The Corporate & Commercial Law Society Blog, HNLU

Tag: Securities Law

  • From Price Control to Market Discipline: Reading SEBI’s Base Expense Ratio Reform in Comparative Perspective

    From Price Control to Market Discipline: Reading SEBI’s Base Expense Ratio Reform in Comparative Perspective

    BY AADIT SHARMA, SECOND YEAR STUDENT AT RMLNLU, LUCKNOW

    INTRODUCTION

    India’s mutual fund industry has experienced accelerated growth with assets under management increasing from ₹72.2 lakh crores in May 2025 to ₹80.8 lakh crores by November 2025 with retail investors having a larger chunk in the market. It is in this context of rapid market expansion and retail involvement that the Securities and Exchange Board of India’s (‘SEBI’) circular dated 17 December 2025(‘Circular’) introducing the Base Expense Ratio (‘BER’) has been primarily discussed as a numerical or transparency-driven intervention. The earlier Total Expense Ratio (‘TER’) was a single, all-inclusive umbrella cap that bundled together the fund’s core management fees, distributor commissions and operating costs along with various statutory and regulatory levies (such as GST, STT, Stamp Duty and SEBI fees) into one consolidated percentage. The now introduced BER includes unbundling of costs. It states that the BER will only include the base core scheme-level expenses such as management fees, distribution costs and routine administration, while statutory and regulatory levies are excluded and charged separately on actuals. 

    This article argues that the BER framework reflects a measured shift by SEBI from merit-based price control towards disclosure-led market discipline, while consciously stopping short of full deregulation. When viewed in a comparative international context, the reform reflects a cautious alignment with global regulatory trends rather than a blind replication of foreign models.

    FROM BUNDLED CONTROL TO SELECTIVE TRANSPARENCY

    Prior to the circular, mutual fund expenses in India were regulated under a TER framework that bundled discretionary fund management fees with statutory and regulatory levies such as GST, Securities Transaction Tax, exchange fees, and SEBI charges. Although nominally framed as a disclosure-based ceiling, the TER regime functioned substantively as merit regulation because SEBI did not merely mandate disclosure of costs but prescribed binding ceilings on total expenses regulated under SEBI (Mutual Funds) Regulations, 1996. By prescribing category-wise caps on the aggregate chargeable expense, SEBI effectively determined what constituted a ‘reasonable’ cost structure for mutual funds, embedding its regulatory judgement directly into cost limits. Investor protection under this framework was achieved less through competitive pricing or informed choice and more through ex ante regulatory intervention. Even where SEBI permitted limited add-ons such as the additional allowance of up to 0.05 basis points in specified circumstances, including exit load–linked expenses, the underlying architecture remained one of bundled cost control, with statutory pass-through levies obscuring the true pricing of fund management services.

    The BER reform marks a deliberate reconfiguration of this approach. By separating core fund management costs from statutory and regulatory levies, now charged on actuals, SEBI has partially withdrawn from adjudicating the fairness of total expenses. Instead, it has enabled investors to evaluate the pricing of asset management services independently of compulsory charges. This shift represents a recalibration rather than an abandonment of regulatory control: while aggregate cost assessment is displaced in favor of transparency and comparability, SEBI has consciously retained category-wise caps on the base component. This reflects continued skepticism about the disciplining capacity of markets in a retail-dominated ecosystem. However, the reform is not without structural consequences. Although statutory levies are excluded for all funds under the BER framework, the practical benefits of this change are not evenly distributed. Large Asset Management Companies (AMCs)which typically operate close to the regulatory TER ceiling benefit from the removal of mandatory levies such as GST and transaction-related taxes from the capped expense head, as this reclassification restores usable pricing space and cushions margin pressure without requiring any adjustment to headline fees. Smaller AMCs, by contrast, generally price their schemes below regulatory caps and therefore derive limited incremental flexibility from the reform. While the BER framework advances transparency, but does not significantly change competitive conditions, as its practical benefits accrue mainly to AMCs constrained by existing expense ceilings. This outcome underscores the limits of disclosure-led governance in addressing distributive and competitive asymmetries that were previously moderated through aggregate cost controls.

    COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: CONVERGENCE AND DELIBERATE DIVERGENCE

    A.    United States: Disclosure Without Price Ceilings

    In the United States (‘US’) mutual fund regulation is   administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission (‘SEC’) under the Investment Company Act of 1940. It is premised on a combination of disclosure, investor education and procedural safeguards rather than direct regulation of fee levels. The SEC does not impose ceilings on expense ratios; instead funds are required to disclose management fees, distribution expenses (including 12b-1 fees) and operating costs in standardized formats leaving pricing discipline to investor choice and competitive pressures. The SEC requires that mutual funds disclose the expense ratios in key documents such as the prospectus and shareholder reports enabling investors to compare costs across funds.

    By contrast SEBI’s BER framework reflects a more cautious regulatory stance. Although disclosure has been strengthened through cost unbundling, SEBI has retained category-wise caps on base expenses, signaling an institutional judgement that disclosure alone may be insufficient to discipline pricing in a predominantly retail market.

    B. European Union: Transparency with Behavioral Framing

    The European Union’s (‘EU’) regulatory framework particularly under the Packaged retail and insurance-based investment products (PRIIPs), places strong emphasis on cost transparency through mandatory Key Information Documents . The EU regulatory framework is premised on the view that disclosure is effective only when it can be readily understood by retail investors. Accordingly, the PRIIPs regime requires investment costs to be presented in standardized formats and in many instances to be expressed in monetary terms over defined holding periods rather than only as percentages. This approach reflects an explicit regulatory acknowledgement that purely numerical disclosures may not be sufficient to inform investors in decision-making.

    SEBI’s BER framework aligns with the EU’s approach in unbundling costs and enhancing comparability across schemes but differs in its method of disclosure. While the Indian framework improves numerical transparency by separating base expenses from statutory levies it does not mandate behavioral framing or investor-oriented presentation of costs.  The reform enhances visibility of pricing components  but stops short of shaping how investors interpret or process that information.

    Taken together, these comparisons indicate that SEBI’s reform represents hybrid regulatory design. It borrows transparency mechanisms from global best practices while retaining structural controls suited to domestic conditions. The result is neither full convergence with them nor resistance to them but selective adaptation.

     THE LIMITS OF DISCLOSURE AS INVESTOR PROTECTION

    Disclosure-based regulation rests on the assumption that investors are able to read, understand and meaningfully compare cost information across financial products. In practice, this assumption is unevenly satisfied in India’s predominantly  retail driven mutual fund market. Levels of  low financial literacy are entangled with perceived complexity and limited information on investors’ part. As a result, the investors rely on intermediaries, brand reputation or recent returns rather than cost metrics when making investment decisions. In this context, the BER framework may improve the visibility of expense components without necessarily altering investor behavior. While headline base expense figures are now easier to identify, investors may underappreciate the cumulative impact of statutory levies charged separately or may continue to prioritize short-term performance over cost efficiency. As a result, transparency may not translate into effective market discipline. This does not undermine the regulatory rationale of the BER reform, but it highlights an inherent limitation: disclosure can function as a meaningful tool of investor protection only where investors possess the capacity and incentives to use the information disclosed.

    CONCLUSION: MAKING TRANSPARENCY EFFECTIVE

    The introduction of the BER marks a recalibration of mutual fund regulation rather than a completed transition. By unbundling statutory levies from core scheme expenses SEBI has created the conditions for improved cost comparison but transparency alone will not ensure market discipline unless it is operationalized through complementary regulatory practices.

    To realise the BER framework’s potential, post-implementation monitoring must assume central importance. SEBI should systematically track how expense structures evolve under the new regime and whether cost efficiencies are passed on to investors or absorbed within margins and distribution incentives. Periodic, category-wise publication of BER trends could strengthen competitive pressure without additional rulemaking.

    The impact of disclosure also depends on how intermediaries operate. In a market dominated by retail investors, transparency at the scheme level will have limited effect if distributors continue to shape investment decisions without regard to costs. Unless distributor incentives and point-of-sale disclosures reflect BER-related cost differences, investors are unlikely to use this information in practice. In addition, small improvements in how costs are presented such as showing base expenses alongside statutory levies can help investors better understand the total cost of investing, even without introducing formal behavioral mandates.

    Read this way the BER reform is best understood as a foundational step. Its success will depend less on arithmetic recalibration and more on whether transparency is translated into sustained pricing discipline through monitoring, intermediary oversight and usable disclosure.

  • Beyond Arbitrage: The High-Speed Scandal That Shook Dalal Street

    Beyond Arbitrage: The High-Speed Scandal That Shook Dalal Street

    PRIYANSHI JAIN, FOUTH-YEAR STUDENT AT INSTITUTE OF LAW, NIRMA UNIVERSITY

    INTRODUCTION

    India’s ₹4,844 crore Jane Street case was not just about fraudulent trading; it attacked the very credibility of India’s securities market. It is about whether the world’s largest derivatives market is built on a settlement system that can easily be manipulated.

    On July 2025, the Securities Exchange Board of India (‘SEBI’) passed an interim order against the Jane Street group, an American proprietary trading firm, for its alleged manipulation of the Bank Nifty index derivatives during expiry-day trading. The order seized nearly ₹4,844 crore and barred the firm from accessing Indian markets while proceedings continue. It was SEBI’s largest enforcement action of its kind and immediately drew attention across financial and legal circles.

    The case matters because it highlights the structural flaws in India’s market framework. Unlike the United States (‘US’) and European Union (‘EU’), which use closing auctions, or Singapore, which employs randomized settlement windows, India continues to rely on a 30-minute Volume-Weighted Average Price (‘VWAP’) to settle expiries. VWAP, an indicator derived from price and volume that represents the average price of a security, is increasingly outdated. Entity-level surveillance misses group strategies and doctrinal standards under the Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices Regulations, 2003 (‘PFUTP’), which remain unclear. SEBI’s order looks powerful in the headlines, but in reality, its durability before tribunals is far less certain.

