The Corporate & Commercial Law Society Blog, HNLU

Author: HNLU CCLS

  • COMI Confusion: Can India Align With The Global Insolvency Order?

    COMI Confusion: Can India Align With The Global Insolvency Order?

    Prakhar Dubey, First- Year LL.M student, NALSAR University, Hyderabad

    INTRODUCTION

    In the contemporary global economy, where firms often operate across various countries, the growing complexity of international financial systems has made cross-border insolvency processes more complicated than ever. International trade and business have proliferated, with companies frequently possessing assets, conducting operations, or having debtors dispersed across multiple nations. In a highly interconnected environment, a company’s financial hardship in one jurisdiction may have transnational repercussions, impacting stakeholders worldwide. Consequently, addressing insolvency with equity, efficacy, and certainty is essential.

    A fundamental challenge in cross-border insolvency is establishing jurisdiction—namely, which court will manage the insolvency and which laws will regulate the resolution process. The issue is exacerbated when several nations implement disparate legal norms or frameworks for cross-border recognition and collaboration. Two fundamental concepts, forum shopping and Centre of Main Interests (‘COMI’), profoundly influence this discourse.

    Forum shopping occurs when debtors take advantage of jurisdictional differences to file in nations with more lenient rules or advantageous outcomes, such as debtor-friendly restructuring regulations or diminished creditor rights. Although this may be strategically advantageous for the debtor, it frequently generates legal ambiguity and compromises the interests of creditors in alternative jurisdictions. To mitigate such exploitation, the United Nation Commission on International Trade Law Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (‘UNCITRAL Model Law’) has formalised the COMI test, a principle designed to guarantee openness and predictability in cross-border procedures. It offers an impartial method to determine the most suitable forum based on the locus of a debtor’s business operations.

    Although recognising the need for cross-border bankruptcy reform, India has not yet officially adopted the Model Law. Instead, it relies on antiquated processes such as the Gibbs Principle, which asserts that a contract covered by the law of a specific country can only be terminated under that legislation, along with ad hoc judicial discretion. These constraints have led to ambiguity, uneven treatment of creditors, and prolonged cross-border remedies.

    This blog critically assesses India’s present strategy, highlights the gap in the legislative and institutional framework, and offers analytical insights into the ramifications of forum shopping and COMI. This analysis utilises the Jet Airways case to examine comparable worldwide best practices and concludes with specific measures aimed at improving India’s cross-border insolvency framework.

    INDIA’S STANCE ON ADOPTING THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW

    The existing cross-border insolvency structure in India, as delineated in Sections 234 and 235 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code ( ‘IBC’ ), 2016, is predominantly inactive. Despite the longstanding recommendations for alignment with international standards from the Eradi Committee (2000) and the N.L. Mitra Committee (2001), India has not yet enacted the UNCITRAL Model Law.

    More than 60 nations have implemented the UNCITRAL Model Law to enhance coordination and collaboration across courts internationally. India’s hesitance arises from apprehensions of sovereignty, reciprocity, and the administrative difficulty of consistently ascertaining the COMI. Adoption would include not only legislative reform but also institutional preparedness training for judges, fortifying the National Company Law Tribunal (‘NCLT’) and National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (‘NCLAT’), and establishing bilateral frameworks.

    KEY PROVISIONS OF THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW AND IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA

    The four fundamental principles of the UNCITRAL Model Law, Access, Recognition, Relief, and Cooperation, are designed to facilitate the efficient and fair resolution of cross-border bankruptcy matters. They facilitate direct interaction between foreign representatives and domestic courts, expedite the recognition of foreign procedures, protect debtor assets, and enhance cooperation among jurisdictions to prevent delays and asset dissipation.

    The effectiveness of these principles is evident in global bankruptcy processes, as demonstrated by the rising number of nations implementing the UNCITRAL Model Law and the more efficient settlement of complex international cases. Nonetheless, its implementation has not achieved universal acceptance, with certain countries, such as India, opting for different approaches, which may pose issues in cross-border insolvency processes.

    In the case of In re Stanford International Bank Ltd., the English Court of Appeal faced challenges in establishing the COMI due to inconsistencies between the company’s formal registration in Antigua and Barbuda and the true location of its business operations. This case underscores the imperative for a well-defined COMI standard that evaluates significant commercial operations rather than merely the jurisdiction of incorporation. The Court of Appeal finally determined that the Antiguans’ liquidation represented a foreign primary procedure, underscoring that the presumption of registered office for COMI may only be refuted by objective and verifiable elements to other parties, including creditors. This case highlights the complexity that emerges when a company’s official legal domicile diverges from its practical reality, resulting in difficulties in implementing cross-border insolvency principles.

    Moreover, India’s exclusion of a reciprocity clause hindered the global implementation of Indian rulings and vice versa. In the absence of a defined statutory mandate, ad hoc judicial collaboration often demonstrates inconsistency and unpredictability, hence compromising the global enforceability of Indian insolvency resolutions. This reflects the challenges encountered by other jurisdictions historically, as demonstrated in the European Court of Justice’s ruling in Re Eurofood IFSC Ltd. This pivotal judgment elucidated that the presumption of the registered office for the COMI can only be contested by circumstances that are both objective and verifiable by third parties, including the company’s creditors. These cases highlight the pressing necessity for a comprehensive and globally harmonised legal framework for insolvency in India, with explicitly delineated criteria to prevent extended and expensive jurisdictional conflicts.

    FORUM SHOPPING AND INSOLVENCY LAW: A DELICATE BALANCE

    Forum shopping may serve as a mechanism for procedural efficiency while simultaneously functioning as a strategy for exploitation. Although it may assist debtors in obtaining more favourable restructuring terms, it also poses a danger of compromising creditor rights and creating legal ambiguity.

    In India, reliance on the Gibbs Principle, which posits that a contract can only be discharged by the governing law, has hindered flexibility. This was seen in the Arvind Mills case, where the disparate treatment of international creditors was scrutinised, and in the Dabhol Power issue, where political and legal stagnation hindered effective settlement.

    While a certain level of jurisdictional discretion enables corporations to seek optimal restructuring, India must reconcile debtor flexibility with creditor safeguarding. An ethical framework grounded in transparency and good faith is crucial to avert forum shopping from serving as a mechanism for evasion.

    COMI IN INDIA: NEED FOR LEGAL CLARITY

    India’s judicial involvement in COMI was prominently highlighted in the Jet Airways insolvency case, which entailed concurrent processes in India and the Netherlands. The NCLT initially rejected the acknowledgement of the Dutch proceedings owing to the absence of an explicit provision in the IBC. The NCLAT characterised the Dutch process as a “foreign non-main” proceeding and confirmed India as the COMI. In a recent judgment dated November 12th, 2024, the Supreme Court ultimately ordered the liquidation of Jet Airways, establishing a precedent for the interpretation of COMI. This decision solidifies India’s position as the primary jurisdiction for insolvency proceedings involving Indian companies, even when concurrent foreign proceedings exist. It underscores the Indian judiciary’s assertive stance in determining the COMI and signals a stronger emphasis on domestic insolvency resolution, potentially influencing how future cross-border insolvency cases are handled in India.

    This case illustrates the judiciary’s readiness to adapt and the urgent requirement for legislative clarity. In the absence of a defined COMI framework, results are mostly contingent upon court discretion, leading to potential inconsistency and forum manipulation. Moreover, it demonstrates that India’s fragmented strategy for cross-border cooperation lacks the necessary robustness in an era of global corporate insolvencies.

    To address these difficulties, India must execute a set of coordinated and systemic reforms:

    Implement the “Nerve Centre” Test (U.S. Model)

    India should shift from a rigid procedure to a substantive assessment of the site of significant corporate decision-making. This showcases the genuine locus of control and decision-making, thereby more accurately representing the commercial landscape of contemporary organisations.

    Apply the “Present Tense” Test (Singapore Model)

    The COMI should be evaluated based on the circumstances at the time of insolvency filing, rather than historical or retrospective factors. This would deter opportunistic actions by debtors attempting to exploit more lenient jurisdictions.

    Presumption Based on Registered Office

    Utilising the registered office as a basis for ascertaining COMI provides predictability; nonetheless, it must be regarded as a rebuttable presumption. Judicial bodies ought to maintain the discretion to consider factors outside registration when evidence suggests an alternative operational reality.

    Institutional Strengthening

    India’s insolvency tribunals must be endowed with the necessary instruments and experience to manage cross-border issues. This encompasses specialist benches within NCLT/NCLAT, training initiatives for judges and resolution experts, and frameworks for judicial collaboration. The adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law must incorporate a reciprocity clause to enable mutual enforcement of judgments. India should pursue bilateral and multilateral insolvency cooperation agreements to augment worldwide credibility and enforcement.

    By rectifying these legal and procedural deficiencies, India may establish a resilient insolvency framework that is internationally aligned and capable of producing equitable results in a progressively interconnected financial landscape.

    CONCLUSION

    The existing cross-border bankruptcy structure in India is inadequate to tackle the intricacies of global corporate distress. As multinational businesses and assets expand, legal clarity and institutional capacity become imperative. The absence of formal acceptance of the UNCITRAL Model Law, dependence on antiquated principles such as the Gibbs Rule, and lack of a clearly defined COMI norm have resulted in fragmented and uneven conclusions, as shown by the Jet Airways case. To promote equity, transparency, and predictability, India must undertake systemic changes, including the introduction of comprehensive COMI assessments, a reciprocity provision, and institutional enhancement. Adhering to international best practices will bolster creditor trust and guarantee that India’s bankruptcy framework stays resilient in a globalised economic landscape.

  • Contractual ‘Non-Use’ Covenants: Plugging the Shadow-Trading Gap

    Contractual ‘Non-Use’ Covenants: Plugging the Shadow-Trading Gap

    Aditya Singh, THIRD- Year Student, Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab

    INTRODUCTION

    The successful prosecution in Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) v. Panuwat has introduced “shadow trading” as a novel enforcement concept for securities regulators. While India is yet to confront a concrete instance of shadow trading and its cognizance by Securities and Exchange Board of India (‘SEBI’), the U.S. experience highlights a potential lacuna in domestic regulations. Under SEBI’s current framework, insiders face civil liability only when trading in the stock of the very issuer, whose Unpublished Price-Sensitive Information (‘UPSI’) -they possess, and SEBI must prove both that the information “likely to materially affect” a particular security and that the insider used it with profit motive. The application of the shadow-trading principle domestically would therefore demand a framework which captures UPSI-driven trades beyond the issuer’s own stock, without becoming entangled in intricate economic-linkage or intent inquiries.

    This piece shows how India can strengthen its insider-trading regime by requiring all “designated persons” to pre-commit—via an expanded Code of Conduct—to refrain from using any UPSI for profit, and then empowering SEBI to invoke misappropriation principles against any breach. It begins by defining “shadow trading,” contrasts the classical and misappropriation theories, and then sets out the covenant-plus-notice proposal and its statutory foundation. The piece goes on to address proportionality and practical objections before concluding with implementation steps.


