The Corporate & Commercial Law Society Blog, HNLU

Author: HNLU CCLS

  • Inside the SEBI Intervention: Anatomy of Jane Street’s Derivatives Manipulation

    Inside the SEBI Intervention: Anatomy of Jane Street’s Derivatives Manipulation

    BY HIMANSHU YADAV, THIRD-YEAR STUDENT AT MNLU, CS.

    INTRODUCTION

    India is the world’s largest derivatives market, accounting for nearly 60% of the 7.3 billion equity derivatives traded globally in April, according to the Futures Industry Association. Amid growing concerns over market integrity and transparency, the Securities Exchange Board of India (‘SEBI’) took decisive action to protect the interests of investors. On July 3, 2025, the SEBI banned Jane Street from Indian markets for manipulating indices. The US-based global proprietary trading firm, Jane Street Group, operating in 45 countries with over 2,600 employees, is banned from trading until further notice. The order marks a significant regulatory action against market manipulation. Jane Street reportedly earned ₹36,502 crore through aggressive trading strategies, facing ₹4,843 crore in impounded unlawful gains.

    In April 2024, based on prima facie evidence, SEBI initiated an investigation against entities of Jane Street for alleged market abuse. The firm’s activities were found to have violated SEBI’s Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market Regulations, 2003 (‘PFUTP’). The further investigation by SEBI led to findings that on the weekly index options expiry dates, the firm was holding extremely large positions in cash equivalents in the Future and Options (‘F&O’) market. Based on prima facie evidence, the SEBI issued a caution letter to Jane Street and its related entities.

    The activity of Jane Street, mostly done on expiry dates, allowed the firm to influence the settlement outcomes. On expiry day, the closing price of an index (like Nifty or Bank Nifty) determines the final settlement value of all outstanding options and futures contracts. Even a small change in the index’s closing value can lead to huge profits or losses, especially when large positions are involved. Due to the large position held by Jane Street, it allowed the firm to easily conceive the motive.

    SEBI held Jane Street accountable for the two-phase strategy on January 17, 2024 intensive morning buying of Bank Nifty stocks/futures and simultaneous bearish options positioning, followed by aggressive afternoon sell-off to push the index lower at close. These trades directly influenced Bank Nifty’s settlement value, disproportionately benefiting Jane Street’s option positions at the expense of others.

    HOW JANE STREET’S JANUARY 17, 2024 TRADES MANIPULATED THE BANK NIFTY INDEX ON EXPIRY DAY

    The SEBI analysed the top 30 profitable trades of Jane Street, out of which 17 days were shortlisted for detailed analysis concerning derivative expiry day trades. The critical analysis of these days resulted in 15 days with the same deployed strategy for manipulation of indexes, which can also be termed as “Intraday Index Manipulation Strategy”.

    The manipulation strategy was deployed in such a manner that JS Group held a large position. In Patch-I, the net purchases of JS group were INR 4,370.03 crore in cash and future markets. As the purchases in the Index stocks in the morning were executed, it raised the prices of Bank Nifty constituents and the index. The purchases were so high, it made the index move upward. Now that the index moved upward, the put option would become cheaper and the call option would become expensive. This sudden surge gives a misleading signal of bullish interest in Bank Nifty. Based on this delusion of a bullish trend, the JS group purchased the put positions at a cheaper rate quietly. In Patch-II, the JS group sells all the futures positions that were purchased in Patch-I, as the volume bought and sold was so large that it resulted in pushing the index downward. Now, the premium of put prices rises, and there is a drop in the value of call options. This sole movement by JS group entities misled the retail investors, resulting in a loss booked by the retailers, as they were the single largest net buyer across Bank Nifty during this patch. This price upward movement reflects that the Jane Street group was creating an upward pressure during Patch-I.

    EXTENDED MARKING THE CLOSE STRATEGY ADOPTED BY JANE STREET

    On July 10, 2024, the entity was again held liable for “Extended Marking the Close” manipulation. The tactic used under this strategy is to aggressively give a sell or purchase order in the last trading session, upon which the final closing price of a security or index is reflected.  On the last day of trading (called expiry day), the final value of an index like Bank Nifty is very important because all option contracts are settled based on that final number, known as the closing price. Jane Street had placed bets that the market would fall (these are called short options positions, like buying puts or selling calls). If the market closed lower, they would make more money. So, in the last hour of trading on July 10, 2024, Jane Street sold a lot of stocks and index futures very quickly. This sudden selling pushed the Bank Nifty index down, even if only slightly. Even a small drop in the index at the end of the day can increase the value of their bets and bring in huge profits. This tactic is called “marking the close” It means influencing the final price at which the market closes to benefit your trades.

    THE LEGAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE STRATEGIES ADOPTED BY JS GROUP

    In trading, manipulating the market effectively creates and uses monopolistic power.  Order-Based Manipulation (‘OBM’) by high-frequency  traders have several negative effects, such as heightened price volatility in both frequency and size, unfair and monopolistic profit from manipulated investors’ losses and instability potential.

    The JS group and its entities are allegedly held liable for the Intra-day Index Manipulation strategy and Extended Marking the Close strategy. Regulations 3 and 4 of the SEBI PFUTP Regulations, 2003, prohibit any act that manipulates the price of securities or misleads investors. The JS Group was held liable under section 12A(a), (b) and(c) of the SEBI Act, 1992; regulations 3(a), (b), (c), (d), 4(1) and 4(2)(a) and (e) of the PFUTP Regulations, 2003.

    The SEBI, which acts as a market watchdog, is well within its jurisdiction to initiate criminal proceedings as well as impose penalties against entities of the JS group under Section 24 of the SEBI Act, 1992. Section 11 of the SEBI Act 1992 empowers SEBI “to protect the interests of investors in securities and to promote the development of, and to regulate, the securities market.” Section 11B – Directions by SEBI gives SEBI quasi-judicial powers to issue directions “in the interest of investors or the securities market,” even in the absence of specific wrongdoing. It allows the regulator to: Restrain trading activities, modify operational practices, and Direct intermediaries and related entities to cease and desist from certain actions.

    Further, the defence of arbitrage cannot be validly exercised by Jane Street. The activity incurred by Jane Street cannot be termed as a traditional arbitrage practice, as arbitrage means taking advantage of existing price gaps naturally. Jane Street was not only finding pricing gaps and making fair profits rather Jane Street was also manipulating the pricing of some index options and futures to change the market in a way that isn’t normal arbitrage.

    Jane Street artificial price moves through high-frequency, manipulative trading to mislead the market.

    WAY FORWARD

    The Jane Street ‘Soft Close’ Strategy and SEBI’s delayed discovery of such transactions highlight the extent to which a system can lag in evaluating manipulative actions by traders at machine speed. It was actually in 2023, the U.S. Millennium, a prominent global hedge fund, filed a lawsuit against Jane Street after poaching its employees. These employees disclosed a previously covert Indian market strategy centred around artificially influencing expiry-day closing prices to benefit Jane Street’s derivatives positions, a tactic akin to a “soft close.” Only upon the filing of such a suit, the SEBI launched a full-fledged investigation, and the regulator analyzed the 3-year expiry trades of the JS Group. The SEBI’s long-term sustained efforts over the years to safeguard the retail investors from losing their money, at this juncture, a much more advanced regulatory scrutiny is required. Jane Street, being a high-frequency trader, the tactics deployed by such an entity shock the market and have a grave impact on the retail investors. High-frequency Trading (‘HFT’),  has the potential to bring the most worrisome instability to the market. The Flash Crash 2010, which was triggered by automated selling orders worsened by HFT, is one of the most severe events that disrupted market stability. Going forward, SEBI must adopt a more agile and tech-driven oversight model, capable of detecting unusual volumes, timing-based trade clusters, and order book imbalances in real time. It should also consider making a special HFT Surveillance Unit that works with AI-powered systems. This isn’t to replace human judgment, but to help with pattern recognition and rapidly identify anything that doesn’t seem right.

    CONCLUSION

    The regulator recently released statistics showing that the number of retail investors in the derivatives market is close to 10 million. They lost 1.05 trillion rupees ($11.6 billion, £8.6 billion) in FY25, compared to 750 billion rupees in FY24. Last year, the average loss for a retail investor was 110,069 rupees ($1,283; £958). Due to such manipulative trading activities, it is the retail derivative traders who face a tight corner situation and end up losing their money.  SEBI, in its report published on July 7, 2025, highlights that 91% of retail investors lose their money in the Equity Derivative Segment (‘EDS’) The regulatory check and stricter analysis on the trading session are the need of the hour. But on the contrary, cracking down on the practice of such a global level player is what SEBI should be praised for. More dedicated and faster technology should be adopted by SEBI to carry out such an investigation in a swifter manner. 

  • In Dissent Lies the Truth: A Critical Look at the Court’s Power to Modify an Arbitral Award

    In Dissent Lies the Truth: A Critical Look at the Court’s Power to Modify an Arbitral Award

    BY ANMOL TYAGI, THIRD-YEAR STUDENT AT RGNUL, PATIALA.

    INTRODUCTION

    With a 4:1 majority decision in Gayatri Balasamy vs. M/S ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd. (2025), (‘Balasamy’) the Supreme Court fundamentally altered India’s arbitration landscape by recognizing courts’ power to modify arbitral awards under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (‘the Act’) to modify an arbitral award. This watershed judgment resolves a decade-long jurisprudential conflict sparked by the Court’s 2021 M. Hakeem ruling, which categorically denied modification powers. By permitting limited judicial corrections from computational errors to compensation adjustments, the majority attempts to balance arbitration’s finality with the practical need for efficient justice. However, Justice K.V. Viswanathan’s dissent warns that this “judicial innovation” risks reviving the very interventionist culture the 1996 Act sought to eradicate. This article, firstly, delves into the controversy and analyses the ratio in its pragmatic context; secondly, it analyses its implications and advocates for how what should have been a unanimous verdict is penned down as a dissenting opinion; and lastly, it tries to explore a way forward.

    THE MAJORITY ON THE POWER TO MODIFY

    The Apex Court, through judicial precedents, proffered minimal judicial intervention in arbitral awards, not extending to correction of errors of fact, reconsideration of costs, or engagement in the review of the arbitral awards.

    For modification of awards, the court held that a modification does not necessarily entail the examination of the merits of the case, thereby allowing limited power of modification within the confines of Section 34 without a merit-based evaluation under certain circumstances including; where severing invalid from the valid, correcting clerical, computational and typographical error, certain post award interest and under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, where it is required and necessary to end litigation.  Progressively, such a decision was held to prevent the hardship of re-filing an arbitration and a manifestation of the objects of the Act.

    To that end, the majority in Balasamy invoked the maxim omne majus continet in se minus (“the greater includes the lesser”) to justify modification as incidental to the power to set aside awards. This reasoning hinges on Section 34(2)(a)(iv), which permits partial annulment if an award exceeds the scope of submission. By framing severability as statutory intent, the Court positioned modification as a natural extension of existing powers rather than a novel judicial innovation.

