BY SATCHITH SUBRAMANYAM, A FOURTH-YEAR STUDENT AT GNLU, GANDHINAGAR
Introduction
The primary objective of procurement is to source goods or services, at the right quality and price, at the right time. While ‘public procurement’ refers to broader exercise, public-private partnerships (‘PPP’) projects are a means to public procurement. The Government of India views this exercise as entering into a procurement function, as opposed to perceiving it as a mere partnership. This is apparent from the definition of PPP under the Public Procurement Bill, 2012. India is one of the leading markets for PPP projects. Nevertheless, data suggests that out of 1500 projects, that commenced two decades ago, only 48% of them are operational. Even those projects which are operational have left private developers in disdain, due to the lack of adequate financial returns resulting in reduced participation.
The legal framework for such projects has been streamlined by the Department of Economic Affairs in the form of appraisal and approval mechanisms, which consist of separate guidelines to be followed. The responsibility to oversee such compliance is with the Public-Private Partnership Appraisal Committee (‘PPPAC’). Further, Concession Agreements (‘CA’) are sector-specific and define all the aspects related to the partnership, such as ownership, responsibilities, risk allocation, and contract management. It is essentially a standardized form of the concession agreement between a Government Contracting Authority (‘GCA’) and a private entity (‘Concessionaire’), wherein the GCA awards certain rights to the concessionaire for the implementation and execution of public services. For instance, an agreement is entered into between the National Highway Authority of India and a private operator. In the said agreement certain rights are granted and vested in the private entity for undertaking the operation, maintenance & management of a project highway.
PPP contracts are intrinsically subject to reassessment, which may be attributed to the long duration of such contracts, spanning years. Decision-makers cannot foresee all the risks. Hence, a critical feature of a PPP transaction is the transfer of specified risks from the GCA to the concessionaire. From the standpoint of the government, this is one of the key methods for obtaining value for money in a PPP transaction by having the private sector take on some risks that would often be borne by the government in a conventional public works project. On the other hand, from the perspective of the private sector, the concessionaire is willing to accept various risks and earn profits by managing them efficiently.
The downside of incompleteness in concession contracts is that it promotes opportunistic behavior on the part of the contracting parties who seek to interpret this vagueness to their advantage. It ensues in conflicting interpretations, with each party promoting its own agenda. The typical solution to this issue is renegotiation of the contract. It refers to the process of making modifications to the original contract, in order to address unforeseen events, which often entails significant changes to the core concession clauses. Almost 40% of the PPP projects in India are renegotiated. Nevertheless, there is no established legal or institutional framework which governs such renegotiation.
One central issue associated with the renegotiation of concession contracts is that it can lead to retrospective distortion of the competitive tender procedure. The key attribute of awarding contracts through competitive tenders is that it provides the potential concessionaires with a fair chance to compete for the contract. Moreover, it also ensures that the GCA selects the most qualified concessionaire based on a competitive price while maintaining high standards of performance.
Post renegotiation, it is doubtful whether the concessionaire chosen for the project delivers the best cost-effective option. This is due to the fact that the projects that were originally tendered and those that were renegotiated are literally two separate projects. Further, the GCA has to be cautious of opportunistic renegotiation initiated by the concessionaire. In the same vein, opportunistic renegotiation on the part of the GCA will not just jeopardize its relationship with the concessionaire but will also serve to be detrimental to the long-term interest of the private sector.
Obsolescing Bargaining Theory-
Obsolescing Bargain refers to a private player’s gradual loss in power of negotiation in PPP contracts. This phenomenon results in government opportunism, giving the government an upper hand over the concessionaire. The theory posits that the negotiating leverage shifts during the course of the project. At first, the government offers enticing terms because it needs private investors. Once the project is up and running, the investors need a long amortization period to realize their promised return while the government has already acquired the necessary resources, making the initial agreement no longer relevant.