    THE SHADOW-TRADING PUZZLE

    Scholars have defined shadow trading as – when private information held by insiders can also be relevant for economically-linked firms and exploited to facilitate profitable trading in those firms. In SEC v. Panuwat, the U.S. District Court for Northern California confronted a novel fact pattern: Matthew Panuwat, a Senior Director at Medivation, received a confidential email revealing Pfizer’s imminent acquisition of Medivation. Rather than trading Medivation stock, he bought shares of Incyte—a competitor whose share price would rise on news of the Medivation deal.

    On the anvils of misappropriation theory, it was held that Panuwat’s breach of Medivation’s insider trading policy which expansively prohibited trading (while in possession of Medivation’s inside information) in not only Medivation’s securities, but arguably in any publicly traded securities in which Medivation’s inside information would give its insiders an investing edge. This fiduciary duty to Medivation—gave rise to insider-trading liability, even though he never traded Medivation securities. In rejecting Panuwat’s argument that liability requires trading in the issuer whose information is misused, the court emphasized that “misappropriation of confidential information for trading any economically linked security” falls within the scope of securities fraud under Rule 10b-5.

    The above discussion necessitates understanding 2 main principles behind insider trading. Under the classical model, insider-trading liability arises when an insider breaches a fiduciary duty by trading in the issuer’s own securities. By contrast, misappropriation theory treats any breach of duty to the source of confidential information as actionable; and India has consistently adhered to the classical approach.

    POSSIBLE IMPLEMENTATION IN INDIA THROUGH EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATION

    While the market-protection, investor-equity, and price-discovery rationales behind the prohibition of insider trading have been extensively examined by scholars, those same principles equally justify a similar regulatory approach to shadow trading, which is effectively an extension of insider trading itself.

    An interpretative reading of the SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015 (‘PIT Regulations’), can be used for the domestic application of shadow trading . Regulation 2(1)(n) defines UPSI as any information “directly or indirectly” relating to a company’s securities that is “likely to materially affect” their price. The qualifier “indirectly” can thus for instance bring within UPSI material non-public information about Company A that predictably moves Company B’s shares due to their economic linkage. Indian tribunals have already endorsed expansive readings (see FCRPL v SEBI).  Likewise, the definition of “Insider” under Regulation 2(1)(g) encapsulates anyone who “has access to” UPSI. Once that information is used to trade Company B’s securities, the trader effectively becomes an “insider” of Company B.

    However, relying solely on this interpretative route raises a host of practical and doctrinal difficulties. The next section examines the key obstacles that would complicate SEBI’s attempt to enforce shadow‐trading liability under the existing PIT framework.

    CHALLENGES TO IMPLEMENTATION

    Key implementation challenges are as follows:

    No clear test for “indirect” links: Using “indirectly” as a qualifier posits the problem that no benchmark exists to determine how tenuous an economic link between two entities may be. Is a 5 % revenue dependence enough? Does a 1% index weight qualify? Without clear criteria, every “indirect” claim becomes a bespoke debate over company correlations in the market.

    Heavy proof of price impact: To show UPSI would “likely materially affect” a non-source instrument, SEBI and insiders can each hire economists/experts to argue over whether UPSI about Company A truly “likely materially affects” Company B’s price. Disputes over timeframes, statistical tests, and which market indicators to use would turn every shadow-trading case into an endless technical showdown.

    Uncertain Profit-Motive Standards: Courts already grapple with an implicit profit-motive requirement that the PIT Regulations do not explicitly mandate—a problem Girjesh Shukla and Aditi Dehal discuss at length in their paper—adding an ambiguous intent element and uncertain evidentiary burden. In shadow‐trading cases, where insiders can spread trades across stocks, bonds or derivatives, this uncertainty multiplies and is compounded by the undefined “indirect” linkage test and the need for complex price impact proofs as outlined above.

    THE CONTRACTUAL “NON-USE” COVENANT AND IMPORT OF MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY

    The author argues here that, despite there being many ways through legislative action to solve the problem, the quickest and most effective solution to this problem would be through an import of Misappropriation theory.

    This can be done by leveraging SEBI’s existing requirement for written insider-trading codes. Regulation 9(1) of the PIT Regulations mandates that every listed company adopt a Code of Conduct for its “designated persons,” incorporating the minimum standards of Schedule B, with a designated Compliance Officer to administer it under Regulation 9(3).

    Building on this foundation, SEBI could introduce a requirement to each Code to include a “Non-Use of UPSI for Profit” covenant, under which every insider expressly agrees to (a) abstain from trading in any security or financial instrument while in possession of UPSI, except where a safe-harbour expressly applies, (b) accept that a formal “UPSI Notice” serves as conclusive proof of materiality, obviating the need for SEBI—or any adjudicator—to conduct fresh event studies or call expert testimony on price impact and (c) Safe-harbour provision: extent to which trades can be made, to be determined/formulated by SEBI from time to time. Section 30 of the SEBI Act, 1992 authorises the Board to make regulations to carry out the purposes of this Act, thereby making the addition procedurally valid as well. It is important to note here that this covenant works alongside SEBI’s trading-window rules under PIT Regulations: insiders must honour the temporary ban on trading whenever they hold UPSI.

    Time-bound blackouts are already standard: EU MAR Article 19 enforces a 30-day pre-results trading freeze, and India’s PIT Regulations enforces trade freeze during trading window closures. This covenant simply extends that familiar blackout to cover any UPSI capable of moving related securities to adapt to evolving loopholes in information asymmetry enforcement.

    Under this covenant structure, SEBI’s enforcement simplifies to three unambiguous steps:

    1. UPSI Certification: The company’s board or its designated UPSI Committee issues a written “UPSI Notice,” categorising the information under pre-defined, per se material events (financial results, M&A approvals, rating actions, major contracts, etc.).
    2. Duty Evidence: The insider’s signed covenant confirms a clear contractual duty not to trade on UPSI and to treat the Board’s certification as definitive.
    3. Trade Verification: Any trade in a covered instrument executed after the UPSI Notice automatically constitutes a breach of duty under misappropriation theory—SEBI needs only to show the notice, the covenant and the subsequent transaction.

    To avoid unduly rigid freezes, the covenant would operate as a rebuttable presumption: any trade executed after a UPSI Notice is prima facie violative unless the insider demonstrates (i) a bona-fide, UPSI-independent rationale or; (ii) eligibility under a defined safe-harbour.

    The import of the misappropriation theory will help execute this solution, that is to say, as soon as this covenant is breached it would be a breach of duty to the information’s source, triggering the insider trading regulation through the misappropriation principle.

    The misappropriation theory can be embedded in the PIT regulations through an amendment to the Regulation 4 by SEBI to read, in effect:

    4(1A). “No Insider shall misappropriate UPSI in breach of a contractual or fiduciary duty of confidentiality (including under any Company Code of Conduct) and trade on that information in any security or financial instrument.”

    The blanket restraint on trading engages Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution but survives the four-part proportionality test articulated in Modern Dental College & Research Centre v State of MP and applied to financial regulation in Internet & Mobile Association of India v RBI.

    WHY NOT A FACTOR-BASED TEST?

    An alternative approach,  advocates for a similar factor based test to determine “abuse of dominant position” by antitrust regulators to be adopted to the PIT regulations to determine cognizable economic linkage. Under this model, SEBI would assess a mix of metrics to decide when Company A’s UPSI is “economically linked” enough to Company B’s securities to trigger liability.

    However, the author argues that the covenant-based approach would be more effective. Unlike a factor-based linkage regime, which demands constant recalibration of revenue shares, index weights and supply-chain ties; fuels expert-driven litigation over chosen metrics and look-back windows; produces unpredictable, case-by-case outcomes; imposes heavy database and pre-clearance burdens; and leaves insiders free to game the latest matrices—the covenant-plus-misappropriation model skips the entire exercise as relies on one clear rule: no trading on UPSI. SEBI’s job becomes simply to confirm three things: the insider signed the promise, the information was certified as UPSI, and a trade took place afterward. This single-step check delivers legal certainty, slashes compliance burdens, and sharply boosts deterrence without ever reopening the question of how “indirectly” two companies are linked.

    CONCLUSION

    The covenant-plus-misappropriation framework streamlines enforcement, preserves SEBI’s materiality standard, and leverages existing Code-of-Conduct machinery—allowing rapid roll-out without new legislation. However, its success depends on corporate buy-in and consistent compliance-monitoring: companies must integrate covenant execution into their governance processes, and SEBI will still need robust surveillance to detect breaches. Therefore, SEBI should publish a consultation paper and pilot the covenant with select large-cap companies
    to identify practical challenges before a market-wide rollout.

  • Fixing What’s Final? The Gayatri Balasamy Dilemma

    Fixing What’s Final? The Gayatri Balasamy Dilemma

    BY Arnav Kaushik and Saloni Kaushik, THIRD and FIFTH- YEAR studentS AT Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University, Lucknow And MahArashtra NaTIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY, NagPUR

    INTRODUCTION

    On 30 April 2025, in Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd. (‘Gayatri Balasamy’), a Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court by a 4:1 majority, held that courts possess a limited power to modify arbitral awards. This power was interpreted as falling within courts’ express powers under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (‘1996 Act’). The judgment departs from Project Director, National Highway v. M. Hakeem (‘M. Hakeem’), where such powers were expressly denied. The Court identified three limited circumstances permitting modification: (1) severance of invalid portions of award, (2) alteration of post-award interest, and (3) correction of inadvertent errors or manifest errors. Justice Vishwanathan dissented, arguing that modification cannot be read into Section 34, except to rectify inadvertent errors. While the majority sought to resolve a legal impasse, it arguably introduced new interpretative ambiguities.

    PARTY AUTONOMY AND JUDICIAL NON-INTERVENTION

    To discern the implications of this ruling, one must consider the foundational principles of arbitration law—party autonomy and minimal judicial intervention. The 1996 Act, modelled on the UNCITRAL Model Law (‘Model Law’), enshrines these core principles. Party autonomy, the grundnorm of arbitration, allows parties procedural freedom, as contemplated in Article 19(1) of the Model Law and Section 19(2) of the 1996 Act.  Complementing party autonomy, the Model Law’s non-interventionist approach is adopted by the 1996 Act, emphasizing minimal judicial interference and finality of awards. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the 1996 Act clearly reveals the legislative intent to limit courts’ intervention, with sub-point (v) of Point 4 expressly aiming to minimize courts’ supervisory role. Section 5’s non obstante clause confines the scope of judicial intervention to matters governed by Part I of the 1996 Act, while Section 35 ensures finality of awards, highlighting the legislative intent of minimal judicial interference.

    NO POWER TO MODIFY ARBITRAL AWARD?