    For severability of awards, the court held that the greater power to set aside an award under Section 34 also includes the lesser power to sever the invalid portion of an award from the valid portion under Section 34(2)(a)(iv) of the Act, whenever they are legally and practically separable. The court differentiated the power conferred under section 34(4) from the limited power to modify on the ground of flexibility. The court upheld the idea of remittal under Section 34(4) as a remedial mechanism enabling the arbitral tribunal to correct curable defects in the award upon court adjournment. On the other hand, modification involves the court directly changing the award, which is limited and requires certainty.

    ANALYSIS OF THE MAJORITY OPINION

    While the court may have tried to weave the principle of equity and justice without offending the judicial fabric of Section 34 and the legislative intent of the Act, certain shortcomings are still exposed. Justice K.V. Vishwanathan’s dissent helps explore these shortcomings.

    i) Theoretical tensions: Party Autonomy vs. Judicial Paternalism

    Justice K.V. Vishwanathan’s dissent concurs with the idea that the power to modify subsumes the power to set aside under section 34 of the Act is fallacious, since the power to set aside an arbitral award does not inherently include the power to modify it because the two functions serve distinct purposes within the arbitration framework. Similar was the rationale of the court in M. Hakeem. Setting aside an award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is a corrective measure that allows courts to annul an award if it violates fundamental legal principles, such as public policy or procedural fairness. In contrast, modification implies an active intervention where the court alters the substance of the award, which contradicts the principle of minimal judicial interference in arbitration, as in the Mcdermott International Case.

    The proposition of limited modification of an award in the interest of expeditious dispute resolution may seem attractive at first instance, especially for commercial arbitrations involving public law, where the courts may modify the award to enhance compensation for the land acquisition. However, it points to vital concerns regarding its applicability by the courts in general and arguably, the power of remand under section 34(4), though different from the modification powers, acts as a safety valve and serves a similar purpose as it arrays wide powers upon the arbitral tribunal to modify an arbitral award for an effective enforceability.

    Theoretically, arbitration is a voluntary act of dispute resolution through a third party, different from courts and its legal procedures.  While the judgment provides for modification powers to remove the ‘invalid’ from the ‘valid’ and enforce complete justice under Article 142 of the Constitution, it not only raises concerns as to its applicability and limitation in determining what constitutes ‘invalid’ or complete justice, but also strikes at the core of arbitration. It does so by contradicting the fundamental characteristic and statutory intent of arbitration, i.e., the finality of the award through minimal judicial intervention, as was held in Re: Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements Under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and the Indian Stamp Act, 1899.

    Justice K.V. Viswanathan’s dissent highlights a critical tension: the 1996 Act deliberately omitted modification powers present in its predecessor, the 1940 Arbitration Act. The legislature’s conscious choice to limit courts to setting aside or remitting awards reflects a policy decision to prioritize finality over granular corrections. Noting that the Parliament intentionally omitted the ‘powers to modify’ from the repealed Arbitration Act, 1940, the majority’s interpretation risks judicial overreach by reading into the Act what the Parliament excluded, a point underscored by the dissent’s warning that using Article 142 to modify awards subverts legislative authority.

    To that end, arbitration’s legitimacy stems from its contractual nature. By allowing courts to “improve” awards, Balasamy subtly shifts arbitration from a party-driven process to one subject to judicial paternalism. This contravenes the kompetenz-kompetenz principle, which reserves jurisdictional decisions for tribunals. Notably, the UNCITRAL Model Law emphasizes tribunal autonomy in rectifying awards (Article 33), a responsibility now partially appropriated by Indian courts

    ii. Impact on Arbitral decision making

    The threat of post-hoc judicial adjustments may incentivize arbitrators to over-explain conclusions or avoid innovative remedies. For instance, tribunals awarding compensation in land acquisition cases might default to conservative valuations to pre-empt judicial reduction. Conversely, the power to correct clerical errors (e.g., miscalculated interest rates) could save parties from unnecessary remands.

    iii. Enforcement Challenges

    While the Court envisions modification as a time-saving measure, practical realities suggest otherwise. District courts lacking commercial arbitration expertise may struggle to apply the “severability” test, leading to inconsistent rulings and appeals. The Madras High Court’s conflicting orders in Balasamy (first increasing compensation, then slashing it) illustrate how modification powers can prolong litigation.

    Arguably, with the possibility of modification, the judgment practically creates uncertainty and opens Pandora’s box, thereby exposing every arbitration being challenged under some pretext or other. The effect of the judgment might extend to various PSUs, companies, and individuals opting out of arbitration, fearing the non-finality of the award.

    The majority’s reliance on Article 142 to justify modifications creates a constitutional paradox.

    While the provision gives the Supreme Court the power to do “complete justice,” applying it to an arbitral mechanism of private dispute settlement blurs the line between public law exceptionalism and the enforcement of private contracts, which arguably would render Article 142 a “universal fix” for disenchanted arbitral awards.

    For land acquisition cases and corporate disputes both, this poses a paradox: courts acquire efficiency tools at the risk of sacrificing arbitration’s fundamental promise of expert-driven finality. As Justice Viswanathan warns, the distinction between “severance” and appellate review remains precariously thin. With ₹1.3 trillion in ongoing arbitrations at stake, Balasamy’s real test lies in whether lower courts use this power with the “great caution” prescribed inadvertently to revive India’s reputation for boundless arbitration litigation

    COMPARITIVE INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES

    Leading arbitration hubs strictly reserve judicial modification. Singapore’s International Arbitration Act only allows setting aside on grounds of procedure and not on a substantive basis. The UK Arbitration Act 1996 can correct only clerical errors or clarifications (Section 57), whereas Hong Kong’s 2024 rules authorize tribunals-not courts-to correct awards. India’s new “limited modification” system varies by allowing courts to modify compensation values and interest rates, which amounts to re-introducing appellate-style review.

    The UNCITRAL Model Law that influenced the Act limits courts to setting aside awards (Article 34). More than 30 Model Law jurisdictions, such as Germany and Canada, allow modifications by way of tailormade legislative provisions. The Balasamy judgment establishes a hybrid model where there is judicial modification without an express statutory authority, raising concerns in enforcement under the New York Convention. As Gary Born observes, effective jurisdictions identify procedural predictability as a core value threatened by unfettered judicial discretion.

    THE WAY FORWARD: ENSURING EQUILIBRIUM

    The decision permitting limited alteration of the arbitral award represents a paradigm shift in the jurisprudence. The decision demonstrates a genuine effort to balance efficiency with fairness. However, its success depends on responsible judicial application. In the absence of strict adherence to the “limited circumstances” paradigm, India stands the risk of undermining arbitration’s essential strengths: speed, finality, and autonomy. As Justice Viswanathan warned, the distinction between correction and appellate review remains hair-thin. What is relevant here is how the courts apply the new interpretation to amend arbitral awards. Objectively, the courts have to be careful not to exercise the powers of amendment in exceptional situations to that extent, refraining from any impact on the finality of the arbitral award as well as the faith of the citizenry and other institutions within it.

    To avoid abuse, parliament has to enact modification grounds by amending Section 34, in line with Section 57 of the UK Arbitration Act, specifically allowing for corrections confined to reasons specified, promoting clarity and accountability. The Supreme Court would need to direct guidelines to the lower courts for arbitral award modification only when the errors are patent and indisputable, refrain from re-assessing evidence or re-iterating legal principles, and give preference to remission to tribunals under Section 34(4) where possible.

  • Digital Competition Bill: Complementing or Competing with the Competition Act?

    Digital Competition Bill: Complementing or Competing with the Competition Act?

    BY Winnie Bhat, SECOND- YEAR STUDENT AT NALSAR, HYDERABAD
    Introduction

    Data is the oil that fuels the engine of the digital world. The economic value and competitive significance of data accumulation for companies in the digital age cannot be overstated. It is in recognition of this synergy between competition and data privacy laws, that the Competition Commission of India (‘CCI’) has imposed a fine of Rs 213 crore on Meta, the parent company of WhatsApp, for abusing its dominant market position under Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 (‘CA’).

    As digital markets evolve, so too must the legal frameworks that regulate them. This article considers whether the proposed Digital Competition Bill, 2024 (‘DCB’) enhances the current competition regime or risks undermining it through regulatory overlap. In doing so, it assesses how traditional competition tools have been stretched to meet new challenges and whether a shift toward an ex-ante model is necessary and prudent.

    Reliance on Competition Act, 2002

    In the absence of a dedicated digital competition framework, Indian regulators have increasingly relied on the CA to address issues of market concentration, data-driven dominance, and unfair terms imposed by Big Tech firms. One of the clearest examples of this reliance is the CCI’s scrutiny of WhatsApp’s 2021 privacy policy. In the present case, CCI found that WhatsApp’s 2021 privacy policy which mandated sharing of users’ data with WhatsApp and thereafter its subsequent sharing with Facebook vitiated the ‘free’, ‘optional’ and ‘well-informed’ consent of users as WhatsApp’s dominant position in the market coupled with network and tipping effects effectively left users with no real or practical choice but to accept its unfair terms.

    This contrasts with the CCI’s previous stances in Vinod Kumar Gupta v WhatsApp and Harshita Chawla v WhatsApp & Facebook, where it declined to intervene because data privacy violation did not impact competition. However, in a slew of progressive developments, a market study by CCI has now recognized privacy as a non-price competition factor and the Supreme Court’s nod in 2022 for CCI to continue investigation in the Meta-WhatsApp mater has effectively granted CCI the jurisdiction to deal with issues relating to privacy that have an adverse effect on competition.

    The facts of this case very closely resemble that of Bundeskartellamt v Facebook Inc.,2019 wherein the German competition regulator had flagged Facebook for imposing one sided terms about tracking users’ activity in the social networking market where consent was reduced to a mere formality. Both cases illustrate how dominant digital platforms exploit their market power to impose unfair terms on users, effectively bypassing meaningful consent. This pattern reflects a deeper structural issue—where existing competition law, focused on ex-post remedies, is used to address the unique challenges of digital markets. It is precisely this regulatory gap that the proposed DCB seeks to fill through its ex-ante approach.

    Abuse of dominant positions by Big Tech companies in the digital era occurs in more subtle ways as the price of these services is paid for with users’ personal data. A unilateral modification in the data privacy policy leaves users vulnerable as they have little bargaining power against established corporate behemoths. These companies collect huge chunks of “Big data” by taking advantage of their dominance in one relevant market (in the present case, the instant messaging market) and use them in other relevant markets (social networking, personalized advertising, etc.) which gives them a significant edge against their competitors. This creates entry barriers and a disproportionate share of the market goes to a few large corporations resulting in monopoly-like conditions.

