim period”. Stipulating a claim period is not a mandatory requirement and inclusion of the same depends solely on the discretion of the contracting parties.  If the bank defaults in honouring its obligations, the beneficiary is entitled to approach the court of law and the period within which the beneficiary is permitted to enforce their rights from the date of default is called the “enforcement period”.   

    The enforcement period is prescribed under the Limitation Act 1963 (Limitation Act) and any agreement that limits the time within which a party may enforce its rights is hit by section 28 of the ICA. According to the provision, an agreement is void 

    1. if it absolutely restricts a party from enforcing their rights under a contract or if it limits the time within which a party can enforce their contractual rights, or 
    2. if it extinguishes the contractual rights of a party or it discharges a party from any contractual liability on the expiry of a prescribed period such that the rights cannot be enforced beyond it.

    exception 3 appended to the provision states that if a contract for bank guarantee stipulates a term for extinguishment of rights or discharge of liability on the expiry of a given period, such a clause would not be void provided the said period is not less than one year from the date of the specified event.  

    History behind Exception 3

    Prior to 1997, the courts created a distinction between ‘remedy’ and ‘right’ and an agreement which barred a remedy to sue beyond the prescribed time period was void under section 28 but an agreement which relinquished rights under the contract was held to be valid[1]. The Law Commission, in its 97th Report dated 31 March 1984, observed that such a distinction was not practical and it gave a dominant party the power to limit the period of remedy by limiting the period of relinquishment of rights because if rights didn’t exist, the remedy would also be extinguished. Consequently, clause (b) was added to section 28. 

    As a result of this amendment, banks were concerned that they could no longer limit their obligations under the BGs and would be required to maintain their BGs for 30 years in case of government contracts and 3 years for private contracts pursuant to the Limitation Act. It was feared that the high cost of maintaining BGs would severely affect the banks’ ability to issue fresh guarantees. In order to assuage the concerns of the banking sector, exception 3 was added to section 28 by way of the Banking Law (Amendment) Act, 2012 (The 2013 Amendment) on the recommendations of Sh. T.R. Andhyarujina Committee. 

    The aftermath of the 2013 Amendment

    Post the 2013 amendment, there was confusion whether the exception dealt with the claim period or the enforcement period. The IBA was of the view that the exception concerned the claim period and therefore it issued circulars recommending banks to stipulate a minimum claim period of 12 months in BGs. It was further believed that if the banks stipulate a claim period of less than 12 months, they will lose the benefit under exception 3 and the period specified under the Limitation Act would be applicable.  

    The confusion was further compounded after the Supreme Court’s observations in the case of Union of India & Anr. vs. M/s Indusind Bank Ltd. & Anr. (2016). Here, the Apex Court was concerned with an issue concerning section 28 as it stood before the 1997 amendment. In this case, the BG stipulated an invocation period of three months beyond the validity period, however, the BG was invoked after the expiry of three months. The Court held that since the clause did not provide for a time limit for lodging a claim before the court, the same will not be hit by section 28. Further, in its obiter, the Court noted that:

     “… Stipulations like the present would pass muster after 2013 if the specified period is not less than one year from the date of occurring or non-occurring of a specified event for extinguishment or discharge of a party from liability.” 

    In this case, the Court was dealing with the time period for filing a claim with the bank and not the period for enforcing the guarantee before the courts. Therefore, when it mentioned “stipulations like the present would pass muster after 2013”, it seemed that the Court had interpreted exception 3 to mean that it provided for a mandatory claim period of minimum one year, thereby, worsening the already unsettled position with respect to exception 3.  

    Notably, a BG is a costly affair for the borrower as it has to maintain margin money/collateral security in support of the guarantee and has to pay commission charges at regular intervals. In such a scenario, a mandatory claim period of 12 months poses a financial burden on the borrower. Not only is the borrower forced into paying commissions for an additional period of one year, but funds locked in as margin money results in increasing the working capital requirements. A 12 month claim period would be even more commercially unviable in cases of short-term guarantees. For example, a BG with an original validity period of six months would be required to be kept open for a period of 18 months! In view of this, critics of exception 3 sought another amendment to section 28 to rectify the anomaly. 

    The decision in  Larsen & Toubro Limited vs. Punjab National BankIn this case, L&T had filed a writ petition against PNB, IBA and the RBI before the Delhi High Court challenging their interpretation of exception 3. As noted above, IBA, in its circulars dated 10 February 2017 and 5 December 2018, had recommended a minimum claim period of 12 months for BGs. It was also stated that, in the absence of such a clause, limitation period as per the Limitation Act would be applicable.