    There is no express provision in the 1996 Act, which recognizes the power to modify or vary arbitral award. The majority in Gayatri Balasamy invoked the maxim omne majus continet in se minus, arguing that the bigger power to set aside an arbitral award inherently subsumes the lesser power to modify. In contrast the minority, relying on Shamnsaheb M. Multtani v. State of Karnataka, argued that this maxim, rooted in criminal law, applies only when two offences are ‘cognate’— sharing common essential elements. Since modification and setting aside differ fundamentally in their legal consequence, the former results in alteration whereas the latter leads to annulment, therefore, the power to modify cannot be subsumed within power to set aside. Nonetheless, the application of this maxim violates the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation. According to this rule, where the language is unambiguous, it must be given plain and ordinary meaning. Notably, the majority held that Section 34 does not restrict the range of ‘reliefs’ the court can grant.  However, in our opinion, the plain text of Section 34 limits the recourse to ‘only’ setting aside an award. This deliberate restriction, supported by expressio unius est exclusio alterius, and upheld in M. Hakeem signifies the legislative intent to exclude other remedies such as modification.  Unlike foreign jurisdictions such as the U.K., U.S.A, and Singapore, and Section 15 of the erstwhile 1940 Act, the 1996 Act does not expressly provide for modification powers. Despite Vishwanathan Committee’s recommendation, the legislature has not evinced any intent to incorporate an express provision, as is evident from the Draft (Amendment) Bill 2024. Therefore, imputing a power of modification would amount to the courts engaging in a merit-based review of the arbitral award, a course of action unauthorized by law.

    MODIFICATION V. SEVERANCE

    As discussed in the preceding section of this blog, the powers to modify and to set aside an award are fundamentally distinct in their legal consequences. This raises the question: can the powers to partially set aside an award, that is to sever certain portions, be equated with the powers to modify? The minority view relies on the definition of “sever as to separate” to justify the power to set aside an arbitral award partly. Section 34(2)(a)(iv) contemplates severance, allowing partial setting aside of an award where the invalid portion is separable, in variability and quantum, to preserve the valid portion. Severance is possible where claims are structurally independent. As held in J.G Engineers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India , distinct claims—separate in subject-matter, facts, and obligations can be severed without altering award’s substance. A decision on a particular claim is an independent award in itself, capable of surviving despite invalidity of another claim, as endorsed in NHAI v. Trichy. While power to partial setting aside is recognised, this does not equate to a power to modify. Essentially, severance entails elimination of invalid portions without examining the merits, whereas modification entails a pro-active alteration which may or may not require a merit-based review. Furthermore, the majority view remained silent on a pertinent question: whether modification can fill the gap where severance fails due to structural dependence of claims, as with composite awards? With respect to invalid portions, Section 34 contemplates the initiation of fresh proceedings which re-affirms that severance is not an alternative to setting aside of an award but an ‘exception’ within it.

    BUILT-IN FIXES: SECTION 33 & 34(4) OF 1996 ACT

    Despite express provisions under Section 33, the Supreme Court held that courts may also rectify errors in arbitral awards by invoking inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (‘CPC’). However, it is our considered view that inherent powers cannot override express statutory provisions, even under the pretext of serving justice. This is because it is presumed that procedure specifically laid down by the legislature, including under Section 34 of 1996 Act, is guided by the notions of justice.

    Both the opinions invoked Section 152 of the CPC, which allows correction of accidental slips in judgments to avoid undue hardship. The minority held that this may apply only where (a) errors were not raised under Section 33; or (b) despite being raised, were not rectified by the arbitral tribunal. The majority, however, broadened this to include “manifest errors” by combining Section 152, the power to recall, and the doctrine of implied powers. Yet, term “manifest errors”lack clear scope: does it refer only to inadvertent errors under Section 33(1)(a), or also to curable procedural defects? We draw a distinction here: inadvertent errors are unintentional and apparent, while curable defects involve procedural irregularities affecting the award’s integrity, such as lack of reasoning, or inadequate award interest. Addressing such defects require discretion, and rightly falls squarely within tribunal’s authority under Section 33. Interestingly, the majority itself conceded that remand, unlike modification, enables tribunal to take corrective measures such as recording additional evidence. This position was further reinforced by the majority’s holding that where any doubt arises as to the propriety of a correction, the appropriate course is to remand the award to the tribunal under Section 34(4). This aligns with judicial pronouncements in I-Pay Clearing Services (P) Ltd. v. ICICI Bank Ltd. and Dyna Technologies Private Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves Ltd., which clarified that courts ought to provide the tribunal an opportunity to rectify curable defects.  Moreover, Sections 33(2) and (3) explicitly empower the tribunal to evaluate whether correction requests are justified, reaffirming its authority over its procedural irregularities. In our view, curable procedural defects, such as post-award interest, should mandatorily be remanded to the tribunal, while courts may independently rectify inadvertent, clerical errors, under Section 152, CPC.

    JUDICIAL OVERREACH AND ARTICLE 142

    The minority view, while referring to the Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India and Shilpa Sailesh v. Sreenivasan (‘Shilpa Sailesh’), emphasized that Article 142 should not be invoked to construct a new legal framework in the absence of express provisions, such as modification powers under Section 34 of 1996 Act. In the case of Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India, the Supreme Court had enunciated that Article 142, while rooted in equity, must conform to statutory prohibitions, especially those grounded on some fundamental principles of general or specific public policy. Citing interpretation of “specific public policy” in the case of Shilpa Sailesh, the minority held that the powers under Article 142 cannot override non-derogable principles central to a statute— in this context party autonomy and minimal judicial interference. 

     While we agree with the minority, the majority opinion warrants a closer scrutiny. While stating that Article 142 powers should not be invoked to modify awards on merit, the majority simultaneously observed that it may be invoked to end litigation, thereby blurring the scope of intervention. The equitable principles under Article 142, such as patent illegality, notions of morality and justice, and principles of natural justice, are already embedded as grounds for setting aside arbitral awards. Interestingly, the Vishwanathan Committee had recommended insertion of an express proviso allowing courts to make consequential orders varying the award only in exceptional circumstances to meet the ends of justice. However, this recommendation  didn’t materialise, thereby indicating that the legislature intended the mechanism of setting aside an award to serve the purpose of ensuring complete justice.

    CONCLUSION

    The Supreme Court’s ruling in Gayatri Balasamy marks a significant shift in Indian arbitration law by permitting courts limited power to modify arbitral awards. Citing legal maxims like omne majus continet in se minus, and inherent powers, the majority blurred the distinction between setting aside and modifying awards, risking judicial overreach and merit-based review.  The issue of modifying arbitral awards is inherently complex and must be approached with restraint. While courts may justifiably correct inadvertent, clerical errors, given that such corrections do not amount to review on merits, any broader exercise of this power must be checked. The vague and undefined use of the term ‘manifest errors’ creates a troubling lacuna, allowing scope for subjective judicial interpretation. The Apex Court must clarify the contours of what constitutes a ‘manifest error’, otherwise the courts risk exceeding the boundaries of minimal intervention. In the pursuit of doing complete justice, the courts must not undermine the legislative intent of excluding modification as a remedy, particularly when such a change can only be brought through a legislative policy decision. To resolve the present ambiguity, the legislature should reconsider the Vishwanathan Committee’s recommendation and expressly delineate the limited circumstances under which courts may vary an award.  Despite being well-intentioned, the judgment introduces new complexities, necessitating legislative intervention to preserve the delicate balance between finality of awards and fairness of outcomes

  • Bridging Global Standards: India’s Approach To Enforcing Emergency Arbitrator Orders

    Bridging Global Standards: India’s Approach To Enforcing Emergency Arbitrator Orders

    Ishita kashyap and Vinayak RajaK, Fourth and Fifth Year students, NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY DELHI, NEW Delhi

    INTRODUCTION

    Emergency arbitration (‘EA’) is an evolving concept in the world of arbitration. It seeks to provide a speedy mechanism for disposal of interim relief applications made by the parties in arbitration before the tribunal is formed. It has been recognised by many international institutional rules such as Singapore International Arbitration Centre (‘SIAC’) and International Commercial Arbitration. There was an ambiguity on the legal question of enforceability of the ‘award’ given by such a method of arbitration. The Supreme Court of India, in the judgment of Amazon v Future, resolved this ambiguity and held the enforceability of such emergency arbitral ‘award’ under Section 17(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (‘Arbitration Act’) valid in the cases of Indian-seated arbitration. This article provides the backdrop of the judgment and the recent Draft amendment of 2024 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996 (‘draft amendments’), and further analyses its legal implications on the arbitration landscape of India.

    JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS

    The legal standing of emergency orders in India was uncertain before the landmark judgment in the Amazon-Future case. The Delhi High Court, in Raffles Design v Educomp, determined that an emergency arbitrator’s order is unenforceable under Section 17 of the Act in foreign-seated arbitration, hence necessitating recourse under Section 9 of the Act for such arbitrations. Therefore, this case did not weaken emergency arbitration awards but rather focused only on foreign-seated arbitrations.

    Subsequently, the Delhi High Court in Ashwani Minda v. U-Shin denied the relief to the parties under Section 9, reasoning that the parties had excluded Part I of the Act, and the emergency arbitrator had already rejected the request, thereby the Doctrine of Election coming into play to bar the parties from switching forums. The Bombay High Court in Plus Holdings v. Xeitgeist granted interim relief to the parties under Section 9 despite an EA being appointed under SIAC rules because it explicitly allowed for court intervention.
    While neither case turned solely on Section 9(3), the two judgments showed the divergent judicial attitudes for court intervention when emergency arbitration has already been invoked. This judicial ambiguity around emergency arbitration enforcement in India was ultimately clarified in the Amazon-Future decision.

    AMAZON V. FUTURE RETAIL

    The Amazon–Future dispute originated when Amazon NV Investment Holdings LLC initiated arbitration proceedings against Future Retail Ltd. before the SIAC. In the course of these proceedings, Future moved to transfer its retail assets to a third party, which Amazon claimed was violative of pre-existing contractual arrangements. Amazon obtained interim relief from the emergency arbitrator, prohibiting Future from proceeding with this transaction. It sought to enforce this award in India under Section 17(2) of the 1996 Act.

    On 6th August 2021, the Supreme Court held that the Arbitration Act does not preclude parties from adopting procedural rules that allow an emergency arbitrator to grant interim relief. Since SIAC rules permit this mechanism, the EA award should be held valid and enforceable. The Court emphasised that party autonomy, which is the bedrock principle of arbitration, allows for such institutional rules, and as long as parties have agreed to them, the emergency arbitration must be respected.

    LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE RULING

    The court answered the legal question of whether an award given by emergency arbitration can be considered as an order under section 17(1) of the Arbitration Act to be enforceable. The court read sections 2(1)(a), (c) and (d) along with sections 2(6) and 2(8) and recognised the party’s authority to determine issues that arise between the parties in any way they prefer. This autonomy was extended under section 2(8) to the selection of institutional rules which would govern the process of arbitration. Similarly, section 19(2) allowed for agreement on procedure to be followed by an arbitral tribunal in future proceedings.

    This reading emphasized the importance of party autonomy in dealing with substantive as well as procedural arrangements of arbitration. Further, section 21 proves that the arbitral proceedings are commenced on a date on which the request for that dispute to be referred to arbitration is received by the respondent. While this provision is expressed as limited by the parties’ consent to any other date, it provides a deemed date for commencement of proceedings before the actual arbitral tribunal is formed.

    The court used the ratio in Bharat Aluminium Co vs Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services and M/S. Centrotrade Minerals and Metals  to reaffirm the significance of party autonomy being the brooding and guiding principle  in arbitration. In this light, when section 2(1)(d) is read, it is to be read in subjection to the phrase “unless context otherwise requires”. The context in cases is provided by institutional rules agreed upon by the parties, which in this case were given by SIAC, which does provide for emergency arbitration.

