The Corporate & Commercial Law Society Blog, HNLU

Tag: SIAC

  • Bridging Global Standards: India’s Approach To Enforcing Emergency Arbitrator Orders

    Bridging Global Standards: India’s Approach To Enforcing Emergency Arbitrator Orders

    Ishita kashyap and Vinayak RajaK, Fourth and Fifth Year students, NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY DELHI, NEW Delhi

    INTRODUCTION

    Emergency arbitration (‘EA’) is an evolving concept in the world of arbitration. It seeks to provide a speedy mechanism for disposal of interim relief applications made by the parties in arbitration before the tribunal is formed. It has been recognised by many international institutional rules such as Singapore International Arbitration Centre (‘SIAC’) and International Commercial Arbitration. There was an ambiguity on the legal question of enforceability of the ‘award’ given by such a method of arbitration. The Supreme Court of India, in the judgment of Amazon v Future, resolved this ambiguity and held the enforceability of such emergency arbitral ‘award’ under Section 17(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (‘Arbitration Act’) valid in the cases of Indian-seated arbitration. This article provides the backdrop of the judgment and the recent Draft amendment of 2024 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996 (‘draft amendments’), and further analyses its legal implications on the arbitration landscape of India.

    JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS

    The legal standing of emergency orders in India was uncertain before the landmark judgment in the Amazon-Future case. The Delhi High Court, in Raffles Design v Educomp, determined that an emergency arbitrator’s order is unenforceable under Section 17 of the Act in foreign-seated arbitration, hence necessitating recourse under Section 9 of the Act for such arbitrations. Therefore, this case did not weaken emergency arbitration awards but rather focused only on foreign-seated arbitrations.

    Subsequently, the Delhi High Court in Ashwani Minda v. U-Shin denied the relief to the parties under Section 9, reasoning that the parties had excluded Part I of the Act, and the emergency arbitrator had already rejected the request, thereby the Doctrine of Election coming into play to bar the parties from switching forums. The Bombay High Court in Plus Holdings v. Xeitgeist granted interim relief to the parties under Section 9 despite an EA being appointed under SIAC rules because it explicitly allowed for court intervention.
    While neither case turned solely on Section 9(3), the two judgments showed the divergent judicial attitudes for court intervention when emergency arbitration has already been invoked. This judicial ambiguity around emergency arbitration enforcement in India was ultimately clarified in the Amazon-Future decision.

    AMAZON V. FUTURE RETAIL

    The Amazon–Future dispute originated when Amazon NV Investment Holdings LLC initiated arbitration proceedings against Future Retail Ltd. before the SIAC. In the course of these proceedings, Future moved to transfer its retail assets to a third party, which Amazon claimed was violative of pre-existing contractual arrangements. Amazon obtained interim relief from the emergency arbitrator, prohibiting Future from proceeding with this transaction. It sought to enforce this award in India under Section 17(2) of the 1996 Act.

    On 6th August 2021, the Supreme Court held that the Arbitration Act does not preclude parties from adopting procedural rules that allow an emergency arbitrator to grant interim relief. Since SIAC rules permit this mechanism, the EA award should be held valid and enforceable. The Court emphasised that party autonomy, which is the bedrock principle of arbitration, allows for such institutional rules, and as long as parties have agreed to them, the emergency arbitration must be respected.

    LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE RULING

    The court answered the legal question of whether an award given by emergency arbitration can be considered as an order under section 17(1) of the Arbitration Act to be enforceable. The court read sections 2(1)(a), (c) and (d) along with sections 2(6) and 2(8) and recognised the party’s authority to determine issues that arise between the parties in any way they prefer. This autonomy was extended under section 2(8) to the selection of institutional rules which would govern the process of arbitration. Similarly, section 19(2) allowed for agreement on procedure to be followed by an arbitral tribunal in future proceedings.

    This reading emphasized the importance of party autonomy in dealing with substantive as well as procedural arrangements of arbitration. Further, section 21 proves that the arbitral proceedings are commenced on a date on which the request for that dispute to be referred to arbitration is received by the respondent. While this provision is expressed as limited by the parties’ consent to any other date, it provides a deemed date for commencement of proceedings before the actual arbitral tribunal is formed.

    The court used the ratio in Bharat Aluminium Co vs Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services and M/S. Centrotrade Minerals and Metals  to reaffirm the significance of party autonomy being the brooding and guiding principle  in arbitration. In this light, when section 2(1)(d) is read, it is to be read in subjection to the phrase “unless context otherwise requires”. The context in cases is provided by institutional rules agreed upon by the parties, which in this case were given by SIAC, which does provide for emergency arbitration.