    L&T challenged this clause on the grounds that the extended claim period grossly affected its ability to sign new contracts and affected its fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India to carry on business. It was also contended that a claim period is contractually agreed term between the borrower and the creditor and it may or may not be present in BGs. After scrutinising the tumultuous amendment history of section 28, the Court concluded that exception 3 provides for enforcement period and not a claim period. In coming to this conclusion, the Court observed that exception 3 curtails the limitation period within which the beneficiary can approach the appropriate forum for enforcing its rights. [SS3] The said provision, in no way, limits the period for filing a claim with the bank and the same is to be contractually agreed between the creditor and the debtor. Therefore, IBA’s interpretation that exception 3 dealt with a claim period does not hold ground. The Court also distinguished the obiter in the case of IndusInd with the present case and stated that “the judgement cannot be relied upon since the clauses in question dealt with the enforcement period i.e. curtailment of the limitation period and not the claim period of a bank guarantee”. 

    Concluding remarks

    The 2013 amendment, though well intended, had thrown open a can of worms. BGs, which should ensure smooth flow of cash in business, were rendered ineffective by the weight of exception 3. The confusion surrounding the provision often stood in the way of claims under guarantees and severely affected the ease of doing business in India. In view of this, the judgment of Delhi High Court is a welcome move as the parties can now choose to incorporate a claim period that suits their needs, thereby, significantly bringing down the cost of maintaining the guarantee. 

    [1]Shakoor Gany v. Hinde &Co (AIR 1932 Bom. 330); Kerala Electrical & Allied Engineering Co.Ltd. v. Canara Bank & Others (AIR 1980 Ker 151)

  • Funding of Food Aggregators & Competition law: A Post Covid Analysis

    Funding of Food Aggregators & Competition law: A Post Covid Analysis

    By Rohan Mandal and Jeezan Riyaz, fourth and third year students at USLLS, GGSIPU, Delhi and NLIU, Bhopal respectively.

    In an exclusive arrangement as part of its strategic push, the food delivery giants, Zomato and Swiggy are all set to raise more than $1 billion, which will help them to leverage a position of dominance in the food delivery business. Duopolistic designs, coupled with pricing below the belt, and the viability of recuperating losses have led to a strategic dominance for these entities in the food delivery market, thereby harming the consumers in the long run.  Accordingly, the food aggregators have been under the constant radar of the Competition Commission of India (“CCI”) for manipulating pricing, deep discounting and offering of rebates with an intention to distort competition.

    At the heart of the Competition Act, 2002 (“The Act”), lies the principles of fair competition and therefore any activity or strategy that abuses the ongoing competition in the marketplace, is said to fall within the ambit of the anti-competitive activities.  The Act in the explanation under section 4(2) defines “dominant position”, as a position of strength or dominance, enjoyed by any enterprise which enables it to: (a) individually dominate or function without the competing opponents in a marketplace; or (b) manipulate the consumers in a sense, that is grossly disadvantageous to the other forces of the market. This gains more traction particularly in light of the increased use of these apps and reluctance to dine out in light of Covid.

    • Abuse of Competition & Appetite for market dominance

    Section 4(2)(a)(ii), of the Act disallows an enterprise from engaging in predatory pricing, which is understood as selling goods below cost to drive out competition. While, 4(2)(c) prohibits those activities that deny access to the market and lead to foreclosure of competition. Economies of scale may lead to dominance, and if deep discounting and new rounds of funding received by the food aggregators is viewed holistically, a conclusion to that effect can be drawn.

    With Zomato having acquired Uber Eats and other small start-ups alongside its strategy to rechristen Zomato gold to Zomato pro (a premium subscription model), it gets a strategic edge to dominate the marketplace. Swiggy, on the other hand has launched their initiative called Swiggy Super, which has forced small start–ups to wind up their operations by diverting the consumer base to their platform. This comes at a time when people do not have the luxury of going out to a restaurant due to the ongoing pandemic and are reliant on food delivery apps. Section 19(4) lays down relevant factors to be considered to ascertain abuse of dominance, which include the economic power of the entity vis-à-vis their competitors and market share of the enterprise. The Food aggregators have control over the listing of restaurants and have access to consumer data, which is being leveraged for their benefit and to promote their in-house kitchens. Therefore, an argument can be made thatabuse of dominance is prevalent in the marketplace.

    Further, CCI in its report on e-commerce states that the food aggregators have benefitted immensely by establishing cloud kitchens (cooking spaces without a dine-in-option). These aggregator-run-establishments have an edge over normal restaurants on the app in terms of the user data available to them, preferential listing provided and by forcing other restaurants to purchase items from them. This has led to an unequitable profit earning structure, thereby exhibiting anti-competitiveness from the legal standpoint. Therefore, with data in the hands of these in-house-kitchens in the present digital economic paradigm, they are in a better position to maximize sales and entice consumers.

    In Matrimony.com Ltd. v. Google LLC, Google was accused of violating anti-trust provisions by manipulating their search algorithms and giving preferential listing to its own products and features. This caused the complainant to be listed lower, and thereby affected their business. It was held by the CCI that Google was directly manipulating the consumers by diverting their attention from rival services to their own. Google abused its dominant position to exert pressure on other players to exit the market, which was accordingly dealt with under section 4(2)(e). The CCI has laid down in MCX v. NSE, that  activities which are covered under section 4 such as predatory pricing and denying access endanger competition in the market. In a similar vein, it can be argued that the food aggregators are abusing their position of dominance through their in-house kitchens.