    THE DRAFT ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION (AMENDMENT) BILL, 2024

    This draft amendment fills the legal gap which was created by Amazon v. Future. While it judicially recognized orders of emergency arbitrators seated in India, there was no express statutory basis for the same. By bringing “emergency arbitrator” in the definitional clause and creating Section 9A, Parliament would recognize the appointment and functioning of emergency arbitrators in domestic arbitration, bringing the existing implied power under institutional rules now under the statute’s backing.

    The draft explicitly provides that orders of emergency arbitrators are enforceable as if they are tribunal orders under Section 17(2). This fades away the ambiguity about whether courts would treat EA orders as interim measures or final awards, which was an interpretive tension post-Amazon. Now, parties can rely on EA relief being directly enforceable without seeking parallel court injunctions.

    Section 9A(4) and the new Section 17(1)(da) ensure that once the full tribunal is constituted, it can confirm, modify, or vacate the EA’s order. This balances the urgent nature of EA relief with party rights to a full hearing. It mirrors Singapore and Hong Kong’s approach and ensures that provisional relief does not unjustly prejudice parties, once more facts emerge.

    However, a major limitation that persists is that the draft does not address foreign-seated emergency arbitration. There is no mechanism to enforce EA orders made abroad, since Part II, which governs foreign awards, does not extend to interim relief. Part II applies only to final awards under the New York Convention, and therefore, the cross-border parties would still need to apply for interim measures before Indian courts under Section 9 if they need urgent relief within India’s territory. This leaves India behind Singapore and Hong Kong, which allow some cross-border EA enforcement.

    IMPLICATIONS FOR ARBITRATION LAW IN INDIA

    This is a boon for foreign investors and multinational parties who prefer arbitration but need urgent interim relief early on. While high compliance rates with EA awards have been reported globally, having enforceability on record is critical for those situations where compliance fails. It also advances a pro-arbitration policy that the Law Commission and experts have long advocated. The Supreme Court in Amazon v Future used EA orders as a tool “in aid of decongesting the civil courts and affording expeditious interim relief to the parties”.

    The court’s approach may prompt parties to reconsider forum choices. Because only Indian-seated EAs benefit from this enforceability (by virtue of Part I applying), parties to international contracts may increasingly prefer India as the seat when quick interim relief is desired. However, the court’s reasoning is strictly limited to Indian-seated arbitrations. Notably, the Court held that an EA award with a foreign seat is not a “decree” or final award and therefore not enforceable in India under the New York Convention or Section 17(2). Thus, the Amazon v. Future case is raising the question of the enforcement of EA orders with a foreign seat in India—a sector that could potentially require legislative intervention if it is found to be problematic.

    CONCLUSION

    The Amazon v. Future Retail Supreme Court ruling is a crucial step towards harmonising India’s emergency arbitration regime with the values enshrined in United Nations Commission On International Trade Law Model Law (‘Model Law’), while at the same time uncovering subtle tensions. Model Law Articles 7, 9, and 17H converge with each other in consolidating party autonomy, coexistence of interim measures issued by courts and arbitration agreements, and enforcement of interim relief granted by arbitral tribunals. The Court’s judgment is consistent with this principle by treating orders issued under EA as binding interim measures enforceable under Section 17(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, thereby solidifying India’s pro-arbitration policy. A subtle divergence remains, as unlike the Model Law and SIAC Rules, which equate EA orders to awards, the Supreme Court treats them as provisional and enforceable, subject to modification by the arbitral tribunal.

    This interpretation works reasonably well with Model Law Article 17H, but it causes complications under the New York Convention, which generally authorizes cross-border enforcement of awards. In limiting enforceability to EAs seated in India, the ruling excludes foreign-seated EA orders from the Convention’s ambit, thus exposing a residual lacuna to be refined legislatively in the future.

  • Microfinance In India: The Bad Loan Crisis And The Regulatory Conundrum

    Microfinance In India: The Bad Loan Crisis And The Regulatory Conundrum

    BY Kshitij Kashyap and Yash Vineesh Bhatia FOURTH- Year
    STUDENT AT DSNLU, Visakhapatnam

    INTRODUCTION

    Microfinance offers financial services to low-income people generally overlooked by conventional banking systems, facilitating small businesses and propelling the growth of the economy. India is a country where nearly every second household relies on microcredit, therefore, it is often the only bridge between aspiration and destitution. While the sector empowers millions, it is increasingly burdened by bad loans, also known as Non-Performing Assets (‘NPA’).

    In India, microfinance is regulated by the Reserve Bank of India (‘RBI’). Although the Indian microfinance sector has shown promising growth, it has had its share of challenges. During COVID-19, Micro Finance Institutions (‘MFIs’) experienced an unprecedented rise in NPAs, followed by a sharp recovery. The recovery appears promising, but a closer look reveals deeper structural vulnerabilities in the sector, owing to its fragmented regulatory framework.

     This piece analyses the statutory framework of India’s microfinance sector, reviewing past and present legislations, and exploring potential reforms for the future, allaying the existing challenges. While doing so, it does not touch upon The Recovery of Debt and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (‘Act’) since Non-Banking Financial Companies (‘NBFCs’) do not fall within the ambit of a “bank”, “banking company” or a “financial institution” as defined by the Act in Sections 2(d), 2(e) and 2(h) respectively.

    LOST IN LEGISLATION: WHY THE MICROFINANCE BILL FAILED

    In 2012, the Government of India introduced The Micro Finance Institutions (Development & Regulation) Bill (‘Bill’), intending to organise microfinance under one umbrella. However, in 2014, the Bill was rejected by the Standing Committee on Finance (‘Yashwant Sinha Committee’), chaired by Mr. Yashwant Sinha. Glaring loopholes were identified, with a lack of groundwork and a progressive outlook.

    In its report, the Yashwant Sinha Committee advocated for an independent regulator instead of the RBI. It highlighted that the Bill missed out on client protection issues like multiple lending, over-indebtedness and coercive recollection. Additionally, it did not define important terms such as “poor households”, “Financial Inclusion” or “Microfinance”. Such ambiguity could potentially have created hurdles in judicial interpretation of the Bill since several fundamental questions were left unanswered. 

    A SHIELD WITH HOLES: SARFAESIs INCOMPLETE PROTECTION FOR MFIs

    The Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest (‘SARFAESI’) Act, 2002, is a core legal statute when it comes to credit recovery in India. It allows banks and other financial institutions to seize and auction property to recover debt. Its primary objective involves allowing banks to recover their NPAs without needing to approach the courts, making the process time and cost-efficient.

    While SARFAESI empowered banks and financial institutions, originally, NBFCs and MFIs were excluded from its purview. This was changed in the 2016 amendment, which extended its provisions to include NBFCs with an asset size of ₹500 crore and above. This threshold was further reduced via a notification of the government of India dated 24 February, 2020, which incorporated smaller NBFCs with an asset size of ₹100 crore and above within the ambit of this Act. However, its impact is extremely limited when it comes to MFIs as they do not meet the financial requirements

    .

    THE IBC GAP: WHERE SMALL NBFCs FALL THROUGH THE CRACKS

    The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘IBC’), is another statute aimed at rehabilitating and restructuring stressed assets in India. Like the SARFESI Act, this too originally excluded NBFCs from its purview. The IBC recovers debt through Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (‘CIRP’), wherein the debtor’s assets are restructured to recover the debt. In 2019, the applicability of  IBC was extended to NBFCs with an asset size of ₹500 crore and above.

    The IBC, however, has certain pitfalls, which have kept it away from the finish line when it comes to debt recovery. Some of these pitfalls were enumerated in the thirty-second report of the Standing Committee on Finance 2020-2021 (‘Jayant Sinha Committee’), chaired by Mr. Jayant Sinha. The Jayant Sinha Committee observed that low recovery rates and delays in the resolution process point towards a deviation from the objectives of this Code. Further, under the existing paradigm, Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (‘MSMEs’), which somewhat rely on microfinance, are considered as operational creditors, whose claims are addressed after secured creditors.

    BRIDGING THE GAP: REGULATORY PROBLEMS AND THE WAY FORWARD

    Fundamentally, three problems are to be dealt with. The first one is a regulatory overlap between the SARFAESI Act and the IBC. While the SARFAESI Act caters to NBFCs with an asset size of ₹100 crore and above, the IBC caters to those with an asset size of ₹500 crore and above. Secondly, there is a major regulatory gap despite there being two statutes addressing debt recovery by NBFCs. The two statutes taken collectively, fix the minimum threshold for debt recovery at ₹100 crore. Despite this, they continue to miss out on the NBFCs falling below the threshold of ₹100 crore. Lastly, the problem of the recovery of unsecured loans, which constitute a majority of the loans in the microfinance sector and are the popular option among low to middle income groups, also needs redressal since unsecured loans have largely been overlooked by debt recovery mechanisms.

    For the recovery of secured loans

    Singapore’s Simplified Insolvency Programme (‘SIP’), may provide a cogent solution to these regulatory problems. First introduced in 2021 as a temporary measure, it was designed to assist Micro and Small Companies (‘MSCs’) facing financial difficulties during COVID-19. This operates via two channels; Simplified Debt Restructuring Programme (‘SDRP’) and Simplified Winding Up Programme (‘SWUP’). SDRP deals with viable businesses, facilitating debt restructuring and recovery process, while on the other hand, SWUP deals with non-viable businesses, such as businesses nearing bankruptcy, by providing a structured process for winding up. The SIP shortened the time required for winding up and debt restructuring. Winding-up a company typically takes three to four years, which was significantly reduced by the SWUP to an average of nine months. Similarly, the SDRP expedited debt restructuring, with one case completed in under six months, pointing towards an exceptionally swift resolution.

    In 2024, this was extended to non-MSCs, making it permanent. The application process was made simpler compared to its 2021 version. Additionally, if a company initiates SDRP and the debt restructuring plan is not approved, the process may automatically transition into alternative liquidation mechanisms, facilitating the efficient dissolution of non-viable entities. This marked a departure from the erstwhile SDRP framework, wherein a company was required to exit the process after 30 days or upon the lapse of an extension period. This, essentially, is an amalgamation of the approaches adopted by the SARFAESI Act and the IBC.

    Replicating this model in India, with minor tweaks, through a reimagined version of the 2012 Bill, now comprehensive and inclusive, may finally provide the backbone this sector needs. Like the SIP, this Bill should divide the debt recovery process into two channels; one for restructuring, like the IBC, and the other for asset liquidation, like SARFAESI. A more debtor-centric approach should be taken, wherein, based on the viability of the debt, it will either be sent for restructuring or asset liquidation. If the restructuring plan is not approved, after giving the debtor a fair hearing, it shall be allowed to transition into direct asset liquidation and vice versa. The classification based on asset size of the NBFCs should be done away with, since in Singapore, the SIP was implemented for both MSCs and non-MSCs. These changes could make the debt recovery process in India much simpler and could fix the regulatory overlap and gap between SARFAESI and the IBC.