    EXPIRY-DAY MECHANICS AND VULNERABILITIES

    To understand why SEBI’s order matters, it is necessary to see how expiry in India works. When Bank Nifty future options expire every Thursday, their final settlement value is not taken from the last traded price. Instead, it is computed using the VWAP of the index in the last half-an-hour before trading closes. The problem lies in VWAP as it can be influenced. Large, well-timed trades placed near the close can push the average up or down, even if only slightly. This practice is known as “marking the close”, and it can tilt the expiry settlement in a direction favourable to those who hold large options positions. In theory, these trades appear genuine; however, in reality, they are buy or sell orders, and their purpose is to manipulate the benchmark rather than reflect true supply and demand.

    The stakes are high as Bank Nifty is India’s most heavily-traded derivatives contract. As per SEBI’s own analysis, nearly 9/10 of retail derivatives traders lost money, with Bank Nifty options driving much of this activity. Even a slight change in VWAP can result in major retail losses. Unlike the US or EU, where expiry markets are dominated by institutions with hedging strategies, India’s market is retail-driven. This implies that structural fragilities like VWAP distortions inflict disproportionate harm on individuals who are least equipped to hedge risk. What looks like a technical flaw in design is a transfer of wealth from small investors to sophisticated firms.

    VWAP was chosen to avoid the distortions of last-trade settlement, but in practice, it creates a different vulnerability: it concentrates risk in a short window that sophisticated traders can target. The Jane Street episode illustrates that the vulnerability is not in one firm’s strategy but in the structure of the expiry system itself.

    LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND DOCTRINAL STANDARDS

    PFUTP Regulations, 2003

    SEBI’s case against Jane Street rests mainly on the Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices (PFUTP) Regulations, 2003. Regulation 3 prohibits the use of fraudulent or deceptive devices, and Regulation 4(1) bans trading practices that create a false or misleading appearance of trading or manipulate prices.

    Indian tribunals have consistently required a high threshold for providing manipulation. In Ketan Parekh v. SEBI (2006), (‘Ketan Parekh’), the Securities Appellate Tribunal (‘SAT’) held that a case must show the creation of an artificial price backed by intent, not merely aggressive or opportunistic trading. In Nirma Bang Securities v. SEBI (2004), the SAT emphasised that trades must produce a false appearance; if the orders are real and executed transparently on an exchange, they may not qualify as fraud. In DSQ Software Ltd. v. SEBI (2002), (‘DSQ Software’), expiry-day manipulation was penalised, but the case turned on circular trades and matched orders, not exploitation of settlement mechanics.

    Under Ketan Parekh, influencing VWAP may not amount to an “artificial” price at all, since VWAP is the legally prescribed benchmark. Under the Nirmal Bang case, Jane Street’s trades were genuine, transparent, and on-exchange, which made it difficult to argue that they created a “misleading appearance”. And unlike DSQ Software, where sham trades propped up expiry values, here the trades were economically real, albeit timed strategically. SEBI must therefore stretch precedent to fit behaviour that exploits design flaws rather than violates market integrity in the conventional sense.

    SEBI ACT, 1992

    The SEBI Act, 1992, grants the regulator broad powers to act in the interest of investors. Section 11 establishes SEBI’s mandate, while Sections 11B and 11D allow it to issue interim directions, including barring firms from markets. Section 12A prohibits manipulative conduct, and Section 24 provides for criminal sanctions.

    Interim orders under these provisions are often passed ex-parte, which enables SEBI to act quickly. Yet their durability is fragile. On appeal before the SAT or the Supreme Court, regulators must present evidence that meets the strict doctrinal tests of “artificial price” or “misleading appearance”. As past jurisprudence shows, SEBI’s broad preventive powers are constrained by how tribunals interpret manipulation, and orders that appear stringent at first glance often face dilution when they are tested against precedent.

    FPI REGULATIONS, 2019

    SEBI also cited breaches of the Foreign Portfolio Investor Regulations, 2019 (‘FPIRegulations’). Regulation 20(4) restricts intraday netting of trades across affiliates. The logic is to prevent one entity from using multiple arms to take offsetting positions. However, India’s surveillance remains entity-based, not consolidated. If affiliates or sub-accounts operate in coordination, their trades may escape detection unless positions are aggregated at the group level.

    This creates a structural blind spot. SEBI can penalise one entity, but coordinated strategies across multiple offshore vehicles may remain invisible. The Jane Street episode underscores how global trading firms can exploit the limits of surveillance architecture rather than simply breaching the letter of the law.

    SEBI’S INTERIM ORDER: STRENGTHS AND LIMITS

    SEBI’s interim order against Jane Street was notable for its speed and scale. Within days of the expiry, SEBI had impounded nearly ₹4,844 crore and imposed a trading ban. The sheer size of the disgorgement sent a deterrent signal not only to foreign portfolio investors but also to domestic proprietary desks that expiry-day strategies would be scrutinized closely. By framing the order around retail investor protection, SEBI strengthened its optics: Bank Nifty is retail-heavy, and positioning the case as a defence of small investors bolstered regulatory legitimacy. SEBI’s action is depicted as forceful yet legally fragile, because proving manipulation under PFUTP technically requires showing an artificial or misleading price, and Jane Street’s on-exchange, economically significant trades may be viewed as lawful VWAP exploitation unless regulators prove the trades lacked any legitimate economic purpose, a stance appellate bodies like the SAT have taken in narrowing “manipulation” in past cases. The order also highlights a surveillance gap: by focusing on entity-level positions, current systems may miss coordinated strategies run across affiliates or sub-accounts, implying that without group-level oversight enforcement can become piecemeal, penalizing one entity while broader structure remains unaddressed. The upshot is a recurring cycle where headline penalties signal resolve, but fragile legal footing leads to dilution or reversal on appeal unless settlement frameworks and surveillance architectures are overhauled to withstand scrutiny and capture cross-entity orchestration at scale.

    COMPARATIVE INSIGHTS AND REFORM DIRECTIONS

    India should pivot from a 30-minute VWAP expiry to transparent closing auctions or hybrid windows to curb benchmark tilts and concentrate integrity where liquidity is deepest. Sequencing pilots on F&O names and phasing towards auctions aligns with global practice and SEBI’s active consultations, while guarding liquidity optics. At the same time, regulators should mandate group-level disclosures and beneficial ownership look-through, operationalized via standardized, trigger-based reporting and a lead-regulator model. Cross-border Memorandum of Understandings with explicit timelines and data schemes should backstop enforcement against SPVs and secrecy regimes. Finally, the pair auction closes with AI-assisted surveillance under human oversight, restrained on labelled expiry datasets to manage false positives.

    CONCLUSION

    The Jane Street episode underlines that India’s episode underlines that India’s expiry framework itself is vulnerable. VWAP-based settlement concentrates risk in a narrow window, while entity-level surveillance misses coordinated strategies across affiliates. These are not flaws of one case but of the market’s design.

    Doctrinally, SEBI also faces hurdles. Under the PFUTP Regulations, tribunals have demanded proof of “artificial prices” or “misleading appearances”. Jane Street’s trades, though large and well-timed, were real and visible. This ambiguity may weaken SEBI’s case before appellate forums, showing how difficult it is to stretch the old standard to new trading strategies.

    The policy lesson is straightforward: in the absence of change, SEBI will continue to act reactively, making headlines by penalizing people after the fact while running the risk of legal reversals. Reliance on VWAP and fragmented oversight leaves India exposed in ways other major markets have already addressed through auctions, randomization, and consolidated monitoring.

    For the world’s largest derivatives market, with millions of retail traders, the demand is simple that India’s framework should be at least as robust as that of the US or EU. Anything less risks repeating the same cycle.

  • Bridging Borders: SCRR Amendment 2024 and India’s Gateway to Global Capital

    Bridging Borders: SCRR Amendment 2024 and India’s Gateway to Global Capital

    BY MANAV PAMNANI AND SHOURYA SHARMA, THIRD-YEAR STUDENTS AT NALSAR HYDERABAD AND JINDAL GLOBAL LAW SCHOOL, SONIPAT

    INTRODUCTION

    The Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance (‘MoF’), has recently amended the Securities Contracts Regulation Rules, 1957 (‘SCRR’). This Amendment attempts to make it easier for Indian public companies to list their equity shares within International Financial Service Centres (‘IFSCs’) such as the Gujarat International Finance Tec-City (‘GIFT City’), under the framework of Direct Listing of Equity Shares Scheme and the Companies (Listing of Equity Shares in Permissible Jurisdictions) Rules, 2024. One of the significant changes under the Amendment is the reduction of minimum public shareholding thresholds from 25% to 10% for listing made in IFSCs, making international listings more accessible, especially for start-ups and technology-driven enterprises. This move mirrors the government’s broader commitment towards placing India among the world’s competitive investment-friendly destinations and financial hives. This article attempts to analyse the legal framework of this Amendment, alongside exploring its practical implications for the Indian financial landscape.

    REGULATORY FOUNDATIONS AND LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

    The SCRR was notified by the Central Government to help achieve the objectives of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 (‘SCRA’) effectively. The preamble clause of the SCRA states that the objective of the statute is to regulate undesirable transactions in securities by overseeing the dealing in securities and monitoring other ancillary business activities. The Amendment aligns the SCRR with this overarching objective. The legal foundation of this Amendment lies in section 30(h)(A) of the SCRA, which gives the Central Government the power to introduce rules stipulating the specific requirements that companies have to follow to get their securities listed on any stock exchange. The word “any” here has to be given a wide interpretation to align with the framers’ intention which was to bestow supervisory and regulatory authority upon the Government to foster the maintenance of a reliable and efficient securities business framework. Therefore, the regulation of listing of securities on IFSCs squarely falls within the competence and authority of the Government.

    Earlier in 2024, the MoF, through a notification amending the Foreign Exchange Management (Non-debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 (‘NDI Rules’), explicitly enabled the listing of securities of public Indian companies on international exchanges recognized in Schedule XI of NDI Rules. This, termed as the Direct Listing Scheme, governed several intricacies such as permissible investors, compliance with sectoral caps, regulations regarding prohibited sectors, and pricing guidelines. Simultaneously, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (‘MCA’) had also introduced the Companies (Listing of Equity Shares in Permissible Jurisdictions) Rules, 2024 by virtue of its power under section 23(3) r/w section 469 of the Companies Act, 2013 to regulate the entities that can list and jurisdictions where the listing can take place.