    • Assessment of dominance and abusive conduct: CCI analysis

    Fueled by the stiff domestic competition among restaurants, lack of alternative dine-in-options and buoyed by the ever-expanded funding inthe food delivery business, it has paved a way for a duopoly in the Indian paradigm. This makes it imperative on the part of the CCI to conducta thorough investigation from a competition law standpoint.

    In the new normal of the restrictions worldwide, the food delivery aggregators are engaging in anti-competitive practices such as predatory pricing, violation of platform neutrality, exclusivity, barriers to entry and obliging the already existing rivals to exit. Thus, impacting footfalls and diverting the entire consumer rush to their own benefit. The National Restauranters Association of India’s (“NRAI”), a body which represents over 5,00,000 restaurants, in their complaint to the CCI also echoes this sentiment, wherein they allege abuse of dominance by the aggregators. In their complaint they allege that aggregators charge restaurants exorbitant fees, give preferential listing to restaurants on payment of fees, and engage in deep discounting (non-adherence to deep discount schemes means lower visibility for the restaurants).

    The COMPAT in  Schott Glass appeal case, had observed that abuse of dominance and predatory pricing involves the satisfaction of two important requirements: (i) unequal treatment of similar transactions; and (ii) harm meted out to the competition in the marketplace. This places all the sellers on an unequal footing and is disadvantageous to the interests of the buyers. In another important case, the XYZ v. REC Power Distribution Company related to abuse of dominance, the CCI held that “establishing a denial of access”, indicates exclusivity and sizeable degree of market power being controlled by those in position of dominance.

    The NRAI complaint to the CCI has also alleged that the practices of the deep funded aggregators have forced several restaurants to shut down. Consequently, there is a need to reach a middle ground to ensure that there is stability and transparency in the process and that capitalism doesn’t hamper the very essence of competition as abuse of strength can impact both the competition and the consumers in the long run.

    • The Impact of IPO and the new rounds of funding

    The Zomato IPO will raise Rs. 9,375 crores against the backdrop of Zomato posting losses of Rs. 886 crores in the last financial year. On the other hand, Swiggy is set to raise Rs. 9,297 crores  in their newfunding round against losses of Rs. 3,768 crores in the 2019-2020 accounting year. This inflow of cash against the continued loss-making nature of these food aggregators, makes the market interesting from a section 4 standpoint as the entities will have the financial capability to strengthen their grip on the market, while posting losses, therefore, adversely affecting competition. In Uber v. CCI, the Supreme Court dealt with a case involving taxi aggregators offering rides at lower rates while making losses. The Hon’ble Court held that continued losses incurred by aggregators is prima facie indicative of abuse of dominance because predatory pricing helps them to drive out competition and control the marketplace at the same time. The CCI was ordered to investigate the activities of the aggregators. Although, the Commission would later give the taxi aggregators a clean chit, but the principle that continued losses merit an investigation by the CCI still stands, and should be applied in the present case.

    Zomato and Swiggy have stated that they will continue to make losses in the near future in order to develop business. This would be done by starting operations in new cities, and also diversifying to the item delivery market. At the same time, they also continue to give deep discounts and preferential treatment to certain enterprises. These activities should be investigated under section 4 and the possible appreciable adverse effect on trade under section 3 needs to be looked at. This becomes necessary, particularly in light of the fact that the CCI has also investigated such models in the case of taxi aggregators and e-commerce giants,  Amazon in Lifestyle v. Amazon. In this case the CCI held Amazon guilty under the Act  for not granting visibility to the products of the complainant. The decision of the CCI in Ashish Ahuja v. Snapdeal is also relevant for this purpose, where Snapdeal was accused of granting exorbitant discounts on their platform, which affected the business of their competitors. The CCI held that discounts coupled with harm to the market amounts to abuse of dominance. In the current paradigm, it is evident that the food aggregator market is dominated by two players, whose activities such as continuous deep discounts and preferential listing is prima facie indicative of abuse of dominance, and this merits an investigation by the CCI.

    All these factors have been put forward in the NRAI complaint. Further, the new cash inflow means that the aggregators will have the capacity to continue with the above-mentioned activities, which if left unchecked could have serious effect on the market.

    • Conclusion

    To sum up the above discussions, the authors submit that two important factors need to be considered, namely, the new funding and the previous activities of the food aggregators. When these two factors are looked at in tandem, it becomes imperative that a thorough investigation is conducted by the CCI, to gauge the market situation and address the apprehensions of the NRAI. Zomato and Swiggy have maintained that they will continue to make losses in the near future in order to develop business, which further makes it important for the CCI to probe the allegations against the aggregators. Covid has resulted in the popularity of food delivery giants soaring to greater heights. Therefore, there is a need to critically analyze the legal impediments of anti-competitive strategies that form the basis of the competition laws in India.