    To deal with such issues, competition law first identifies a corporation’s dominant position in the market. Once this is established, it investigates the factors that lead to the abuse of this position. Here, the factor is collection of data which invades the privacy of users without their free and informed consent. The CCI, in its ruling against Meta, held WhatsApp to be in violation of Sections 4(2)(a)(i), 4(2)(c) and 4(2)(e) of the CA, dealing with imposition of unfair conditions in purchase of service, engagement in practices resulting in denial of market access and use of dominant position in one market to secure its market position in another relevant market respectively.

    The Digital Competition Bill, 2024

    The proposed Digital Competition Bill, 2024  when enacted, would signify a landmark shift in how India approaches competition regulation in digital markets. Unlike the CA, which operates on an ex-post basis; acting upon violations after analysing their effects, the DCB introduces a proactive approach that seeks to regulate the conduct of Systemically Significant Digital Enterprises (‘SSDEs’) through an ex-ante framework. SSDEs are large digital enterprises that enjoy a position of entrenched market power and serve as critical intermediaries between businesses and users. The DCB aims to curb their ability to engage in self-preferencing, data misuse, and other exclusionary practices before harm occurs, rather than waiting for evidence of anti-competitive outcomes. While this progressive approach aims to address the unique challenges posed by the dominance of digital giants, it also raises critical concerns about legislative overlap, disproportionate penalties on corporations and potential legal uncertainty.

    A key issue with the coexistence of the DCB and the CA is the overlap in their regulatory scopes. The CA, particularly through Section 4, targets abuse of dominance through a detailed effects-based inquiry. As evidenced in the CCI’s ruling against WhatsApp, a compromise or breach of data privacy of the users will not be tolerated and has the potential to be considered as a means of abuse of an enterprise’s dominant position. By contrast, the DCB imposes predetermined obligations on SSDEs, which are deemed to have significant market power. Section 12 of the DCB prescribes certain limitations on the use of personal data of the users of SSDEs, whereas Section 16 grants the CCI the power to inquire into non-compliance if a prima facie case is made out, regardless of the effects such non-compliance may have on competition.

    Concerns about dual enforcement

    This duality creates an ambiguity. For instance, should a prima facie case involving data misuse by an SSDE, which unfairly elevates its market position, be assessed under the CA’s abuse of dominance provisions, or should it fall exclusively within the purview of the DCB? The risk of dual penalties further compounds these challenges. Section 28 (1) of the DCB empowers the CCI to impose significant fines (not exceeding 10% of its global turnover) on SSDEs for non-compliance with its obligations. However, under Section 48 of the CA, these entities are also subject to penalties for engaging in anti-competitive behaviour that may stem from the same act of data misuse.

    Although, the protection against double jeopardy only applies to criminal cases, the spirit of double jeopardy is clearly visible in this case, wherein businesses could face disproportionate punishments for overlapping offenses, raising concerns about fairness and proportionality. This mirrors similar concerns in the European Union, where the Digital Markets Act (‘DMA’) (India’s DCB is modelled on EU’s DMA) and Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (traditional EU competition law provisions) operate in tandem. However, EU’s DMA grants the European Commission overriding powers over the nations’ competition regulating authorities, which brings unique challenges and is not applicable in India since the regulating authority (CCI) oversees implementation of both the CA and DCB. This vests the CCI with considerable discretion in deciding which act takes precedence and their spheres of regulation. The MCA report leaves potential overlaps in proceedings to be resolved by the CCI on an ad hoc basis. Therefore, statutory clarity on the application of the DCB and the CA are essential to avoid inconsistency in outcomes.

    The Way Forward

    To address these challenges, India must focus on creating a harmonious regulatory framework. Moreover, a Digital Markets Coordination Council could be established to harmonize enforcement actions, share data, and resolve jurisdictional disputes. Such a body could include representatives from the CCI, the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY), and independent technical experts to ensure holistic oversight.

    Proportional penalties are another area for reform. Lawmakers should ensure that corporations do not have to bear the burden of being punished in two different ways for the same offence. Introducing a standardised penalty framework across the DCB and CA would prevent over-penalisation and ensure fairness.

    Since the DCB has not been enacted yet, India can pre-empt these concerns of overlap and ensure that the CA and DCB complement rather than compete with each other. The exact scope of a solution to these concerns is beyond the scope of this article, but by learning from the EU’s experiences and adopting a coordinated, balanced approach, India can create a regulatory framework that promotes innovation, safeguards competition, and protects consumers’ rights and interests in the digital age.

  • From Approval To Autonomy: SEBI’s New Framework For Stock Brokers In GIFT-IFSC

    From Approval To Autonomy: SEBI’s New Framework For Stock Brokers In GIFT-IFSC

    BY Vishvajeet Rastogi, SECOND-YEAR STUDENT AT CNLU, PATNA
    INTRODUCTION

    The Gujarat International Finance Tec-City – International Financial Services Centre (‘GIFT-IFSC’) is India’s ambitious bid to develop a globally competitive financial centre catering to international markets and investors. A major regulator of securities markets in India, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (‘SEBI’) has inducted significant regulatory reform to ease the operational environment for stock brokers who seek to operate in GIFT-IFSC.

    On May 2, 2025, SEBI released a circular titled “Measure for Ease of Doing Business – Facilitation to SEBI registered Stock Brokers to undertake securities market related activities in Gujarat International Finance Tech-city – International Financial Services Centre (GIFT-IFSC) under a Separate Business Unit” (‘SEBI Circular’) abolishing pre-approval for stock brokers for conducting securities market activities in GIFT-IFSC and enabling them to conduct such activities through a Separate Business Unit (‘SBU’) of their existing structure. This transition from a strict approval regime approach to an autonomous regime is likely to promote ease of doing business and support the internationalization of India’s financial services.

    This article assesses the salient provisions of the SEBI Circular, discusses its regulatory and legal implications, and reviews the opportunities and issues it throws for stock brokers’ foray into the GIFT-IFSC.

    KEY CHANGES

    The SEBI Circular brings in major reforms in order to ease the functioning of stock brokers in the GIFT-IFSC. It does away with the mandatory condition under which stock brokers have to take SEBI’s advance approval for starting securities market activities in GIFT-IFSC. The reform eases the entrance process and enables brokers to get started sooner with less procedural complexity.

    `In place of the previous approval mechanism, stockbrokers can now conduct activities through an SBU within their existing organizational structure. An SBU can be created in the form of an exclusive branch or division, providing more flexibility in organizing the business of brokers. Although the SEBI Circular encourages the utilization of SBUs, it also leaves the choice for stockbrokers to carry on through subsidiaries or through joint ventures if desired. Similarly, brokers who have already established subsidiaries or joint ventures in the GIFT-IFSC can choose to wind them down and bring their activities under an SBU if it aligns with their business strategy.

    The SEBI Circular also defines regulatory contours by bringing the operations of the SBU under the ambit of the International Financial Services Centres Authority (‘IFSCA’). That is to say that policy issues, risk management, grievance redressal, and enforcement in relation to the SBU will be regulated by IFSCA rules, not SEBI. SEBI’s jurisdiction will continue to extend only to Indian securities market activities. For the purposes of clear demarcation between the two activities, the SEBI Circular requires activities of the SBU to be segregated from the stockbrokers’ domestic activities at arm’s length. This requires maintaining separate accounts and operational autonomy to prevent regulatory overlap.

    Financial segregation has also come with the condition that the net worth of the SBU must be held separate from the stock broking entity dealing in the Indian market. The net worth of the stockbroker for Indian operations will be computed excluding the finances of the SBU, and the SBU itself will have to fulfil capital adequacy norms as per IFSCA’s regulatory guidelines.

    Finally, the SEBI Circular makes it clear that the investors dealing with the SBU will not be subject to SEBI’s grievance redressal platforms like the SEBI’s Complaints Redress System (‘SCORES’) or the Investor Protection Fund operated by the stock exchanges. Their protections and redressal of grievances will instead come under the framework of the regulation of IFSCA, strengthening the operational autonomy of the unit in the GIFT-IFSC.

    Together, these amendments constitute a policy shift towards regulatory clarity and increased operational autonomy with well-codified governance norms to allow stock brokers to successfully increase their presence in international financial services.

    Regulatory Rationale and Objective

      This SEBI Circular outlines the new strategy to promote operational efficiency and regulatory clarity for the stock brokers in the GIFT-IFSC. Removal of the requirement of prior approval from SEBI enhances the regulatory ease of doing business by reducing barriers to entry for brokers to conduct cross-border securities activities. This reform aligns with the larger vision of transforming the GIFT-IFSC into an internationally competitive financial centre at the global stage with international capital and global-level market players.

      The setting up of SBUs in existing stock-broking establishments brings about an objective definitional and regulatory distinction between transactions in domestic business and activities under the jurisdiction of GIFT-IFSC. Segregation does away with regulatory overlap, demarcates the areas of oversight between SEBI and the IFSCA, and protects against conflict of interest.

      Segregation requirements for finances as well as separate net worth requirements and accounting methods further specify that risk and obligation are properly segmented. These requirements increase transparency and the integrity of domestic and foreign market segments.

      In addition to this, the SEBI Circular specifically defines the extent of investor protection and vests grievance redressal and resolution of disputes in the jurisdiction of IFSCA and thereby strengthens jurisdictional certainty.

      Legal and Compliance Implication

      This SEBI Circular represents an important jurisdiction shift for stock brokers who are present in the GIFT-IFSC from SEBI to the IFSCA for business transacted through SBUs. This requires strict adherence to the dual regime of regulation where domestic business continues to be under SEBI’s jurisdiction while SBUs in the GIFT-IFSC operate in terms of IFSCA’s separate regulatory regime.

      The keystone of such a structure is the rigorous ring-fencing requirement with financial, operational, and legal separation between domestic and GIFT-IFSC activities of the stock broker. Financial ring-fencing implies separate accounts maintained by the SBU and separate net worth standards as governed by IFSCA to have clear delineation of assets and liabilities. Operationally, the SEBI Circular stipulates separation of SBUs through arm’s-length management to avoid inappropriately influencing control and mixing of resources. Legally too, separation enforces jurisdiction-related divisions, reduces regulatory arbitrage, and limits system risk.

      This regulatory framework replicates international best practices in influential global financial hubs like the Dubai International Financial Centre (‘DIFC’) and Singapore Monetary Authority-regulated centres. These jurisdictions all prioritize unambiguous jurisdictional demarcation, independence in operations of international financial institutions as well as strong investor protection systems, which support integrity in the marketplace and investor confidence.

      Emulating such principles, SEBI’s SEBI Circular establishes GIFT-IFSC as a compliant and competitive global hub, weighing deregulation against essential safeguards to preserve financial stability and regulatory oversight.

      Opportunities and Challenges for Stock Brokers

      These new guidelines offer stock brokers some strategic options. Most significant among them is greater operational independence, enabling brokers to carry out international securities activities in the GIFT-IFSC with the help of SBUs without obtaining SEBI approval in advance. This independence allows for quicker entry into the market, where brokers can leverage new opportunities in the international markets more easily. Also, carrying out business in the GIFT-IFSC exposes brokers to more international customers and varied financial products, largely opening them up to an extended marketplace and new revenue streams.