    However, both these enactments, along with the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2020 which prescribed certain similar requirements pertaining to listing in international exchanges, served as mere regulatory tools rather than efficient operational guidelines. They prescribed an overarching framework that has to be adhered to during such listing and discussed the eligibility criteria but failed to provide or clarify points regarding specific thresholds and other operational mechanisms specified under the SCRR.

    LEGAL ANALYSIS

    The recent Amendment fills the void identified above by introducing a few but impactful changes in the securities listing regime, thus reflecting its commitment to fostering a globally competitive and investor-friendly framework while aligning domestic practices with international standards. These international standards include the minimum public float thresholds in jurisdictions like Singapore, the International Organisation of Securities Commissions’ principles of efficiency, transparency and fairness in cross-border listings, the securities regime in the Dubai International Financial Centre, the Financial Action Task Force’s Anti-Money Laundering /Combating the Financing of Terrorism recommendations, and the pricing mechanisms and sectoral compliance thresholds present in the European Union Capital Markets Union and the United States Securities and Exchange Commission Regulations.

    The widespread benefits accruing to investors and other stakeholders through the effectuation of this Amendment not only covers the inflow of higher foreign capital and a more efficient and dynamic securities framework but also extends to direct tax advantages. section 10(4D) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 provides a significant tax exemption on income arising from transactions conducted on recognized stock exchanges within IFSCs, including GIFT-IFSC. This incentivizes participation, reduces transactional costs for investors, and creates a persuasive financial rationale for businesses contemplating listing on foreign exchanges. It is also in line with the numerous Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements (‘DTAAs’) entered into by India to prevent non-resident Indians from being taxed twice, in both, India and their country of residence, thus significantly alleviating their tax burden. Additionally, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (‘SEBI’) has considerable control over listing and transactions in the IFSC, as is evident from the scheme of the SEBI (International Financial Services Centres) Guidelines, 2015. This reiterates the commitment of SEBI to safeguard the interests of investors and other stakeholders, alongside maintaining an effective securities landscape.

    An important caveat to consider with respect to this Amendment is that the reduction of thresholds from 25% to 10% extends only to listings made in the IFSC. This implies that as per domestic subscription requirements, the extent of public shareholding is still fixed at the previous 25%. This distinction creates a dual regulatory framework, potentially leading to compliance complexities for companies seeking listings in both domestic and IFSC exchanges. This may limit the seamless integration of domestic and international listing strategies, requiring companies to carefully navigate the differing regulatory requirements to maximize benefits and avoid potential conflicts. Although the text of the Amendment alters Rule 19(2)(b) of SCRR, which covers domestic listings, the primary intention of the legislature was to effect changes in the IFSC listing framework. This ambiguity necessitates a clarification, which will most likely uphold uniformity by stating that the reduction also extends to listings made on domestic stock exchanges by companies wishing to obtain listing on permitted international exchanges. The importance of such uniformity and standardization is also evident from the two definitions (IFSC and International Financial Services Centre Authority (‘IFSCA’) that have been introduced which do not impose their own requirements but simply suggest an alignment with the definitions incorporated in existing legislations. The Amendment while defining these terms states that an IFSC means an IFSC as defined under section 3(1)(g) of the IFSCA Act, 2019 and an IFSCA means the Authority established under section 4(1) of the IFSCA Act. This significantly reduces complexity and fosters consistency and clarity in the navigation of relevant legalities pertaining to share listing and other compliance requirements.

    PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

    This Amendment marks a shift in India’s financial regulatory regime by redefining the entry of companies into global capital markets. In its amplitude, it is not an ordinary technical change but a strategic recalibration of structures of investment. The reduction of public shareholding thresholds from 25% to 10% for foreign listings creates an easier route for start-ups, emerging businesses, and small, mid and large capitalisation companies to access global capital, a phenomenon that is already experiencing an upward trajectory. For example, the gross foreign portfolio investment (‘FPI’) in India was massively estimated at around US$ 41.6 billion in the year 2023-24, which is bound to increase manifold due to this Amendment. The business insights from  companies like Reliance Industries Limited and HDFC Bank Limited, among others, reflect clear examples of corporations successfully accessing large amounts of global capital due to international financial listing. This consequentially places Indian business enterprises in a robust position as reduction in public shareholding compliance requirements is an attractive proposition for investors.

    Interestingly, the lowering of the barriers to international capital access also provides the same growth opportunities to a wider spectrum of sector-specific enterprises, including deep technology, renewable energy and biotechnology. These are crucial sectors requiring large investments. Furthermore, this change may even decentralise India’s economic hubs by allowing international capital to penetrate smaller companies located in tier-2 and tier-3 cities. As an offshoot, regions other than the economically prospering metro cities would witness increased industrialisation and employment generation since more local companies would gain access to foreign investments.

    A research conducted by the International Monetary Fund on emerging markets provides a broader context in which this Amendment fits into a global trend, towards more accessible and flexible capital markets. It represents the benefits of India’s strategic approach to positioning itself as an attractive destination for global investors. Indian firms may be better positioned to raise capital in foreign currencies with a more straightforward pathway to listing abroad while hedge-protecting firms reliant on imports for raw materials or technology from the capricious market exchange rate.

    Contrary to the apprehensions of capital outflow, this Amendment may benefit India’s domestic markets since an international listing enhances reputation of a company, provides international exposure, and encourages investor confidence. Companies will attract a larger pool of sophisticated retail and institutional investors, leading to increased credibility and brand value through such listings. This will enhance liquidity, valuation, expertise, innovation and overall market efficiency.

    However, the opportunity comes with nuanced challenges, particularly for companies that aim to be listed on both domestic and international exchanges. In a dual-listed company structure, the requirement for multi-jurisdictional shareholder and board approvals introduces complexities to decision-making and company operations. This substantially increases audit and compliance costs, necessitating detailed planning and high investments in financial and legal advisory services.

    CONCLUDING REMARKS

    This Amendment is more than a routine regulatory change because it aims to manifest India as a global financial hub by significantly relaxing listing requirements in the IFSC. It serves as a forward-looking measure with the objective of modernising the Indian securities law landscape and aligning it with international best practices by furthering a more inclusive access to global capital markets. With the introduction of this Amendment, the legislature has taken a significant step in the right direction and it will be interesting to observe the future course this Amendment adopts, particularly concerning its effective implementation.

  • Centralised Fee Collection Mechanism: Sebi’s Move To Shield Investors

    Centralised Fee Collection Mechanism: Sebi’s Move To Shield Investors

    BY SUKRITI GUPTA, THIRD-YEAR STUDENT AT NLU, ODISHA

    INTRODUCTION

    The Securities and Exchange Board of India (“SEBI”), has recorded around 33,00 registered entities according to its recognised intermediaries data. Amongst these, SEBI has close to 955 registered Investment Advisors (“IA”) and 1381 Research Analysts (“RA”) as of September 2024. 

    In common parlance, an IA is an entity that provides investment advice to the investors and an unregistered IA is simply the one who provides such advisory without having registration from SEBI. Interestingly, around 35% of IA are unregistered in India which entails a violation of the SEBI (Investment Advisers) (Amendment) Regulations, 2020.

    Additionally, RA also plays a pivotal role in preparing research reports by conducting investigations, research, and evaluation of financial assets. They provide advisory to investors to assist them in making decisions regarding investing, buying, or selling off financial securities, and they are administered by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Research Analysts) Regulations, 2014.

    It was observed by SEBI through several accusations and grievances reported by investors that there is an incremental rise in the misconduct of unregistered analysts who falsely portray themselves as registered IA and RA to facilitate investment services. These entities exploit investors by giving them fake and unrealistic securities advisories to encourage investments. 

    Thus, pursuant to this, SEBI issued a circular dated 13th September 2024 to set in motion a uniform system for fee collection by IA and RA, known as the “Centralised Fee Collection Mechanism”. This initiative, co-drafted by BSE Limited followed rigorous consultations from common people and feedback from several stakeholders.

    The author in this post delves into the significance and objectives of SEBI’s new mechanism by highlighting its broader implications. Furthermore, the author critically inspects the potential concerns and queries related to this initiative. 

    HOW DOES THE CENTRALISED FEE MECHANISM WORK?

    Under this mechanism, SEBI has established a supervisory platform for IA/RA to offer a uniform and centralised fee collection process. It provides a portal through which the investors can pay the fees to registered IA/RA which will be overseen by a recognised Administration and Supervisory Body (“ASB”). Every transaction will be initiated by assigning a virtual account number, with the availability of various modes of payment like UPI, net banking, NEFT etc. For using this facility, there is likely to be a system where IA/RA shall enroll themselves in this platform and provide fee-related details for their clients and the fee collected will then be transferred to these registered entities. It is made optional for both investors and IA and RA. 

    It aims to increase the participation of investors in the securities market by creating a transparent and riskless payment environment to curb the activities of unregistered IA/RA from taking dominance of investors under the guise of regulatory compliance.

    SAFEGUARDING INVESTORS INTERESTS: NEED FOR A CENTRALISED FEE COLLECTION MECHANISM

    By introducing a Centralised Fee Collection Mechanism, SEBI aims to mitigate all possible misleading and fraudulent activities of the unregistered IA/RA. To ensure that the investor’s money is in safe hands, it is imperative to save them from becoming a victim of illegitimate entities. Since many investors may not know how to inspect whether an entity is a registered one or not, therefore, it is the onus of SEBI, being a market regulator, to guard the interests of investors by introducing such an appropriate mechanism. 