    For the recovery of unsecured loans

    For the recovery of unsecured loans, the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, the pioneer of microfinancing, can serve as an inspiration. It offers collateral free loans with an impressive recovery rate of over 95%. Its success is attributed to its flexible practices, such as allowing the borrowers to negotiate the terms of repayment, and group lending, wherein two members of a five-person group are given a loan initially. If repaid on time, the initial loans are followed four to six weeks later by loan to other two members. After another four to six weeks, the loan is given to the last person, subject to repayment by the previous borrowers. This pattern is known as 2:2:1 staggering. This significantly reduced the costs of screening and monitoring the loans and the costs of enforcing debt repayments. Group lending practically uses peer pressure as a method to monitor and enforce the repayment of loans. Tapping basic human behaviour has proven effective in loan recovery by the Grameen Bank. The statute should similarly mandate unsecured microcredit lenders to adopt such practices, improving recovery rates while cutting operational costs.

    CONCLUSION

    Microfinance has driven financial inclusion in India but faces regulatory hurdles and weak recovery systems. Existing systems offer limited protection for unsecured lending. A unified legal framework, inspired by the models like Grameen Bank and Singapore’s SIP can fill these gaps and ensure sustainable growth for the sector.

  • SEBI’s Rights Issue Amendments 2025: Streamlined Issues or Regulatory Labyrinth?

    SEBI’s Rights Issue Amendments 2025: Streamlined Issues or Regulatory Labyrinth?

    BY Devashish Bhattacharyya and Sadhika Gupta, FOURth- Year STUDENT AT Amity Law School, Noida
    Introduction

    A Rights Issue enables companies to offer existing shareholders the opportunity to purchase additional shares directly from the company at a price lower than the prevailing market rate. According to the Securities and Exchange Board of India (‘SEBI’) Annual Report, the number of companies that raised funds through rights issues declined from 73 in 2022–23 to over 67 in 2023–24. It was observed that numerous companies opted for alternative fundraising methods, as the existing Rights Issue process was considered protracted.

    SEBI, in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 11 and Section 11A of the SEBI Act, 1992, read with Regulation 299 of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2018 (‘SEBI ICDR Regulations’), notified amendments under the framework of Rights Issue on 8 March 2025. The purpose of these Amendments was to improve the efficacy of capital raising by companies, as outlined in the Consultation Paper published by SEBI on 20 August 2024.

    Key Amendments in Rights Issue

    I. No more fast track distinction

    Pursuant to the Rights Issue Amendment 2025, regulations for Rights Issue now apply to all issuers regardless of their size. There is no longer a distinction in the documentation required for Rights Issue as SEBI has removed fast track eligibility requirements.

    II. SEBI Drops DLoF Requirement

    Draft Letter of Offer (‘DLoF’) and Letter of Offer (‘LoF’) must contain material disclosures to allow applicants to make a well-informed decision.  Since the issuer is listed, much of the DLoF/LoF information is already public, causing unnecessary duplication. Examining the aforesaid concerns, SEBI, through its recent amendments discontinued the requirement of filing DLoF with SEBI for the issuance of its observation.

    III. Disclosure Requirements under LoF

    Pursuant to the Recent Rights Issue Amendments 2025 , now an issuer undertaking a Rights Issue is required to comply with the updated Part-B of Schedule VI of the SEBI ICDR Regulations, eliminating the differentiation of Part B and Part B-1 of Schedule VI.

    IV. Removal of Lead Managers

    SEBI has lifted the necessity for the appointment of Lead Managers, i.e., Merchant Bankers (‘MBs’), in a Rights Issue process under the Recent ICDR Amendments 2025. The SEBI ICDR Regulations fail to define timelines for the completion of the due diligence and filing of DLoF/ LoF resulting in a prolonged duration.

    These ancillary activities that MBs perform are generic in nature and can be performed by the Issuer, Market Infrastructure Institutions, and Registrar and Transfer Agents. Therefore, the elimination of MBs will have a significant impact in expediting the issue process.

    V. Allotment to Specific Investors

    SEBI has promoted the allocation of securities through the renouncement of Rights Entitlements (‘Res’) to specific investors outside the promoters and promoter group under the Rights Issue Amendments 2025.

    A promoter must renounce REs within the promoter group. The Rights Issue Amendment 2025 eases these restrictions on the renunciation of REs to promoters and promoter group, allowing issuers to onboard specific investors as shareholders by inserting Regulation 77B.

    VI. Revised timeline for Rights Issues

    SEBI published a circular on 11 March 2025 requiring the completion of a Rights Issue within 23 days. This revised timeline is specified vide Regulation 85.

    The new timeline has been explained below:

    ActivityTimelines
    1st board meeting for approval of rights issueT
    Notice for 2nd board meeting to fix record date, price, entitlement ratio, etc.T* (Subject to Board’s/ shareholders’ approval)
    Application by the issuer for seeking in-principle approval along with filing of DLoF with stock exchangesT+1
    Receipt of in-principle approval from Stock ExchangesT+3
    2nd Board meeting for fixing record date, price, entitlement ratio etc.T+4
    Filing of LoF with Stock Exchanges and SEBIT+5–T+7
    Record DateT+8
    Receipt of BENPOS on Record date (at the end of the day)T+8
    Credit of REsT+9
    Dispatch/Communication to the shareholders of LoFT+10
    Publication of advertisement for completion of dispatchT+11
    Publication of advertisement for disclosing details of specific investor(s)T+11
    Issue opening and commencement of trading in REs (Issue to be kept open for minimum 7 days as per Companies Act, 2013)T+14
    Validation of BidsT+14–T+20
    Closure of REs trading (3 working days prior to issue closure date)T+17
    Closure of off-market transfer of REsT+19
    Issue closureT+20

    *If the Issuer is making a rights issue of convertible debt instruments, the notice for the 2nd board meeting to fix record date, price, entitlement ratio, etc. will be issued on the approval date of the shareholders, with the timeline adjusted accordingly.

    Rights Issue Amendments 2025: What SEBI Forgot to Fix?

    I. Erosion of Shareholder Democracy

    A listed company shall uphold a minimum public shareholding (‘MPS’) of 25% under Rule 19A of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Rules, 1957. Prior to the Rights Issue Amendments, promoters and promoter group had restrictions to renounce rights within the promoter group, except for adherence to MPS requirements. The recent amendments have lifted this restriction. The promoters may renounce their rights in both manners without restrictions to related parties, friendly investors, strategic allies, etc. Such a specific investor may seem to be a public shareholder on paper, yet they effectively align their voting and acts with the interests of promoters. This creates a grey zone indirectly enhancing the control of promoters without formally increasing their share ownership. Since, SEBI has relaxed restrictions on the renunciation of REs; it shall consider introducing a cap limit on promoter renunciations in favour of specific investors. This would help prevent over-concentration of control, thereby safeguarding the interests and voice of public shareholders.

    II. Circumventing Takeover Code Intent

    Promoters are permitted to renounce their REs in favour of specific investors and allow issuers to allot unsubscribed shares to them, as per the Rights Issue Amendments 2025. This creates a vulnerability in which a specific investor can acquire a substantial stake, potentially exceeding 25%, without triggering an open offer under Regulation 3(1) of the SEBI Takeover Regulations. The exemption, which typically pertains to Rights Issues, is not applicable in this instance due to the following reasons: the acquisition is not pro-rata, it is the result of renunciation by another party, and it is not equally accessible to all shareholders. Consequently, the spirit of the SEBI Takeover Regulations may be violated if control is transferred stealthily without providing public shareholders with an exit opportunity. The Rights Issue Amendments 2025 facilitate backdoor takeovers and undermine investor protection unless SEBI clarifies that such selective acquisitions elicit open offer obligations. SEBI may consider introducing  a ceiling for acquisitions through rights issue renunciations (for e.g., 5% maximum through RE-based allotment unless open offer is made). This would prevent backdoor takeover route.

    III. Unmasking Preferential Allotment under the Veil of Rights Issue

      Under the SEBI Rights Issue Amendments 2025, companies conducting a rights issue can allocate the REs to specific investors rather than existing shareholders, provided that their identities are disclosed at least two working days prior to the opening of the issue, thereby contravening Regulation 90(2) of the SEBI ICDR Regulations. Under the veil of a rights issue, issuers can circumvent the more stringent and transparent process of preferential issue under Chapter V of SEBI ICDR Regulations by directing REs to specific investors. Further, the SEBI ICDR Regulations lack a framework that mandates issuers to justify why such specific investors were chosen.

      Pricing formula and lock-in restrictions applicable to preferential issue under Regulations 164 and 167 of the SEBI ICDR Regulations, respectively, should be applied to all discretionary allotments of REs. Any such allotment exceeding a defined threshold should require prior approval through a special resolution as specified under Section 62(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013. In addition, the SEBI ICDR Regulations should set a framework obligating issuers to disclose the rationale for selecting any specific investor.

      IV. Mandatory Lock-in Period for Specific Investors

        While the SEBI’s proposed framework on allotment of specific investors allows promoters to renounce their REs in favour of specific investors, and issuers to allot unsubscribed portions of the rights issue to such investors, it fails to mandate a lock-in period for the shares so allotted. Short-term arbitrageurs or entities allied with insiders may exploit this lacuna by acquiring shares at a discount and subsequently selling them in the secondary market to realise quick profits without a long-term obligation to the issuer.

        To prevent speculative arbitrage and ensure regulatory parity with preferential allotment norms, it is suggested that SEBI implement a mandatory 6-12 months lock-in on equity shares allotted to selective investors through promoter renunciation or unsubscribed portions in rights issues.

        Conclusion

        The Rights Issue Amendments 2025 mark a progressive shift in streamlining the Rights Issue process, which ameliorates procedural challenges and compliance requirements. However, the amendments also open a Pandora’s box of regulatory blind spots. What was once a pro-rata, democratic mechanism of capital raising now runs the risk of becoming a “Preferential Allotment in Disguise.” The unrestricted renunciation of REs to specific investors, the absence of a mandatory lock-in, and the circumvention of the Takeover Code’s spirit collectively enable promoters to strengthen their control, potentially sidelining public shareholders and eroding market fairness. While SEBI has turbocharged the rights issue vehicle, it needs to make sure no one drives it off-road so that it remains equitable and transparent.

      1. Inside the SEBI Intervention: Anatomy of Jane Street’s Derivatives Manipulation

        Inside the SEBI Intervention: Anatomy of Jane Street’s Derivatives Manipulation

        BY HIMANSHU YADAV, THIRD-YEAR STUDENT AT MNLU, CS.

        INTRODUCTION

        India is the world’s largest derivatives market, accounting for nearly 60% of the 7.3 billion equity derivatives traded globally in April, according to the Futures Industry Association. Amid growing concerns over market integrity and transparency, the Securities Exchange Board of India (‘SEBI’) took decisive action to protect the interests of investors. On July 3, 2025, the SEBI banned Jane Street from Indian markets for manipulating indices. The US-based global proprietary trading firm, Jane Street Group, operating in 45 countries with over 2,600 employees, is banned from trading until further notice. The order marks a significant regulatory action against market manipulation. Jane Street reportedly earned ₹36,502 crore through aggressive trading strategies, facing ₹4,843 crore in impounded unlawful gains.