      But these advantages carry built-in difficulties. Dual regulatory compliances present a nuanced challenge in that stock brokers have to manage the regulatory conditions of SEBI for their Indian operations as well as IFSCA for their activities in the GIFT-IFSC. This duplicity requires evolved compliance structures and internal controls for maintaining conformity with separate law regimes. In addition, the investor dealing with SBUs will not be able to enjoy SEBI’s prescribed grievance redressals like SCORES, which can potentially create investor protection and redress concerns.

      Internally, stock brokers also need to have strict ring-fencing of resources and finances to have clean separation of both domestic and international operations. Proper management of the segregation is important in order not to have operational overlaps, to protect financial integrity, and to guard against commingling of assets and liabilities. While the SEBI Circular paves the way for internationalization and growth, it also necessitates enhancing the risk management capacities and the regulatory infrastructure of the stock brokers.

      Conclusion and Way Forward

      The SEBI Circular is a forward-looking step towards increasing the regulatory independence of stock brokers in GIFT-IFSC by doing away with previous approval systems and permitting activities in terms of SBUs. The reform not just makes it easier to enter the market but also strengthens India’s vision of promoting GIFT-IFSC as an international financial centre powered by well-defined regulatory lines between SEBI and IFSCA.

      While it introduces new opportunities, it also poses issues like managing the dual regulatory compliances and lack of SEBI’s grievance redressals for investors transacting with SBUs. The author suggests that the stock brokers need to pre-emptively enhance their systems of compliance and risk management in order to be able to manage such complexity. In addition, having closer collaboration between SEBI and IFSCA on regulatory harmonization, particularly investor protection, would increase the confidence of the markets. Proper communication to the investor about the grievance mechanism applicable under IFSCA is also needed to inculcate trust and transparency in the new ecosystem. Using these steps, stock brokers can reap the maximum advantage of this regulatory change and promote sustained development and international integration of India’s financial markets.

    1. A New Chapter in India’s Insolvency Law: What the 2025 Amendments Mean for Stakeholders

      A New Chapter in India’s Insolvency Law: What the 2025 Amendments Mean for Stakeholders

      BY Suprava Sahu, Fourth-Year student at gnlu, Gandhinagar
      INTRODUCTION

      The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘IBC’) marked a shift in India’s approach to the corporate resolution process. By changing a fragmented framework into a unified, creditor-centric process, IBC aimed to expedite the resolution of non-performing assets and enhance the ease of doing business. While studies have highlighted that IBC succeeded in improving recovery rates and reducing the timelines, structural issues began to surface as the code matured. Delays in the resolution, underutilization of viable assets, and limited investor participation called for reform.

      Recognizing this need, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (‘IBBI’) introduced the IBBI ((Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Fourth Amendment Regulations 2025 which aim to address the inefficiencies and enhance the effectiveness of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (‘CIRP’). Key features of this amendment include enabling part-wise resolution of corporate debtors, harmonizing payment timelines for dissenting creditors, and mandating the presentation of all resolution plans to the Committee of Creditors (‘CoC’).

      The piece unpacks whether the regulatory changes align with the IBC and its intended goals or are just a mere paper over the institutional cracks.

      DIAGNOSING THE IBC’S STRUCTURE

      IBC rests on three foundational pillars: maximizing the value of assets, ensuring a time-bound insolvency process, and balancing the interests of all stakeholders. These principles are affirmed as the foundational principle behind the IBC by cases like Essar Steel India Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta.

      Yet these principles exist in tension. For example, despite the 190–270-day timeline for the CIRP, the IBBI’s quarterly report shows that  more than 60% of the CIRPs have exceeded the timelines, which leads to diminished asset value, deters strategic investors, and disrupts the objective of value maximization.

      The framework also gives substantial control to financial creditors via the CoC, with operational creditors having a very limited say. This structure offers swift decision making it has attracted criticism for privileging institutional lenders at the cost of small creditors. The introduction of staged payments for dissenting creditors and asset-specific resolution under the new regulations can be seen as a regulatory response to this imbalance.

      The IBC initially favoured a rigid process to instill discipline in resolution, but a one-size-fits-all model may stifle innovation. Scholars have argued that insolvency systems need to adapt to varied market structures and varied market structures especially in emerging economies. A key question remains: can a rigid, rule-bound structure effectively adapt to the complexities of a diverse insolvency system? The amendments must be understood not as isolated tweaks but as strategic interventions to reconcile the tensions inbuilt in the IBC’s design.

      DISSECTING THE KEY AMENDMENTS

      The amendment introduces four main changes each targeting to address long-standing inefficiencies and gaps in the stakeholder engagement.

      • Part-wise Resolution of Corporate Debtors

      The amended regulations now allow the Resolution Professionals (‘RPs’)to invite resolution plans for specific business segments of the corporate debtor in addition to the entire company. This creates a dual-track mechanism that offers unprecedented flexibility to the CoC and RPs. It is grounded on the fact that many insolvency cases involve heterogeneous assets, some of which are viable, some of which are distressed. Under the earlier regime, focusing on a holistic resolution often led to delayed proceedings and discouraged potential resolution applicants who were only interested in certain businesses. A similar model has been employed in jurisdictions like UK, where the pre-pack administrative sales and partial business transfers allow administrators to sell parts of their enterprise to recover the maximum value. Studies have advocated for asset-wise flexibility as a strategy to reduce liquidation rates and protect value.

      However, this reform risks of cherry picking, where bidders might try to choose profitable units while leaving liabilities and nonperforming divisions. This can potentially undermine the equitable treatment of creditors and complicate the valuation standard and fair assessment. This concern was evident in cases like Jet Airways where bidders sought profitable slots while avoiding liabilities. Jurisdictions like the UK mitigate this through independent scrutiny in pre-pack sales, a safeguard which India could adapt.

      • Harmonized Payment Timelines for Dissenting Creditors

      In cases like Jaypee Kensington and Essar Steel, the Supreme Court upheld that dissenting creditors must receive at least the liquidation value but left ambiguity on payment. Previously, the treatment of dissenting creditors lacked clarity, especially around the payment timelines. The amendment resolves this ambiguity by laying down a clear rule. . By ensuring that dissenters are not disadvantaged for opposing the majority, it reinforces a sense of procedural justice and also encourages more critical scrutiny of resolution plans within the CoC. It seeks to balance the majority rule with individual creditor rights, thereby enhancing the quality of proceedings.

      But, this provision could also complicate cash flow planning for resolution applicants and disincentivize performance-based payouts. Early, mandatory payouts to dissenters could affect plan viability and reduce the flexibility needed for restructuring. There is also a risk that dissenters may use their position to strategically extract early payments, leading to non-cooperation or tactical dissent – an issue which the amendment has left unaddressed.

      The balancing act between fairness and functionality can be seen as a reform which not just enhances inclusivity but also introduces a new operational pressures.  

      • Enhanced role for interim finance providers

      Another noteworthy intervention is that the CoC may now direct RPs to invite interim finance providers to attend CoC meetings as observers. These entities will not have voting rights but their presence is expected to improve the informational symmetry within the decision-making process. Finance providers have more risk when they are lending to distressed entities. Allowing them to observe deliberation offers more visibility into how their funds are being used and enhances lender confidence. From a stakeholder theory perspective, this inclusion marks a shift away from creditor dominance towards a more pluralist approach. This was also argued by Harvard Professor Robert Clark, who stated that insolvency regimes must recognize the varied capital interests involved in business rescue.

      While the introduction of interim finance providers promotes transparency and may increase lender confidence, the observer status needs to be carefully managed. Without clear boundaries, non-voting participants could still exert indirect influence on CoC deliberations or access sensitive information. To mitigate such risks, the IBBI could consider issuing guidelines to standardize observer conduct. This highlights a broader concern – expanding stakeholder involvement without proper guardrails, which may create issues in the already complex process.

      • Mandatory Presentation of All Resolution Plans to the CoC

      Earlier, RPs would filter out non-compliant plans and only present eligible ones to the CoC. The new amendment mandates all resolution plans to be submitted to the CoC along with the details of non-compliance. This reform shifts from RP discretion to CoC empowerment. It repositions the RP as a facilitator and reduces the risk of biased exclusion of potential plans.

      The amendment enhances transparency and aligns with the principles of creditor autonomy, which states that the legitimacy of the insolvency process depends not only on outcomes but on stakeholder confidence in the process. It also carries a risk of “decision fatigue” if the CoC is flooded with irrelevant non-viable proposals. The RP’s expert assessment should still carry some weight and structured formats for presenting non-compliant plans may be needed to make this reform operationally sound.

      Taken together, the amendments do not merely fix operational gaps they reflect a broader evolution of India’s insolvency framework from rigidity to responsiveness.

      STAKEHOLDER IMPLICATIONS & CONCERNS

      The regulation significantly rebalances roles within the CIRP, with distinct implications for each stakeholder. For Financial Creditors, part-wise resolutions, allowing staged payments and overseeing finance participants through the CoC has deepened their influence. This aligns with the creditor-in-control model, which states that power demands fiduciary accountability. Dominant creditors could steer outcomes for selective benefit, risking intra-creditor conflicts previously flagged by IBBI.

      Dissenting creditors now gain recognition through statute in phased payouts, ensuring they receive pro rata payments before consenting creditors at each stage. However, operational creditors remain outside the decision-making process, raising concerns about continued marginalization. This concern was also highlighted by IBBI that insolvency regimes that overlook smaller creditors risk creating long-term trust deficits in the process. RPs must now present all resolution plans, including the non-compliant ones to the CoC. This not just curtails arbitrary filtering but also increases the administrative burden.. Beyond the RP’s procedural role, the reforms also alter the landscape for resolution applicants.  The amendment benefits RPs by offering flexibility to bid for specific parts of a debtor. This may attract specialized investors and increase participation. However, unless the procedural efficiencies are addressed alongside the increased discretion, both RPs and applicants may find themselves in navigating through a system which is transparent but increasingly complex.

      CONCLUSION AND WAY FORWARD

      The Fourth Amendment to the CIRP reflects a bold move that seeks to move from a procedural rigidity towards an adaptive resolution strategy. The reforms aim to align the IBC more closely with the global best practices which are mainly focused on value maximization and creditor democracy. Yet as numerous scholars have emphasized insolvency reform is as much about institutional capability and procedural discipline as it is about legal design. The real test would lie in implementation, how the CoCs exercise their enhanced discretion and how RPs manage rising procedural complexity. Equally important is ensuring that small creditors, operational stakeholders and dissenters are not left behind.

      Going forward, further reforms are needed which include standard guidelines for plan evaluation, better institutional support and capacity upgrades for the NCLTs. Without these, the system risks duplicating the old inefficiencies. Overall, the 2025 reform represents a necessary evolution, but whether it becomes a turning point or a missed opportunity will depend on how effectively the ecosystem responds.