    In the author’s view, by providing a centralised platform for payments, SEBI might ensure that the investor’s personal information and data remain fully confidential and safe since there will be a very minute chance of data leakage due to all the services being provided in one designated sphere. Secondly, through various digital payment modes being facilitated, there remains a minimal chance of disruption in the payment mechanism, ensuring a seamless and steady payment. It will also keep a check on the fees charged by these registered entities concerning  SEBI’s guidelines regarding the fees charged by IA, thereby helping to reduce exorbitant charges. Additionally, investors will not be charged any platform fee thus reducing unnecessary expenditure.

    Also, by operationalisation of this centralised payment system, investors will easily identify which entity is a registered entity. This will in turn be beneficial to IA and RA because they will get due recognition as they will be distinguished from unregistered ones. This will help them to attract genuine clients seeking their assistance. Furthermore, it will also help IA/RA who do not have any automated platforms of their own, thereby saving time and reducing burden

    CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE MECHANISM

    To delve deeper into the implications and analysis of the Centralised Fee Collection Mechanism, it is essential to ponder on three major points. Firstly, for what purpose the mechanism is kept optional, Secondly, whether such an initiative enhance investor’s vigilance when hailing services from unregistered entities? Lastly, how will this mechanism ensure the security and privacy of investor’s data?

    Discussing the first point, in the author’s view, it is essential to note that keeping the mechanism optional for users to pay and IA/RA to collect fees, is providing a flexible choice by giving them time to adapt and integrate into the new framework of the mechanism. By not mandating its use, SEBI is trying to ensure that they don’t feel that it is being involuntarily imposed upon them. Rather, they have the discretion to avail it. Additionally, potential shortcomings, challenges and doubts can also be identified for allowing further incorporation of necessary amendments and improvements based on the experience and feedback of the users and entities. 

    Therefore, the main idea behind keeping it optional is to grab the attention and trust of the investors and entities in this platform and make them familiar with the procedures for gradual adoption. This flexibility will enable a smoother transition and necessary adjustments. According to the author, SEBI might eventually make it compulsory in the near future. 

    Gauging on the second point, while this mechanism has significant potential to reduce the number of unregistered entities and heighten investor’s attentiveness, it is crucial to recognise that not all users may be aware of the reforms and regulations brought by the regulator. Thus, according to the author, to attain the full purpose of the mechanism, SEBI needs to prioritise its promotion through advertisements, webinars, awareness activities etc., via authorised channels. If the targeted audience becomes aware of such a facility, the likelihood of success of such an initiative would increase, eventually serving a larger segment of the investing public.

    One concern of IA/RA regarding this mechanism could be the reluctance of investors to provide their personal information while paying fees. Many of them may not be comfortable sharing their details on an online platform like such. To cater to this, SEBI must ensure transparency by rolling out certain procedures for safeguarding investor’s privacy and trust. One approach could be to give a unique identification number to each investor for aid in digital enlisting. E-receipts, payment tracking and reconciliation could also be enabled. SEBI can also launch a portal alongside, which will enable the investors to report any issue encountered by them during transactions. It may operate like a customer care center to deal with and sort out the grievances faced by them. 

    While it appears that this mechanism is viable to ensure adequate safety and privacy of the investors, yet, there is a need for vigorous regulation to fully reassure the investors of their privacy and trust in IA/RA. 

    CONCLUSION

    SEBI’s introduction of Centralised Fee Collection Mechanism is a double-edged sword, safeguarding both investors and entities. By offering a compliant and centralised system for fee collection, it is not only protecting investors from deceitful and unauthorised entities but also fortifying the credibility of registered IA and RA. It also marks a noteworthy step towards establishing a transparent, viable and secured space in security’s advisory sphere. However, for initiatives like this to become successful, it is crucial to focus on its continued promotion, awareness, investor education and robust privacy safeguard standards to entrust confidence in the platform. Eventually, this mechanism aims to build a safer, systematic and coherent environment that benefits both the investors and advisory entities alike. Let us see whether it will be welcomed or feared.  

  • From Hearsay to Hard Facts – SEBI’s Crackdown on Rumour Verification

    From Hearsay to Hard Facts – SEBI’s Crackdown on Rumour Verification

    BY RITUNJAY SINGH AND SEJAL SINGH, FIFTH-YEAR STUDENTS AT RMLNLU, LUCKNOW

    Introduction

    On May 17, 2024, the Securities Exchange Board of India (‘SEBI’) announced a pivotal change by notifying the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) (Amendment) Regulations, 2024 (‘2024 Amendment’). The amendment brings notable updates to the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 (‘LODR Regulations’) by mandating Market Rumour Verification (‘MRV’) by listed companies, particularly those that lead to material price movement (‘MPM’).

    Understanding the Regulation and its Evolution

    The 2023 Amendment focused on triggering rumour verification upon a ‘material event’ occurrence but failed to define ‘material event’, leading to unclear compliance requirements. Consequently, SEBI proposed the formation of an Industry Standards Forum (‘ISF’) by industry associations in July 2023. By August 2023, the ISF, a collaboration between the Associated Chambers of Commerce, the Confederation of Indian Industry, and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, was established to formulate standards for implementing specific circulars and regulations. This collaboration resulted in a Consultation Paper released in December 2023, which laid the groundwork for the 2024 Amendment.

    The 2024 Amendment builds on this foundation, which initially mandated MRV but delayed its enforcement. The new regulations mandate rumour verification for the top 100 listed entities from June 1, 2024, and aim to extend it to the top 250 listed entities from December 1, 2024. The entity must verify specific market rumours reported in mainstream media that lead to MPM, usually within 24 hours from the trigger of MPM. General or vague rumours do not necessitate a response. It shall be specific to the industry consisting of unpublished information. 

    Mainstream media includes Indian newspapers with substantial circulation and readership, their digital versions, designated online news sources, and select international newspapers and news channels. It excludes news sources behind paywalls, news aggregators, and social media platforms, except for verified accounts of recognised news sources. Such focused delineation may presumably provide entities with a manageable scope to monitor. However, excluding social media platforms may leave gaps in differentiating facts from fiction, as seen in the Sadhna Broadcast pump-and-dump controversy, where rumours on social media and YouTube videos artificially inflated stock prices, causing investors losses once the stock inevitably crashed. A similar scenario occurred in the infamous Reddit-fuelled GameStop frenzy, where a coordinated effort by retail investors caused an unexpected stock surge, defying traditional market expectations and forcing hedge funds into massive losses. Furthermore, SEBI’s recent efforts to caution the public against dealing with unregulated entities and clamping down on the association between regulated entities and ‘finfluencers’, SEBI acknowledges this pervasive influence. Excluding such platforms from rumour verification leaves a blind spot in the regulatory framework.

    Having mentioned price volatility, it is crucial to understand MPM. The Bombay Stock Exchange (‘BSE’) and the National Stock Exchange (‘NSE’) introduced the MPM Framework to standardise its assessment, providing clear criteria for its calculation. It considers the cut-off percentage to price variation in share price between the closing price of the previous trading day and the next trading day’s opening price, excluding the benchmark index’s impact (e.g., NSE’s NIFTY 50 and BSE’s SENSEX). Additionally, intraday price movements are analysed, focusing on volatility throughout the trading day rather than just the opening versus closing prices. This responsibility of identifying the MPM rests with the listed entity, which may delegate this role to a designated officer. Owing to the constant fluctuation in stock prices, notifying the listed entity regarding the MPM necessitates a sophisticated technology-based solution. Going forward, service providers will likely offer these alert systems to companies. The lookback period i.e. the timeframe within which companies must retrospectively examine previous market rumours that might have induced an MPM is not specified, allowing companies to tailor their verification procedures flexibly to ensure a thorough and context-appropriate assessment.

    On May 21 2024, SEBI released another circular regarding the “framework for considering the unaffected price for transactions upon confirmation of market rumour.” This framework calculates the unaffected price by excluding the effect of MPM and rumour confirmation on equity share prices. In mergers and acquisitions, if parties’ names are non-disclosable due to confidentiality, the unaffected price is valid for 180 days from rumour confirmation; if names are disclosable, it’s valid for 60 days post-confirmation (Paragraph 5.2.2). If the price variation due to rumour confirmation hits the price band on the next trading day, subsequent trading days’ price variation is included for adjustment until it no longer hits the price band. For example, if ‘A’ trades at Rs. 100 per share and a rumour about acquiring ‘B’ causes the stock price to rise to Rs. 400 per share, later proving untrue and falling to Rs. 50 per share, the rumour period causing the fluctuation is determined. The average stock price of ‘B’ prior to the rumour, over a fixed period (e.g., six months), is analysed. If this average is Rs. 100 per share and market trends align, the unaffected price is Rs. 100 per share. This benefit only applies if the rumour is confirmed within 24 hours of MPM.

    Bridging the Gaps: A Vision for the Future

    The 24-hour timeframe provided under Regulation 30(11) not only seems insufficient to locate the exact source of the rumour in order to effectively address it, given the vast trenches of media requiring navigation; but also, proves to be a very small window to provide the public with the necessary documents that support its confirmation or denial. Something similar took place in the short-selling saga of the Adani-Hindenburg case, wherein even after their quick response within 24 hours, Adani’s stocks continued to tread downwards. Moreover, such a stringent timeline could attract regulatory scrutiny under the PFUTP Regulations in the accidental case of a hasty and, incorrect disclosure. Conversely, the NYSE Manual allows the confirmation of a rumour without the ticking 24-hour time clock, alleviating any pressure and allowing the company to make an accurate statement that verifies the accuracy of a rumour without the risk of any regulatory repercussions for incorrect disclosures.

    Furthermore, in the event of a merger and acquisition, a Non-Disclosure Agreement, which more often than not governs these negotiations, may act as a significant impediment to the Regulation, restricting the information that can be publicly shared. A premature confirmation or outright denial may attract a weaker negotiating position for the entity. While an argument can be made that a rumour may be surfacing owing to an already existing breach, that is not an argument strong enough for intentionally breaching confidentiality agreements. Henceforth, if a company were to deny a rumoured merger and later go through with it, investor trust could still very well be damaged. Some countries, like the United Kingdom (‘UK’), have a standstill period of 6 months under section 2(6) of the UK Takeover Code, in case a company does not verify a rumoured merger within 28 days. However, while this prioritises investor clarity and market stability, it is done at the expense of corporate flexibility and strategic planning. Companies might be forced into premature decisions that misalign with their timelines or negotiation strategies. A premature confirmation could also lead to a failed negotiation and wasted resources in case the deal does not go through.  Nevertheless, missing the 28-day verification window would result in being barred from making any such offers within the next six months, potentially missing out on opportunities.