        In April 2024, based on prima facie evidence, SEBI initiated an investigation against entities of Jane Street for alleged market abuse. The firm’s activities were found to have violated SEBI’s Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market Regulations, 2003 (‘PFUTP’). The further investigation by SEBI led to findings that on the weekly index options expiry dates, the firm was holding extremely large positions in cash equivalents in the Future and Options (‘F&O’) market. Based on prima facie evidence, the SEBI issued a caution letter to Jane Street and its related entities.

        The activity of Jane Street, mostly done on expiry dates, allowed the firm to influence the settlement outcomes. On expiry day, the closing price of an index (like Nifty or Bank Nifty) determines the final settlement value of all outstanding options and futures contracts. Even a small change in the index’s closing value can lead to huge profits or losses, especially when large positions are involved. Due to the large position held by Jane Street, it allowed the firm to easily conceive the motive.

        SEBI held Jane Street accountable for the two-phase strategy on January 17, 2024 intensive morning buying of Bank Nifty stocks/futures and simultaneous bearish options positioning, followed by aggressive afternoon sell-off to push the index lower at close. These trades directly influenced Bank Nifty’s settlement value, disproportionately benefiting Jane Street’s option positions at the expense of others.

        HOW JANE STREET’S JANUARY 17, 2024 TRADES MANIPULATED THE BANK NIFTY INDEX ON EXPIRY DAY

        The SEBI analysed the top 30 profitable trades of Jane Street, out of which 17 days were shortlisted for detailed analysis concerning derivative expiry day trades. The critical analysis of these days resulted in 15 days with the same deployed strategy for manipulation of indexes, which can also be termed as “Intraday Index Manipulation Strategy”.

        The manipulation strategy was deployed in such a manner that JS Group held a large position. In Patch-I, the net purchases of JS group were INR 4,370.03 crore in cash and future markets. As the purchases in the Index stocks in the morning were executed, it raised the prices of Bank Nifty constituents and the index. The purchases were so high, it made the index move upward. Now that the index moved upward, the put option would become cheaper and the call option would become expensive. This sudden surge gives a misleading signal of bullish interest in Bank Nifty. Based on this delusion of a bullish trend, the JS group purchased the put positions at a cheaper rate quietly. In Patch-II, the JS group sells all the futures positions that were purchased in Patch-I, as the volume bought and sold was so large that it resulted in pushing the index downward. Now, the premium of put prices rises, and there is a drop in the value of call options. This sole movement by JS group entities misled the retail investors, resulting in a loss booked by the retailers, as they were the single largest net buyer across Bank Nifty during this patch. This price upward movement reflects that the Jane Street group was creating an upward pressure during Patch-I.

        EXTENDED MARKING THE CLOSE STRATEGY ADOPTED BY JANE STREET

        On July 10, 2024, the entity was again held liable for “Extended Marking the Close” manipulation. The tactic used under this strategy is to aggressively give a sell or purchase order in the last trading session, upon which the final closing price of a security or index is reflected.  On the last day of trading (called expiry day), the final value of an index like Bank Nifty is very important because all option contracts are settled based on that final number, known as the closing price. Jane Street had placed bets that the market would fall (these are called short options positions, like buying puts or selling calls). If the market closed lower, they would make more money. So, in the last hour of trading on July 10, 2024, Jane Street sold a lot of stocks and index futures very quickly. This sudden selling pushed the Bank Nifty index down, even if only slightly. Even a small drop in the index at the end of the day can increase the value of their bets and bring in huge profits. This tactic is called “marking the close” It means influencing the final price at which the market closes to benefit your trades.

        THE LEGAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE STRATEGIES ADOPTED BY JS GROUP

        In trading, manipulating the market effectively creates and uses monopolistic power.  Order-Based Manipulation (‘OBM’) by high-frequency  traders have several negative effects, such as heightened price volatility in both frequency and size, unfair and monopolistic profit from manipulated investors’ losses and instability potential.

        The JS group and its entities are allegedly held liable for the Intra-day Index Manipulation strategy and Extended Marking the Close strategy. Regulations 3 and 4 of the SEBI PFUTP Regulations, 2003, prohibit any act that manipulates the price of securities or misleads investors. The JS Group was held liable under section 12A(a), (b) and(c) of the SEBI Act, 1992; regulations 3(a), (b), (c), (d), 4(1) and 4(2)(a) and (e) of the PFUTP Regulations, 2003.

        The SEBI, which acts as a market watchdog, is well within its jurisdiction to initiate criminal proceedings as well as impose penalties against entities of the JS group under Section 24 of the SEBI Act, 1992. Section 11 of the SEBI Act 1992 empowers SEBI “to protect the interests of investors in securities and to promote the development of, and to regulate, the securities market.” Section 11B – Directions by SEBI gives SEBI quasi-judicial powers to issue directions “in the interest of investors or the securities market,” even in the absence of specific wrongdoing. It allows the regulator to: Restrain trading activities, modify operational practices, and Direct intermediaries and related entities to cease and desist from certain actions.

        Further, the defence of arbitrage cannot be validly exercised by Jane Street. The activity incurred by Jane Street cannot be termed as a traditional arbitrage practice, as arbitrage means taking advantage of existing price gaps naturally. Jane Street was not only finding pricing gaps and making fair profits rather Jane Street was also manipulating the pricing of some index options and futures to change the market in a way that isn’t normal arbitrage.

        Jane Street artificial price moves through high-frequency, manipulative trading to mislead the market.

        WAY FORWARD

        The Jane Street ‘Soft Close’ Strategy and SEBI’s delayed discovery of such transactions highlight the extent to which a system can lag in evaluating manipulative actions by traders at machine speed. It was actually in 2023, the U.S. Millennium, a prominent global hedge fund, filed a lawsuit against Jane Street after poaching its employees. These employees disclosed a previously covert Indian market strategy centred around artificially influencing expiry-day closing prices to benefit Jane Street’s derivatives positions, a tactic akin to a “soft close.” Only upon the filing of such a suit, the SEBI launched a full-fledged investigation, and the regulator analyzed the 3-year expiry trades of the JS Group. The SEBI’s long-term sustained efforts over the years to safeguard the retail investors from losing their money, at this juncture, a much more advanced regulatory scrutiny is required. Jane Street, being a high-frequency trader, the tactics deployed by such an entity shock the market and have a grave impact on the retail investors. High-frequency Trading (‘HFT’),  has the potential to bring the most worrisome instability to the market. The Flash Crash 2010, which was triggered by automated selling orders worsened by HFT, is one of the most severe events that disrupted market stability. Going forward, SEBI must adopt a more agile and tech-driven oversight model, capable of detecting unusual volumes, timing-based trade clusters, and order book imbalances in real time. It should also consider making a special HFT Surveillance Unit that works with AI-powered systems. This isn’t to replace human judgment, but to help with pattern recognition and rapidly identify anything that doesn’t seem right.

        CONCLUSION

        The regulator recently released statistics showing that the number of retail investors in the derivatives market is close to 10 million. They lost 1.05 trillion rupees ($11.6 billion, £8.6 billion) in FY25, compared to 750 billion rupees in FY24. Last year, the average loss for a retail investor was 110,069 rupees ($1,283; £958). Due to such manipulative trading activities, it is the retail derivative traders who face a tight corner situation and end up losing their money.  SEBI, in its report published on July 7, 2025, highlights that 91% of retail investors lose their money in the Equity Derivative Segment (‘EDS’) The regulatory check and stricter analysis on the trading session are the need of the hour. But on the contrary, cracking down on the practice of such a global level player is what SEBI should be praised for. More dedicated and faster technology should be adopted by SEBI to carry out such an investigation in a swifter manner. 

      2. In Dissent Lies the Truth: A Critical Look at the Court’s Power to Modify an Arbitral Award

        In Dissent Lies the Truth: A Critical Look at the Court’s Power to Modify an Arbitral Award

        BY ANMOL TYAGI, THIRD-YEAR STUDENT AT RGNUL, PATIALA.

        INTRODUCTION

        With a 4:1 majority decision in Gayatri Balasamy vs. M/S ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd. (2025), (‘Balasamy’) the Supreme Court fundamentally altered India’s arbitration landscape by recognizing courts’ power to modify arbitral awards under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (‘the Act’) to modify an arbitral award. This watershed judgment resolves a decade-long jurisprudential conflict sparked by the Court’s 2021 M. Hakeem ruling, which categorically denied modification powers. By permitting limited judicial corrections from computational errors to compensation adjustments, the majority attempts to balance arbitration’s finality with the practical need for efficient justice. However, Justice K.V. Viswanathan’s dissent warns that this “judicial innovation” risks reviving the very interventionist culture the 1996 Act sought to eradicate. This article, firstly, delves into the controversy and analyses the ratio in its pragmatic context; secondly, it analyses its implications and advocates for how what should have been a unanimous verdict is penned down as a dissenting opinion; and lastly, it tries to explore a way forward.

        THE MAJORITY ON THE POWER TO MODIFY

        The Apex Court, through judicial precedents, proffered minimal judicial intervention in arbitral awards, not extending to correction of errors of fact, reconsideration of costs, or engagement in the review of the arbitral awards.

        For modification of awards, the court held that a modification does not necessarily entail the examination of the merits of the case, thereby allowing limited power of modification within the confines of Section 34 without a merit-based evaluation under certain circumstances including; where severing invalid from the valid, correcting clerical, computational and typographical error, certain post award interest and under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, where it is required and necessary to end litigation.  Progressively, such a decision was held to prevent the hardship of re-filing an arbitration and a manifestation of the objects of the Act.

        To that end, the majority in Balasamy invoked the maxim omne majus continet in se minus (“the greater includes the lesser”) to justify modification as incidental to the power to set aside awards. This reasoning hinges on Section 34(2)(a)(iv), which permits partial annulment if an award exceeds the scope of submission. By framing severability as statutory intent, the Court positioned modification as a natural extension of existing powers rather than a novel judicial innovation.

        For severability of awards, the court held that the greater power to set aside an award under Section 34 also includes the lesser power to sever the invalid portion of an award from the valid portion under Section 34(2)(a)(iv) of the Act, whenever they are legally and practically separable. The court differentiated the power conferred under section 34(4) from the limited power to modify on the ground of flexibility. The court upheld the idea of remittal under Section 34(4) as a remedial mechanism enabling the arbitral tribunal to correct curable defects in the award upon court adjournment. On the other hand, modification involves the court directly changing the award, which is limited and requires certainty.

        ANALYSIS OF THE MAJORITY OPINION

        While the court may have tried to weave the principle of equity and justice without offending the judicial fabric of Section 34 and the legislative intent of the Act, certain shortcomings are still exposed. Justice K.V. Vishwanathan’s dissent helps explore these shortcomings.

        i) Theoretical tensions: Party Autonomy vs. Judicial Paternalism

        Justice K.V. Vishwanathan’s dissent concurs with the idea that the power to modify subsumes the power to set aside under section 34 of the Act is fallacious, since the power to set aside an arbitral award does not inherently include the power to modify it because the two functions serve distinct purposes within the arbitration framework. Similar was the rationale of the court in M. Hakeem. Setting aside an award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is a corrective measure that allows courts to annul an award if it violates fundamental legal principles, such as public policy or procedural fairness. In contrast, modification implies an active intervention where the court alters the substance of the award, which contradicts the principle of minimal judicial interference in arbitration, as in the Mcdermott International Case.