    2. Addressing the Silence: Security for Costs in India’s Arbitration Landscape (Part II)

      Addressing the Silence: Security for Costs in India’s Arbitration Landscape (Part II)

      BY Pranav Gupta and Aashi Sharma Year, RGNUL, Punjab

      Having discussed the concept of Security for Costs and International Precedents of Investment Arbitration, this part will delve into precedents of Commercial Arbitration and potential solution for the security for cost puzzle.

      B. Commercial Arbitration Procedure:

      The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, being a foundational framework, empowers the tribunal to order SfC under Article 17(2)(c), after being amended in 2006. The ambiguous drafting of the provision fell prey to a much-anticipated debate,[i] with critics arguing it fails to clearly address the issue of SfC. It led to a proposal[ii] for amending Article 17(2)(c) by adding words “or securing” after “assets” to signify security of some sort. Despite this, the Model Law continues to influence the rules of major arbitral institutions like the London Court for International Arbitration Rules (“LCIA Rules”) and the Singapore International Arbitration Centre Rules (“SIAC Rules”).

      Article 25.2 under the LCIA rules grants the arbitral tribunal power to order for SfC as mirrored by Article 38(3) of the English Arbitration Act, 1996 which is the governing law of arbitrations seated in England and Wales. In the cases of Fernhill Mining Ltd. and Re Unisoft Group (No. 2), the judges devised a three-pronged test for granting SfC: Firstly, there must be “reasons to believe” that the claimant will be unable to pay the defendant’s costs if unsuccessful in the claim. Secondly, there must be a balancing of the interest[iii] of the defendant and the claimant by protecting the defendant against impecunious claims while not preventing the claimant from proceeding with a meritorious claim. Thirdly, the conduct of the party[iv] seeking a SfC must not suggest an attempt to stifle a meritorious claim.

      Rule 48 of the SIAC Rules 2025 empowers the arbitral tribunal to order for SfC. Notably, both the LCIA and SIAC Rules distinguishes between SfC and ‘security for the amount in dispute’, with LCIA Article 25.1(i) and Article 25.2 addressing each separately, in the similar way as SIAC Rule 48 and 49 do.

      A Possible Solution to the Security for Costs Puzzle

      As the authors earlier observed that The Arbitration Act doesn’t possess any express provision for awarding SfC, leading courts to resort to section 9 of The Act, an approach later debunked by the Delhi High Court. However, this contentious issue gained prominence again with the landmark judgement of Tomorrow Sales Agency. The case remains landmark, being the first Indian case to expressly deal with the issue of SfC, with the earlier cases touching the issue only in civil or implied contexts. The case led to the conclusion that SfC couldn’t be ordered against a third-party funder, who is not impleaded as a party to the present arbitration, though the Single Judge Bench upholding the court’s power to grant such a relief under Section 9. However, the judgment leaves ambiguity regarding the particular sub-clause under which SfC may be granted, which the author tries to address by providing a two-prong solution.

      As an ad-hoc solution, the authors prescribe the usage of sub-clause (e) of section 9(1)(ii) of The Arbitration Act, which provides the power to grant any ‘other interim measure of protection as may appear to the court to be just and convenient’. The above usage would be consistent with firstly with the Tomorrow Sales Agency case as it implies the power to order such measure under section 9 of The Act and secondly with the modern interpretation of section 9, where courts emphasised its exercise ex debito justitiae to uphold the efficiency of arbitration.

      As a permanent solution, the authors suggest the addition of an express provision to The Arbitration Act. The same can be added by drawing inspiration from the LCIA Rules and the SIAC Rules’ separate provisions for ‘SfC’ and ‘securing the amount in dispute’, further building on the specifics of the concept laid down in Rule 53 of ICSID Rules, with particular emphasis on the above mentioned Indian precedents. An illustrative draft for the provision adopting the above considerations is provided below:

      • “Section XZ: Award of Security for Costs
      • Upon the request of a party, the Arbitral Tribunal may order any other party to provide Security for Costs to the other party.
      • In determining the Security for Costs award, the tribunal shall consider all the relevant circumstances, including:
      • that party’s ability or willingness to comply with an adverse decision on costs;
      • the effect that such an order may have on that party’s ability to pursue its claims or counterclaim;
      • the conduct of the parties;
      • any other consideration which the tribunal considers just and necessary.

      Provided that the tribunal while considering an application for Security for Costs must not prejudge the dispute on the merits.

      • The Tribunal shall consider all evidence adduced in relation to the circumstances in paragraph (2), including the existence of third-party funding.

      Provided that the mere existence of a third-party funding arrangement would not by itself lead to an order for Security for Costs.

      • The Tribunal may at any time modify or revoke its order on Security for Costs, on its own initiative or upon a party’s request.”

      Hence, in light of increasing reliance on mechanisms such as TPF, the absence of a dedicated provision for SfC remains a glaring procedural gap. While, the Indian courts have tried to bridge this void through the broad interpretations of section 9 of The Arbitration Act, a coherent solution requires both an ad interim interpretive approach, through the invocation of sub-clause (e) of Section 9(1)(ii) and a long-term legislative amendment explicitly incorporating SfC as a standalone provision. Such a provision must be drawn from international frameworks such as the ICSID, LCIA, and SIAC Rules, ensuring India’s credibility as an arbitration-friendly jurisdiction.

      [i] United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Report of the Working Group on Arbitration and Conciliation on the work of its forty-seventh session (Vienna, 10-14 September, 2007).

      [ii] ibid.

      [iii] Wendy Miles and Duncan Speller, ‘Security for costs in international arbitration- emerging consensus or continuing difference?’ (The European Arbitration Review, 2007) <https://www.wilmerhale.com/-/media/e50de48e389d4f61b47e13f326e9c954.pdf > accessed 17 June 2025.

      [iv] Sumeet Kachwaha, ‘Interim Relief – Comments on the UNCITRAL Amendments and the Indian Perspective’ (2013) 3 YB on Int’l Arb 155 <https://heinonline-org.rgnul.remotexs.in/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/ybinar3&i=163> accessed 5 June 2025.  

    3. Addressing the Silence: Security for Costs in India’s Arbitration Landscape (Part I)

      Addressing the Silence: Security for Costs in India’s Arbitration Landscape (Part I)

      BY PRANAV GUPTA AND AASHI SHARMA, SECOND- YEAR STUDENT AT RGNUL, PUNJAB

      Introduction

      The recent cases of Lava International Ltd. and Tomorrow Sales Agency have reignited the confusions regarding the concept of Security for Costs (‘SfC’) in India.Gary B. Born[i] defines SfC as “an interim measure designed to protect a respondent against the risk of non-payment of a future costs award, particularly where there is reason to doubt the claimant’s ability or willingness to comply with such an award.”

      The authors in this manuscript shall wade through the confusions raised in the above cases. For that, firstly, we try to conceptually understand the concept of SfC by distinguishing it from the other situated similar concepts, while also emphasizing on the legal provisions governing them. Secondly, we analyze the concept of SfC in light of the leading international investment and commercial arbitration practices. Lastly, the authors propose a two-tier solution to the problem of SfC in India building on the international practices with certain domestic modifications.

      Security for Costs: Concept and Law
      1. Understanding Security for Costs:

      The concept of SfC is fundamentally different from that of ‘securing the amount in dispute’, as the latter is a measure to ensure the enforceability of the arbitral award by securing the party with whole or some part of the amount claimed or granted. section 9(1)(ii)(b) and section 17(1)(ii)(b) of The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (‘The Arbitration Act’) regulates the regime for ‘securing the amount in dispute’ as an interim measure. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Arcelor Mittal and Nimbus Communications clarified that section 9 permits securing the ‘amount in dispute’ on a case by case basis. Further, SfC is also distinct from ‘Recovery of Costs’, as ‘costs’ are recovered post the declaration of award and is addressed by section 31A of The Arbitration Act. 

      B. Security for Costs and Section 9: A Legal Void:

      While, The Arbitration Act deals with the similarly situated aspects of SfC as shown above, it remains silent on a provision for SfC, a gap that remains unaddressed even by the 2015 Amendment and The Draft Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Bill, 2024. A landmark ruling with respect to SfC was delivered in the J.S. Ocean Liner case, by ordering to deposit USD 47,952 as an amount for recovery of legal costs. The court relied on section 12(6) of the English Arbitration Act 1950, akin to section 9(1)(ii)(b) of The Arbitration Act, to award SfC as an interim measure in this case. However, this harmonious interpretation was later rejected in the cases of Intertoll Co. and Thar Camps, by observing that under sub-clause (b) of section 9(1)(ii), only ‘amount in dispute’ can be secured and not the SfC. Hence, The Arbitration Act needs a reform with respect to the provision concerning SfC.

      International Precedents concerning Security for Costs
      1. Investment Arbitration Insights:

      The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (‘ICSID’) Tribunal (‘The Tribunal’), being the world’s primary institution, administers the majority of all the international investment cases. Till the 2022 Amendment to The ICSID Arbitration Rules (‘ICSID Rules’), even ICSID Rules were silent on this concept of SfC, however now Rule 53 of the same Rules contains the express provision for awarding SfC by The Tribunal. As the newly introduced Rule 53 is in its nascent stage with no extensive judicial precedents[ii] on it yet, the authors analyze the cases prior to the 2022 Amendment to understand the mechanism for granting SfC.

      Prior to the 2022 Amendment, SfC was granted as a provisional measure[iii] under Article 47 of The ICSID Convention and Rule 39 of The ICSID Rules as observed in the cases of RSM v. Grenada[iv] and Riverside Coffee.[v] However, in the Ipek[vi] case, the Tribunal permitted the granting of SfC only in ‘exceptional circumstances’.[vii] The high threshold[viii] was reaffirmed in Eskosol v. Italy[ix], where even the bankruptcy didn’t sustain an order for SfC. Further, in EuroGas[x] case, financial difficulty and Third-Party Funding (’TPF’) arrangement were considered as common practices, unable to meet the threshold of ‘exceptional circumstances’.

      Finally, in the RSM v. Saint Lucia[xi] case, the high threshold[xii] was met as the Claimant was ordered to pay US$ 750,000 as SfC on account of its proven history of non-compliance along with the financial constraints, and TPF involvement. In the same case, The Tribunal established a three-prong test[xiii] for awarding SfC emphasizing on the principles of ‘Exceptional Circumstances, Necessity, and Urgency’,[xiv] with the same being followed in the further cases of Dirk Herzig[xv] and Garcia Armas.[xvi] Further, The Tribunal added a fourth criterion of ‘Proportionality’[xvii] to the above three-prong test in the landmark case of Kazmin v. Latvia.[xviii]

      The Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA”) is another prominent institution, with nearly half its cases involving Investment-State arbitrations. The PCA resorts to Article 26 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules to award SfC as seen in the Nord Stream 2 case.[xix] In Tennant Energy v. Canada[xx] and South American Silver,[xxi] the PCA applied the same test, devised in the Armas case to grant SfC.[xxii] Similar approaches have been adopted by the local tribunals, including Swiss Federal Tribunal and Lebanese Arbitration Center.[xxiii]

      [i] Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration (3rd edn, Kluwer Law International 2021); See also Maria Clara Ayres Hernandes, ‘Security for Costs in The ICSID System: The Schrödinger’s Cat of Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (Uppsala Universitet, 2019) <https://uu.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1321675/FULLTEXT01.pdf&gt; accessed 17 June 2025.