    A balance can be restored by allowing the company to delay disclosures if an immediate clarification poses potential harm. This postponement ensures that an entity can manage sensitive information without being forced into a premature disclosure that could disrupt ongoing negotiations. The same is ensured by Chapter 3 of the European Union Market Abuse Regulation. However, this ability to delay does not come without oversight. Entities choosing to delay shall have to provide regulators with an explanation for the same, demonstrating how exactly it aligns with their legitimate interests, thereby preventing the misuse of the provision for any unfair competitive advantage. Similarly, vis-a-vis leaving room for corporate flexibility, SEBI can also take note of Part III of Appendix 7A of the Corporate Disclosure Policy of Singapore that carves out exceptions to disclosure due to market rumours: (a) The information to be disclosed doesn’t breach any law (Rule 703(2)); (b) The issuer can temporarily refrain from publicly disclosing particular information if a reasonable person would not expect it to be disclosed, and the information is kept confidential (Rule 703(3)). This comes with the caveat of maintaining the strictest confidentiality to prevent leaks.

    Conclusion

    SEBI’s attempts to balance transparency and accountability are evident, even addressing possible concerns via its Guidance Note, including handling speculations regarding a Managing Director/Chief Executive Officer’s health. Yet, as noted earlier, the indeterminate lookback period tips the scales slightly against corporations. By adopting a more structured approach akin to international practices, Indian entities could be better equipped to safeguard their legitimate interests while maintaining investor confidence. Such regulatory evolution could demystify market speculations, enhance stability, and bring India’s disclosure standards into closer alignment with international standards, safeguarding the truth in trading.

  • SEBI’s Norms For Sharing Real-Time Price Data: Laudable Yet Restrictive

    SEBI’s Norms For Sharing Real-Time Price Data: Laudable Yet Restrictive

    BY SACHIN DUBEY AND SUKRITI GUPTA, THIRD-YEAR STUDENTS AT NLU, ODISHA

    Introduction

    Securities and Exchange Board of India (‘SEBI’), vide circular dated 24th May 2024, introduced ‘Norms for sharing of real-time price data to third parties.’ The circular has been brought to tackle the concerns arising from the unauthorized sharing of real-time price data (‘Price data’) with online gaming platforms and other third parties and to protect the securities market. Price data refers to the current data of information which is made accessible as soon as it is generated. It is used in time-centric applications like stock trading and navigation to have real-time price analytics.

    This restriction was made in the purview of an upsurge in online gaming platforms, virtual trading apps, fantasy stock trading apps, and various other websites. Since the past couple of years, there has been an incremental increase in trading through these virtual platforms which therein invited attention to regulate the functioning of these platforms. It works in a way that provides its users with an illusionary image ofhow stock trading is done by featuring the exact parallel stocks listed on Stock Exchanges and also by citing similar price values and fluctuations. Since they do not fall under the domain of SEBI, they,therefore, become an unregulated fragment. Sharing real-time price data poses a high risk of leakage of sensitive information related to securities in the market. These virtual trading platforms appropriately use the data for their apps and websites to build a real trading atmosphere for their users which in turn fabricates their mind to construe this trading to be an actual stock market trading. This may also create parallel, unregulated platforms which would continue to hamper the trust of its users thus, promoting unfair trading. The sharing of real-time price data also acts as a disruptor in the securities market, because of which the regulator is consistently trying to prioritize the interests of investors above all else.

    The circular also mentions that market infrastructure institutions (‘MIIs’) and market intermediaries such as brokerages are forbidden to share price datawith third parties. However, it comes with an exception that price data can be shared if such information is essential for the systematic functioning of the securities market and regulatory compliances. Further, a written agreement needs to be entered and due diligence is required before transferring price data with third parties so that it will not be put to any illegal use.

    This post delves into the impact of SEBI’s recent circular on investors and virtual stock trading apps, highlighting its broader implications. Additionally, it sheds light on the potential drawbacks of the circular and suggests measures to cure the same.

    REGULATORY GREY ZONES AROUND VIRTUAL STOCK TRADING PLATFORMS

    Hitherto, Virtual stock trading apps operate in an ambiguous regulatory environment. Regulatory officials describe it as a form of Dabba Trading, an unlawful practice which involves placing bets on the movement of the price of underlying assets such as stocks or commodities. In India, Dabba trading activities flout various provisions of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 (‘SCRA’) and are subject to punishment under section 23 of the SCRA. 

    SEBI already made its intention clear in 2016 when it issued a warning to investors against various entities offering leagues/schemes/competitions etc. based on the securities data. SEBI stated that these schemes are neither authorized nor endorsed by SEBI or any SEBI-recognized exchanges. It further sought public input on proposed amendments to SEBI Investments Advisers (Regulations), 2013 which included a provision to prohibit anyone from organizing schemes, games, leagues, or competitions related to the securities market. However, it did not forward the proposal and instead prohibited Stock Brokers from participating in games, leagues, schemes, competitions, etc., that involve the distribution of prizes, medals, gifts, etc. SEBI’s recent circular will further force virtual trading stocks to shut down their operations.

    Apart from SEBI, the National Stock Exchange (‘NSE’) vide circular dated 20th April 2023 observed that some market participants are misusing its data for gaming and virtual trading, which undermines fair and transparent trading principles. It reminded trading members that NSE Data should only be used for legitimate trading activities by their clients and not for gaming or virtual trading purposes.

    Therefore, there has never been regularity clarity regarding virtual stock trading apps which made them operate in a regulatory grey area.

    SEBI’s OBJECTIONS AGAINST VIRTUAL STOCK TRADING APPS USING REAL TIME PRICE DATA

    Although SEBI was not concerned with these platforms working as stock market simulators for education or entertainment purposes utilizing price data, the problem arose with the involvement of money. Platforms like India Trading League or Stock Race charge a small entry fee and award monetary rewards tied to the performance of stocks or commodities. This has sparked an addictive interest among users leading to the successful development of their business model.Further, they do not come within the regulatory foothold of SEBI and therefore are not required to provide disclaimers to users regarding the difference between actual trading and virtual trading as well as the risks attached to virtual trading.

    Further SEBI’s concern about restricting price data with these platforms comes from its objective to protect the interest of investors in the securities market. Out of the regulatory foothold of SEBI, these platforms tend to create a virtual, parallel and uncontrolled securities market where there will be no trust among the users.

    Stock Exchanges primarily generate revenue through transaction fees on trades and subscription fees for providing price data. SEBI has explicitly forbidden the creation and operation of games or competitions related to securities and security markets.If a third-party platform acquires price data and uses it to operate subscription-based games, it would undermine the exchanges’ revenue sources and breach SEBI regulations.

     KEY CONCERNS

    The move to regulate the sharing of price data with third parties, including fantasy stock trading games, is commendable for its aim to prevent investors from becoming addicted to these games and getting duped into the fraudulent practices of these platforms.Still, it has certain shortcomings which need to be acknowledged and taken care of.

    To start with, SEBI should not view every such development with suspicion which is beneficial for innovation and the growth of private businesses in the economy. SEBI should promote these business platforms while simultaneously bringing them under its regulatory foothold.

    SEBI should take a proactive approach by establishing a clear framework for these platforms, detailing the rules and regulations related to securities they must adhere to, and specifying the required disclosures for registration. Such measures will not only ensure compliance but also promote transparency and encourage innovation, creating a more dynamic and trustworthy financial ecosystem. It could have also outlined the eligibility criteria for participants, including age limits, net worth, and other intriguing requirements. The Board can take a cue from the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (‘ASIC’) which requires platforms like fantasy stock trading games to obtain a license before starting operation. Licensed platforms which are called binary options providers in Australia ensure protection to investors as they need to make certain disclosures as well as need to fulfil certain obligations imposed by ASIC.

    Further, the circular states that that price data will be provided to investor educational platforms with a delay of one day.If price data is allowed to be shared with educational platforms with lag of one day, then these platforms will be compelled to use delayed data which will not serve the purpose of such learning platforms. Their business model would go in negatives as its whole object of live simulation-based tasks would be affected, offering no monetary incentives. Their contribution in enhancing investment skills and simplifying the investment process for individuals through realistic stock market simulations will be significantly impacted. Therefore, SEBI should consider repealing it from the circular.

    Hence, while SEBI’s plan to issue a circular regulating the sharing of price data with third parties, including virtual trading platforms, is praiseworthy, yet restrictive. This regulation may hinder innovation that aids in the development of investment skills and simplifies the investment process for individuals.

    Conclusion

    Globally, many countries are adapting to digital era due to the rise of various online platforms offering monetary services. With the increase in these platforms, there is a growing concern regarding sharing price data with the third parties. Regulators around the globe are becoming aware of the risks and challenges connected with manipulation of markets, and leakage of sensitive data. So, it has become essential to have rules and regulations to regulate data sharing. Therefore, amidst this, SEBI has brought such norms which restricts sharing price data with third parties to bring credibility and stability in the worldwide stock market. Although it is commendable, SEBI could have implemented regulations to bring these platforms under its regulatory framework while still allowing them to operate. After all, a country’s legislation aim should be to let the private business develop in the country with having certain regulatory control over them.

  • Navigating SEBI’s Upstreaming Clients’ Funds Framework

    Navigating SEBI’s Upstreaming Clients’ Funds Framework

    BY AISHANA AND NIKITA SINGH, THIRD-YEAR STUDENTS AT GNLU, GUJARAT

    Introduction 

    In the past few years, The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has taken several steps to safeguard investors’ securities and funds, but a significant amount of investor funds may still be vulnerable to the risk of potential misuse. To mitigate the same, in a recent regulatory move, it has released a circular that lays out a crucial framework for stock brokers (SBs) and clearing members (CMs) to upstream their clients’ funds to clearing corporations (CCs). The circular is a strategic step to protect customers’ money and guarantee its prudent use, with important ramifications for investors and the securities market alike.