        The proposition of limited modification of an award in the interest of expeditious dispute resolution may seem attractive at first instance, especially for commercial arbitrations involving public law, where the courts may modify the award to enhance compensation for the land acquisition. However, it points to vital concerns regarding its applicability by the courts in general and arguably, the power of remand under section 34(4), though different from the modification powers, acts as a safety valve and serves a similar purpose as it arrays wide powers upon the arbitral tribunal to modify an arbitral award for an effective enforceability.

        Theoretically, arbitration is a voluntary act of dispute resolution through a third party, different from courts and its legal procedures.  While the judgment provides for modification powers to remove the ‘invalid’ from the ‘valid’ and enforce complete justice under Article 142 of the Constitution, it not only raises concerns as to its applicability and limitation in determining what constitutes ‘invalid’ or complete justice, but also strikes at the core of arbitration. It does so by contradicting the fundamental characteristic and statutory intent of arbitration, i.e., the finality of the award through minimal judicial intervention, as was held in Re: Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements Under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and the Indian Stamp Act, 1899.

        Justice K.V. Viswanathan’s dissent highlights a critical tension: the 1996 Act deliberately omitted modification powers present in its predecessor, the 1940 Arbitration Act. The legislature’s conscious choice to limit courts to setting aside or remitting awards reflects a policy decision to prioritize finality over granular corrections. Noting that the Parliament intentionally omitted the ‘powers to modify’ from the repealed Arbitration Act, 1940, the majority’s interpretation risks judicial overreach by reading into the Act what the Parliament excluded, a point underscored by the dissent’s warning that using Article 142 to modify awards subverts legislative authority.

        To that end, arbitration’s legitimacy stems from its contractual nature. By allowing courts to “improve” awards, Balasamy subtly shifts arbitration from a party-driven process to one subject to judicial paternalism. This contravenes the kompetenz-kompetenz principle, which reserves jurisdictional decisions for tribunals. Notably, the UNCITRAL Model Law emphasizes tribunal autonomy in rectifying awards (Article 33), a responsibility now partially appropriated by Indian courts

        ii. Impact on Arbitral decision making

        The threat of post-hoc judicial adjustments may incentivize arbitrators to over-explain conclusions or avoid innovative remedies. For instance, tribunals awarding compensation in land acquisition cases might default to conservative valuations to pre-empt judicial reduction. Conversely, the power to correct clerical errors (e.g., miscalculated interest rates) could save parties from unnecessary remands.

        iii. Enforcement Challenges

        While the Court envisions modification as a time-saving measure, practical realities suggest otherwise. District courts lacking commercial arbitration expertise may struggle to apply the “severability” test, leading to inconsistent rulings and appeals. The Madras High Court’s conflicting orders in Balasamy (first increasing compensation, then slashing it) illustrate how modification powers can prolong litigation.

        Arguably, with the possibility of modification, the judgment practically creates uncertainty and opens Pandora’s box, thereby exposing every arbitration being challenged under some pretext or other. The effect of the judgment might extend to various PSUs, companies, and individuals opting out of arbitration, fearing the non-finality of the award.

        The majority’s reliance on Article 142 to justify modifications creates a constitutional paradox.

        While the provision gives the Supreme Court the power to do “complete justice,” applying it to an arbitral mechanism of private dispute settlement blurs the line between public law exceptionalism and the enforcement of private contracts, which arguably would render Article 142 a “universal fix” for disenchanted arbitral awards.

        For land acquisition cases and corporate disputes both, this poses a paradox: courts acquire efficiency tools at the risk of sacrificing arbitration’s fundamental promise of expert-driven finality. As Justice Viswanathan warns, the distinction between “severance” and appellate review remains precariously thin. With ₹1.3 trillion in ongoing arbitrations at stake, Balasamy’s real test lies in whether lower courts use this power with the “great caution” prescribed inadvertently to revive India’s reputation for boundless arbitration litigation

        COMPARITIVE INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES

        Leading arbitration hubs strictly reserve judicial modification. Singapore’s International Arbitration Act only allows setting aside on grounds of procedure and not on a substantive basis. The UK Arbitration Act 1996 can correct only clerical errors or clarifications (Section 57), whereas Hong Kong’s 2024 rules authorize tribunals-not courts-to correct awards. India’s new “limited modification” system varies by allowing courts to modify compensation values and interest rates, which amounts to re-introducing appellate-style review.

        The UNCITRAL Model Law that influenced the Act limits courts to setting aside awards (Article 34). More than 30 Model Law jurisdictions, such as Germany and Canada, allow modifications by way of tailormade legislative provisions. The Balasamy judgment establishes a hybrid model where there is judicial modification without an express statutory authority, raising concerns in enforcement under the New York Convention. As Gary Born observes, effective jurisdictions identify procedural predictability as a core value threatened by unfettered judicial discretion.

        THE WAY FORWARD: ENSURING EQUILIBRIUM

        The decision permitting limited alteration of the arbitral award represents a paradigm shift in the jurisprudence. The decision demonstrates a genuine effort to balance efficiency with fairness. However, its success depends on responsible judicial application. In the absence of strict adherence to the “limited circumstances” paradigm, India stands the risk of undermining arbitration’s essential strengths: speed, finality, and autonomy. As Justice Viswanathan warned, the distinction between correction and appellate review remains hair-thin. What is relevant here is how the courts apply the new interpretation to amend arbitral awards. Objectively, the courts have to be careful not to exercise the powers of amendment in exceptional situations to that extent, refraining from any impact on the finality of the arbitral award as well as the faith of the citizenry and other institutions within it.

        To avoid abuse, parliament has to enact modification grounds by amending Section 34, in line with Section 57 of the UK Arbitration Act, specifically allowing for corrections confined to reasons specified, promoting clarity and accountability. The Supreme Court would need to direct guidelines to the lower courts for arbitral award modification only when the errors are patent and indisputable, refrain from re-assessing evidence or re-iterating legal principles, and give preference to remission to tribunals under Section 34(4) where possible.

      3. Digital Competition Bill: Complementing or Competing with the Competition Act?

        Digital Competition Bill: Complementing or Competing with the Competition Act?

        BY Winnie Bhat, SECOND- YEAR STUDENT AT NALSAR, HYDERABAD
        Introduction

        Data is the oil that fuels the engine of the digital world. The economic value and competitive significance of data accumulation for companies in the digital age cannot be overstated. It is in recognition of this synergy between competition and data privacy laws, that the Competition Commission of India (‘CCI’) has imposed a fine of Rs 213 crore on Meta, the parent company of WhatsApp, for abusing its dominant market position under Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 (‘CA’).

        As digital markets evolve, so too must the legal frameworks that regulate them. This article considers whether the proposed Digital Competition Bill, 2024 (‘DCB’) enhances the current competition regime or risks undermining it through regulatory overlap. In doing so, it assesses how traditional competition tools have been stretched to meet new challenges and whether a shift toward an ex-ante model is necessary and prudent.

        Reliance on Competition Act, 2002

        In the absence of a dedicated digital competition framework, Indian regulators have increasingly relied on the CA to address issues of market concentration, data-driven dominance, and unfair terms imposed by Big Tech firms. One of the clearest examples of this reliance is the CCI’s scrutiny of WhatsApp’s 2021 privacy policy. In the present case, CCI found that WhatsApp’s 2021 privacy policy which mandated sharing of users’ data with WhatsApp and thereafter its subsequent sharing with Facebook vitiated the ‘free’, ‘optional’ and ‘well-informed’ consent of users as WhatsApp’s dominant position in the market coupled with network and tipping effects effectively left users with no real or practical choice but to accept its unfair terms.

        This contrasts with the CCI’s previous stances in Vinod Kumar Gupta v WhatsApp and Harshita Chawla v WhatsApp & Facebook, where it declined to intervene because data privacy violation did not impact competition. However, in a slew of progressive developments, a market study by CCI has now recognized privacy as a non-price competition factor and the Supreme Court’s nod in 2022 for CCI to continue investigation in the Meta-WhatsApp mater has effectively granted CCI the jurisdiction to deal with issues relating to privacy that have an adverse effect on competition.

        The facts of this case very closely resemble that of Bundeskartellamt v Facebook Inc.,2019 wherein the German competition regulator had flagged Facebook for imposing one sided terms about tracking users’ activity in the social networking market where consent was reduced to a mere formality. Both cases illustrate how dominant digital platforms exploit their market power to impose unfair terms on users, effectively bypassing meaningful consent. This pattern reflects a deeper structural issue—where existing competition law, focused on ex-post remedies, is used to address the unique challenges of digital markets. It is precisely this regulatory gap that the proposed DCB seeks to fill through its ex-ante approach.

        Abuse of dominant positions by Big Tech companies in the digital era occurs in more subtle ways as the price of these services is paid for with users’ personal data. A unilateral modification in the data privacy policy leaves users vulnerable as they have little bargaining power against established corporate behemoths. These companies collect huge chunks of “Big data” by taking advantage of their dominance in one relevant market (in the present case, the instant messaging market) and use them in other relevant markets (social networking, personalized advertising, etc.) which gives them a significant edge against their competitors. This creates entry barriers and a disproportionate share of the market goes to a few large corporations resulting in monopoly-like conditions.

        To deal with such issues, competition law first identifies a corporation’s dominant position in the market. Once this is established, it investigates the factors that lead to the abuse of this position. Here, the factor is collection of data which invades the privacy of users without their free and informed consent. The CCI, in its ruling against Meta, held WhatsApp to be in violation of Sections 4(2)(a)(i), 4(2)(c) and 4(2)(e) of the CA, dealing with imposition of unfair conditions in purchase of service, engagement in practices resulting in denial of market access and use of dominant position in one market to secure its market position in another relevant market respectively.

        The Digital Competition Bill, 2024

        The proposed Digital Competition Bill, 2024  when enacted, would signify a landmark shift in how India approaches competition regulation in digital markets. Unlike the CA, which operates on an ex-post basis; acting upon violations after analysing their effects, the DCB introduces a proactive approach that seeks to regulate the conduct of Systemically Significant Digital Enterprises (‘SSDEs’) through an ex-ante framework. SSDEs are large digital enterprises that enjoy a position of entrenched market power and serve as critical intermediaries between businesses and users. The DCB aims to curb their ability to engage in self-preferencing, data misuse, and other exclusionary practices before harm occurs, rather than waiting for evidence of anti-competitive outcomes. While this progressive approach aims to address the unique challenges posed by the dominance of digital giants, it also raises critical concerns about legislative overlap, disproportionate penalties on corporations and potential legal uncertainty.

        A key issue with the coexistence of the DCB and the CA is the overlap in their regulatory scopes. The CA, particularly through Section 4, targets abuse of dominance through a detailed effects-based inquiry. As evidenced in the CCI’s ruling against WhatsApp, a compromise or breach of data privacy of the users will not be tolerated and has the potential to be considered as a means of abuse of an enterprise’s dominant position. By contrast, the DCB imposes predetermined obligations on SSDEs, which are deemed to have significant market power. Section 12 of the DCB prescribes certain limitations on the use of personal data of the users of SSDEs, whereas Section 16 grants the CCI the power to inquire into non-compliance if a prima facie case is made out, regardless of the effects such non-compliance may have on competition.