      [ii] International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, The First Year of Practice Under the ICSID 2022 Rules (30 June 2023).

      [iii] Lighthouse Corporation Pty Ltd and Lighthouse Corporation Ltd, IBC v. Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/2, Procedural Order No. 2 (Decision on Respondent’s Application for Provisional Measures) (13 February 2016) para 53.

      [iv] Rachel S. Grynberg, Stephen M. Grynberg, Miriam Z. Grynberg and RSM Production Corporation v. Grenada, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/6, Tribunal’s Decision on Respondent’s Application for Security for Costs (14 October 2010) para 5.16.

      [v] Riverside Coffee, LLC v. Republic of Nicaragua, ICSID Case No. ARB/21/16, Procedural Order No. 7 (Decision on the Respondent’s Application for Security for Costs) (20 December 2023) para 63.

      [vi] Ipek Investment Limited v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/18/18, Procedural Order No. 7 (Respondent’s Application for Security for Costs) (14 October 2019) para 8.

      [vii] BSG Resources Limited (in administration), BSG Resources (Guinea) Limited and BSG Resources (Guinea) SÀRL v. Republic of Guinea (I),ICSID Case No. ARB/14/22, Procedural Order No. 3 (Respondent’s Request for Provisional Measures) (25 November 2015) para 46.

      [viii] Lao Holdings N.V. v. Lao People’s Democratic Republic (I), ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/6, Award (6 August 2019) para 78.

      [ix] Eskosol S.p.A. in liquidazione v. Italian Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/50, Procedural Order No. 3 Decision on Respondent’s Request for Provisional Measures (12 April 2017) para 23.

      [x] EuroGas Inc. and Belmont Resources Inc. v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/14, Procedural Order No. 3 (Decision on the Parties’ Request for Provisional Measures) (23 June 2015) para 123.

      [xi] RSM Production Corporation v. Saint Lucia, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/10, Decision on Saint Lucia’s Request for Security for Costs (13 August 2014) para 75.

      [xii] Transglobal Green Energy, LLC and Transglobal Green Panama, S.A. v. Republic of Panama, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/28, Decision on the Respondent’s Request for Provisional Measures Relating to Security for Costs (21 January 2016) para 7.

      [xiii] Libananco Holdings Co. Limited v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/8, Decision on Applicant’s Request for Provisional Measures (7 May 2012) para 13.

      [xiv] BSG Resources Limited (n vii) para 21.

      [xv] Dirk Herzig as Insolvency Administrator over the Assets of Unionmatex Industrieanlagen GmbH v. Turkmenistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/18/35, Decision on the Respondent’s Request for Security for Costs and the Claimant’s Request for Security for Claim (27 January 2020) para 20.

      [xvi] Domingo García Armas, Manuel García Armas, Pedro García Armas and others v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, PCA Case No. 2016-08, Procedural Order No. 9 Decision on the Respondent’s Request for Provisional Measures (20 June 2018) para 27.

      [xvii] Transglobal Green Energy (n xii) para 29.

      [xviii] Eugene Kazmin v. Republic of Latvia, ICSID Case No. ARB/17/5, Procedural Order No. 6 (Decision on the Respondent’s Application for Security for Costs) (13 August 2020) para 24.

      [xix] Nord Stream 2 AG v. European Union, PCA Case No. 2020-07, Procedural Order No. 11 (14 July 2023) para 91.

      [xx] Tennant Energy, LLC v. Government of Canada, PCA Case No. 2018-54, Procedural Order No. 4 (Interim Measures) (27 February 2020) para 58.

      [xxi] South American Silver Limited v. The Plurinational State of Bolivia, PCA Case No. 2013-15, Procedural Order No. 10 (Security for Costs) (11 January 2016) para 59.

      [xxii] Domingo García Armas (n xvi).

      [xxiii] Claimant(s) v. Respondent(s) ICC Case No. 15218 of 2008.

    4. Reconsidering the Scope of Section 14 of IBC: Analysing the Inherent Extra-Territorial Scope of Moratorium 

      Reconsidering the Scope of Section 14 of IBC: Analysing the Inherent Extra-Territorial Scope of Moratorium 

      BY ADITYA DWIVEDI AND PULKIT YADAV, FOURTH-YEAR STUDENTS AT NUSRL, RACHI

      INTRODUCTION

      The moratorium provisions under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘The Code’), are important mechanisms to maintain the debtor’s assets and maximise value for all stakeholders. Yet, the territorial applicability of these provisions, especially in proceedings involving cross-border assets, is a matter of judicial interpretation and academic discussion. 

      This article analyses the extra-territorial applicability of moratorium under the Code with a special focus on comparing and contrasting the interpretation of moratoriums applicable to Corporate Insolvency Resolutions Process (‘CIRP’) and Insolvency Resolution Process (‘IRP’) under Sections 14 and 96 of the Code, respectively. 

      By analysing the recent judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Rajesh Sardarmal Jain v. Sri Sandeep Goyal, (‘Rajesh Sadarmal’) this article contends that whereas Section 96 moratorium might be restricted to Indian jurisdiction, Section 14 moratorium necessarily has extra-territorial application due to the interim resolution professional’s statutory obligation to manage foreign assets under Section 18(f)(i) of the Code.

      TERRITORIAL SCOPE OF MORATORIUM: DIVERGENT INTERPRETATIONS

      The Code provides for two types of insolvency proceedings: CIRP for corporate persons under Part II and IRP for individuals and partnership firms under Part III, with moratoriums under Sections 14 and 96, respectively, to facilitate these processes

      However, courts have interpreted the moratoria under Sections 14 and 96 differently. In P. Mohanraj v. Shah Bros. Ispat, the Supreme Court held that Section 14 has a broader scope but limited its analysis to domestic proceedings. In contrast, the Calcutta High Court in Rajesh Sadarmal highlighted the extra-territorial reach of Section 96. Hence, examining these interpretations is key to understanding the territorial scope of both provisions.

      INSOLVENCY RESOLUTION PROCESS VIS-A-VIS SCOPE OF SECTION 96: ANALYSING THE NARROW INTERPRETATION OF MORATORIUM UNDER PART III

      IIn Rajesh Sardarmal, the Calcutta High Court held that the Section 96 moratorium for personal guarantors does not extend to foreign jurisdictions, as the Code’s scope under Section 1 is limited to India and does not specify the enforcement of the Section 96 moratorium in foreign courts. Thus, the court held that actions in foreign jurisdictions cannot be suspended by Section 96. This interpretation implies that all provisions under the Code lack extra-territorial application.

      However, this view contradicts the Code’s inherent extra-territorial mechanism, as outlined in Sections 234 and 235 of the Code which respectively empower the central government to enter into reciprocal arrangements with other countries to enforce the provisions of the Code and allow the Adjudicating Authority (‘AA’) to issue a letter of request to the competent authority of a reciprocating country, requesting it to take necessary action regarding any ongoing homebound proceedings against the Corporate Debtor (‘CD’) under the Code. Further, this interpretation also negates the inherent extra-territorial scope of the moratorium under Section 14. 

      CORPORATE INSOLVENCY RESOLUTION PROCESS VIS-À-VIS SCOPE OF SECTION 14: A CASE WARRANTING BROADER INTERPREATAION OF MORATORIUM UNDER PART II

      The Supreme Court, in M/S HPCL Bio-Fuels Ltd v. M/S Shahaji Bhanudas Bhad, held that the Code, as an economic legislation, is intended for the revival of the CD rather than being used as a recovery mechanism. Further, in Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, the Apex Court held that moratorium under section 14 envisions the protection of the assets of the CD, to facilitate its smooth revival. 

      Therefore, applying Rajesh Sadarmal’s narrow interpretation to Section 14 would weaken the moratorium’s purpose and hinder the CIRP. In a globalised economy, corporate debtors often hold foreign assets, which must be brought under the control of the interim resolution professional and the resolution professional under Sections 18 and 25 of the Code, respectively. This will maximise the value of the CD and enhance the chances of higher recovery for creditors. Further, it would also prevent successful resolution applicants from acquiring foreign assets of the CD without making any payment, and enable the committee of creditors to exercise their commercial wisdom judiciously in selecting the most suitable resolution plan after assessing the true financial position of the CD. 

      EXTRA-TERRITORIAL SCOPE: LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

      In Dr. Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil v. The Chief Minister & Anr, the Supreme Court held that courts must act upon the intent of the legislature, and such intent can be gathered from the language used in the statute. Moreover, inRenaissance Hotel Holdings Inc. v.  B. Vijaya Sai & Others, the Apex Court ruled that the quintessential principle of interpretation is that every provision of a statute shall be interpreted considering the scheme of the given statute. Meaning thereby that the textual interpretation must align with the contextual one. 

      The Supreme Court went further ahead in the State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala, and held that a statute may have extra-territorial application if a sufficient territorial nexus exists. Hence, Section 1 of the Code does not bar such application. Interpreting Section 14 thus requires examining legislative intent and nexus, with Sections 18(f)(i), 234, and 235 providing key guidance.

      SECTION 18(f)(i): CONTROL OVER FOREIGN ASSETS

      After the commencement of insolvency and imposition of moratorium, the AA appoints an interim resolution professional under Section 16. As per Section 18(f)(i), the interim resolution professional must take control of all assets owned by the corporate debtor, including those located abroad. This establishes a clear territorial nexus, supporting extra-territorial application.

      In M/s Indo World Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. Mukesh Gupta, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (‘NCLAT’) held that under Section 18(f), read with Section 20, the interim resolution professional must secure and preserve the corporate debtor’s assets. This interpretation aligns with the moratorium’s objective under Section 14. Such an intra-textual reading reflects the legislative intent to extend the moratorium to foreign assets for effective CIRP and value maximisation. While Section 1 poses no bar, supported by the doctrine of territorial nexus, actual enforcement abroad still depends on securing international cooperation through agreements under the Code.

      INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT UNDER SECTION 234 AND 235: HIGHLIGHTING THE INHERENT EXTRA-TERRITORIAL SCOPE OF THE CODE

      Under Part V, the Code provides a legislative route under Sections 234 and 235 to facilitate the extraterritorial application of its provisions. This legislative structure recognises the necessity of international coordination and highlights the extraterritorial nature of the Code. 

      However, their efficacy is yet to be tested because, to date, no notification[i] has been issued by the central government in this regard. Therefore, unless the central government gives effect to these provisions through mutual agreement with other countries, no provision of the Code can be extended to foreign proceedings or assets situated in foreign lands. 