    The SEBI circular mandates the upstreaming of all client funds received by SBs and CMs to CCs in the form of cash, lien on fixed deposit receipts (FDRs), or pledge of units of mutual fund overnight schemes (MFOS). Specific conditions are outlined for creating FDRs, including the requirement that FDRs should be pre-terminable on demand and lien-marked to one of the clearing corporations (CCs) at all times. Guidelines for pledging MFOS units are introduced to ensure minimal risk transformation of client funds and exposure to risk-free government securities. The circular also emphasizes measures to improve operational efficiency and reduce transaction costs, along with compliance and monitoring mechanisms for stock exchanges and CCs. 

    In this article, the authors will explain the conditions outlined for creating FDRs including the guidelines introduced for pledging MFOS units, aiming to mitigate risk transformation and limit exposure to risk-free government securities, which will be examined in detail. Moreover, the article also encompass the circular’s overarching goals of improving operational efficiency, reducing transaction costs, and establishing robust compliance and monitoring mechanisms for both stock exchanges and CCs. 

    The Purpose and Rationale of the Framework

    The principle behind the framework for upstreaming of clients’ funds by SBs and CMs to CCs is that no clients’ funds should be retained by SBs and CMs on end of the day basis. This means that all the clear credit balances of the clients, i.e., the funds that are not required for meeting the margin or settlement obligations of the clients, should be transferred to the CCs every day. The CCs are the entities that facilitate the clearing and settlement of trades in the securities market. They act as the central counterparties and guarantee the settlement of trades, thereby reducing the counterparty risk and enhancing the market integrity. The sole purpose of the framework is to protect client funds from abuse or misappropriation on the part of SBs and CMs. Additionally, it seeks to guarantee that the clients’ money is placed in low-risk or risk-free products, like government bonds, and that it is accessible to fulfil their obligations as needed. By including procedures for collateral utilisation and margin adjustment, the framework also aims to lower transaction costs and increase operational efficiency for market players. In addition, it also aims to improve upstreaming process compliance and oversight by requiring reporting and audits from stock exchanges, CMs, CCs, and SBs.

    The Forms and Conditions of Upstreaming

    The framework allows three forms of upstreaming of clients’ funds to CCs: cash, lien on Fixed Deposit Receipts, or pledge of units of MFOS. It also specifies certain conditions for creating FDRs out of clients’ funds such as FDRs must be pre-terminable on demand, allowing redemption without any penalty or loss of interest. Secondly, it should be consistently lien-marked to one of the CCs, serving as collateral and necessitating CCs’ consent for withdrawal or transfer by SBs or CMs. Thirdly, It also must be issued by scheduled commercial banks with a minimum A1+ credit rating, excluding co-operative and regional rural banks and should be in the name of the SB or CM, explicitly mentioning “client funds.” Furthermore, these FDRs should exist in dematerialized form within a depository, with daily reports sent to CCs by the depository, ensuring transparent oversight and compliance with the SEBI circular. These stringent conditions underline SEBI’s commitment to meticulous risk management and client fund protection within the securities market. 

    Moreover, the guidelines are also laid down for the pledging of Mutual Fund Overnight Scheme (MFOS) units derived from clients’ funds. To ensure transparency and effective oversight, these MFOS units must exclusively exist in dematerialized form within a depository, with daily reports dispatched to CCs by the depository. Pledging procedures involve the units being pledged in favour of CCs through the depository system, with the pledge remaining valid until released by the CCs. Valuation of the MFOS units is pegged at the previous day’s net asset value , and the application of a haircut by CCs is capped at 10% of the unit’s value, exemplifying a cautious approach to risk management. Crucially, upon the release of the pledge by CCs, the redemption of MFOS units must occur on the same day, with the proceeds seamlessly credited to the client nodal bank account of the SB or  CMs. These guidelines underscore SEBI’s commitment to meticulous risk mitigation, transparency, and ensuring the seamless utilization of clients’ funds within the regulatory framework of the securities market.

    The Applicability and Monitoring Mechanisms of the Circular

    The framework applies to all SBs and CMs in all segments of the securities market but also holds some noteworthy exceptions include Bank-CMs, encompassing clearing members that are banks providing clearing and settlement services, and the proprietary funds of SBs and CMs, specifically reserved for their individual trading pursuits. Augmenting the effectiveness of this framework are various monitoring mechanisms outlined within the circular. To ensure meticulous implementation, stock exchanges and CCs are tasked with creating systems capturing daily details of clients’ funds received and upstreamed by SBs and CMs, with reconciliation against reports from depositories and banks. Periodic inspections and audits of SBs and CMs, conducted by stock exchanges and CCs, serve as a means to verify compliance, with a commitment to take appropriate action against any defaulters. Additionally, these regulatory bodies are obligated to submit quarterly reports to SEBI, offering insights into the circular’s implementation status, any deviations encountered, and the corresponding corrective measures taken. Simultaneously, SBs and CMs are entrusted with maintaining meticulous records of clients’ funds, readily providing them to stock exchanges, CCs, and SEBI upon request. With an effective date set for July 01, 2023, this framework reflects SEBI’s proactive stance in fostering transparency, accountability, and adherence to regulatory norms within India’s dynamic securities market.

    The Impact and Implications of the Circular

    The framework also necessitates the compliance of SBs and Clearing Members (CMs) in upstreaming all clients’ funds to CCs on a daily basis, following prescribed forms and conditions. This requirement curtails the flexibility and discretion of SBs and CMs in managing clients’ funds, potentially impacting their liquidity and profitability. They are also burdened with the operational costs and risks associated with the upstreaming process, including charges for creating FDRs or pledging MFOS units, and the risk of default or delay in the redemption of these instruments. Furthermore, they must adhere to the reporting and audit requirements imposed by the circular, facing consequences for non-compliance.

    On the other hand, CCs stand to benefit from an increased inflow of funds from SBs and CMs in the form of cash, FDRs, or MFOS units, thereby expanding their collateral pool and enhancing their risk management capabilities. However, they are tasked with building mechanisms for collateral utilization and margin adjustment to facilitate the upstreaming process and reduce transaction costs for market participants. Additionally, they are responsible for monitoring the compliance of SBs and CMs with the circular and reporting the same to the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI).

    From the clients’ perspective, the framework offers several advantages. Their funds are safeguarded from misuse or misappropriation by SBs and CMs and are invested in risk-free or low-risk instruments. The pre-terminable nature of FDRs and MFOS units ensures that clients have access to their funds whenever required, with the possibility of same-day redemption. Moreover, the oversight of stock exchanges, CCs, and SEBI over the upstreaming process ensures greater transparency and accountability in the management of their funds. Thus, while the framework imposes certain constraints on SBs and CMs, it ultimately serves to protect the interests of clients and enhance the robustness of the financial system.

    Concluding thoughts 

    It can be concluded that the implementation of the circular’s guidelines will require concerted efforts from all stakeholders in the securities market. SBs and CMs must ensure strict adherence to the conditions for creating FDRs and pledging MFOS units. Stock exchanges and CCs, on the other hand, must bolster their compliance and monitoring mechanisms to ensure the effective implementation of these guidelines. Moreover, continuous dialogue and feedback mechanisms should be established to address any challenges that may arise during the implementation phase. This will not only ensure the smooth execution of the circular’s mandates but also contribute to the overarching goal of safeguarding investors’ securities and funds. The circular represents a significant step towards a more secure and efficient securities market. By ensuring the prudent use of customers’ money and reducing potential misuse, it paves the way for a more robust and investor-friendly securities market in India.

  • Mandatory Dematerialisation of Securities: Unveiling the new MCA Amendment

    Mandatory Dematerialisation of Securities: Unveiling the new MCA Amendment

    BY TARUN THAKUR, A SECOND-YEAR STUDENT AT NLUO, CUTTACK

    Introduction

    In an interesting move recently, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) vide notification on 27 October 2023 introduced the Companies (Prospectus and Allotment of Securities) Second Amendment Rules, 2023. Now, this amendment has inserted Rule 9B which stipulates that securities issued by private companies must be in a dematerialised form, and further mandates that both issue and facilitation of its existing securities should necessarily be in dematerialised form. This is a major leap as now securities can now only be in dematerialised form. After this amendment, with effect from 30 September 2024, a private company has to comply with the new rules.

    This amendment does not come as a huge surprise to the private companies as there were already discussions in the market from a long time that soon it will become mandatory that securities must be held in dematerialised form. Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) in its report titled – Report of the Group on Reduction of Demat Charges that was released in early 2004 highlighted the risks involved when dealing with physical shares and SEBI also stated that it is playing an important role in in nurturing the growth of dematerialisation of securities in the country. So, from the report it is very coherent that even SEBI was in favour of dematerialisation at that time and was also working to achieve it. Moreover, the CLC working committee report was released last year in March 2022 which also hinted towards the new amendment that has been done to the Companies (Prospectus and Allotment of Securities) Rules, 2014 (PAS rules), as it noted the advantages of dematerialisation and also proposed that the Companies Act, 2013 (CA) should be amended and issue, transfer and facilitation of securities should be done only in dematerialised form.

    Tracing the origins of dematerialization

    Now before moving forward with the intricacies and challenges that this amendment poses it is crucial to know about dematerialisation and its inception. The term “dematerialisation” simply means converting physical shares and securities into electronic form and it was first introduced in the Depository Act, 1996 (DA 1996), as section 9(1) of the Act states that all securities pertaining to a depository shall be dematerialised.

    This was the inception point when securities facilitation and storage started in dematerialised form.  It is also noteworthy that Section- 29 of the CA broadened the scope of dematerilization as it mandates that the issuance of securities should only be in dematerialized form, thus complimenting the DA.  