        Concerns about dual enforcement

        This duality creates an ambiguity. For instance, should a prima facie case involving data misuse by an SSDE, which unfairly elevates its market position, be assessed under the CA’s abuse of dominance provisions, or should it fall exclusively within the purview of the DCB? The risk of dual penalties further compounds these challenges. Section 28 (1) of the DCB empowers the CCI to impose significant fines (not exceeding 10% of its global turnover) on SSDEs for non-compliance with its obligations. However, under Section 48 of the CA, these entities are also subject to penalties for engaging in anti-competitive behaviour that may stem from the same act of data misuse.

        Although, the protection against double jeopardy only applies to criminal cases, the spirit of double jeopardy is clearly visible in this case, wherein businesses could face disproportionate punishments for overlapping offenses, raising concerns about fairness and proportionality. This mirrors similar concerns in the European Union, where the Digital Markets Act (‘DMA’) (India’s DCB is modelled on EU’s DMA) and Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (traditional EU competition law provisions) operate in tandem. However, EU’s DMA grants the European Commission overriding powers over the nations’ competition regulating authorities, which brings unique challenges and is not applicable in India since the regulating authority (CCI) oversees implementation of both the CA and DCB. This vests the CCI with considerable discretion in deciding which act takes precedence and their spheres of regulation. The MCA report leaves potential overlaps in proceedings to be resolved by the CCI on an ad hoc basis. Therefore, statutory clarity on the application of the DCB and the CA are essential to avoid inconsistency in outcomes.

        The Way Forward

        To address these challenges, India must focus on creating a harmonious regulatory framework. Moreover, a Digital Markets Coordination Council could be established to harmonize enforcement actions, share data, and resolve jurisdictional disputes. Such a body could include representatives from the CCI, the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY), and independent technical experts to ensure holistic oversight.

        Proportional penalties are another area for reform. Lawmakers should ensure that corporations do not have to bear the burden of being punished in two different ways for the same offence. Introducing a standardised penalty framework across the DCB and CA would prevent over-penalisation and ensure fairness.

        Since the DCB has not been enacted yet, India can pre-empt these concerns of overlap and ensure that the CA and DCB complement rather than compete with each other. The exact scope of a solution to these concerns is beyond the scope of this article, but by learning from the EU’s experiences and adopting a coordinated, balanced approach, India can create a regulatory framework that promotes innovation, safeguards competition, and protects consumers’ rights and interests in the digital age.

      4. From Approval To Autonomy: SEBI’s New Framework For Stock Brokers In GIFT-IFSC

        From Approval To Autonomy: SEBI’s New Framework For Stock Brokers In GIFT-IFSC

        BY Vishvajeet Rastogi, SECOND-YEAR STUDENT AT CNLU, PATNA
        INTRODUCTION

        The Gujarat International Finance Tec-City – International Financial Services Centre (‘GIFT-IFSC’) is India’s ambitious bid to develop a globally competitive financial centre catering to international markets and investors. A major regulator of securities markets in India, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (‘SEBI’) has inducted significant regulatory reform to ease the operational environment for stock brokers who seek to operate in GIFT-IFSC.

        On May 2, 2025, SEBI released a circular titled “Measure for Ease of Doing Business – Facilitation to SEBI registered Stock Brokers to undertake securities market related activities in Gujarat International Finance Tech-city – International Financial Services Centre (GIFT-IFSC) under a Separate Business Unit” (‘SEBI Circular’) abolishing pre-approval for stock brokers for conducting securities market activities in GIFT-IFSC and enabling them to conduct such activities through a Separate Business Unit (‘SBU’) of their existing structure. This transition from a strict approval regime approach to an autonomous regime is likely to promote ease of doing business and support the internationalization of India’s financial services.

        This article assesses the salient provisions of the SEBI Circular, discusses its regulatory and legal implications, and reviews the opportunities and issues it throws for stock brokers’ foray into the GIFT-IFSC.

        KEY CHANGES

        The SEBI Circular brings in major reforms in order to ease the functioning of stock brokers in the GIFT-IFSC. It does away with the mandatory condition under which stock brokers have to take SEBI’s advance approval for starting securities market activities in GIFT-IFSC. The reform eases the entrance process and enables brokers to get started sooner with less procedural complexity.

        `In place of the previous approval mechanism, stockbrokers can now conduct activities through an SBU within their existing organizational structure. An SBU can be created in the form of an exclusive branch or division, providing more flexibility in organizing the business of brokers. Although the SEBI Circular encourages the utilization of SBUs, it also leaves the choice for stockbrokers to carry on through subsidiaries or through joint ventures if desired. Similarly, brokers who have already established subsidiaries or joint ventures in the GIFT-IFSC can choose to wind them down and bring their activities under an SBU if it aligns with their business strategy.

        The SEBI Circular also defines regulatory contours by bringing the operations of the SBU under the ambit of the International Financial Services Centres Authority (‘IFSCA’). That is to say that policy issues, risk management, grievance redressal, and enforcement in relation to the SBU will be regulated by IFSCA rules, not SEBI. SEBI’s jurisdiction will continue to extend only to Indian securities market activities. For the purposes of clear demarcation between the two activities, the SEBI Circular requires activities of the SBU to be segregated from the stockbrokers’ domestic activities at arm’s length. This requires maintaining separate accounts and operational autonomy to prevent regulatory overlap.

        Financial segregation has also come with the condition that the net worth of the SBU must be held separate from the stock broking entity dealing in the Indian market. The net worth of the stockbroker for Indian operations will be computed excluding the finances of the SBU, and the SBU itself will have to fulfil capital adequacy norms as per IFSCA’s regulatory guidelines.

        Finally, the SEBI Circular makes it clear that the investors dealing with the SBU will not be subject to SEBI’s grievance redressal platforms like the SEBI’s Complaints Redress System (‘SCORES’) or the Investor Protection Fund operated by the stock exchanges. Their protections and redressal of grievances will instead come under the framework of the regulation of IFSCA, strengthening the operational autonomy of the unit in the GIFT-IFSC.

        Together, these amendments constitute a policy shift towards regulatory clarity and increased operational autonomy with well-codified governance norms to allow stock brokers to successfully increase their presence in international financial services.

        Regulatory Rationale and Objective

          This SEBI Circular outlines the new strategy to promote operational efficiency and regulatory clarity for the stock brokers in the GIFT-IFSC. Removal of the requirement of prior approval from SEBI enhances the regulatory ease of doing business by reducing barriers to entry for brokers to conduct cross-border securities activities. This reform aligns with the larger vision of transforming the GIFT-IFSC into an internationally competitive financial centre at the global stage with international capital and global-level market players.

          The setting up of SBUs in existing stock-broking establishments brings about an objective definitional and regulatory distinction between transactions in domestic business and activities under the jurisdiction of GIFT-IFSC. Segregation does away with regulatory overlap, demarcates the areas of oversight between SEBI and the IFSCA, and protects against conflict of interest.

          Segregation requirements for finances as well as separate net worth requirements and accounting methods further specify that risk and obligation are properly segmented. These requirements increase transparency and the integrity of domestic and foreign market segments.

          In addition to this, the SEBI Circular specifically defines the extent of investor protection and vests grievance redressal and resolution of disputes in the jurisdiction of IFSCA and thereby strengthens jurisdictional certainty.

          Legal and Compliance Implication

          This SEBI Circular represents an important jurisdiction shift for stock brokers who are present in the GIFT-IFSC from SEBI to the IFSCA for business transacted through SBUs. This requires strict adherence to the dual regime of regulation where domestic business continues to be under SEBI’s jurisdiction while SBUs in the GIFT-IFSC operate in terms of IFSCA’s separate regulatory regime.

          The keystone of such a structure is the rigorous ring-fencing requirement with financial, operational, and legal separation between domestic and GIFT-IFSC activities of the stock broker. Financial ring-fencing implies separate accounts maintained by the SBU and separate net worth standards as governed by IFSCA to have clear delineation of assets and liabilities. Operationally, the SEBI Circular stipulates separation of SBUs through arm’s-length management to avoid inappropriately influencing control and mixing of resources. Legally too, separation enforces jurisdiction-related divisions, reduces regulatory arbitrage, and limits system risk.

          This regulatory framework replicates international best practices in influential global financial hubs like the Dubai International Financial Centre (‘DIFC’) and Singapore Monetary Authority-regulated centres. These jurisdictions all prioritize unambiguous jurisdictional demarcation, independence in operations of international financial institutions as well as strong investor protection systems, which support integrity in the marketplace and investor confidence.

          Emulating such principles, SEBI’s SEBI Circular establishes GIFT-IFSC as a compliant and competitive global hub, weighing deregulation against essential safeguards to preserve financial stability and regulatory oversight.

          Opportunities and Challenges for Stock Brokers

          These new guidelines offer stock brokers some strategic options. Most significant among them is greater operational independence, enabling brokers to carry out international securities activities in the GIFT-IFSC with the help of SBUs without obtaining SEBI approval in advance. This independence allows for quicker entry into the market, where brokers can leverage new opportunities in the international markets more easily. Also, carrying out business in the GIFT-IFSC exposes brokers to more international customers and varied financial products, largely opening them up to an extended marketplace and new revenue streams.

          But these advantages carry built-in difficulties. Dual regulatory compliances present a nuanced challenge in that stock brokers have to manage the regulatory conditions of SEBI for their Indian operations as well as IFSCA for their activities in the GIFT-IFSC. This duplicity requires evolved compliance structures and internal controls for maintaining conformity with separate law regimes. In addition, the investor dealing with SBUs will not be able to enjoy SEBI’s prescribed grievance redressals like SCORES, which can potentially create investor protection and redress concerns.

          Internally, stock brokers also need to have strict ring-fencing of resources and finances to have clean separation of both domestic and international operations. Proper management of the segregation is important in order not to have operational overlaps, to protect financial integrity, and to guard against commingling of assets and liabilities. While the SEBI Circular paves the way for internationalization and growth, it also necessitates enhancing the risk management capacities and the regulatory infrastructure of the stock brokers.

          Conclusion and Way Forward

          The SEBI Circular is a forward-looking step towards increasing the regulatory independence of stock brokers in GIFT-IFSC by doing away with previous approval systems and permitting activities in terms of SBUs. The reform not just makes it easier to enter the market but also strengthens India’s vision of promoting GIFT-IFSC as an international financial centre powered by well-defined regulatory lines between SEBI and IFSCA.

          While it introduces new opportunities, it also poses issues like managing the dual regulatory compliances and lack of SEBI’s grievance redressals for investors transacting with SBUs. The author suggests that the stock brokers need to pre-emptively enhance their systems of compliance and risk management in order to be able to manage such complexity. In addition, having closer collaboration between SEBI and IFSCA on regulatory harmonization, particularly investor protection, would increase the confidence of the markets. Proper communication to the investor about the grievance mechanism applicable under IFSCA is also needed to inculcate trust and transparency in the new ecosystem. Using these steps, stock brokers can reap the maximum advantage of this regulatory change and promote sustained development and international integration of India’s financial markets.