    THE DRAFT ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION (AMENDMENT) BILL, 2024

    This draft amendment fills the legal gap which was created by Amazon v. Future. While it judicially recognized orders of emergency arbitrators seated in India, there was no express statutory basis for the same. By bringing “emergency arbitrator” in the definitional clause and creating Section 9A, Parliament would recognize the appointment and functioning of emergency arbitrators in domestic arbitration, bringing the existing implied power under institutional rules now under the statute’s backing.

    The draft explicitly provides that orders of emergency arbitrators are enforceable as if they are tribunal orders under Section 17(2). This fades away the ambiguity about whether courts would treat EA orders as interim measures or final awards, which was an interpretive tension post-Amazon. Now, parties can rely on EA relief being directly enforceable without seeking parallel court injunctions.

    Section 9A(4) and the new Section 17(1)(da) ensure that once the full tribunal is constituted, it can confirm, modify, or vacate the EA’s order. This balances the urgent nature of EA relief with party rights to a full hearing. It mirrors Singapore and Hong Kong’s approach and ensures that provisional relief does not unjustly prejudice parties, once more facts emerge.

    However, a major limitation that persists is that the draft does not address foreign-seated emergency arbitration. There is no mechanism to enforce EA orders made abroad, since Part II, which governs foreign awards, does not extend to interim relief. Part II applies only to final awards under the New York Convention, and therefore, the cross-border parties would still need to apply for interim measures before Indian courts under Section 9 if they need urgent relief within India’s territory. This leaves India behind Singapore and Hong Kong, which allow some cross-border EA enforcement.

    IMPLICATIONS FOR ARBITRATION LAW IN INDIA

    This is a boon for foreign investors and multinational parties who prefer arbitration but need urgent interim relief early on. While high compliance rates with EA awards have been reported globally, having enforceability on record is critical for those situations where compliance fails. It also advances a pro-arbitration policy that the Law Commission and experts have long advocated. The Supreme Court in Amazon v Future used EA orders as a tool “in aid of decongesting the civil courts and affording expeditious interim relief to the parties”.

    The court’s approach may prompt parties to reconsider forum choices. Because only Indian-seated EAs benefit from this enforceability (by virtue of Part I applying), parties to international contracts may increasingly prefer India as the seat when quick interim relief is desired. However, the court’s reasoning is strictly limited to Indian-seated arbitrations. Notably, the Court held that an EA award with a foreign seat is not a “decree” or final award and therefore not enforceable in India under the New York Convention or Section 17(2). Thus, the Amazon v. Future case is raising the question of the enforcement of EA orders with a foreign seat in India—a sector that could potentially require legislative intervention if it is found to be problematic.

    CONCLUSION

    The Amazon v. Future Retail Supreme Court ruling is a crucial step towards harmonising India’s emergency arbitration regime with the values enshrined in United Nations Commission On International Trade Law Model Law (‘Model Law’), while at the same time uncovering subtle tensions. Model Law Articles 7, 9, and 17H converge with each other in consolidating party autonomy, coexistence of interim measures issued by courts and arbitration agreements, and enforcement of interim relief granted by arbitral tribunals. The Court’s judgment is consistent with this principle by treating orders issued under EA as binding interim measures enforceable under Section 17(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, thereby solidifying India’s pro-arbitration policy. A subtle divergence remains, as unlike the Model Law and SIAC Rules, which equate EA orders to awards, the Supreme Court treats them as provisional and enforceable, subject to modification by the arbitral tribunal.

    This interpretation works reasonably well with Model Law Article 17H, but it causes complications under the New York Convention, which generally authorizes cross-border enforcement of awards. In limiting enforceability to EAs seated in India, the ruling excludes foreign-seated EA orders from the Convention’s ambit, thus exposing a residual lacuna to be refined legislatively in the future.

  • Addressing the Silence: Security for Costs in India’s Arbitration Landscape (Part II)

    Addressing the Silence: Security for Costs in India’s Arbitration Landscape (Part II)

    BY Pranav Gupta and Aashi Sharma Year, RGNUL, Punjab

    Having discussed the concept of Security for Costs and International Precedents of Investment Arbitration, this part will delve into precedents of Commercial Arbitration and potential solution for the security for cost puzzle.

    B. Commercial Arbitration Procedure:

    The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, being a foundational framework, empowers the tribunal to order SfC under Article 17(2)(c), after being amended in 2006. The ambiguous drafting of the provision fell prey to a much-anticipated debate,[i] with critics arguing it fails to clearly address the issue of SfC. It led to a proposal[ii] for amending Article 17(2)(c) by adding words “or securing” after “assets” to signify security of some sort. Despite this, the Model Law continues to influence the rules of major arbitral institutions like the London Court for International Arbitration Rules (“LCIA Rules”) and the Singapore International Arbitration Centre Rules (“SIAC Rules”).