     Understanding the rationale behind mandatory dematerilisation

    The main contention revolves around the rationale behind making dematerilisation mandatory for the private companies  Earlier in 2018, MCA amended the PAS Rules (2018 Amendment) which inserted Rule 9A and made it mandatory for the public companies to issue and facilitate existing securities in dematerialised form. The same Rules have been applied to the private companies via the new amendment with minor differences.

    Dematerialization combats back-dated transactions and improves transparency of the system. Backdating is the practice of changing a document’s date to an earlier one but when the documents pertaining to shares will be in an electronic form than backdating cannot be done, hence transparency will get bolstered.  Furthermore, dematerialization assists in real-time monitoring of any non-compliance of rules that has been done by any company due to its electronic nature and strict regulatory oversight.

    Challenges Ahead: Examining the Transition to Dematerialisation

    The current amendment exempts only small and government companies from mandatory dematerilisation in contrast to its previous 2018 Amendment, which in addition to small and government companies, also exempted Nidhi companies and wholly owned subsidiaries from mandatory dematerilisation. The reason cited for this was that these type of companies have limited number of shareholders. This gives rise to a pertinent question – why is there a diversion from the previous 2018 amendment, and what is the rationale behind not exempting Nidhi companies and wholly owned subsidiaries in the current amendment?

    One justification for non-exemption might be to fill in the gaps that existed in the 2018 amendment. An additional and more convincing rationale could be that the government is rapidly approaching dematerialization and any exemption granted to any company will eventually run its course. As a result, soon there will be no company that will be exempted from dematerialization. To maintain a cohesive framework, MCA must address the concerns of the stakeholders.

    Further, while extension of the dematerialized realm to private companies seems like a bold move, the compliance timeline given to the private companies is only 18 months i.e. till 30 September 2024, after which issuance and transfer of securities can only happen in demat form.  In India, there are 24,61,937 private companies that are currently registered. . All of these companies will be filing applications in the NSDL and CSDL for the conversion of securities. Consequently, the main concern is whether both these systems have the requisite digital infrastructure and technology to not only facilitate this conversion of securities, but also facilitate them in a fast and smoother way as massive amount of applications may pose operational challenges to both of them.

    Another  obstacle is that a private subsidiary company cannot qualify as a small company.  In case of subsidiaries of private foreign companies, they will also need to adhere to the new rules that have been notified. This will be cumbersome for both, the government and private foreign companies, as they will need to open a demat account with SEBI which requires them to complete a comprehensive Know Your Customer (KYC) process and also obtain a permanent account number (PAN).  This will be taxing for the government as there will be an influx of foreign entities trying to obtain PAN. Moreover, the private foreign companies will also face a challenge as even after obtaining PAN after a comprehensive process, they will have to incur a recurring cost to maintain their demat account.

    Course of Action for Private companies

    In order to comply with the new regulations, private enterprises will need to take a few steps as a result of this amendment. Initially, in order to facilitate the dematerialisation of securities, a private company must get the International Securities Identification Number (ISIN) for each security. Subsequently, the company must notify its shareholders of this information. A private company’s securities should only be issued and transferred in dematerialised form once its share capital has been dematerialised. Additionally, the dematerialisation of the securities held by the company’s directors and promoters should be required. The amendment does not provide for any penal sanctions for non-compliance but on non-compliance a private company will not be able to facilitate transfer of securities and if a there is any grievance a security holder has then it will be resolved by the Investor Education and Protection Fund Authority (IEPFA).

    Concluding thoughts

    This amendment though has some issues but this is a major transformation from the conventional system where the transfer and issuance of securities was done in physical form. Dematerialization shall help in  bringing more efficiency and transparency into the system. Further, from the regulators point of view, this will help them in tackling and mitigating benami transactions and theft by incorporating this new technology driven digital system. It is still debatable whether there is adequate infrastructure to sustain this paradigm shift. The government has to ensure that intact systems are placed so as to regulate and facilitate changes that this new amendment will bring.

    Electronic form of securities also helps in tracking real time market movements and see if there is any suspicious activity which cannot be done in the case of physical securities. While a company has to bear printing expense in case of physical securities, a much lower cost is involved in managing electronic securities. Also, the stringent KYC norms posed by this amendment give an overriding benefit to the government as it will help them to maintain a comprehensive database which would further help in bringing more transparency in the system and make it more robust.

    In the end, it can be stated that this is a major progressive reform but there are some concerns that needs to be addressed by the MCA.

  • Regulating Through Litigating: Quandary of SEBI

    Regulating Through Litigating: Quandary of SEBI

    BY ANSH CHAURASIA, A THIRD-YEAR AT RMLNLU, LUCKNOW

    Introduction

    Recently, the securities market regulator Securities and Exchange Board of India (‘SEBI’), equipped with broad powers, had difficulty defending its quasi-judicial orders. For instance, the Supreme Court (‘SC’) rejected SEBI’s appeal against the order of the Securities Appellate Tribunal (‘SAT’) in the matter of Apollo Tyres. SEBI was reprimanded by the SC for imposing a penalty for violation of SEBI (Buy Back of Securities) Regulations, 1998, but only after the show cause notice was issued to the respondent after more than a decade in 2014 for a cause of action that arose way back in 2003. SEBI passed the order imposing the maximum penalty in 2016, which was set aside by the SAT on grounds that it was not justified in imposing the maximum penalty. Subsequently, the revised penalty was quashed by SAT, against which SEBI approached the apex court. The SC affirmed the decision of SAT on the grounds of inordinate delay, a point of law entirely overlooked by the SEBI during the whole proceedings, right from the commencement of the investigation in 2014 to its appeal before the court on 4 December 2023. Although the SEBI Act has no limitation period per se for the issuance of show cause notice or the completion of the adjudication proceedings, the court’s earlier decision settled the position that such exercise of power must be done within a reasonable time.

    The aforementioned failure of SEBI in appealing before SC is part of a larger trend. At the heart of this regulatory struggle lies the legally untenable orders of SEBI and consequential litigation before SAT and SC. The redundancy of SEBI’s regulatory role resulting from such orders being litigated and decided against affects its credibility and has far-reaching implications for the key market regulator.

    The detrimental litigation

    The legislative history and precedent of the SC lucidly point to the cases appropriate for the appeal. The unamended Section 15Z, the appellate remedy to the High Court, was provided on any question of law or fact. After the amendment in 2002, the appellate court was changed from the High Court to the Supreme Court, and the grounds for appeal were limited to only questions of law, making it the current position. The SC interpreted the phrase ‘question of law’ in the backdrop of Section 15Z to arise when there is either erroneous construction or interpretation of the legal provisions of the statute or the general principles of law. The court also held that the power under Section 15Z has to be exercised while keeping in mind the sectorial laws and policy evolved by the tribunal acting under Section 15T through its interpretation of the Acts, Rules and Regulations. Therefore, the scope of the appeal and criteria of the cases appropriate for appeal are settled propositions of law.

    In its attempt to enforce its order, SEBI has appealed multiple times to the apex court despite a clear scope. In WhatsApp leaks case, SEBI imposed a penalty upon noticees for forwarding messages containing information about financial results. However, the order lacked any finding with respect to the originator of the message. SEBI’s order completely overlooked the fact that noticees merely forwarded the messages with sensitive information, which resulted in SAT overturning the order and vindicating SAT’s finding by the SC.

    In Tata Steel case, SEBI appealed to SC after its order to impose a penalty was set aside by SAT. SC refused to interfere because the order of SAT clearly established that the show-cause notice did not impute any charge upon the noticees. Consequently, the penalty was set aside. SC also remarked whether SEBI appealed only because their ‘ego was hurt’.

    In NSE Dark fibre case, SEBI appealed to SC after a setback from SAT when the disgorgement order for Rs 625 crore with interest was quashed due to a lack of nexus between the disgorgement order and the wrongdoing as required under Section 11B. Another order of fine was set aside by SAT in this case due to inadequate reasons to impose a maximum fine under Section 15J. Consequently, SAT reduced the quantum of the penalty. The move of SEBI demanding a stay on SAT’s order delineates an approach centred on recourses to enforce its orders rather than introspecting on its quasi-judicial adjudication process. Frequent dismissals in appeals whose fate could have been easily determined pinpoints the obdurate nature of the regulator.

    The ramifications of SEBI donning a litigator’s mantle

    The inefficiency of the adjudicatory process becomes apparent when shortcomings in SEBI’s order are pointed out by SAT and vindicated by SC. This directly dents the investor confidence that SC regards to be directly dependent upon the effectiveness of the regulatory mechanism. In SEC v Zandford, investor confidence was held to be the key objective behind the introduction of the Securities Exchange Act. Investors should not perceive the market as a system stacked against them. The Sisyphean undertones in SEBI’s approach to taking the case to the apex court, which has now been frequently falling to the ground, negate the fundamental credibility that the legislature intended to imbibe in the eyes of the investors.

    The SC interpreted the statutory right of appeal incorporated under Section 15T as scrutiny of SEBI’s broad power and emphasised the crucial role of the tribunal in the structural and consistent evolution of sectorial laws. Overlooking the shortcomings pinpointed by the order of SAT or requesting a ‘stay’ on its order before the apex court erodes the parliamentary intent and development of sectorial law.

    Against this backdrop, the problem of complying with basic technicalities is also a glaring issue. A lackadaisical approach in passing orders without providing adequate and sound reasons and bypassing the jurisprudence enunciated by SAT decisions is concerning.

    However, at the outset, SEBI incurs a financial burden every time it decides to go against an order of SAT, and the imposition of a similar burden on the opposite party is problematic. Justice Madan B. Lokur lamented this approach of government agencies litigating for the sake of litigating in a 2018 judgment. SEBI itself passed a proposal in 2019 mandating the appellants before SAT to deposit 10 per cent of the penalty so it could curb the appeals solely aimed at delaying the execution of its order. Therefore, SEBI does acknowledge the hardened mindset to resort to appeal, if not within itself yet among the parties aggrieved by its order, and it rightly points to the consequences of such an approach.