Private entities see a lot of commercial & regulatory risks in infrastructure investment. As compensation for bearing these risks, they expect high returns, which the government is willing to concede ex-ante. Nevertheless, once investors sunk their capital, created jobs, utilized technology, and produced output, their bargaining power was reduced, and the private returns that the government thought were reasonable ex-ante, seemed excessive and superfluous ex-post. Projects like the GMR Ambala Chandigarh Expressway and L&T Halol Shamlaji Tollway, are quintessential to this aspect. In these projects, the issue was attributed to the unrealistic traffic projections before the agreement was entered into. During the operation stage there was lower-than-expected traffic growth which resulted in reduced toll fee collection and, hence lower returns.
Indian Contract Law-
The contractual concept of undue influence, economic duress and the judicial dicta on renegotiation of contracts in general, are against the government engaging in such behavior. In, Atlas Express Ltd. v. Kafco ltd, the Queen’s bench held that, where a party to a contract was under economic pressure to the extent that he was compelled by the other party to renegotiate the terms of the contract to his detriment, his apparent acquiescence to the new terms was vitiated by economic duress. Further, in Mahavir Singh v. State of Haryana, there was a disparity in the bargaining power of the petitioner and the GCA. The court underscored that in such circumstances the private entities are expected to sign on dotted lines, which amounted to renegotiation vitiated by economic duress.
In tune to these judicial pronouncements, a committee was constituted to formulate a policy on efficiently regulating renegotiation.
The Kelkar Committee-
To curb phenomena such as obsolescing bargaining among others, the government formed the Kelkar committee. The committee report gave many recommendations to revitalize the PPP model in India. Among these, the committee recommendations on obsolescing bargaining was one based on incorporating safeguards in favor of the concessionaire in the CA. The key recommendation was the inclusion of ex-ante provisions in the renegotiation framework. The committee made a case for the ab initio inclusion of such contractual safeguards to ensure a certain level of bargaining power during the renegotiation of issues and prevent jeopardizing the sanctity of the bid award long after the project is finished. Further, the report posits the ex-ante establishment of critical assumptions, and only if the actuals deviate significantly from these assumptions can the renegotiation of the terms of the original contract be allowed.
One critical prerequisite for the implementation of these recommendations is identifying the possible contingencies while drafting the CA. This usually involves front-end transaction costs which are the costs incurred on identifying possible future events and the efficient allocation of obligations, which are usually high. Concessionaires may protect themselves from these risks through such ex-ante contractual designs. Nevertheless, a major fallout of such measures is that they fail to redress the fundamental incentive for the government to renege. Additionally, a government that is motivated to renege may concoct justifications or look for legal loopholes to do so. Moreover, the government may renege even in cases where a scenario transpires that was anticipated in the original CA. For instance, the government reneges when the country witnesses a macroeconomic shock. Indeed, in such situations, the government indulges in “wholesale reneging” (across several agreements).
It is understandable that ex-ante provisions in the context of renegotiation attempt to incorporate the flexibility required to promote efficiency. Nevertheless, the likelihood of renegotiation may jeopardize ex-ante efficiency. Consider a scenario where the parties to a CA renegotiate it to ensure effective performance. To do this, they must come to a new understanding of how to divide the surplus brought about by their trade. This surplus is inclusive of the gains from any particular investments, and the concessionaire who makes the investment will already have incurred the associated costs. Therefore non-investors (GCA) will benefit from a larger amount of the gains of investment, but will not incur a larger portion of the investment’s sunk costs (incurred on the investment which cannot be recovered) by participating in the redistribution of the surplus. Hence ex-ante efficiency is compromised since the initial investment is discouraged by the possibility of being “held-up” during renegotiation.
Therefore, contract design can go some distance in safeguarding the concessionaire from the phenomenon of obsolescing bargaining, but only to a certain extent. At best they serve as an inception for renegotiation in cases where the GCA reneges. Therefore a more effective protection is to be found.
Conclusion
The issue of obsolescing bargaining yields a very peculiar state of affairs. While precluding government reneging by means of contract design has failed to hold up well in practice, it suggests that concessionaires can be safeguarded by building a business strategy that ensures equity in bargaining relations. The concessionaire must deliver the project benefits gradually over time. For instance, the concessionaires may intend to develop a project in stages, despite compromising on the economies of scale. The phased transfer of investment and technology will maintain the bargaining power with the GCA. Such a measure will not just protect the concessionaire from unforeseen changes beyond his control, but will also make sure that the recourse to renegotiation is not misused.
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