    Article 25.2 under the LCIA rules grants the arbitral tribunal power to order for SfC as mirrored by Article 38(3) of the English Arbitration Act, 1996 which is the governing law of arbitrations seated in England and Wales. In the cases of Fernhill Mining Ltd. and Re Unisoft Group (No. 2), the judges devised a three-pronged test for granting SfC: Firstly, there must be “reasons to believe” that the claimant will be unable to pay the defendant’s costs if unsuccessful in the claim. Secondly, there must be a balancing of the interest[iii] of the defendant and the claimant by protecting the defendant against impecunious claims while not preventing the claimant from proceeding with a meritorious claim. Thirdly, the conduct of the party[iv] seeking a SfC must not suggest an attempt to stifle a meritorious claim.

    Rule 48 of the SIAC Rules 2025 empowers the arbitral tribunal to order for SfC. Notably, both the LCIA and SIAC Rules distinguishes between SfC and ‘security for the amount in dispute’, with LCIA Article 25.1(i) and Article 25.2 addressing each separately, in the similar way as SIAC Rule 48 and 49 do.

    A Possible Solution to the Security for Costs Puzzle

    As the authors earlier observed that The Arbitration Act doesn’t possess any express provision for awarding SfC, leading courts to resort to section 9 of The Act, an approach later debunked by the Delhi High Court. However, this contentious issue gained prominence again with the landmark judgement of Tomorrow Sales Agency. The case remains landmark, being the first Indian case to expressly deal with the issue of SfC, with the earlier cases touching the issue only in civil or implied contexts. The case led to the conclusion that SfC couldn’t be ordered against a third-party funder, who is not impleaded as a party to the present arbitration, though the Single Judge Bench upholding the court’s power to grant such a relief under Section 9. However, the judgment leaves ambiguity regarding the particular sub-clause under which SfC may be granted, which the author tries to address by providing a two-prong solution.

    As an ad-hoc solution, the authors prescribe the usage of sub-clause (e) of section 9(1)(ii) of The Arbitration Act, which provides the power to grant any ‘other interim measure of protection as may appear to the court to be just and convenient’. The above usage would be consistent with firstly with the Tomorrow Sales Agency case as it implies the power to order such measure under section 9 of The Act and secondly with the modern interpretation of section 9, where courts emphasised its exercise ex debito justitiae to uphold the efficiency of arbitration.

    As a permanent solution, the authors suggest the addition of an express provision to The Arbitration Act. The same can be added by drawing inspiration from the LCIA Rules and the SIAC Rules’ separate provisions for ‘SfC’ and ‘securing the amount in dispute’, further building on the specifics of the concept laid down in Rule 53 of ICSID Rules, with particular emphasis on the above mentioned Indian precedents. An illustrative draft for the provision adopting the above considerations is provided below:

    • “Section XZ: Award of Security for Costs
    • Upon the request of a party, the Arbitral Tribunal may order any other party to provide Security for Costs to the other party.
    • In determining the Security for Costs award, the tribunal shall consider all the relevant circumstances, including:
    • that party’s ability or willingness to comply with an adverse decision on costs;
    • the effect that such an order may have on that party’s ability to pursue its claims or counterclaim;
    • the conduct of the parties;
    • any other consideration which the tribunal considers just and necessary.

    Provided that the tribunal while considering an application for Security for Costs must not prejudge the dispute on the merits.

    • The Tribunal shall consider all evidence adduced in relation to the circumstances in paragraph (2), including the existence of third-party funding.

    Provided that the mere existence of a third-party funding arrangement would not by itself lead to an order for Security for Costs.

    • The Tribunal may at any time modify or revoke its order on Security for Costs, on its own initiative or upon a party’s request.”

    Hence, in light of increasing reliance on mechanisms such as TPF, the absence of a dedicated provision for SfC remains a glaring procedural gap. While, the Indian courts have tried to bridge this void through the broad interpretations of section 9 of The Arbitration Act, a coherent solution requires both an ad interim interpretive approach, through the invocation of sub-clause (e) of Section 9(1)(ii) and a long-term legislative amendment explicitly incorporating SfC as a standalone provision. Such a provision must be drawn from international frameworks such as the ICSID, LCIA, and SIAC Rules, ensuring India’s credibility as an arbitration-friendly jurisdiction.

    [i] United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Report of the Working Group on Arbitration and Conciliation on the work of its forty-seventh session (Vienna, 10-14 September, 2007).

    [ii] ibid.

    [iii] Wendy Miles and Duncan Speller, ‘Security for costs in international arbitration- emerging consensus or continuing difference?’ (The European Arbitration Review, 2007) <https://www.wilmerhale.com/-/media/e50de48e389d4f61b47e13f326e9c954.pdf > accessed 17 June 2025.

    [iv] Sumeet Kachwaha, ‘Interim Relief – Comments on the UNCITRAL Amendments and the Indian Perspective’ (2013) 3 YB on Int’l Arb 155 <https://heinonline-org.rgnul.remotexs.in/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/ybinar3&i=163> accessed 5 June 2025.