    The ripple impact of this approach is now perceptible as affecting institutional integrity. The SC reprimanded SEBI in the Suzlon case, asking the regulator to ‘regulate rather than litigate’. Although the SC granted the relief to SEBI, clarifying that the contested order would not be treated as precedent, it proceeded to remark. In Apollo Tyres case, SEBI was criticised for appealing against every order that went against them and directed to submit an affidavit of appeals they have filed.

    Conclusion

    The SEBI is a unique statutory body that has the role of regulating, investigating, adjudicating, and deterring the offender. We see an amalgamation of executive, legislative, and quasi-judicial functions within the SEBI. The broad powers conferred upon it have to be exercised to protect the interest of the investors and inspire confidence among the public. SEBI ought to weigh the above considerations before moving to the apex court. SEBI brought itself into this position where it has been reprimanded multiple times for ascertaining the cases only to meet the on-paper requirements. However, the situation requires adherence in spirit. This obstinacy on the part of SEBI is a Faustian bargain where it is giving up institutional credibility for no change in consequences and further losing an opportunity to look into regulatory mechanisms. Any decision to appeal must pass the muster of the requirements of appeal irrespective of the fact that SEBI has been aggrieved at the hands of the SAT.

    The striking similarity in all cases challenged before SC and quashed before SAT is SEBI’s failure to substantiate its allegations and insistence on enforcing its order. Changes in its regulatory and investigatory mechanism can lower the recurrence of these defects. Recently, the SC expert committee constituted to investigate the Adani-Hindenburg made significant suggestions for the prudent and effective exercise of the broad power at SEBI’s disposal. It suggested an ‘effective enforcement policy’ to lay down criteria by which SEBI must decide whether to initiate the proceeding either to impose a monetary penalty, to take a remedial action, or to take a punitive action. Such criteria should be clear and non-arbitrary. Laying down criteria would delineate an objective requirement of specific conditions to initiate proceedings, consequently leading to a proportionate exercise of regulatory powers.

  • Interplay Between SEBI Regulations and Liability of Financial Influencers (FinFluencers)

    Interplay Between SEBI Regulations and Liability of Financial Influencers (FinFluencers)

    By VARUN MATLANI and Vaibhav Gupta, THIRD-year students at GNLU, GANDHINAGAR

    Introduction

    The massive growth of social media influencers coupled with high internet penetration for a country with the world’s youngest population, particularly in the earning age bracket has given birth to the rise of a new segment of financial influencers or popularly known as ‘FinFluencers’. These FinFluencers claim to advise and teach people about making quick bucks through stock markets. This article examines the legal liability of their advice, to what extent they should be bound by relevant Securities and Exchanges Board of India (‘SEBI’) regulations and what accountability they have for their content to their followers who rely on them and are frequently their source of income from commercials, stock broker affiliate marketing, and the sale of their courses. Further, the article compares the newly evolving jurisprudence internationally especially in Netherlands and Germany by comparing their regulations and guidelines for FinFluencers with that of SEBI in India.

    Are FinFluencers bound by SEBI?

    The majority of FinFluencers operate outside of SEBI’s purview and prima facie do not adhere to its regulations, operating in a grey space or on a thin line of difference of definition as research analysts. SEBI, staying committed to its tagline “strength of every investor” has voluminous regulations binding those giving investment advices in order to protect the gullible and first-time investors from falling into dubious schemes. The author contends that these FinFluencers would fall within the ambit of definition of ‘Research Analyst’ under Regulation 2(u) of SEBI (Research Analysts) Regulation, 2014 making them accountable for their content as per the relevant regulations.

    The definition holds a person to be considered as Research Analyst if they prepare or publish content of research report or provide research report or offer an opinion with regards to a public offer or give price targets also.     These regulations also require them to be technically qualified and pass National Institute of Securities Market (‘NISM’) exams, providing a safety net for investors and fulfilling the fundamental purpose of  SEBI.

    Interestingly, the word ‘Research Report’ under Regulation 2(w) includes any kind of electronic communications and generally exempts opinion on overall market trends or generalised opinions. Therefore, the videos and posts of these FinFluencers does not escape the definition of report.

    In light of these regulations, one may scrutinize the “top FinFluencers” (in terms of their follower base on social media platforms), and can broadly ascertain a pattern of content that is posted by them, i.e., giving analysis on IPOs, fundamental analysis of stocks, recommending stocks for long term or short term. A major problem that arises here is that till the time the end user watches the video, the information can be converted into misinformation due to time variation gaps (for instance, an Instagram reel being uploaded today and end user considering it relevant when it reaches him/her, but the substantial time has elapsed for the user to act correctly) and information asymmetry causing heavy losses to the viewers. SEBI Regulations provide for regulation(s) for publication of report public media whereby the said regulations are directly applicable in literal manner. Electronic communication which is perceived through various social media with a massive reach to the audience may also be categorised similar to appearance before public media whereby too, as per Regulation 21, there exists a requirement for disclosure and assurance of reasonableness and fairness in creation of such report.

    Liability if FinFluencers are made to register as Research Analyst

    Many of the “top FinFluencers” would not qualify under technical requirements (for example, possessing the 5-year experience, professional qualification, or postgraduate degree) for education under the regulation. Further, NISM exam mandate would ensure not anyone with access to the internet can start giving opinions on the internet.

    Once considered as Research Analyst, Regulations 16 and 18 shall restrict these FinFluencers from trading into scrips.

    The contents of the research report would need more precision in terms of rating and time horizon benchmarking (i.e., the validity of such advice) along with a disclaimer and persuasive liability on publishers to ensure reliable facts and information forming part of their research as per Regulation 20.

    Regulation 24 makes research analysts responsible for maintaining an arms-length distance from taking up promotional activities and ensuring that the members involved in publishing of such content are complying with Regulation 7 (with regards to technical qualifications).

    Regulation 25 would require keeping a record of all their research along with the rationale of providing so, thereby preventing any escape by any deletion of such reports and also subjecting these records for inspection.    

    International Comparative Analysis of Existing Regulatory Frameworks for Social Media Influencers Pertaining to Financial Information

    In this segment, the regulatory frameworks of Germany’s German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (also known as BaFin) and Netherland’s Authority for Financial Markets (Autoriteit Financiële Markten – AFM) – the SEBI’s counterparts of their respective countries, are analysed with respect to their regulations and evolving legal framework with administrative actions for FinFluencers.

    • Netherlands

    The Dutch authority, AFM, conducted exploratory study to understand the legal landscape of FinFluencers and has even adopted the term FinFluencers for referring to those giving financial advice on social media platforms. The study found that FinFluencers lack neutrality and transparency, promoting risky products, and thereby keeping their own interests first. AFM also flagged the risk of non-compliance of regulations in Dutch that require influencers/finfluencers/third-party advertisers for license (s)/registration with AFM which can be drawn parallel to SEBI’s regulations in India.

    There is a Dutch ban on third-party inducements, which further prohibits FinFluencers from charging referral fees or advertisement fees. It was also noted that merely posting a disclaimer does not allow an escape route from regulations if they provide such services de facto. In the recent case of Grinta Invest, AFM issued notices to the company as well as FinFluencers for not holding appropriate licenses and promoting highly risky instruments such as foreign exchange and CFDs.

    • Germany

    The German authority ‘BaFin’ too requires FinFluencers to comply with the ‘Unfair Competition Act’ in terms of advertising products within the ambit of competition law and secondly, to comply with Market Abuse Regulation along with specific requirements from Delegated Regulations on the Market Abuse Regulations which directs any person recommending investment or investment strategy and presents himself as financial experts to comply with transparency, disclosures, fairness and other relevant provisions of Market Abuse Regulations.     Non-compliance with these regulations can lead to fine and other punishment within the ambit of German Securities      Trading Act. Unfair practices with regards to these regulations can also make the financial companies directing FinFluencers liable.

    Evolving Jurisprudence in India

    SEBI has taken note of the the impact of social media influence on stock markets, price discovery, and losses of the gullible new investors falling for “tips” or recommendations. Lately Telegram groups, which were the biggest direct contributor to these factors have been cracked down upon. In Re: Stock Recommendations using Social Media Channel (Telegram) (SEBI) it was held that those running the channel were not registered as Research Analysts or Investment Advisors and had unfairly charged fees. The number of members and quantum of tips/recommendations did have an impact though for a short time since there was a spike in trading of a particular scrip which also involved Prevention of Unfair Trade Practices regulations. This has been a leading step against social media influence on Indian traders and stock markets. But, deliberation on indirect harm to the new/gullible investor community by FinFluencers needs to be done at the earliest.

    Conclusive Analysis with Indian Regulations

    In light of international regulatory framework, the authors opine that SEBI must draw inspiration from international bodies in terms of conducting research and identifying the impact of these FinFluencers on Indian markets and the stakeholders. The SEBI regulations already in place are an example of an effective and well thought rule of law, but its implementation intertwined with the rapidly growing social media needs to be closely examined. It must be also noted that SEBI, to a great extent, has been successful in introducing changes with regards to telegram tips and trades, but cognisance of these FinFluencers and their growing popularity must be taken.

    Interestingly, in the Telegram case, SEBI took note of how a huge subscriber base can lead to manipulation of stock prices and has been actively taking steps (like imposing a ban on Telegram channels, issuing show-cause notices to offenders, etc. to prevent practices promoting unhealthy and unfair trade practices.      In contrast, the US markets have lately faced a lot of such manipulations which went uncontrolled by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) in cases such as Reddit’s WallStreetBets’ pump and dump of particular scrips, which is an appreciative comparison of the effective management of SEBI to keep up with the objective of securing Indian investors.

    Further, though cryptocurrency hasn’t been a domain of SEBI, the dark reality of FinFluencers can be quantitatively examined. For example approximately Rs. 5 Lakhs almost all the famous Indian Finfluencers promoted Crypto-FD, a highly risky product of Vauld, which lately stopped all withdrawal activities, a close look into the functioning would have made it evident, that the product they promote has fundamental flaws, especially in uncertain crypto markets.

    More often than not their target audience is the first-time investor, who can lose faith in markets forever with one such instance, and these are usually those who themselves have a little safety net of earnings. This example must be boldly noted to examine the ill impact that FinFluencers have the power to bring about.