      However, in State Bank of India v. Videocon Industries Ltd., the National Company Law Tribunal (‘NCLT’) held that the  CD’s foreign assets will form part of the CIRP and be subject to Sections 18 and 14 of the Code. Yet, the NCLT has not provided any judicial framework for the consolidation of the CD’s foreign assets in the CIRP. 

      Therefore, even if the CD’s foreign assets are considered part of the CIRP, in the absence of a judicial or legislative framework (such as mutual agreements), those assets cannot be included in the CIRP.

      NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE CROSS-BORDER FRAMEWORK

      In DBS Bank Limited Singapore v. Ruchi Soya Industries Limited & Another, the Apex Court held that the primary aim of the Code is to balance the rights of various stakeholders by enabling the resolution of insolvency, encouraging investment, and optimising asset value. 

      Therefore, it is necessary to address the concerns of distressed Indian companies with a foreign presence and foreign companies having the centre of main interest (‘COMI’) in India. This will ensure that stakeholders or creditors are not left in the lurch due to skewed recovery resulting from the non-inclusion of the CD’s foreign assets in the CIRP. 

       However, to effectively address these concerns, there is a need to devise a cross-border framework that encompasses not only the CIRP but also the IRP. At present, India lacks such a framework, which constitutes a significant regulatory gap in its insolvency regime. In cases where personal guarantors possess assets located outside the country, this gap severely impairs the ability of creditors to recover dues effectively. The present framework is limited in scope and fails to provide mechanisms for the recognition and enforcement of foreign proceedings involving personal guarantors, thereby undermining the efficiency of cross-border recoveries.

      While the Report of the Insolvency Law Committee on Cross-Border Insolvency, 2018 (‘The Report’) laid down a robust foundation for dealing with CDS, it did not address personal insolvency, as Part III of the Code had not yet been notified at that time. The report emphasised the importance of providing foreign creditors access to Indian insolvency proceedings and of enabling Indian insolvency officials to seek recognition abroad. However, with the subsequent notification of provisions relating to personal guarantors, there is now an urgent need to expand the cross-border framework to encompass personal guarantor insolvency as well. The report also supports this view as it provides for the subsequent extension of cross-border provision on IRP, post notification of Part III. 

      Moreover, in Lalit Kumar Jain v. Union of India,  the Supreme Court held that due to the co-extensive nature of the liability of the surety with that of the principal debtor under Section 128 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, creditors can recover the remaining part of their debt from CIRP by initiating IRP against the personal guarantor to the CD.

      Therefore, failing to extend the cross-border insolvency regime to IRP would limit creditors’ access to the guarantor’s foreign assets, thereby impeding the full and effective realization of their claims.

      To address this regulatory shortfall, a pragmatic way forward would be to operationalise Section 234 through mutual agreements with key trading partners of India, by expanding the scope of the cross-border framework, as suggested in the report   to include IRP, and amending the Code accordingly. 

      Further, the Courts should also refrain from narrowly interpreting the scope of moratoriums and other provisions of the Code, and should take into account the doctrine of territorial nexus while analysing the scope of any provision of the Code. 

      A broader interpretation, especially in cases involving foreign assets or proceedings, would facilitate a more effective and holistic resolution process by recognising the global footprint of many CDs. This approach aligns with the objective of maximising the value of assets under Sections 20 and the preamble of the Code and ensures that proceedings under the Code are not rendered toothless in cross-border contexts. 

      Additionally, invoking the doctrine of territorial nexus can help establish a sufficient legal connection between India and foreign assets or persons, thereby allowing Indian insolvency courts to issue directions that can have extraterritorial reach, wherever justified. This interpretive approach will ultimately enhance creditor confidence and will reinforce India’s credibility as a jurisdiction with a robust insolvency regime.

      Moreover, in the absence of any judicial and legislative framework, the doctrine of Comity of Courts can be invoked by the creditors seeking the enforcement of insolvency proceedings on foreign lands. This common law doctrine postulates an ethical obligation on the courts of one competent jurisdiction to respect and to give effect to the judgments and orders of the courts of other jurisdictions.

      Creditors can also seek recognition of Indian insolvency proceedings abroad through the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, as seen in Re Compuage Infocom Ltd., where the Singapore High Court recognised the Indian CIRP but denied asset repatriation. This highlights the urgent need for a comprehensive cross-border insolvency framework aligned with the spirit of the Code and the report that is primarily based on the Model Law.

      CONCLUSION

      While the Calcutta High Court’s ruling in Rajesh Sardarmal limits the territorial reach of Section 96 moratorium, Section 14 moratorium has to be interpreted more expansively, considering its inextricable link with Section 18(f)(i). Further, while interpreting the Code, the courts must give due regard to the legislative intent and the judicial principle of territorial nexus.  The success of the Code’s insolvency resolution mechanism, especially in cross-border asset cases, relies on acknowledging and enabling the extra-territorial operation of moratorium provisions. Legislative amendments, international cooperation frameworks, and judicial interpretation of the Code’s provisions based on legislative intent are essential to realise this goal.

      [i] Uphealth Holdings, INC. v. Dr. Syed Shabat Azim & Ors. Co., 2024 SCC OnLine Cal 6311 ¶ 20

    5. Bridging Borders: SCRR Amendment 2024 and India’s Gateway to Global Capital

      Bridging Borders: SCRR Amendment 2024 and India’s Gateway to Global Capital

      BY MANAV PAMNANI AND SHOURYA SHARMA, THIRD-YEAR STUDENTS AT NALSAR HYDERABAD AND JINDAL GLOBAL LAW SCHOOL, SONIPAT

      INTRODUCTION

      The Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance (‘MoF’), has recently amended the Securities Contracts Regulation Rules, 1957 (‘SCRR’). This Amendment attempts to make it easier for Indian public companies to list their equity shares within International Financial Service Centres (‘IFSCs’) such as the Gujarat International Finance Tec-City (‘GIFT City’), under the framework of Direct Listing of Equity Shares Scheme and the Companies (Listing of Equity Shares in Permissible Jurisdictions) Rules, 2024. One of the significant changes under the Amendment is the reduction of minimum public shareholding thresholds from 25% to 10% for listing made in IFSCs, making international listings more accessible, especially for start-ups and technology-driven enterprises. This move mirrors the government’s broader commitment towards placing India among the world’s competitive investment-friendly destinations and financial hives. This article attempts to analyse the legal framework of this Amendment, alongside exploring its practical implications for the Indian financial landscape.

      REGULATORY FOUNDATIONS AND LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

      The SCRR was notified by the Central Government to help achieve the objectives of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 (‘SCRA’) effectively. The preamble clause of the SCRA states that the objective of the statute is to regulate undesirable transactions in securities by overseeing the dealing in securities and monitoring other ancillary business activities. The Amendment aligns the SCRR with this overarching objective. The legal foundation of this Amendment lies in section 30(h)(A) of the SCRA, which gives the Central Government the power to introduce rules stipulating the specific requirements that companies have to follow to get their securities listed on any stock exchange. The word “any” here has to be given a wide interpretation to align with the framers’ intention which was to bestow supervisory and regulatory authority upon the Government to foster the maintenance of a reliable and efficient securities business framework. Therefore, the regulation of listing of securities on IFSCs squarely falls within the competence and authority of the Government.

      Earlier in 2024, the MoF, through a notification amending the Foreign Exchange Management (Non-debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 (‘NDI Rules’), explicitly enabled the listing of securities of public Indian companies on international exchanges recognized in Schedule XI of NDI Rules. This, termed as the Direct Listing Scheme, governed several intricacies such as permissible investors, compliance with sectoral caps, regulations regarding prohibited sectors, and pricing guidelines. Simultaneously, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (‘MCA’) had also introduced the Companies (Listing of Equity Shares in Permissible Jurisdictions) Rules, 2024 by virtue of its power under section 23(3) r/w section 469 of the Companies Act, 2013 to regulate the entities that can list and jurisdictions where the listing can take place.

      However, both these enactments, along with the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2020 which prescribed certain similar requirements pertaining to listing in international exchanges, served as mere regulatory tools rather than efficient operational guidelines. They prescribed an overarching framework that has to be adhered to during such listing and discussed the eligibility criteria but failed to provide or clarify points regarding specific thresholds and other operational mechanisms specified under the SCRR.

      LEGAL ANALYSIS

      The recent Amendment fills the void identified above by introducing a few but impactful changes in the securities listing regime, thus reflecting its commitment to fostering a globally competitive and investor-friendly framework while aligning domestic practices with international standards. These international standards include the minimum public float thresholds in jurisdictions like Singapore, the International Organisation of Securities Commissions’ principles of efficiency, transparency and fairness in cross-border listings, the securities regime in the Dubai International Financial Centre, the Financial Action Task Force’s Anti-Money Laundering /Combating the Financing of Terrorism recommendations, and the pricing mechanisms and sectoral compliance thresholds present in the European Union Capital Markets Union and the United States Securities and Exchange Commission Regulations.

      The widespread benefits accruing to investors and other stakeholders through the effectuation of this Amendment not only covers the inflow of higher foreign capital and a more efficient and dynamic securities framework but also extends to direct tax advantages. section 10(4D) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 provides a significant tax exemption on income arising from transactions conducted on recognized stock exchanges within IFSCs, including GIFT-IFSC. This incentivizes participation, reduces transactional costs for investors, and creates a persuasive financial rationale for businesses contemplating listing on foreign exchanges. It is also in line with the numerous Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements (‘DTAAs’) entered into by India to prevent non-resident Indians from being taxed twice, in both, India and their country of residence, thus significantly alleviating their tax burden. Additionally, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (‘SEBI’) has considerable control over listing and transactions in the IFSC, as is evident from the scheme of the SEBI (International Financial Services Centres) Guidelines, 2015. This reiterates the commitment of SEBI to safeguard the interests of investors and other stakeholders, alongside maintaining an effective securities landscape.

      An important caveat to consider with respect to this Amendment is that the reduction of thresholds from 25% to 10% extends only to listings made in the IFSC. This implies that as per domestic subscription requirements, the extent of public shareholding is still fixed at the previous 25%. This distinction creates a dual regulatory framework, potentially leading to compliance complexities for companies seeking listings in both domestic and IFSC exchanges. This may limit the seamless integration of domestic and international listing strategies, requiring companies to carefully navigate the differing regulatory requirements to maximize benefits and avoid potential conflicts. Although the text of the Amendment alters Rule 19(2)(b) of SCRR, which covers domestic listings, the primary intention of the legislature was to effect changes in the IFSC listing framework. This ambiguity necessitates a clarification, which will most likely uphold uniformity by stating that the reduction also extends to listings made on domestic stock exchanges by companies wishing to obtain listing on permitted international exchanges. The importance of such uniformity and standardization is also evident from the two definitions (IFSC and International Financial Services Centre Authority (‘IFSCA’) that have been introduced which do not impose their own requirements but simply suggest an alignment with the definitions incorporated in existing legislations. The Amendment while defining these terms states that an IFSC means an IFSC as defined under section 3(1)(g) of the IFSCA Act, 2019 and an IFSCA means the Authority established under section 4(1) of the IFSCA Act. This significantly reduces complexity and fosters consistency and clarity in the navigation of relevant legalities pertaining to share listing and other compliance requirements.

      PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

      This Amendment marks a shift in India’s financial regulatory regime by redefining the entry of companies into global capital markets. In its amplitude, it is not an ordinary technical change but a strategic recalibration of structures of investment. The reduction of public shareholding thresholds from 25% to 10% for foreign listings creates an easier route for start-ups, emerging businesses, and small, mid and large capitalisation companies to access global capital, a phenomenon that is already experiencing an upward trajectory. For example, the gross foreign portfolio investment (‘FPI’) in India was massively estimated at around US$ 41.6 billion in the year 2023-24, which is bound to increase manifold due to this Amendment. The business insights from  companies like Reliance Industries Limited and HDFC Bank Limited, among others, reflect clear examples of corporations successfully accessing large amounts of global capital due to international financial listing. This consequentially places Indian business enterprises in a robust position as reduction in public shareholding compliance requirements is an attractive proposition for investors.

      Interestingly, the lowering of the barriers to international capital access also provides the same growth opportunities to a wider spectrum of sector-specific enterprises, including deep technology, renewable energy and biotechnology. These are crucial sectors requiring large investments. Furthermore, this change may even decentralise India’s economic hubs by allowing international capital to penetrate smaller companies located in tier-2 and tier-3 cities. As an offshoot, regions other than the economically prospering metro cities would witness increased industrialisation and employment generation since more local companies would gain access to foreign investments.

      A research conducted by the International Monetary Fund on emerging markets provides a broader context in which this Amendment fits into a global trend, towards more accessible and flexible capital markets. It represents the benefits of India’s strategic approach to positioning itself as an attractive destination for global investors. Indian firms may be better positioned to raise capital in foreign currencies with a more straightforward pathway to listing abroad while hedge-protecting firms reliant on imports for raw materials or technology from the capricious market exchange rate.

      Contrary to the apprehensions of capital outflow, this Amendment may benefit India’s domestic markets since an international listing enhances reputation of a company, provides international exposure, and encourages investor confidence. Companies will attract a larger pool of sophisticated retail and institutional investors, leading to increased credibility and brand value through such listings. This will enhance liquidity, valuation, expertise, innovation and overall market efficiency.

      However, the opportunity comes with nuanced challenges, particularly for companies that aim to be listed on both domestic and international exchanges. In a dual-listed company structure, the requirement for multi-jurisdictional shareholder and board approvals introduces complexities to decision-making and company operations. This substantially increases audit and compliance costs, necessitating detailed planning and high investments in financial and legal advisory services.

      CONCLUDING REMARKS

      This Amendment is more than a routine regulatory change because it aims to manifest India as a global financial hub by significantly relaxing listing requirements in the IFSC. It serves as a forward-looking measure with the objective of modernising the Indian securities law landscape and aligning it with international best practices by furthering a more inclusive access to global capital markets. With the introduction of this Amendment, the legislature has taken a significant step in the right direction and it will be interesting to observe the future course this Amendment adopts, particularly concerning its effective implementation.

    6. The European Commission’s Fine On Meta For Tying Allegations And Why India Needs To Do More

      The European Commission’s Fine On Meta For Tying Allegations And Why India Needs To Do More

      BY ANUSHKA GUHA, THIRD-YEAR STUDENT AT NLU, ODISHA

      INTRODUCTION

      The European Commission (‘EC’) fined Meta for tying Facebook Marketplace (‘FM’) to its social media platform, Facebook, in November 2024. FM is Meta’s online classified advertisement service which was introduced in 2016 and can be used to sell and buy products. Tying is a practice in which the availability of a product or a service is made conditional upon the availability of another. The EC found that Facebook had used its dominant position in the market for social networks and in the market for displaying classified ads to tie both services. What this essentially does is, expose all users of Facebook to FM, regardless of whether they want to see those ads or not. Such practices pose a competitive disadvantage for other online classified ads services, as they do not have access to the enormous database of social media users like Facebook does. Meta has also been accused of imposing unfair trade conditions through its terms of service that authorizes it to use ad-related data of competing classified ads service providers, who advertise on Facebook and Instagram, for the benefit of FM.

      GLOBAL SCRUTINY ON META

      This comes at a time when Meta is also under the scrutiny of the United States Federal Trade Commission for its acquisition of WhatsApp and Instagram resulting in the elimination of competition among social media platforms. The EC has previously fined Meta for providing misleading information during the WhatsApp-Facebook merger in 2014. In India, the Competition Commission of India (‘CCI’) has penalised Meta for abuse of its dominant position over WhatsApp’s contentious privacy policy introduced in 2021, which authorized the messaging platform to share user data with its parent company Meta and its subsidiaries. 

      This is not the first time Meta has been accused of tying its services. The launch of Threads in 2023 raised concerns about tying, as it requires one to have an account on Instagram. Meta, formerly known as Facebook, acquired Instagram, a photo-sharing app, in 2012. Although marketed as a competitor of microblogging platform X, the prerequisite of an Instagram account to operate the application makes it vulnerable to antitrust scrutiny, because the functioning of Threads and Instagram is fundamentally different. The Turkish Competition Authority, Rekabet Kurumu (‘RK’), has been investigating Meta’s anti-competitive practices since last year. In December 2023, the RK launched an investigation into the alleged tying of Threads and Instagram. 

      Subsequently, in January 2024, Meta was fined $160,000 per day for failure to adequately address competition concerns arising from its dominance in social networking, consumer communication, and online advertising. Most recently, the RK fined Meta $37.20 million over data-sharing practices between Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram, and Threads.

      TYING : THE INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

      Tying is prohibited under section 4(2)(e)  of the Competition Act, 2002, in the context of abuse of dominance. The CCI’s interpretation of tying has been a bit more restrictive than its European counterpart. This is especially demonstrated by the element of ‘coercion’ which is very narrowly considered by the CCI. We will try to understand this through two cases: Harshita Chawla v. WhatsApp and Facebook (‘Harshita Chawla’) and the Baglekar Akash Kumar v. Google LLC (‘Google Meet case’). 

      In Harshita Chawla, WhatsApp was accused of tying its Unified Payments Interface, WhatsApp Pay (‘WPay’) services with its messaging platform. The CCI dismissed the allegations on two grounds: first, that the element of ‘coercion’ in using the two products was absent; and second, that it did not cause foreclosure of competition in the market for payments services. It is prima facie amply clear that WhatsApp’s messaging platform and WPay operate in different relevant markets, which is a consideration that was taken into account by the CCI as well. However, its rationale for reaching the conclusion stands on shaky ground. The CCI has failed to consider here that WPay is not independent of the messaging platform, and users need to have a WhatsApp account in order to use it. While the implementation of WPay did not foreclose competition in the market of payment services by itself because it is a heterogeneous market, WhatsApp’s conduct is in clear violation of Section 4(2)(e) for two reasons: first, that users need to use the messaging platform in order to use WPay; and second, that WhatsApp leveraged its dominance in the smartphone-based OTT messaging service market to enter into the payments services market.

      A similar reasoning was used in the Google Meet case. In 2020, Google was accused of anti-competitive tying following the integration of its video-conferencing service Google Meet (‘Meet’) with its client mail service, Gmail. This meant that Meet came pre-installed with Gmail and the latter could not be used without the former. CCI dismissed the allegations on Google on two grounds. Firstly, users were free to use Meet without having a Gmail account. They just needed a Google account, not Gmail. Additionally, they were not under an obligation to necessarily use the video-conferencing service while using Gmail. Secondly, it did not restrict users from using other video conferencing apps with their Google account, thus reaching the conclusion that users are not being ‘coerced’ to use Meet and Gmail together. This approach again overlooks the fact that a dominant enterprise (here, Google) leveraged its position in one relevant market (here, client mail service) to enter into another relevant market (here, video-conferencing service). 

      A PROBLEMATIC APPROACH

      The CCI’s narrow interpretation and mandatory requirement of ‘coercion’ in order to constitute tying is arguably not a favorable one. As demonstrated by both the cases above, it clearly neglects the presence of leveraging. Even if we consider that WPay did not cause foreclosure of market competition in Harshita Chawla, it does not weaken the fact that if a user wishes to use WPay, they would necessarily have to pass through WhatsApp, thereby increasing the market power of the messaging platform and giving it a competitive edge over its counterparts in that relevant market. Additionally, the CCI completely ignores the aspect of consumer inertia or status quo bias with its disproportionate focus on coercion. The concept of status quo bias assumes that consumers refrain from making active choices to change the status quo regardless of economic irrationality. In comparison, it has been due importance by the EC on more than one instance, a notable one being the Google Search (Shopping) decision, where it was observed that of the total consumers, only 1% looked at the second page of Google search results. Similarly, a user with a Gmail account is more likely to tilt towards using Meet over other video-conferencing apps, simply out of convenience, or one may say, irrationality. 

      If we apply the Indian approach to the present case of Meta tying FM with Facebook, chances are that Meta will probably escape CCI’s scrutiny, specifically with respect to tying, because it does not ‘coerce’ Facebook users to necessarily use FM. Users can use the social media platform without using the classified ads services and are also free to use other classified ads services while using Facebook. This approach ignores the aspect that FM is a service that cannot be used in isolation without having a pre-existing Facebook account. Consumer inertia is a significant factor in this case, considering the enormous user base of Facebook. Additionally, as compared to any other online classified ads services, Meta obviously has access to a variety of personal data of millions of users across the world (‘Big Data’), which gives it a significant competitive advantage. Something that has been consistently also ignored is the annoyance caused to the users who do not want to use the additional services but are unable to disable them. These are factors that must be taken into account by CCI while adjudicating upon tying allegations in the digital market. 

      CONCLUSION AND THE WAY FORWARD

      In evolving digital markets, Big Data raises competitive concerns, when dominant undertakings use it to the detriment of other competitors, by indulging in tying and leveraging. Being a non-price parameter for competition, possession of Big Data by technological giants (‘Big Tech’) puts non-dominant enterprises at a disadvantage. This is where competition regulators are expected to step in. As Big Tech is under stringent scrutiny around the world, remarkably in jurisdictions other than the European Union, it calls for stronger compliance strategies. For more market-friendly effects of antitrust regimes, it is essential to go beyond the imposition of fines. A monetary penalty, no matter how hefty it is, does not act as an effective deterrent for Big Tech as compared to the money that they make every minute of the day. Antitrust watchdogs should go further than that, and ensure the termination of the services or modification of anti-competitive features of such services, in order to protect and promote competition in the market. Considering liberal jurisdictions like the United States are becoming more active in scrutinising the distortion of competition by Big Tech, it is essential for developing economies like India to catch up as well, and not shy away from imposing stringent measures in the interest of consumer welfare. As we anticipate India’s ex-ante framework, one can hope that CCI will take its lessons and adopt a more dynamic approach in the future.